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CLOSED
UNTIL

PART V.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

TURKISH WAR.

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PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Turkish War.

Part V.

[4865] No. 1.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Athens, January 26, 1913.*

THE events of the past fortnight have naturally deepened the regret felt here that Bulgaria ever consented to an armistice, and thereby afforded the Great Powers time and opportunity to take a hand in the game, which might otherwise have been played to a finish between the belligerents without outside intervention. Now the allies see the harvest of their successes imperilled by international jealousies and selfish aims. No one of course expected a liberal or enlightened policy from Austria, but the attitude of Italy with regard to the islands has been a source of bitter disappointment, which has been expressed in the press in language of unusual vigour, although to some extent moderated, as I understand, by Government influence. On the other hand your determined and powerful advocacy of the possession of the islands by Greece has produced a chorus of grateful recognition of the traditional British liberal principles from the same writers who for years past have avowed a deep conviction of our sinister designs upon Suda Bay.

It is argued that the speediest way of arriving at a settlement with Turkey would be to return as far as possible to the *status quo* existing before the armistice, and M. Coromilas himself appears to be of that opinion. It is the desire to have a *fait accompli* to oppose to the pretensions of Austria that is the cause of the vigour with which operations are being pushed before Yanina, with a loss of life which, so far as negotiations with Turkey were concerned, was apparently uncalled for, at least until the change of Government at Constantinople.

I alluded the other day in conversation with M. Coromilas to the question of the war indemnity which the Powers are said to be advising the allies not to claim. He said that if they were expected to take over a proportion of the Ottoman debt a war indemnity was a necessity as a set-off to it; as a matter of fact it was the revenues of Constantinople, of which Turkey was not going to be deprived, not those of the provinces, that paid the debt. Moreover there were certain accounts against Turkey which had to be settled; for instance, compensation for the ships seized before the war, and the expenses of maintenance of 40,000 prisoners.

The newspapers publish a series of petitions from the Ægean islanders against their restoration to Turkey, or any arrangement other than their union with Greece; as the originals are said to be addressed to you as president of the conference of Ambassadors it is unnecessary for me to refer to them in greater detail. Some of the papers anticipate that England will follow the noble example which she herself set in the case of the Ionian Islands, and will take advantage of the approaching settlement to hand over Cyprus to the Greek kingdom.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

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[4851] No. 2.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 65.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 26, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Colonel Tyrrell, military attaché to this embassy, on the subject of the recent *coup d'État* and the death and funeral of Nazim Pasha.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER

Enclosure in No. 2.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that in accordance with your Excellency's instructions I attended this afternoon the funeral of the late Minister of War, Nazim Pasha, who was killed yesterday under circumstances of which you are aware.

Owing to the somewhat short notice there was a very small attendance, and a remarkable absence of prominent officials and public men. At the Gulkhane hospital where the body was lying, and whence the funeral procession started, there were hardly any officers besides the foreign military attachés. Among those present were the Sultan's chief aide-de-camp, Salih Pasha, who, however, appeared to be attending in a private capacity; the commander of the garrison of Constantinople, Memdouh Pasha; Pertev Pasha; and Jemal Bey, lately vali of Bagdad. As the procession passed through the streets of Stambul other officers joined it, including Izzet Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff; Zia Pasha, sous-chef of the same; Fuad Pasha, Musteshar of the Ministry of War; and Nazif Pasha, the commandant-general of the gendarmerie. Izzet Pasha told me that he had only just had notice of the funeral, and that the short notice given accounted for there being such a small attendance. At the same time the absence of Mahmud Shevket Pasha or of any one to represent him, and of any representative of the present or the late Cabinet was very marked. Enver Bey joined the procession soon after the start.

Everyone seems to have agreed to call yesterday's unfortunate affair an "accident," of which the primary cause was Nafiz Bey, aide-de-camp to the Grand Vizier, who was one of the victims. The shot which killed Nazim Pasha is stated to have been fired by a civilian, who was also one of those killed. Some one told me that this was a retired officer called Nejib.

It appears that when Enver Bey and his companions presented themselves at the porte there was an altercation in the course of which Nafiz Bey fired at Enver. Nafiz was seized, but struggled to release himself and use his revolver again, and revolvers were produced by others. Nazim Pasha, hearing the shots, came out to see what was going on, and was met by a bullet in the head, which was not, however, intended for him. The man who fired it was shot at the same moment by Nafiz, who was then shot in his turn. Reports vary as to the number of victims, but the only two officers that were killed, as far as I know, were Nafiz Bey and an aide-de-camp of Nazim Pasha's, Captain Tevfik Bey.

Nafiz Bey was a hot-headed young Albanian, and had been prominent among the officers from Monastir who "took to the hills" last July, thereby bringing about the fall of Mahmud Shevket Pasha and of the Committee Cabinet, so that he was rather a marked man, and probably a desperate one. There is therefore nothing inherently improbable in the story that he started the shooting. On the other hand, it is quite likely that, in order to shield the living, to make as little bad blood as possible, and to diminish the unfavourable impression which the affair must cause, the responsibility of the killing is fixed on those who are dead.

Enver Bey is again the central figure, at least to the public eye, of a revolution, and he presents at this moment an interesting psychological study. He is, so far as

I know, a modest young man and a zealous officer. He is no common political schemer who hatches plots without risking his own skin, and both in Macedonia before 1908, and in Tripoli during the past year he has distinguished himself as a soldier in the field. Though he is young and comparatively junior in rank, he has enormous prestige, and on his return from Tripoli he became a sort of rallying-point for the Committee party, and for those dissatisfied with the Government on account of the disasters of the war. He has now very openly contravened the order forbidding officers to take part in politics, but his admirers say that, as he was away in Tripoli at the time, he never personally took the oath which was imposed on all officers after Nazim Pasha became Minister of War. This is a quibble, and I imagine that Enver's own plea of justification would be that the interests of the country override all personal considerations and justify any disobedience. He genuinely believes that it was really necessary to get rid of Kiamil Pasha's Government in order to save the country from a disgraceful peace, and that it was his duty to strive to bring about this change.

I spoke to him for some time this morning and found him calm, natural, and unassuming as ever, discussing yesterday's affair and the future with seemingly perfect sincerity and detachment, as if they were no business of his. "The Government knows what it is going to do, I don't," he said. Nazim Pasha's death was, he said, a pure accident, and he apparently did not even know the names of the officers who were killed. "One was a man called Nafiz," he said, and then turned to an officer standing beside him to ask who the other was.

When he joined the procession this afternoon he must have been aware that he is just now the most prominent man in Stambul, and that at a moment like this, with a revolution hardly consummated, and with a certain body of officers still loyal to their dead chief and resentful of his death, anything might have happened to him. But he came absolutely without precaution, took his place in the most natural manner, and there was no sign to show that this tranquil and decorous young officer had any care or responsibility on his shoulders, or was concerned in anything but the affair of the moment.

Beside me in the procession was Mir Alai Kemal Bey, the commandant of the military school at Pancaldi, who was one of the officers who accompanied Nazim Pasha to Bagdad three years ago. His grief was sincere and unashamed. "What's going to happen to the country?" he said; "I don't care what happens to it now. They don't know what they have lost. That's the worst of it—they don't know. They didn't know him." And he went on repeating these words, accompanying them with gestures indicative of helpless despair.

Though Nazim, like most men of strong character, had many enemies, he certainly had the gift of inspiring very real devotion and trust in those that knew him best, as was shown when he was dismissed from Bagdad many of the officers who had been associated in his work there resigning their appointments and following their chief into temporary retirement, although they incurred the displeasure of the Minister of War and his Government by doing so.

Another man in the procession to whom I talked was Izzet Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff. He is a Freemason and a Young Turk, and has a reputation for more than ordinary sagacity and military knowledge. He was away in the Yemen when the Italian war broke out, when Mahmud Shevket Pasha fell, and when the present war began, so that, like Enver Bey, he had left the country in the hands of a Committee Government with things apparently going fairly well, and had returned to find it in the hands of a Government hostile to the Committee, and with disaster for Turkey on all sides. It is then more than probable that Izzet Pasha was, if not closely connected, at least in sympathy with yesterday's *coup d'État*. I remarked to him on the apathy and apparent indifference with which such grave events were received in this country, and how easy it appeared to be for a few determined men to overthrow a Government. He explained that it was the force of public opinion behind those men. It had been the same in 1908, he said. In 1909, on the other hand, the revolution had failed because public opinion was not behind it. On the present occasion public opinion had felt itself outraged by the Government, by which I took him to mean that public opinion was dead against the decision to which the Government had come to accept peace more or less in accordance with the terms of the note of the Powers. It will be observed that the substitution of "Committee of Union and Progress" for "public opinion" is equally applicable to Izzet Pasha's argument, and exactly fits it.

This despatch is merely a long record of personal impressions, and I have yet another one to add. That is that there is no longer any question about giving up Adrianople. The resumption of hostilities seems to be accepted on all sides as an

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inevitable sequence of yesterday's event, though it is accepted with resignation rather than with enthusiasm.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[4853] No. 3.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 28, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at the Dardanelles, reporting upon atrocities committed by komitajis at Sarichaban and other villages.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Acting Vice-Consul Harris to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Dardanelles, January 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that several muhajjir women from Sarichaban have told me dreadful stories of atrocities committed by the komitajis in that town. It appears that the local Greek population, headed by the priest, made a compact with the Mahommedans for mutual protection in the eventuality of either Turkish or Bulgarian soldiery entering the town.

When the komitajis arrived they took 67 men out to a wood and bayonetted them. The Greek villagers joined the komitajis. This story has been confirmed by four women and a small boy.

Again, a shepherd and two women from Ortakeuy, Kirjali Kayassi, tell me that not a single inhabitant out of the 750 comprising the village escaped except themselves. I hear daily, too, of massacres all round Cavalla, Drana, and district. Any stories confirmed by several eye-witnesses I will send to you.

I have, &c.
M. E. HARRIS.

[4854] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 28, 1913.*

IN my telegram No. 39 of the 23rd instant, I had the honour to report the change of Cabinet brought about by a *coup d'Etat* of the Committee of Union and Progress and the assassination of General Nazim Pasha, Minister of War, his aide-de-camp, and the aide-de-camp of the Grand Vizier.

In my telegram No. 23 of the 16th instant I had the honour to state that the course which the Grand Vizier intended to take was "not devoid of danger and the risk of a *coup d'Etat* by the military extremists or even the assassination of the Grand Vizier and some of his colleagues," while in my telegram No. 28 of the 17th instant I remarked that "the army does not seem to be really under the control of the Minister of War, and it is doubtful if the Cabinet reposes on any real authority, or whether it can assert itself against the committee forces should they come out into the open and become active on Carbonari lines." Again, in my telegram No. 32 of the 19th instant I had the honour to explain that Kiamil Pasha's dilemma was that any attempt by him to prevent greater calamities to the empire by concluding a peace involving the cession pure and simple of Adrianople might lead to an internal revolution or civil war, and "result in the return to power of the committee Jacobins, who would, he thinks, bring still greater disasters on the country." These previsions have now been partly realised by the recent sudden and almost seismic reappearance of the committee forces, though the real inspirers and leaders are still in the background. When Kiamil Pasha became

Grand Vizier it was obvious to any but the casual observer that the police, army, and all the offices of the State were still honeycombed by the partisans of the committee, and that at the psychological moment they would by some violent movement throw off, so to speak, the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet crust and resume the reins of power.

As pointed out in my despatch No. 942 of the 7th November last, even the Minister for Foreign Affairs was secretly a committee adherent, though professedly acting with Kiamil Pasha. He was really, like the rest of the committee, working in with the Triple Alliance and Roumania against the supposed policy of the Triple *Entente*. In Turkish politics there are no independent Turkish convictions, and all native opinion seems, unfortunately, to be divided into what is styled the Triple Alliance policy of the committee and the Triple *Entente* policy of its opponents. From the moment the Bulgarian forces began to approach Chatalja this line of cleavage became very marked, and the representatives of the Triple Alliance, through their press and other agencies, began to play a distinctly active part in influencing and accentuating the "no surrender" tendencies of local opinion, while I and my colleagues of the Triple *Entente* maintained an attitude of abstention, especially as long as the London negotiations seemed to hinge, as set forth in the last paragraph of your telegram No. 25 of the 16th instant, on the actual fall of Adrianople.

When, on the suspension of the negotiations, it was decided to address a collective communication to the Porte advising the cession of Adrianople before its actual fall, the situation here changed, and it seemed indispensable to give some positive support to the Ottoman Cabinet with a view to counteracting the local press and other activities of the committee and Triple Alliance tending towards a "die-hard" policy in the matter of the cession of Adrianople and the islands.

It is credibly reported that an officer who took an active part in bringing about the recent *coup d'Etat* visited the Austrian Embassy four mornings in succession immediately before the event, and that Enver Bey visited the German Embassy on the morning of the 23rd January, while during the three weeks preceding Mahmoud Shevket Pasha on two or three occasions visited both embassies. In native circles it is firmly believed that the Triple Alliance supported those who so abruptly substituted the "peace Cabinet" by those now in power.

Kiamil Pasha and the Minister of War were repeatedly warned of what was brewing, and the ex-Grand Vizier's hesitations as to the convocation of a Grand Assembly, the method of its composition, &c., were merely endeavours on his part to give a conciliatory reply to the collective note before his opponents could come to a final decision as to their contemplated action. Had he succeeded, the *coup d'Etat* would probably have been of a more violent character, and have involved the death of most of the Ministers.

On the morning of the 23rd January the "conspirators," under the pretext of doing military exercises, sent the battalion doing guard at the Porte outside the town and replaced it, without the knowledge of the Minister of War, by the Oushak battalion, whose officers were committee adherents. After cutting telephonic communication with the War Office and the police departments, a body of about forty to sixty individuals, mostly, apparently, of the hooligan class, but including several officers disguised as "hamals," &c., and led by Enver Bey and Jemal Bey, ex-vali at Bagdad, suddenly invaded the precincts of the Porte with loud cries of "Death to the traitors!" "Death to Kiamil Pasha!" and waving liberty banners and Moslem emblems. According to one account, when Enver Bey tried to force his way into the Grand Vizier's room, the latter's aide-de-camp, an Albanian named Nafiz Bey, resisted, revolver in hand, but was promptly shot by one of Colonel Enver Bey's followers, or, as some assert, by Enver Bey himself. General Nazim Pasha's aide-de-camp, Tewfik Bey Kibrizli, who had just got engaged to the Minister of War's daughter, fired on the assailants, but was himself immediately shot dead, while the Minister of War, while issuing from the council chamber to endeavour to deal with the situation, was shot dead by three bullets, one of which entered the head. They are stated to have been fired by the ex-officer Nejib Bey, and by Mumtaz Bey, the assassin of Zeki Bey, while it is alleged that the object in killing the War Minister was to paralyse temporarily the army and his followers. Talaat Bey, who had suddenly appeared on the scene, at once took charge, stopped all access to the Porte, and had the bodies, one of which was that of a committee adherent, said to have been shot by the aide-de-camp of the Minister of War, removed into a side chamber.

While this affray was taking place outside Enver Bey approached the aged Grand Vizier, revolver in hand, and informed him that the army and people would never consent to his policy of surrender, and that he must resign. Kiamil Pasha appears to

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have behaved with great coolness, and to have replied that he could never be in favour of a continuance of the war, and that he was ready to cede his place to those who were. At the invitation of Enver Bey he wrote out on a sheet of paper his letter of resignation to the Sultan couched in the following terms: "I beg humbly to inform your Majesty that at the instance of the military it has become necessary for me to place my resignation in your Majesty's hands." Enver Bey insisted on his adding above the line and before the word "military" the words "of the people and of the." While Enver Bey proceeded in a motor to the Palace, Talaat Bey appointed himself to his old post in the Ministry of the Interior, and proceeded to give orders to the police and other authorities in the capital. He sent to Mahmoud Shevket Pasha to proceed to the Palace, where the Sultan, after meekly accepting Kiamil's resignation, as meekly agreed to designate Talaat Bey's or the occult committee's nominee. The latter was shortly afterwards installed at the Porte, where the ex-Cabinet were detained till late into the night. While Talaat Bey took temporary charge of the destinies of Turkey, and the Sultan, in distress, retired into his inner apartments, the crowd, apparently still composed of the lower strata of the community, had increased and listened to a violent, mainly religious, declamation from some committee orators, assisted by some members of the Egyptian and Indian Red Crescent.

The opponents of the committee, terrified, perhaps, not unnaturally by the violence of the methods employed to bring about the change of Government, began to take refuge in foreign embassies and on board foreign ships, while many have fled the country. Though the new Cabinet has not initiated a "terreur," and is even making a show of clemency, their adversaries believe that this is due to the uncertainty of the action of the army and the exigencies of the foreign situation, and that at any moment their attitude may be reversed. A large body of officers are naturally exasperated at the assassination of their chief, but are said to hesitate to take action while the enemy is at the gates of the capital. Many predict that before very long this *coup d'État* is likely to be followed by a counter-*coup*, and unless the present Government scores some success in the matters of Adrianople and the islands the internal situation may be precarious for some time to come. The professed intention of summoning the last Parliament, which was dissolved owing to irregularities on the elections, is, to say the least, ominous. In foreign affairs the Committee Government will, of course, be more uncompromising in the questions of Adrianople and the islands, &c., and it was noticeable that immediately after its self-installation my German and Austrian colleagues somewhat modified the official attitude of their Governments as set forth in the collective note (see my telegram No. 43 of the 24th January, last paragraph), while the Roumanian Government also sympathetically adopted a more rigid line in its "compensation" negotiations with Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[4857] No. 5.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Berlin, January 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a communication which I have to-day received from the Imperial Foreign Office in regard to various questions connected with the Turkish financial situation.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir E. Goschen.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Government have noted with lively interest Sir Edward Grey's views on the questions arising out of the Turkish financial situation, and can only declare themselves ready, in view of the predominant importance of the German, French, and English financial interests in Turkey, to agree that first of all an exchange of views should take place between these three Powers. They hear with satisfaction that Sir H. Babington Smith has been advised to keep in close touch with the Deutsche

Bank and the Ottoman Bank respecting the question of advances, and they have given the German financial institution a hint in the same sense.

As Sir E. Grey probably knows, the German and French financial groups had, as a result of the conversations recently held in Paris, and on condition of the co-operation of the English group, held out to the Turkish Government the prospect of an advance of £T.1,500,000, making this advance conditional on an option on £T.13,000,000 6 per cent. Treasury bonds and on a prior right to every financial operation which might be based on the yield of the customs increase or on a modification of the unified debt and on the loan tickets ("Lose"). The issue of the £T.13,000,000 Treasury bonds was intended to enable the Porte temporarily to settle the advances and Treasury bonds falling due this year, the non-payment of which would hit the financial groups harder than it would hit Turkey herself. In spite of the considerable German interests at stake, the Imperial Government have, in deference to the views expressed by Sir E. Grey, used their influence with the Deutsche Bank to induce the latter to renounce for the present the transaction which had been planned, and to postpone it to a more suitable period.

As far as the question of an international control of the Turkish finances is concerned, the Imperial Government share the view of Sir Edward Grey that, in the event of Turkey requiring larger advances, it would be desirable, in the interests of those advancing the money, to direct our efforts to seeing that Turkish State expenditure is placed on a footing suited to the economic and financial resources of the country, and especially to preventing as much as possible excessive expenditure for military and naval purposes. The question as to the means by which this end could be attained, and especially whether the case would be met by setting up an international supervisory or consultative body, cannot be settled, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, until after the clearing of the political situation.

Berlin, January 29, 1913.

[5427] No. 6.

Note by Bulgarian Delegation respecting Albanian Frontier Question.—(Communicated by Dr. Danef, February 1, 1913.)

APRÈS les mémoires que les délégations grecque, monténégrine et serbe ont présentés au sujet des frontières de la future Albanie autonome, la délégation bulgare croit devoir consigner dans les quelques lignes qui suivent le point de vue de la Bulgarie.

La conférence des Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople, convoquée en 1876 dans le but d'élaborer un projet de réformes pour la Turquie d'Europe, s'est occupée, entre autres, de la délimitation des provinces habitées par des Bulgares. D'après le projet de Règlement organique élaboré par la conférence, la Bulgarie était divisée en deux grandes provinces, l'une orientale avec Tyrnova pour chef-lieu, l'autre occidentale, s'étendant jusqu'aux confins de l'Albanie, avec Sophia pour chef-lieu.

Ce projet de la conférence était basé principalement sur les statistiques officielles turques sur lesquelles, à cette époque, aucune propagande étrangère n'a pu avoir la moindre influence, et sur les rapports consulaires rédigés à la suite d'investigations faites sur place.

Lors de la conclusion du Traité de San-Stefano, la frontière de la Principauté de Bulgarie du côté de l'Albanie a été fixée conformément aux décisions de la conférence de Constantinople. Cette frontière commençait au confluent de Velechtiza dans le Drin Noir, suivait le cours de cette dernière rivière jusqu'à la frontière ouest du caza d'Ochrida, puis en longeant celle du caza de Starovo se dirigeait vers le sommet du Grammos.

C'est pourquoi nous estimons que la question de la frontière est de la future Albanie autonome, posée par-devant la haute réunion des Ambassadeurs des mêmes Grandes Puissances qui ont participé à la conférence de Constantinople, est une question tranchée préalablement d'une façon précise et impartiale.

Néanmoins, la délégation bulgare, ayant pris connaissance du mémoire albanais présenté sur la même question, s'est décidée d'en saisir MM. les Ambassadeurs.

Les auteurs de ce document se sont permis de formuler des prétentions sur presque toute la Macédoine occidentale—prétentions qui foulent aux pieds le principe même sur lequel est érigé l'autonomie albanaise—le principe des nationalités. En effet, les patriotes albanais voudraient faire incorporer dans la future Albanie les villes d'Uscub

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et de Monastir avec les territoires y attenant jusqu'aux villes de Veles et de Prilep inclusivement! Cette prétention apparaît tellement fantaisiste que nous croyons superflu d'insister qu'elle est dénuée de tout fondement tant soit peu sérieux. Il suffit de souligner que la seule frontière autant naturelle qu'équitable et ethnographique c'est celle fixée ci-dessus, parce qu'elle fut tracée par des organs impartiaux et autorisés.

Toute autre frontière serait non seulement contraire au droit et à l'équité, mais créerait des relations anormales entre l'Albanie autonome et ses voisins. La population bulgare des régions limitrophes de l'Albanie, si cruellement éprouvée dans le passé, ne se soumettrait jamais à une solution englobant ses foyers dans la future Albanie. La nation bulgare qui, durant la guerre actuelle, a fait d'énormes sacrifices en vies et en argent, auxquels est due l'autonomie de l'Albanie elle-même, ne pourrait admettre une pareille injustice.

Il est vrai que dans quelques endroits des régions limitrophes de la future Albanie, comme le caza d'Ochrida et la partie orientale du caza de Dibra restant en dehors de l'Albanie, il y a des Albanais, mais les Bulgares y sont toutefois encore nombreux. Les Bulgares y sont fixés depuis des siècles, tandis que les Albanais ne s'y sont installés que dans les derniers vingt à trente ans. En effet, une partie de la population bulgare de ces régions, persécutée de façon systématique par les Albanais, souvent de connivence avec les autorités turques, a été obligée d'émigrer après la dernière guerre russo-turque, sans avoir même eu la possibilité de liquider ses biens. Elle s'est dispersée dans toute la Macédoine, à Monastir, Salonique, &c., et en Bulgarie, à Sophia et dans d'autres villes. Le fait que la colonie dibriote en Bulgarie a pu, à elle seule, former dans la guerre actuelle un bataillon de volontaires démontre l'importance de l'émigration de Dibra et de ses environs. Il est hors de doute que cette population, émigrée malgré elle, retournera, sitôt la tranquillité rétablie, dans ses foyers auxquels elle est attachée depuis des siècles. Ses droits, même au point de vue de la loi civile, ne sont pas prescrits. Raison de plus de les souligner devant la haute réunion des Ambassadeurs qui, appelée à statuer sur la question, le fera, certes, dans un large esprit d'équité et de justice. Nous sommes convaincus que la plupart des Albanais immigrés, pillards par profession, a déjà lâché pied des terres conquises par la terreur. Ce flux et reflux de la population, conséquence naturelle d'une migration violente et récente, ne peut pas ne pas être pris en considération. C'est ainsi seulement que la guerre pourra redresser une des iniquités dont souffrait la population bulgare établie dans le voisinage de l'Albanie. Autrement, la guerre serait sans objet. Donc, pour être tout à fait juste, il faudrait, après le retour des émigrés involontaires, procéder de nouveau à un recensement lequel ne manquera pas d'établir péremptoirement la prépondérance de l'élément bulgare. Une autre preuve de l'importance et de la vigueur de l'élément bulgare du caza de Dibra est que la ville de Dibra est encore actuellement le siège d'un archevêché bulgare érigé dans le temps avec le consentement des autorités turques. A plus forte raison sont mal fondées les prétentions albanaises sur les cazas d'Ochrida et de Strouga, non seulement parce que la ville d'Ochrida était siège du Patriarcat bulgare ainsi que capitale des anciens Rois bulgares, et que dans les environs du lac d'Ochrida se trouvent des sanctuaires chers aux Bulgares, mais parce que la population bulgare était, même avant la guerre, bien plus nombreuse que la population albanaise.

La Bulgarie désire établir avec la future Albanie des relations de bon voisinage et d'amitié. Or, l'incorporation dans l'Albanie d'une partie des terres bulgares irait à l'encontre de ce but. Voilà pourquoi nous terminons avec le ferme espoir que MM. les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances accompliront une nouvelle œuvre d'équité et de sagesse politique en consacrant les mêmes principes qui étaient la base de leur œuvre dans la conférence de Constantinople.

[4816] No. 7.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 31, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 83 of 30th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also expressed himself in favour of suggestion about Adrianople. He said that he would sound Bulgarian Government on the subject. They would, he thought, agree, were the functionary in question an ecclesiatical representative of the Caliph charged with the administration of the mosques, &c.; but they were not likely to tolerate any kind of emblem of Turkish sovereignty.

[4817] No. 8.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 31, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that Prince Hohenlohe, formerly military attaché here, is being sent by Emperor of Austria with an autograph letter for the Emperor of Russia, and will be received by the latter on 4th February. From what Austrian Councillor told him, his Excellency gathers that object of this mission is to explain Austrian action during the crisis, and that Prince is charged to supplement what is said in the letter by personal explanations. Minister for Foreign Affairs added that he had recently had occasion to speak rather seriously to the Austrian Councillor, and to say that, after the explicit declaration made to you as president of the Ambassadors' Conference by the Servian Government, present attitude of Austria was quite inexplicable. Austrian Government, his Excellency says, realises how strong an anti-Austrian feeling prevails in Russia, and fears that feeling is shared by the Emperor. Prince Hohenlohe will therefore try and convince His Majesty that Austria's attitude has been misunderstood.

[4981] No. 9.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 1, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 52 of 28th January and Berlin telegram No. 21 of 29th January.

New Committee Minister of Marine returned from a visit to the Dardanelles and is reported to be about to replace existing commander by "die-hard" adherent of the Committee. In the event of hostilities being resumed at Chatalja, some ships would presumably be required at the sea end of lines.

I learn that three batches of naval officers, each of whom recently proceeded to Europe in company of Armenian brokers in connection with the purchase of four destroyers in Toulon ordered by a South American Government, a cruiser for China, built at Armstrongs, and another cruiser in Germany, have just returned here.

(Sent to Athens and St. Petersburgh.)

[4988] No. 10.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 1, 1913.*

THOUGH the Committee of National Defence has issued rousing and inflammatory appeals for "mobilisation of the whole nation, men, women, and children," and the Government and press joins in the jingo chorus, it would appear that neither the Government nor the so-called "nation," which really means the Committee of Union and Progress, have any real stomach for the resumption of offensive hostilities, and that the object of this dramatic attitude is to frighten Europe into bringing pressure on the Balkan allies to abate their demands. In the inner committee circles it is hoped apparently that this result may be attained before Tuesday next, while the last thing desired by them is a resumption of hostilities by the allies. Determination to renew hostilities or their actual resumption might be the most effective, and the shortest course to induce the present arbiters of Turkey to regain their sense of proportion and to adopt a more reasonable attitude which the best interests would seem to dictate.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, and Bucharest.)

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[4985] No. 11.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, February 1, 1913.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 60 of 31st January.

Military attaché was informed last night by the Chief of General Staff that he had good reason to believe that Adrianople has provisions for another month.

[5001] No. 12.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, February 1, 1913.*

MINISTER of Foreign Affairs regards the Turkish reply as more conciliatory than was to be anticipated, and thinks conciliation should now be urged on the allies as well as Turkey, especially as regards the indemnity question.

With reference to demands made on the Powers, he thinks some concession desirable in the interests of peace regarding customs increase and faculty to contract commercial treaties. As regards Capitulations and post-offices some non-committal expression of readiness to consider the matter at a more propitious time would probably suffice, as the issue is rather raised to save face than in hopes of assured results.

[4999] No. 13.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, February 1, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 55 of 31st January acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has rather altered his first impression of the note since he has learnt from an officer acquainted with Adrianople that the part the Turks propose to retain is practically nearly the whole of it, and that, as a concession, what the Ottoman Government propose is almost valueless. But he still holds that the best course is to give a moderating advice both at Sophia and Constantinople, and urge them to continue negotiations.

His Excellency assured me that he is still doing all he can to convince the Turks of the futility of resistance, and that he spoke strongly in that sense to the Turkish chargé d'affaires only yesterday.

As regards the last paragraph of your telegram, he said that he had not described the Turkish reply as satisfactory but only as conciliatory, and indicating a desire to continue negotiations.

[4992] No. 14.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February 1, 1913.*

PRIME MINISTER, whom I have just seen, tells me that he considers action of the delegates in breaking off negotiations and giving notice to terminate the armistice as premature, and that they should have awaited the reply of the Porte to the Powers.

He is of opinion that the terms now offered by the Turks might have afforded a good basis for negotiations, and hopes that it may still be possible to avoid hostilities, as it seems not improbable that the Turks may make peace overtures direct to the Balkan Governments.

[5441] No. 15.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 1, 1913.*

IT has always been understood that Bulgaria, while claiming the cession of the town of Adrianople, would give to Turkey conditions especially such as would safeguard the prestige of Turkey and give satisfaction to her susceptibilities regarding the tombs and mosques.

The reply of the Porte to the Powers is a step in advance that seems to provide an opportunity for Bulgaria to state at once to Turkey the conditions that Bulgaria would be prepared to concede to Turkey respecting Adrianople.

I have spoken decidedly in this sense to Dr. Danef, who promised to telegraph it as my opinion to his Government, and said he thought they could do it.

You can offer advice in the same sense if your colleagues receive instructions that are to the same effect, as it is undesirable for individual foreign Ministers at Sophia to take this step in a way that would give an impression that the Powers were divided. But you can of course speak as I have spoken if your opinion is asked.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 58, and Constantinople, No. 78.)

[4572] No. 16.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.**

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 1, 1913.*

MY despatch No. 20 of 28th January.

You should protest to Government to which you are accredited against interference with Ottoman Public Debt officials and interests specified.

[5441] No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 1, 1913.*

BALKANS.

I agree with opinion of Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed in first paragraph of your telegram No. 26 of 31st January, and think action I have taken is best contribution I can make to give effect to it.

[5383] No. 18.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 84.) *Foreign Office, February 1, 1913.*

Sir,

I AGAIN impressed upon M. Cambon to-day the anxiety which was felt in Rome and Berlin about Asia Minor. The Italian Ambassador had again spoken to me about the apprehension created by the articles in the "Temps," and had asked me to get assurances from France. I had told the Ambassador that I had already spoken to M. Cambon some time ago about the articles, and had said to him that, as the Italian Government were on good terms with France, I thought that they should get assurances for themselves if they wanted.

M. Cambon said that the French Ambassador in Rome had already spoken to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had reassured him respecting Syria and the

* Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 16) and Sir R. Paget (No. 35), *mutatis mutandis*.

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articles in the "Temps." The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said that the Italian Ambassador in London had had no instructions to speak about this subject. This, M. Cambon said, could not be accurate, as the Ambassador had spoken more than once to me.

I said that he had certainly spoken more than once, and the last time as lately as the day before yesterday.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5384] No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 57.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 1, 1913.*

THE Russian Ambassador informed me to day that M. Sazonof cordially agreed to the suggestion of a "Tripoli solution" for the town of Adrianople, but would expect in return that Germany would support Russia regarding Albania.

I warned him that German support with regard to Scutari would probably mean support only for a compromise, which might not go nearly as far as Russia desired.

The Ambassador then told me that the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh had certainly suggested to M. Sazonof that the plain adjoining Scutari might be given to Montenegro. This had been the suggestion of the Austrian Ambassador, and not that of M. Sazonof.

I had said that the Austrian Ambassador here had always spoken of the Plain of Ipek, but had shown no sign of yielding about the Plain of Scutari.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5386] No. 20.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 1, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day, I asked whether any of the Ambassadors had received the views of their Governments on the Turkish reply to the collective note of the Powers.

The German Ambassador at once stated the view of his Government, as he had expressed it to me, and as I had recorded it in my telegram No. 55 of yesterday, to Sir E. Goschen, it amounted to advising the Bulgarian Government to accept the Turkish proposal about Adrianople.

The Italian Ambassador said that his Government had the impression that, if the Powers agreed to the conditions for which the Porte had asked, Turkey would yield on the question of Adrianople.

I observed on this that the conditions for which the Porte asked included not only a 4 per cent. increase of the Turkish customs dues, but complete liberty for the Turkish Government to deal with the customs, besides, in fact, the abolition of the Capitulations. This was a very large question, which it would take a long time to discuss, and if we embarked upon it, our deliberations could have no influence on the course of the war, which was urgent.

The Austrian Ambassador said that his Government found the reply of the Porte more favourable in tone than they had expected, but it did not in substance accept the advice of the Powers, and his Government were of opinion that the Powers should not depart from the *terrain* of their collective note. Nevertheless, though the Turks had not yet given satisfaction, the Powers should not withdraw the hope of future support, but should make it still dependent upon the following by Turkey of the advice which

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 83), Sir E. Goschen (No. 49), Sir R. Rodd (No. 40), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 58).

the Powers had given. The Austrian Government thought that the Powers should continue to keep in close touch.

This last point was endorsed also by the Italian and German Ambassadors as being the view of their Governments.

The French and Russian Ambassadors said that they had no information whatever as to the views of their Governments.

I observed that, unfortunately, I could not say the same, as it was my business in the first instance to make views, and I therefore proposed to state my personal opinion. I gave the reasons, explained in my telegram No. 55 of yesterday, to Sir E. Goschen, why I thought that the Bulgarian Government could not be recommended to accept the Turkish reply as it stood. I then said that I proposed to speak to Dr. Danef as follows :—

"It has always been understood that Bulgaria, while claiming the cession of the town of Adrianople, would give to Turkey conditions, especially such as would safeguard the prestige of Turkey and give satisfaction to her susceptibilities regarding the tombs and mosques.

"The reply of the Porte to the Powers is a step in advance that seems to provide an opportunity for Bulgaria to state at once to Turkey the conditions that Bulgaria would be prepared to concede to Turkey respecting Adrianople."

I said that I thought it desirable that the representatives of the Powers in Sophia should not take separate action, which might give the impression of division between the Powers, and I would telegraph to Sir H. Bax-Ironside what I had said to Dr. Danef, instructing Sir H. Bax-Ironside to say the same thing in Sophia if his colleagues received instructions which were in the same sense.

It subsequently appeared that the actual instructions in German, sent to the German Minister in Sophia, did not go quite so far as we had thought from the first sketch of them given by the German Ambassador, and some general comment was made that they were in substance much the same as what I proposed to say.

After the meeting, I showed to the German Ambassador, separately, Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 20 of the 29th ultimo, and pointed out that the line which I had taken corresponded practically with what Herr von Jagow had said to Sir E. Goschen.

The German Ambassador informed us that all news that the Deutsche Bank had directly or indirectly given a loan to Turkey was quite untrue. The only negotiations contemplated were those of the Deutsche Bank, Ottoman Bank, and the National Bank of Turkey with the Turkish Government, and for the present these were in suspense.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2913] No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 1, 1913.*

WITH reference to the second paragraph of your despatch No. 11, Confidential, of the 15th January, respecting the future of the Ægean islands hitherto under Turkish rule, I have to inform you that the language used by the Italian Ambassador did not go so far as therein reported. The Marquis Imperiali's argument was to the effect that the Italian occupation of Rhodes and the other islands at present in Italian hands was necessary until Turkey had ceased in effect to make trouble in Tripoli; and that some islands should remain Turkish, even after the Italian occupation had ceased, so that Italy might have a chance of getting a harbour from Turkey if, but only if, the Turkish Asiatic possessions were distributed and France took Syria and so acquired a naval station at Beirout.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[4708] No. 22.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, February 1, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin, respecting the protection of British and foreign financial interests which may be affected by the cession of Turkish territory on the conclusion of the war.*

Sir E. Grey caused these papers to be submitted to Sir H. Babington-Smith, who, as you are aware, was at one time British representative on the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, and he has furnished a memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed. Sir E. Grey is disposed to think that the conclusions reached in this memorandum are desirable, and preferable to those of Sir Adam Block, on political grounds; but he would be glad to be furnished with the observations of the Lords Commissioners regarding the financial aspects of Sir H. Babington-Smith's recommendations.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[4990] No. 23.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 2, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 62 of 1st February.

It is given out from the Porte that Adrianople has unlimited provisions for several weeks, but I had it from two reliable members of the late Cabinet that their official information was that provisions would last till about 5th February.

Porte has notified that all cypher correspondence between embassies and the foreign consulates at the Dardanelles and on the Ottoman littoral is henceforth prohibited.

I learn that arrangements are being made for mine-dragging on the north coast of the Sea of Marmora, and that Enver Bey is practically to command the forces now concentrated at Ismidt and Panderma, and that steamers here are being requisitioned for transport of these troops to the northern coast of the Marmora.

(Sent to Sophia, Athens, and Bucharest.)

[5014] No. 24.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 2, 1913.*

FOLLOWING information respecting distribution of Ottoman forces which I have received from the Greek Minister, and which he states is quite reliable, may be useful to the Director of Military Operations if it has not reached him from other sources :—

At Panderma, 7,000; on the Asiatic coast, 35,000; at Ortakoui, 5,000; at Gallipoli, 50,000, with 35 heavy guns, 48 field guns, 24 mountain guns, and some machine guns. Commander-in-chief, Fakhri Pasha. Head-quarters at Madyto.

At Ismidt, 10,000.

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* Sir H. Babington-Smith, January 13; ditto, January 30, 1913; Sir G. Lowther (No. 1082), December 18; ditto (No. 1086), December 19, 1912; Sir F. Bertie (No. 8), January 8; ditto (No. 17), January 15, 1913.

[5000] No. 25.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February 2, 1913.*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 32 of 31st January.

Russian Ambassador tells me that two days ago he received a letter from the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. It informed him that the Emperor of Austria was sending Prince Hohenlohe to St. Petersburgh with an autograph letter by which His Imperial Majesty hoped to remove certain misunderstandings which seemed to exist in Russia with regard to the policy of Austria, and at the same time to assure the Emperor of Russia of the pacific intentions of the Emperor of Austria. Letter to the Russian Ambassador does not indicate that the Emperor of Austria touches on the question of detail or alludes to Albania.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called at the Russian Embassy yesterday to explain more fully the meaning of the mission. Prince Hohenlohe will be authorised to amplify verbally purport of the autograph letter, but is not charged to discuss matters of detail directly with the Russian Government, as these are intended to be left to the Ambassadors' meetings in London.

Prince Hohenlohe leaves to-night, and will be received on Tuesday afternoon by the Emperor of Russia.

Russian Ambassador assures me that no pourparlers took place between himself and the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to sending of the letter. It was either suggested by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, or was spontaneous act of the Emperor of Austria. Russian Ambassador is of opinion that the dispatch of the letter is intended more to reassure public opinion of Europe as to the peaceful intentions of Austria-Hungary rather than to settle matters of details in questions in dispute between Russia and Austria.

Russian Ambassador begged me to ask you not to mention to the Russian Ambassador that he had read to me letter of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as it may not yet have reached the Ambassador through the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[5042] No. 26.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Sophia, January 22, 1913.*

IN my telegram No. 19 of the 20th instant, I had the honour to inform you that I had communicated, in accordance with your instructions, to M. Gueshof the memorandum contained in your despatch No. 14 of the 15th instant, regarding the reported ill-treatment of Mahommedans by the Bulgarian armed forces in the course of the present war.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a French translation of a telegram which has been communicated to me by the Prime Minister, received at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs from the generalissimo of the Bulgarian army, reporting the measures taken to guarantee the property, lives, and honour of the Mahommedan population in the territories now occupied by the Bulgarian army.

I have, &c.

H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 26.

General Savof to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Traduction.)
(Télégraphique.) *Lozengrad, le 17 décembre, 1912.*

PAR rapport au contenu de votre dépêche du 16 de ce mois, j'ai donné, il y a quelques jours, l'ordre que voici :

" L'état-major de l'armée reçoit des informations qui pourraient, malheureusement, faire peser sur certaines personnes privées aussi bien que sur divers corps de troupes le soupçon de vols et de violences commis en pays conquis au préjudice

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de la population paisible. Étant donné que des actes de cette nature, hautement condamnables et peu humains, compromettent au plus haut degré notre renom et la nation bulgare en sapant, par ailleurs, la foi de nos futurs sujets—surtout celle de la population mahométane paisible—envers la capacité de notre État de leur assurer les biens, l'honneur et la vie, j'ordonne :

"1. Aux commandants en chef des armées et aux gouverneurs militaires de prendre d'urgence les mesures les plus sévères en vue d'ordonner des enquêtes au sujet des actes susdits commis dans les territoires occupés par leurs troupes, et de faire déférer les coupables à la justice, sans aucune différence de rang ni de profession, conformément aux prescriptions de la loi. Les chefs de divers catégories de la hiérarchie militaire seront invités d'user de la dernière rigueur dans la répression de ce genre d'actes, sans oublier la responsabilité qui pèse sur eux en cas de négligence.

"Les dispositions les plus rigoureuses seront adoptées pour le maintien de l'ordre et de la discipline, sur les derrières des armées. Toutes les personnes qui n'appartiennent pas à l'armée et qui n'y ont pas de destination seront dirigées par étapes sur la Bulgarie. Toute personne appartenant à l'armée, mais qui, par le peu de confiance qu'elle inspire, compromettrait le service sur les derrières, sera dirigée sur les lignes de front (de bataille) des armées.

"2. Tous les grades de l'armée seront prévonus que la population paisible des pays conquis—sans aucune différence de confession ni de nationalité—est sous la pleine protection de nos lois militaires et que toute cruauté, toutes violences ou injustices envers cette population sont rigoureusement défendues par la loi. J'invite dans ce but toutes les autorités militaires et mixtes à prêter leur assistance entière.

"En conclusion, il ne doit pas être oublié que nous avons entrepris la guerre au nom d'une idée hautement humanitaire—la délivrance de cette même population d'un régime que la cruauté et le manque de justice rendaient insupportable. Dieu a permis aux braves fils de la Bulgarie de réaliser par leurs victoires cette noble et généreuse idée. Ces fils de la nation ont donc le devoir de retenir ceux d'entre leurs camarades qui tenteraient de compromettre, aux yeux même de la patrie, l'œuvre grande et glorieuse.

"*Lozengrad, le 15 décembre*, 1912."

Au reçu de votre dernière dépêche, j'ai exigé à nouveau l'exécution rigoureuse de l'ordre ci-dessus et j'ai demandé aux cours martiales d'expédier le plus rapidement possible les procès intentés à la suite des actes dont il a été question plus haut, en procédant sans pitié à l'égard des coupables. J'ai demandé des explications au commandant du détachement de Haskovo, qui comprend les bataillons de volontaires de la territoriale.

[5093] No. 27.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 17.) *Belgrade, January 25, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, respectively on the subject of his relations with the Servian authorities and upon the state of feeling towards the Servians amongst other elements of the population.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 1.) *Uskub, January 18, 1913.*

Sir,

IT seems desirable, in view of the recent controversy over customs duties, that I should offer some account of my relations with the local authorities.

The present authorities in Uskub are the following: The Vrhovna Komanda, which, owing to General Putnik's state of health appears to be largely in the hands of

General Mishich; the Commandant de Place, General Marinovich; the civil prefect, M. Tserovich; and the mayor, Spiro Efendi Hadjiristich. Besides these the Servians have appointed M. Vuchkovich, ex-Servian vice-consul here, as délégué du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, to act as an intermediary between the consuls and the local authorities. I have been to a certain extent in direct semi-official communication with the mayor (on the subject of relief work), and on one occasion made semi-official representations to General Mishich on behalf of a Moslem dignitary, but on directly official matters, such as customs and trosharina, I have always addressed myself to M. Vuchkovich.

At the same time, the present arrangement seems to me to be somewhat unsatisfactory. It is true that friction is avoided, but much time is lost. The virtual effect of the arrangement is that M. Vuchkovich is acting on our representations as a sort of consul for all the Great Powers. It is hardly to be expected that Servian officials should pay the same prompt attention to the enquiries made on behalf of the British consul by a junior Servian official as they would to those same enquiries made by the consul direct. I do not for an instant blame M. Vuchkovich, who is the corn between the upper and the nether millstones, I rather criticise the general attitude of Servian authority.

I would also point out that it seems to me barely polite to expect the consular corps to treat with so junior an official. I myself feel this somewhat, and my colleagues are all at least full consuls.

The fundamental mistake of the Servians is their failure to distinguish clearly occupation from annexation. With the private soldier and the junior officer this takes the crude form of simply asserting that Uskub is Servia now. Although the higher ranks do not say this in so many words, much of their action seems to show that their ideas of occupation are hazy. They have installed what is, I believe, their normal civil administration, from which it results that the Prefect of Tetovo is independent of the Prefect of Skoplje, and that there is no one civil authority with plenary powers over the administration of the occupied provinces. Had such an authority, with a competent knowledge of French and of International Law, existed and been accessible to me, I cannot help thinking that the customs question might have been settled much quicker on the spot. I have come to the conclusion that owing to the lack of centralised authority here, it is practically useless to make representations to the local authority in case of violation of the Capitulations; I now only make them for form's sake, and put my trust entirely in your Excellency's action in Belgrade. As an instance, I may cite the fact that I wrote to M. Vuchkovich on the 2nd January (N.S.) enquiring about customs arrangements, and have not yet received a formal answer; this was, indeed, rendered unnecessary shortly after, when I knew that the Customs were confiscating Servian monopoly goods, but my colleagues have found the same slowness in getting answers, which contrasts strikingly with the haste in trying to force Servian municipal law on the country.

With reference to your Excellency's telegram No. 7 of the 16th inst., I have the honour to state that I myself proposed to make representations, if possible, as soon as a breach of the Capitulations was threatened, rather than after it had taken place. On one or two occasions I had enquired verbally as to what the customs arrangements would be, and expressed my opinion that any augmentation of duty would be resisted by the Powers. It was with this end in view that I made official enquiries about customs, monopolies, and trosharina before I knew that British trade had been adversely affected by Servian action. It was with this end in view that I made the general enquiry as to modifications in the *status quo* referred to in my telegram No. 4 of the 9th instant. I had unfortunately sent this letter, of which I enclose copy, before receipt of your Excellency's telegram No. 4 of the 10th inst., but venture to hope that it is not open to the objections to which it appeared to be from my telegram. In my relations with the local authorities I have never lost sight of the principle that the Servian administration here succeeds to all the rights and duties of the Ottoman, neither more nor less, and my letters to the local authority repeat almost *ad nauseam* phrases such as "le vilayet de Kossovo," "les autorités serbes installées dans l'Empire ottoman."

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Servian Delegate of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

M. le Vice-Consul, *Uscub, le 28 décembre*, 1912 (10 *janvier*, 1913).

AFIN d'éviter une série de demandes et de protestations, je vous prie de m'informer, aussi vite que possible, de toutes les modifications intéressant directement ou indirectement aux étrangers que prétendent apporter au régime fiscal légal, &c., qui subsistait avant la guerre les autorités serbes installées dans le territoire ottoman.

Veuillez, &c.

W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 3 in No. 27.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Sir, *Uskub, January* 23, 1913.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 14, Confidential, of the 12th December, I have the honour to submit a revised impression of public opinion south of the Shar.

The Servians appear to have gained a certain amount of Moslem confidence. It is true that a great number of the Bosniac *émigrés* imported under the Young Turk régime wish to leave; the great majority of these would like to go back to Bosnia, but some staunch Mahommedans are already trying to get back under the Crescent in Anatolia. But in the Servian rayon the local non-muhajir Moslems seem to be returning to their villages. I am, however, not sure how far this confidence is absolute, and how far it is merely relative to that in the Bulgarian administration.

The minor elements of the urban population, Jews, Armenians, and the like, seem to be settling down. I have myself been struck by the absence of anti-Semitism in the Serb character, and have no doubt that the Jews in the Servian army, many of them doctors, have reassured their co-religionists here.

The local Bulgar is the really serious factor in the problem. The fact that the average Servian denies that the population of South Kossovo is Bulgar in no way diminishes this. (I heard recently that a Servian doctor who practised here before the war was somewhat roughly handled by officers at his own dinner table for venturing to say that the Bulgars were in a majority in South Kossovo.)

On the one hand, I still believe that many urban Bulgars will leave; on the other, I have heard time and again from various sources that there will be a serious recrudescence of bomb and hand action. "Where we threw fifteen bombs before we will throw a hundred and five now." Inevitably the local Bulgars would be dissatisfied with annexation to Servia, but the Servian has not shown the least sign of conciliation. As I have had the honour of reporting (my telegram No. 8 of the 17th January), they forbade the Bulgarian Church to perform the usual ceremony of blessing the waters. On the one hand, their public notice of the orthodox ceremony was most unexceptionable in sentiment, inviting all Christians to a common ceremony; on the other, as they appear to have refused to allow the Bulgarian Metropolitan to take any official part, on the ground that he was excommunicated, their action hardly savours of a compromise. The Bulgarians had to content themselves with throwing their cross into a well, and not into the Vardar, as in former years.

I have heard that the Servians have seized some of the archives of the Bulgarian church; my informant said, "they have no right to do so." I disagreed on the question of right, but can imagine that it may be exceedingly unpleasant for the Bulgars to have their archives searched by their rivals.

To show the terror that they are in, or profess to be in, they have approached me, not directly, but through the local Protestant pastor, a Bulgarian by nationality. He told me a long tale of a Bulgar schoolmaster who had disappeared mysteriously, and of the terrorism under which Bulgar villages were living, but has not as yet supplied details.

Though the Epiphany services went off without disorder, I cannot help fearing that the discord between the Churches will sooner or later produce very grave results here. Much water has flowed under the bridges since I entered Uskub with the

Servian troops and heard on all sides the cry, "Vive l'Entente balkanique!" in Bulgarian.

Mr. Louis Cahen, agent of the Macedonian Relief Fund, returned here a short while ago from a tour to Kumanovo, Palanka, Kratovo, Kochana, Ishtib, and Veles. Of these towns all except Kochana and Ishtib are in Servian occupation and administration. Kochana is purely Bulgarian, while in Ishtib the troops are Servian but the civil authority is Bulgarian. He reports that the Moslems are gradually returning to their homes in the Servian territory, and, generally speaking, have greater confidence in the Servian Government than in the Bulgarian. It should, however, be remembered that there is a very recent blood-debt between Christian and Moslem in both Kochana and Ishtib; I would venture on no generalisation about Moslem lack of confidence in Bulgaria from them. Mr. Cahen confirms my view that the ottoman Bulgars are fretting under Servian administration, and are talking of a recrudescence of hand action. It appears that the local mayors and police authorities installed by the Servians are generally ex-agents of their propaganda—schoolmasters, priests, and the like; these men were formerly the victims of the forcible methods of Bulgarian propaganda, and are now using their power to pay out old scores. M. Netkof, Bulgarian Governor-General of Ishtib, informed Mr. Cahen that the Patriarchist Metropolitan of Dibra and Kichevo has been holding Divine service, without sanction from the incumbents, in the Exarchist churches of Veles, Sveti Nikola (N.W. of Ishtib), and Kratovo, has forbidden the prayers for the Exarchist Metropolitan, and has told the Exarchists from the pulpit that they are henceforth to consider themselves Servians.

Mr. Cahen was present when M. Netkof received a Bulgar deputation from Sveti Nikola, which is in Servian occupation. It was complained that Captain Bugarski, the Servian Commandant de Place there, had threatened the inhabitants, "it is true that there is no Vardar here, but we always have guns"—if they did not become Servians, that is to say.

The Christian inhabitants of the Bulgarian occupied places appear content, and Mr. Cahen did not trace any signs of discontent at Egri Palanka.

I have, &c.

W. D. PECKHAM.

[5056] No. 28.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Bucharest, January* 27, 1912.

IT is to be feared that the Committee's *coup d'État* at Constantinople on the 23rd instant, and the prospect that it has opened up of a resumption of hostilities between Turkey and the Balkan allies, have strengthened the hand of those in Roumania who, wishing to have done with Bulgaria's evasive and procrastinating methods of negotiation, are in favour of immediate military action, and I understand that at the Cabinet Council on the 25th instant, reported in my telegram No. 17 of yesterday, opinions were pretty evenly divided among the Ministers between continuing the negotiations and mobilisation. Those in favour of the latter course only consented, I believe, to remain in the Cabinet on condition that the negotiations were conducted with greater energy, and finally it was decided to press at Sophia and in London for a prompt and written reply to the proposals which M. Misu had made to M. Danef, of the exact nature of which I am unaware, but which, I gather, are as broadly stated in my despatch No. 11 of the 21st instant, and comprise the offer of Roumania's assistance against Turkey in return for more extensive territorial concessions than any that Bulgaria has so far proposed.

The communiqué issued to the press after the Cabinet Council runs as follows:—

"At a Cabinet Council held at the Palace to-day, presided over by the King, and at which the Crown Prince was present, Ministers agreed upon the course which must be followed in order to secure a prompt and satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations with Bulgaria."

This announcement is welcomed by the press of all parties as showing that the question of the rectification of the frontier is now to be handled more energetically.

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In the interests of peace it is greatly to be hoped that Bulgaria, if she is not able to grant all that Roumania is asking, will not delay in making definite and concrete counter-proposals. Such public opinion as exists in Roumania—and during the last few weeks something like a tangible public opinion has come into being—is exasperated at the disingenuous and evasive tactics which it considers Bulgaria has hitherto pursued in the negotiations. Unfortunately, the King's moderating influence may not at this crisis be found to carry its traditional weight. He is held responsible for Roumania's having neglected her opportunity on the eve of the war of coming to terms with Bulgaria. It is generally realised that but for this omission Roumania could have obtained from Bulgaria all she wanted, and have obtained it without any rattling of sabres. King Charles was, I believe, taken unawares by the war, as he certainly was by the success of the allies. He has somewhat lost credit with the country, and if Bulgaria persists in her procrastinating tactics he may find himself unable to stem the warlike current. It will be remembered that, when in the early part of this month M. Danef refused to continue the negotiations, the King gave his sanction to an immediate occupation of Bulgarian territory. Fortunately, the intervention of the Austrian and Russian Ministers, and the prompt resumption of the negotiations, averted this catastrophe, and, for a time, at any rate, the Government appeared to be more in favour of recourse to mediation or arbitration in the event of direct negotiations failing than of any military action, but the prospects of this peaceful mode of arranging the differences between the two countries have, I fear, diminished since the Committee's *coup d'Etat* in Constantinople. Doubtless the King, and M. Maioresco and M. Také Jonesco, the two principal members of the Cabinet, would be still in favour of this mode of settlement, but the Cabinet is by no means united, and a Cabinet crisis might lead to the advent to power of M. Bratiano, with a liberal Ministry, which would greatly reduce the chances of a compromise with Bulgaria. The liberals have never ceased to murmur at the passive attitude of Roumania during the war, and the point of view from which they regard the prospect of a renewal of hostilities between Turkey and the allies is shown by a communiqué published in the leading liberal paper of yesterday, which may be translated as follows:—

"The latest developments in Constantinople, as far as they concern Roumania, give her a fresh opportunity of manifesting her wishes, *this time** with all the necessary firmness, in order that the solution of the Balkan crisis may not be reached independently of Roumania, and without taking into *serious* account her rights and claims."

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[5057] No. 29.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 29, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Roumanian Government have concluded an arrangement with the Disconto Gesellschaft group by which the latter engage to take up 150,000,000 fr. (6,000,000*l.*) of Treasury bonds. The bonds run for three years, their issue price is 97, and they are to carry interest at the rate of 4½ per cent.; 50,000,000 fr. are to be taken up at once and the remainder on or after the 1st April.

It is announced that the object of this operation is to increase the stock of gold in this country, exchange being at this moment very much against Roumania owing to the stagnation of the export trade.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

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* Italics are in original.

[5058] No. 30.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 30, 1913.*

IN my telegram No. 17 of the 26th instant I reported that at a Cabinet meeting held on the 25th instant it had been decided to present a note at Sophia and to M. Danef calling for a prompt written reply to Roumania's proposals. This information was given me by a colleague who saw M. Take Ionesco immediately after the Cabinet Council, and was, I believe, telegraphed by the former to his Government.

I now see from Sir H. Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 29 of yesterday that no formal note was presented at Sophia, so that I must conclude either that M. Take Ionesco's conversation with my colleague left the latter with an inaccurate impression, or that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, when sending instructions to the Roumanian Minister, thought it better to endeavour to obtain the end in view, i.e., an explicit statement of what Bulgaria was prepared to grant, by a less drastic method than by a demand couched in a formal note, and I incline to the latter supposition, as a note has been freely spoken of in the press, and, so far as I am aware, the Government have issued no *démenti*.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[5059] No. 31.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that at yesterday's sitting of the Chamber—the first since the Christmas recess—the Government were interpellated by M. Gradishteano, an independent deputy, as to the negotiations with Bulgaria. The interpellation resulted in a vote of confidence in the Cabinet, the Liberals abstaining from voting.

M. Gradishteano complained of the lack of energy shown by the Ministry in the conduct of the negotiations. He recalled the assurance contained in the King's speech at the opening of Parliament that Roumania's voice would be listened to when the time came for a settlement of the questions raised by the Balkan crisis, and said that since M. Danef's visit to Bucharest early last month no progress had been made in the negotiations owing to Bulgaria's tergiversations. He compared that country's methods of negotiation to those of the bazaar, and said that Roumanian public opinion and the dignity of the nation demanded an explicit reply from Bulgaria. Roumania could then see what action was to be taken. The present situation was intolerable, and made Roumania the laughing-stock of Europe. Public opinion insisted on knowing whether the Ministry were capable of an energetic decision, and if not, they should yield their place to others.

M. Maioresco in his reply defended Bulgaria from the charge of tergiversation, and blamed the speaker for basing his complaints on absurd stories in the press. He protested against the statement that Roumania was the laughing-stock of Europe, and declared that the assurance in the King's speech that her voice would be listened to would be fulfilled. He said the negotiations were continuing. The Cabinet assumed all responsibility, and he hoped soon to be able to state what had been done.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

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[5060] No. 32.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, on the matters of general interest in connection with the present situation.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 32.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 3 R. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 30, 1913.*

THERE has been little to record regarding military events in Roumania during the past few weeks, but the men belonging to sixteen classes of the reserve from 1896 to 1911 have been warned to hold themselves in readiness for mobilisation, if required.

There has, however, been a remarkable increase of feeling in favour of war with Bulgaria. One of the reasons given for desiring war is that if it does not come now it will do so at some future date when circumstances are less favourable to Roumania than they are at the present time. In support of the theory that war is inevitable, Roumanians mention a map, which is distributed to the schools in Bulgaria, on which Macedonia, Thrace, and the Dobrugea are represented as territories that should be Bulgarian, but which are not yet conquered. Roumanians consider that the use of this map in Bulgarian schools shows the intention of Bulgaria to attack them at some future date with the intention of acquiring the Dobrugea.

I have never seen this map, but I recently spoke with my Bulgarian colleague here, Major Kissof, on the subject. He produced a Roumanian school map, in which Transylvania and Bessarabia are the same colour as Roumania. Bulgaria does not, therefore, appear to be the only offender in this particular line.

Major Kissof also told me that Bulgaria would never wish to acquire the Dobrugea. By so doing she would have a frontier with Russia at the mouth of the Danube, and would lose the advantage of having Roumania as a buffer State.

With reference to my report No. 2 R. of the 14th instant, on the subject of railways in Roumania, I now hear on good authority that, at the instigation of the Austro-Hungarian Government, Roumania has undertaken to push on as far as the River Pruth, a distance of about 10 miles, the branch railway which now runs to Husi. This is to be done without delay, and sufficient material is to be kept at railhead to admit of the rapid construction of a railway bridge.

Up to the present time Roumania has not succeeded in purchasing any new destroyers for her fleet. She was recently negotiating with Messrs. Armstrong, at Newcastle, for two ocean-going destroyers, which were almost completed for Chili. The negotiations came to nothing, and the impression in the Ministry of War here is that the British Government would not permit the sale of the vessels to Roumania.

I have, &c.
F. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

[5026] No. 33.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on conversations which he has held with Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, the new Grand Vizier, and with Izzet Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, in which the former criticised the conduct of the late war, and the latter expressed himself very definitely as to the disastrous effect of the interference of the military in politics.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 33.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 28, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday I visited Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, on the occasion of his elevation to the post of Grand Vizier, and took the opportunity of presenting Colonel Reed to his Highness.

In spite of the somewhat equivocal circumstances under which the highest office in the State has now been conferred on him, I could not help feeling pleased to meet him again in an official capacity, as I have generally found him a most agreeable man to deal with. He has always treated me and my colleagues with cordiality and an engaging appearance of frankness, while he is usually willing to talk at some length and to impart information on military matters.

He told me yesterday that he was going to be his own Minister of War. Remembering how hard he used to work when he had only the Ministry of War to attend to, it would seem to be impossible, even to one of his energy and application, to conduct the affairs of the Grand Vizierate as well, but he explained that he intended to have, both at the Grand Vizierate and at the Ministry of War, two mustesbars to whom he would leave all matters of detail and routine, and that in this way he expected to have less work than formerly, notwithstanding the fact that the two offices were combined in his person.

In talking of the war, I thought he spoke rather ungenerously of the faults of his predecessor, though he did not mention him by name, attributing all the disasters to the fact that the plans of campaign prepared when he himself was Minister of War were deliberately discarded. This is also the German view, and it is now so obvious and so well known that it is hardly worth repeating, but it was interesting to hear it stated from the lips of the man who was for so long at the head of the Turkish army that the official plan of campaign was to concentrate from 300,000 to 400,000 men on the line of the Ergene and there to await the Bulgars, or at least not to attempt any forward movement until everything had been prepared and the army was ready. Similarly in the western theatre, all the forces would have been massed between Kuprulu and Elassona, Monastir being the head-quarters of the army and the pivot of the operations. Salonica, Uskub, everything that was not a fortress, would have been abandoned, and the various invading armies would have been defeated in detail when the Turkish army was ready.

It is easy to talk thus after the event, but it is one thing to make plans and another to apply them, especially in Turkey, and I do not suppose that Mahmoud Shevket would have been able, any more than Nazim, to overcome the political obstacles to abandoning populous cities and large tracts of Mussulman country to the unbelieving invaders without striking a blow in their defence, or to resist the feeling in favour of the forward concentration and the premature offensive.

I afterwards saw Izzet Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff, who told me that he had been offered the Ministry of War, but had refused it. He would have nothing to do with it, nor with the war, but would retire. On my pointing out that this was hardly possible while the war was going on, he replied that he would just remain what he was and do his duty as Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish army. More than that he would not do. Up till now he had preserved his honour, and he wished to die with his honour unsullied. I was the more surprised at this outburst as he is usually very impassive and reserved, and his attitude led me to try to draw him a little. I talked about the disastrous effects of politics on the army, and touched on some episodes of Mahmoud Shevket's last tenure of the Ministry of War, and Izzet Pasha gave me to understand quite clearly, though he did not say it in so many words, that the kind of Minister of War they wanted him to be was one who would not be master in his own house. In other words, he would have been expected to follow the advice,

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or obey the orders, of certain junior officers representing a political organisation, and to conduct the affairs of the army in the interests of that organisation.

Since I had last seen him he seems to have realised the full significance of the circumstances attending the death of Nazim Pasha. He showed considerable emotion when speaking of it, saying that it was the end of all discipline, and that a fatal example had been set. He despaired of the future both of the army and the country. He seemed doubtful if the war would be continued, and admitted that the prospects of success were remote, but would not have it that the army at Chatalja was bad. "No," he said, "we have a good army, but it is impossible to do anything with it on account of these miserable politics."

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[5044] No. 31.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Sophia, January 30, 1913.*

UNTIL the occurrence of the *coup d'État* at Constantinople there was little to report from this legation regarding the peace negotiations, the outcome of which appeared largely to depend upon the attitude of the Ottoman Government.

On the 20th instant the Prime Minister called on me and discussed at some length the prospects of peace, adding, as I had the honour of reporting to you in my telegram No. 207 of the 2nd December, that the Bulgarian Government intended claiming an indemnity from the Turks. This question would be taken in hand, his Excellency stated, as soon as Adrianople should have fallen, and was a point on which his Government was resolved to insist. Should any difficulty occur they would base their action on the precedent created by the Germans in 1871, and leave an armed force in possession of some portion of Turkish territory, such as Rodosto for instance. His Excellency further hinted that, if the difficulty of obtaining such an indemnity became very serious, his Government might even decide to sequester the revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt, a remark to which I refrained from replying except to say that financial questions of this description were usually discussed in Paris.

The *coup d'État* of the 23rd naturally changed the attitude of the Bulgarian Government, who were very much pressed by MM. Danef and Teodorof, the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, to send instructions to their peace delegates in London to return home at once. The Cabinet, however, decided that it would be better to wait until Monday, the 27th, before taking such action, in the hope that the new Ottoman Government would by then have returned their reply to the collective note of the Powers, although the King was inclined to share the views of MM. Danef and Teodorof. The cession of Adrianople, the Prime Minister added, remained a *sine quâ non*.

On the 23rd I learnt that instructions of a secret nature had been sent to the Bulgarian peace delegates in London to come to a definite decision regarding the peace negotiations after agreement with the delegates of the allies. From another source I learnt that instructions had been sent to the Servian delegates not to make any change in their attitude pending the receipt of the Turkish reply to the collective note and then, should this answer be of an unfavourable nature, to break off the armistice but not the peace negotiations, a procedure which would place them in the same position in which the Greeks have found themselves since the beginning of the negotiations in London. The Servian delegates were further instructed to take no serious step of this nature without previously consulting you and the Ambassadors of the Triple *Entente*.

Another serious difficulty which has come to confront the Bulgarian Government may arise from the attitude of the Servian Government, who are contemplating profiting by the situation produced by the Turkish *coup d'État* to gain certain territorial concessions from Bulgaria for the continuance of their assistance, in the event of a renewal of hostilities against Turkey. These concessions include the cession of certain territory to the north north-west of Monastir, including Kuprulu and Perlépé. Should this decision be carried out, and I know from a good source that it is now being discussed in Belgrade, Servia would advise Bulgaria to accept a proposal on the part of Turkey, if

such an one be made in the answer to the collective note of the Powers, that the latter retain Adrianople on condition that the fortifications be razed. The position of Bulgaria would, in this eventuality, be a difficult one, as it is well known that she would require for the successful conduct of hostilities at least another Servian division, and the heavy Servian artillery of which they stand much in need both at Adrianople and Chatalja.

As I had the honour to report to you in my telegram No. 18 of the 18th instant, information reached me regarding certain secret negotiations proceeding between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Italian chargé d'affaires respecting the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania. These negotiations were intended to provide against the ambition of Austria to acquire if possible the heights of Lovtchen, which are of immense strategical importance as commanding the Bay of Cattaro, which is incomparably the finest port in the Adriatic and one which is at present rendered useless from a military point of view by the possibility of its being threatened by guns hoisted to the top of these heights. Austria's policy at present is ostensibly to propose Scutari as the capital of the new Albania, and she is therefore opposing the cession of this town to Montenegro. Her ultimate policy, I have reason to believe, is, by adopting this attitude of opposition to the wishes of Montenegro, eventually to use it for the purposes of bargaining in return for Lovtchen. She would possibly consent to give Montenegro San Juan di Medua and Alessio as well as Scutari in return for this strategic point. With the same object in view she will probably oppose the acquisition of Ipek by the Montenegrins. Russia is fully aware of the importance of this attitude on the part of Austria, and has categorically informed the King of Montenegro that she will never permit these heights to fall into the hands of Austria-Hungary. I gather that Italy is equally alive to the importance of the question, and fully realises the extent to which the possession of Lovtchen by a Great Power and the foundation of a strong naval base at Cattaro would endanger her own position in the Adriatic.

Regarding the serious tension existing between Bulgaria and Roumania I have had personally little to report during the past fortnight. On the 17th instant I carried out the instructions contained in your telegram No. 5 of the 14th instant. The Prime Minister informed me that the Roumanian demands were fully discussed at the meeting between the King, his Cabinet, and his generals at Mustapha Pasha, which took place on the 15th instant. The Bulgarian Government decided to cede Roumania some territory on the Black Sea in the direction of, but not including, the town of Kavarna, a strip of about 5 kilom. or 6 kilom. on the sea-shore as well as the hinterland. They were also willing to allow a slight rectification of the frontier to the east of Silistria, which town they would refuse to cede although they would agree to its fortifications being razed. They were further prepared to make a few other minor concessions and to meet the wishes of the Roumanian Government on the question of the Koutzo-Vlachs. These concessions, which would be the final limit to which Bulgaria would go, were communicated to M. Danef in London, with instructions to negotiate in that sense. M. Gueshof was of the opinion that little progress would, in all probability, be made until the return of M. Také Jonesco to Bucharest.

On the 29th the Prime Minister informed me that M. Danef, who was to leave London on Saturday, the 1st February, was instructed to sign a protocol, setting forth the Roumanian demands, together with certain concessions to which Bulgaria had agreed for submission to the Bulgarian and Roumanian Cabinets. It was hoped that by this means a basis might be found for the continuation of negotiations between the two countries.

The situation, however, continued to cause anxiety to M. Gueshof as he felt that it would be impossible to grant the Roumanian demands in their entirety.

No formal note embodying these demands had by that day been handed in to the Bulgarian Government, but Prince Chika had informed the Prime Minister verbally that he hoped that he would give the matter his most serious attention. The Cabinet had decided to instruct M. Savafof, the Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople, to proceed shortly to Bucharest to resume negotiations as the Bulgarian representative in that capital is not of a very high calibre.

I have, &c.
H. BAX-IRONSIDE.

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No. 35.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Sophia, January 30, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 5, Confidential, of the 6th instant, giving an account of the history and inception of the Balkan League, I have the honour to report that the chief Government organ, the "Mir," in its number of the 28th December, 1912, divulges the following facts :—

"The first step towards the new alliance took place on the 11th October, 1911, at a meeting between M. Gueshof, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, and M. Milovanovitch, at that time the Servian Prime Minister. This meeting took place in a railway carriage on the line between Servia and Bulgaria. M. Gueshof is credited with the initiative, however, because it was owing to his instructions that the Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade prepared the ground. Thereafter Sophia became the centre of all negotiations between Servia and Bulgaria, as well as between Greece and Bulgaria, and Montenegro and Bulgaria. It was in Sophia that, on the 13th March, 1912, the treaty of alliance between Bulgaria and Servia was signed, and on the 29th May that between Bulgaria and Greece. The plan for undertaking military action against Turkey emanated from Sophia, and was adopted by the allies. The 26th August, 1912, will remain memorable. On that day King Ferdinand presided over the Cabinet meeting at which it was decided to propose to the allies the declaration of war on Turkey if the reforms specified by the Treaty of Berlin were not carried out in her European provinces. The allies readily accepted the proposal, with those results that have now become a matter of history."

The above extract is of considerable interest, as it is generally agreed that the most important political event of 1912 was the birth of the Balkan League, and several claimants have come forward as the proposers of this alliance.

The statement in the "Mir" fully bears out the information which I had the honour previously to report, namely, that the matter was first discussed on the 11th October, 1911, at a meeting between M. Gueshof, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, and M. Milovanovitch, the then Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The first suggestion came from the latter statesman, and he was also the first to propose the inclusion of Greece, as I had the honour to report unofficially to the Foreign Office in November last. The late M. Milovanovitch's contention was that, even putting aside all possibility of military aid from Greece, her fleet would be of enormous assistance to the allies. This surmise has proved to be entirely accurate.

I have, &c.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[5095]

No. 36.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 19.)

Sir, *Belgrade, January 30, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to report that, notwithstanding almost daily urgent representations which I have made at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs concerning irregularities committed by the customs authorities at Uskub or Ghevgheli in either delaying, confiscating, or imposing unjustifiable duties on goods belonging to British firms, these irregularities appear to continue.

I have the honour to enclose copy of a note which I have therefore addressed to the Servian Government, stating that His Majesty's Government reserves all rights to claim compensation or otherwise for any loss whatsoever which British subjects may incur through the action of the Servian authorities.

On all occasions on which I have spoken, either to M. Pasitch or the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on this question they have fully recognised the justice of our contentions, and have assured me that orders had been sent by the Ministry of Finance to the local customs authorities in the new territory occupied by the Servian forces to respect our rights, but these orders appear to have no effect whatever, and I am reluctantly coming to the conclusion that it is the object of the

Servian authorities, by vexatious which they subsequently explain as due to misunderstandings, to hinder trade and delay importation under the present conditions as much as possible. They look upon importation into Servia under the Turkish tariff as so much loss to the Exchequer, and are furthermore influenced by the pressure exercised by Belgrade merchants, whose stocks imported under the Servian tariff cannot compete with goods imported under the Turkish tariff.

Under the circumstances, and as my representations appear to be ineffective, I venture to submit whether it would not also be well that a remonstrance should be addressed to the Servian Government through their representative in London.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Sir R. Paget to M. Pasitch.

M. le Président du Conseil, *Belgrade, January 17 (30), 1913.*

I HAVE already had the honour on repeated occasions to make verbal representations to your Excellency, and also to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of the action of the Servian customs authorities at Ghevgheli and Uskub in either refusing entry to, confiscating, delaying, or endeavouring to impose unjustifiable duties upon the goods of British firms entering the territory in Servian occupation.

As your Excellency is aware, until the annexation of the said territory has been recognised by the Powers the nationals of the latter continue to enjoy all their capitulatory rights as they existed under the Turkish régime, but owing to the persistence of the customs authorities in disregarding the said rights these are being seriously interfered with, and I therefore have to state that His Majesty's Government strictly reserves to itself all its rights to claim compensation and otherwise in the event of British subjects incurring any loss whatsoever through the action of the Servian authorities.

I avail, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

[5037]

No. 37.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 43.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 31, 1913.*

I TOOK an opportunity to-day to give to Herr von Jagow your message to the effect that His Majesty's Government had neither entertained nor countenanced any project having for its object the infringement of the integrity of Asiatic Turkey.

His Excellency begged me to thank you for this message, which he was very glad to receive, as though for him, who knew that His Majesty's Government was equally anxious with that of Germany that all complications should be avoided, such an assurance was scarcely necessary, it would be very useful for the purpose of contradicting the wild reports respecting the intentions of England, France, and Russia, which appeared almost daily in the more sensational newspapers. He added that he must admit that it had not surprised him very much that public opinion was somewhat suspicious about Russia's intentions, as her policy had of late been somewhat obscure, and moreover, some of her Ambassadors, at all events one of them, had indulged in language which was calculated to raise very strong doubts as to her peaceful intentions. He had therefore been very glad to receive from Prince Lichnowsky the substance of the communication made to you by M. Sazonof, which had placed Russian policy in a clearer and, he would add, in a more satisfactory light than he had recently been able to see it. He certainly did not think it at all likely that the necessity for Russia to defend Bulgaria would arise, and, as for the difficulty respecting the Turco-Persian frontier, he could only say that the Imperial Government would be glad, as soon as peace was made, to use such influence as they might possess at Constantinople to bring about a settlement. There remained the cause for anxiety, namely, the strained relations between Bulgaria and Roumania. He could conceive it as possible that if

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these two countries failed to come to terms and Roumania marched into Bulgaria, public opinion might force the Russian Government to interfere, but he had every hope that the case would not arise, and that the Roumanian Government would follow the advice which was being given to them from all sides, and certainly by the Imperial Government, to have patience and remain quiet. In the meantime, it was his opinion that if the Bulgarians were victorious in the new campaign and showed signs of marching upon and occupying Constantinople, Russia's benevolent attitude towards them might be somewhat diminished. He could not understand the policy of Bulgaria with regard to Roumania. It seemed quite certain that the Roumanian Government had signified their willingness to assist Bulgaria with two army corps, if only she would accede to her demands for compensation. As far as one knew, these demands were not excessive, and he was at a loss to understand why the Bulgarian Government had refused to place themselves in such a secure position at such a small cost. For however confident the Bulgarians might be of victory over the Turks, it would surely be safer for them to have a large Roumanian force on their side than threatening their rear. It appeared therefore plain that they counted upon Russia to deal with any Roumanian force that might be sent against them.

Herr von Jagow did not altogether seem very pleased with the Bulgarians, and was especially indignant with regard to their action in denouncing the armistice without waiting for the Turkish answer to the collective note. He considered it, in fact, a piece of gross impertinence towards the Great Powers. His Excellency then told me, as I had the honour to inform you by telegraph, that he had been greatly surprised by the conciliatory tone of the Turkish answer, and that immediately on seeing its text he had instructed the German Minister at Sophia, while avoiding all appearances of giving formal advice, to enquire whether the Bulgarian Government could not see its way to make a few small concessions in order to facilitate matters for the new Turkish Government, whose disposition appeared to be conciliatory, but whose position in that respect was one of the greatest difficulty.

On my saying that I had not yet seen the text of the Turkish reply, his Excellency showed it to me. I said that though the tone of the note sounded very conciliatory, I did not see that it advanced matters much, as while it offered to cede a certain part of Adrianople, the retention of the other part would seem to point to a frontier far less advantageous to the Bulgarians than that claimed by the latter. Also the question of the islands seemed to be left in a very vague state. His Excellency said that of course after what had occurred it was impossible for the new Turkish Government to give way at once all along the line. His idea was that in their note they went as far as they could for the moment, and that by their whole tone they showed that they only required something that would "save their face" to make them go still further in the way of concessions. If they had yielded at once, they would have found it exceedingly difficult to justify their action in causing the overthrow of the previous Government. He hoped therefore that their position would be facilitated as much as possible, as if they were turned out by a counter-revolution, chaos would result, and there would be no one at Constantinople with whom to deal. It was with this in his mind that he had instructed the German Minister at Sophia to do what he could, confidentially and not ostentatiously, towards bringing the Bulgarian Government to a more conciliatory frame of mind.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[5182] No. 38.

Prince Ahmed Fouad to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

Paris, le 31 janvier, 1913.

Excellence,

JE m'adresse à votre Excellence en accomplissant, avec la plus grande confiance, le plus grave de mes devoirs.

Prince albanais, je dois ma personne, mon activité et tout ce qui m'appartient au sort du peuple d'où ma famille est issue.

La conférence des Puissances européennes, que votre Excellence préside avec une fermeté justement admirée, a entre ses mains les destins de ma patrie d'origine. Les espérances des Albanais sont donc en ce moment tournées vers Londres.

L'Angleterre a toujours été la nation la plus ouverte aux souffles des grandes revendications humaines et des idées les plus généreuses d'humanité et de justice.

Elle a joué, et elle joue, un rôle prépondérant dans les évolutions des peuples qui marquent les étapes de la civilisation.

Ému par les souffrances du peuple auquel j'appartiens par le sang et par la tradition, je trahis la pensée et les vœux de l'élite albanaise, en cherchant le salut auprès de votre grand esprit, Excellence.

Ce salut ne saurait plus tarder pour le seul pays d'Europe que l'on garde dépendant et malheureux, alors que depuis très longtemps il ne demande qu'à se réorganiser pour vivre paisible et laborieux.

Afin de répondre, lui aussi, à tous les appels de la civilisation, il a besoin de composer sa vie propre et indépendante autour d'un chef national. Mon devoir, Excellence, est celui de m'adonner entièrement à cette réorganisation, et de lui offrir, en ma personne, le chef que le pays souhaite pour sa renaissance.

J'ai la conscience d'avoir mis jusqu'ici le meilleur de mes énergies au service de cette tâche que je poursuis sans trêve, et j'ai l'espoir que votre Excellence voudra m'accorder la faveur insigne de son approbation.

La nation britannique n'a jamais été indifférente aux appels des nationalités opprimées. Elle ne refusera pas son appui au peuple albanais, qui, ainsi que moi-même, saura ne jamais l'oublier, car cet appui aidera à l'aboutissement de la volonté sacrée de tout un peuple, c'est-à-dire à la réalisation de l'Albanie redonnée aux Albanais.

Je prie ainsi votre Excellence d'agréer, &c.

(Prince) AHMED FOUAD.

[5246] No. 39.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, February 3, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from Adrianople by wireless :—

"Vu la difficulté de garantir la sécurité des colonies étrangères dans le cas du renouvellement du bombardement, le corps consulaire croit de son devoir de suggérer à leurs missions respectives l'opportunité d'obtenir un terrain neutre combinant un refuge efficace pour les étrangers qui voudraient rester à Andrinople, ainsi que les autorisations nécessaires et les moyens pécuniaires pour ceux d'entre eux qui voudraient quitter la ville.—SAMSON, HERXFELT, MEINNIS, KLIMENKO."

[5249] No. 40.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 3, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day, repeating message purporting to be from consuls at Adrianople.

First proposal seems to me impracticable, but perhaps the Bulgarian Government would be disposed to consider the question of foreigners leaving the town.

[5197] No. 41.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 3, 1913.*

THE bombardment of Adrianople is to be commenced this evening.

No other immediate military operations are to be undertaken.

[5252] No. 42.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 3, 1913.*

GERMAN Minister has received instructions to act with me in the sense of your telegram No. 23 of 1st February.

I to-day called on the Prime Minister by appointment. His Excellency at once informed me that the Russian Minister had already offered advice to the Bulgarian Government to make some concession to Turkey respecting Adrianople. Russian Minister had spoken as an individual foreign Minister at Sophia.

Acting on the advice of the Russian Government, the Prime Minister told me that he had already informed the Bulgarian representatives at St. Petersburgh, Berlin, and London that the Bulgarian Government were willing to agree to the appointment of a Turkish representative as a guardian of the sanctuaries of Adrianople under the following conditions: (1) Agreement by the Ottoman Government to a "boundary well known to the [? Powers]"; (2) war indemnity for allies; (3) conclusion of immediate peace.

In reply to an enquiry whether he meant Midia–Enos line, the Prime Minister stated that Enos was strategically unsatisfactory termination for boundary line, but although I pressed him he did not specify any other place.

As regards military operations his Excellency added that the Bulgarian Government expected that Adrianople would not hold out long after bombardment, in which case the situation would change, and for that reason the military authorities had decided to postpone other military operations.

[5307] No. 43.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 37.
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 3, 1913.*

WAR indemnity.

My telegram No. 20 of 20th January.

Prime Minister informs me that the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, while in Paris, succeeded in winning over French Minister of Finance to the idea of Bulgaria obtaining an indemnity from Turkey.

I cannot help thinking that the effect of such a contingency would be deplorable, as the attitude of Bulgaria towards numerous outstanding financial questions to be settled on the conclusion of the war, such as European interests in the Ottoman Public Debt, would be such that the Powers would have great difficulty in forcing her to be reasonable.

[5253] No. 44.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 3, 1913.*

ROUMANIA

[illegible]

Prime Minister handed to me to-day Bulgarian-Roumanian protocol. He particularly drew my attention to a passage in which, while emphasising the Roumanian [illegible] that M. Jonesco did not insist on the present demands, but would [illegible] willing to accept a smaller cession of territory.

Prime Minister stated that he considered that the signed protocol was very favourable to Bulgaria, as it showed a relaxation in determination on the part of [illegible]

Prime Minister added that no date had yet been fixed for M. Saratloff's departure [illegible] expected to see the Roumanian Minister shortly, and to arrange [illegible] with him.

[5258] No. 45.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, February 3, 1913.*

HIS Majesty's ship "Yarmouth" arrived at Suda Bay last week and took over the island's guardianship 1st February. Russian ship left yesterday and may not be replaced. Should His Majesty's ship be ordered away I propose, in the absence of any ship of war, to deal with flags of the protecting Powers and of the Turks as indicated in your telegram No. 2 of 11th January.

[5441] No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 3, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 23 of 1st February.

I gather that all your colleagues are instructed more or less in the same sense, and, if you have not already done so, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of what I said to Dr. Daneff, and express it to him as representing my opinion.

If Minister for Foreign Affairs invites suggestions as to what could be conceded to Turks as regards Adrianople you might mention precedent of Tripoli, where a representative of the Sultan as Caliph is to be admitted, as one possible element in a solution.

[5619] No. 47.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 25.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 3, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day, the Italian and Austrian Ambassadors stated that their Governments had instructed their representatives in Sophia to speak in the sense which I had proposed on Saturday, the 1st instant.

The Russian Ambassador said that his Government also had sent instructions.

The German Minister in Sophia had already spoken more or less in the same sense.

The French Ambassador said that, though he had not heard definitely from his Government, there was no doubt that the French Minister would receive the same instructions.

I observed that there was nothing for us to do this afternoon. The question of the Ægean Islands could hardly be discussed profitably till after the war was over; at least, it could not be discussed profitably during the present stage of the war. There seemed little use in our meeting again until we could discuss the Albanian frontier question. We really ought to discuss this as soon as we could make any progress with it.

The Austrian Ambassador said that he was ready at any time.

The Russian Ambassador said that he was expecting to receive some telegrams about it.

We agreed provisionally to meet on Thursday afternoon next, the 6th instant, at 3:30, to discuss this question.

The German Ambassador said that his Government were very anxious about the situation between Roumania and Bulgaria, but he had no proposition to make.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 93), Sir E. Goschen (No. 51), Sir R. Rodd (No. 42), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 66).

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

[4670] No. 48.

*Foreign Office to Sir H. Babington Smith.**

(Confidential.)

Foreign Office, February 3, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to previous communications respecting the question of advances to the Turkish Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin stating that the German Government share his opinions and agree that an exchange of views should first of all take place between England, France, and Germany. They welcome Sir E. Grey's advice to you to keep in close touch with the Deutsche Bank, and have given a hint to the latter in the same sense. In spite of the considerable German interests involved, the German Government have in deference to Sir E. Grey's views induced the Deutsche Bank to abandon for the present the scheme for an advance, in conjunction with the British and French groups, of £ T. 1,500,000 with an option on £ T. 13,000,000 Treasury bonds.

The German Government agree with the Secretary of State as to the desirability, in the event of larger advances, of establishing some control over Turkish expenditure, but they consider that the method by which this end can be attained cannot be settled until the political situation has become clearer.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[3057] No. 49.

Foreign Office to Manchester Chamber of Commerce.

Foreign Office, February 3, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th January respecting the losses that might be entailed on Manchester merchants engaged in trade with the port of Salonica if the judgments of the law courts of that town were no longer operative in the districts of Macedonia, Kossovo, Epirus, Albania, Monastir, and Novi-Bazar.

In reply, I am to state that Sir E. Grey fully appreciates the anxiety of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in this respect. A copy of the printed circular enclosed in your letter had already been received and noted in this department, but it will doubtless be understood that Sir E. Grey can hardly express any further opinion upon its contents until the political future of Salonica is decided.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[5352] No. 50.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 11.) Treaty.

Salonica, January 28, 1913.

Sir,

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 3 of this date, concerning the imposition by the Bulgarian authorities at Cavalla of customs duties on goods forwarded by sea from here, after having naturally paid duty to the Hellenic authorities on disembarkation, I have the honour to report that, according to the latest information furnished by the acting vice-consul at that place, duty at the rate of 11 per cent. was still being levied on such goods. This information is confirmed by all the local merchants whom I have consulted on the matter and also by my Austrian colleague, who further informs me

* Also to Colonel Lawrence (Ottoman Bank) *mutatis mutandis*.

that, in addition to these customs duties, an octroi is being levied on certain categories of goods according to the tariff of which a copy is enclosed for your information.

At the same time I am obliged to confess that in the existing condition of communications between the two places, it is impossible to state positively that the duties are still actually being levied. It is not yet possible to correspond by telegraph, and the Bulgarians refuse permission to the foreign post-offices in Cavalla to land their mails, while their own postal service by railway is uncertain and averages five days in transit each way.

The British steamer "Tasso," which was the last to leave here for Cavalla, excepting yesterday's Austrian, from which no news has yet been received, was unable to land cargo at all, owing to the fact that the Bulgarians were commandeering all the lightermen they could lay hands upon for special service at Dede-Aghatch, and that accordingly none were available to man the lighters at Cavalla itself.

The Bulgarian officials here tell me that they know nothing about the matter, though one of them admitted that he believed that orders had been given at the commencement of the occupation to levy 11 per cent., but he fancied that these orders had since been revoked.

With regard to the goods forwarded from here by rail to intermediate places occupied by the Bulgarian troops, it is still more impossible to obtain positive information. The majority of merchants here assure me that, as there is no goods traffic at all on the junction railway, which is in the hands of the Bulgarian military authorities, the question of duty can only arise in connection with small parcels, taken with them as personal baggage by clients from the interior, as to which they have no subsequent knowledge. This is, indeed, generally true, as not only is there no demand for any merchandise, excepting articles of first necessity, at any place along this line, but it is an extremely difficult and complicated business to obtain the means of transport even for those. At Serres, for instance, I am assured that all non-Bulgarian shops are practically closed, owing to the fact that soldiers and others insist on paying for their purchases by means of "chits" written in Bulgarian, but frequently unsigned and meaningless, which they declare will be payable in Sophia after the cessation of hostilities. A certain number of favoured individuals do, however, succeed in obtaining the means of transport for such goods as sugar, coffee and other articles of consumption, but I am confidentially assured that in such cases, the officers in charge of the line, and sometimes also the civil officials, are associated in the profits of the trade, and that both the freight and the amount of duty, if any, are matters of private and unofficial arrangement between them.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 50.

TARIFF of octroi duty alleged to be levied by Bulgarian authorities on goods landed at Cavalla.

Nature of Commodity.	Amount of Octroi.
Beer in cases	10 cents. per bottle.
Brandy, bitters, absinthe	40 " " "
Rum, &c., in barrels	40 " " kilog.
Sugar and confectionery	20 " " "
Coffee	50 " " "
Tea	1 fr. " "
Candles	20 cents. " "
Oil (olive or sesame)	10 " " "
Petroleum, benzine, &c.	5 " " "

Matches, salt, playing cards and cigarette paper are monopolies.

PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE, LONDON

[5318] No. 51.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Belgrade, January 31, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report which Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Thomson, military attaché to this legation, is addressing to the Director of Military Operations at the War Office on the subject of the present disposition and future movements of the Servian Army.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomson.

M.O. 2, Colonel, *Belgrade, January 31, 1913.*

HIS Excellency the Minister of War (General Boyanovitch) informed me this morning that should the Bulgarians require further Servian reinforcements two divisions and some heavy artillery would be sent to Thrace; that one division would proceed via Salonica by rail to Dedeagatch, and the other viâ Nish and Sophia. The divisions selected would probably be the Morava and Drina 1st ban divisions. Their destination was, I gathered, Chatalja, while the heavy artillery was intended for operations against Adrianople. His Excellency, without directly referring to the question of compensation for this further assistance, left the impression that the price demanded would be the towns of Monastir, Prilep, and Kuprulu, thus extending the future eastern frontier of Servia in the conquered territory to the line of the River Vardar.

Hostilities do not recommence until 7 P.M. on the 3rd February, and the Minister stated that as yet no definite arrangements had been made.

Two batteries of field artillery are being sent to reinforce the Montenegrins.

It is not proposed to send any reinforcements to the Greeks.

The Danube division 1st ban has now returned to Servia. Its head-quarters are at Chuprin, and the units are distributed along the railway line between that place and Nish.

If the above-mentioned reinforcements are sent to Thrace there will be left only six divisions of 1st and 2nd ban troops in Servia and the conquered territory, which are located approximately as follows:—

Danube division, 1st ban, between Nish and Chuprin.
Schumadia division, 1st ban, in Northern Albania.
Schumadia division, 2nd ban, in Northern Albania.
Drina division, 2nd ban, on Adriatic littoral.
Morava division, 2nd ban, Kalkandelen, Gostivar, and Elbassa.
Timok division, 2nd ban, not yet located, probably Prilep.

The reduced numbers and distribution of the Servian forces render the country most vulnerable to offensive action on the part of Austria, a fact which is fully recognised at Servian head-quarters, where, however, there appears to be much less apprehension of such action than was the case a few weeks ago.

The recruits for 1913, who should have been enrolled on the 14th instant, will be called up shortly; and as, owing to the absence of instructors, they cannot undergo their recruit training at peace head-quarters, they will be sent direct to units in Servia and Macedonia. There are over 20,000 recruits.

The twelve 4·7 inch guns and four 6-inch mortars ordered from Creusot for the war, which were delivered recently at Salonica, are now at Nish, where the personnel for the new batteries will be collected.

Dandan Popovitch, who was removed from the army at the instance of His Majesty's Government on account of the leading part taken by him in the regicide plot, has now been reinstated with the rank of colonel. He is at present at Durazzo, but may shortly take over the command of the Danube division, formerly held by the present War Minister.

C. B. THOMSON,
Military Attaché.

[5319] No. 52.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Belgrade, February 1, 1913.*

M. PASITCH told me to-day that he had recently sent a message to Count Berchtold to the effect that as it was the desire of the Servian Government to live on friendly terms with the Monarchy, he would be glad if his Excellency would state any wishes he might have regarding future relations.

Count Berchtold replied that the points which in his opinion might be discussed between the two Governments were a new commercial treaty, transit facilities for Austrian commerce on the Servian railways, connection between the Bosnian and Servian railway system, and the right to buy tobacco for the Austrian *régie* in Macedonia on the same terms as those which obtained previous to the war. He also intimated, M. Pasitch told me confidentially, that it would create a good impression if he (M. Pasitch) himself would come to Vienna for the purpose of discussion.

M. Pasitch has stated in reply that, whilst taking note of these points, it appears to him inexpedient to commence their discussion until peace is declared and the difficulties connected with the Albanian delimitation have been definitively settled. As regards his visiting Vienna personally at the present moment, his presence there might not only give rise to suspicion amongst the allies, but would excite public opinion in Servia, and only lead to a renewal of animosity against Austria were the negotiations not to bring any profitable result from the Servian point of view.

M. Pasitch then went on to speak of Salonica. His idea is that it should be under a condominium of the allies, and that the frontier between Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece should be so arranged as to give each country free access to the common area enclosing the port. He appears most anxious for some arrangement of the sort as, although Servia has been guaranteed access to the Adriatic, it will be many years before the railway is built or the port is of any value for commerce, and, moreover, he feels sceptical as to how and when the findings of the Powers will be carried out.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[5481] No. 53.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 4, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 62 of 1st February, and Sophia telegram of yesterday.

Despite present outward bellicose attitude of present Cabinet, there are distinct signs yesterday and to-day that they would like to avoid having to take offensive. They have no rest at Chatalja.

As foreshadowed in last paragraph of your telegram No. 25 of 10th January, actual taking of Adrianople would probably be a decisive factor in bringing about conclusion of peace on terms acceptable to the allies, especially if the latter agree to the arrangement made in the case of Tripoli, *i.e.*, appointment by the Sultan Caliph of a representative as a guard of Moslem interests in Adrianople.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[5479] No. 54.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 20. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 4, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 38 of 3rd February.

Although, as I understand, Roumanian demands, as stated in the protocol, comprise the frontier from Turtukai to Baltchik, the Russian Minister, whom I have seen this morning, seems hopeful of inducing the Roumanian Government to content themselves with much less, viz., the four points mentioned in my telegram No. 8 of 10th January, and, in addition, a strip of the coast more extensive than that offered by Bulgaria, but stopping short of Kavarna.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

[5493] No. 55.

Sir C. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 4, 1913.*

ROUMANIAN Government have received the protocol and are now asking the Bulgarian Government to continue negotiations in Bucharest or Sophia.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw to-day, said that Bulgarian proposals were insufficient, though he was evidently pleased to have at last a precise statement of them.

(Confidential.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs complained that M. Danef appeared to have been too much influenced in the negotiations by the desire to stand well with the Sobranjé. His Excellency instanced the omission from the protocol of any mention of Medjidieh Taba, which had been offered through the Russian Minister (see my telegram No. 8 of 10th January)—omission evidently due to M. Danef's desire that the onus of making this concession should rest elsewhere than on him.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[5489] No. 56.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 4, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 35 of 3rd February.

Bombardment of Adrianople commenced last night. It continued from 8 o'clock to 11, and has recommenced this morning.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[5490] No. 57.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 4, 1913.*

GREEK Minister here has reliable news that 100 tons weight of submarine torpedoes, 10 fortress cannons, and 5 tons weight of ammunition cases have been delivered by a German ex-officer at Constantza to Ottoman agents, and have been placed on two Turkish transports in that harbour; 100 tons weight of submarine torpedoes are also expected. A Turkish transport transformed into a cruiser is waiting outside the port.

Bulgarian Government have received confirmation of the above.

[5487] No. 58.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February 4, 1913.*

PRIME Minister is about to instruct the Servian chargé d'affaires in London to represent once more to His Majesty's Government that the inclusion of Ipek, Jakova, Prisrend, and Dibra in the new Albania would be a bitter disappointment to what Servia considers her legitimate aspirations on both historical and geographical grounds, especially after all the sacrifices and concessions she had made out of regard for the wishes of the Great Powers.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the name of the Prime Minister, begs me to request His Majesty's Government to support this point of view, which is also shared by Russia. Servian Government are convinced that as Austria is gaining her point about Scutari she will give way about the eastern frontier, if the *Entente* Powers are quite unanimous in supporting the Servian view.

Ipek would ultimately go to Montenegro.

[5488] No. 59.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February 4, 1913.*

FOLLOWING yesterday from Uskub, No. 17:—

"Servian Government here is applying their own tobacco régie, and the Ottoman régie is prevented from working.

"My telegram No. 2.

"Ottoman Public Debt is in possession of its office and stamps, but the executive authority refuses to support it; consequently it cannot work.

"My French colleague is telegraphing in the above sense to his legation at Belgrade."

(R.) Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs tells me that the Ottoman régie is allowed to buy and export tobacco, but not to sell it in territory occupied by Servia.

As regards the Public Debt, it appears that the local authorities do not lend assistance necessary for enforcing collection of taxes.

French Minister is also communicating the above to his Government.

[5249] No. 60.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 4, 1913.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegrams Nos. 66 and 67, both of 3rd February: Adrianople.

You should ask Bulgarian Government whether they can take any steps to carry out the two proposals made by the consuls at Adrianople.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 75.)

[5252] No. 61.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 36 of 3rd February.

An indemnity will probably be opposed by the Powers, and I do not think Turkey should, or can, be made to pay it, but this had better be the subject of joint action by the Powers. You can, however, state my own view unofficially, but only if you are asked about it.

[4660] No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 12 of 30th January: Customs duties

As there is some prospect of an arrangement between the Greeks and the Servians for duties only being levied at the port of entry and at 11 per cent. *ad valorem* on goods destined for the occupied territories, you need not make representations for the present.

[2925] No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 24.) *Foreign Office, February 4, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 14 of the 15th January, I would draw your attention to paragraph 16 of Mr. Young's despatch No. 1 of the 2nd January, enclosed in your despatch No. 4, Confidential, of the 6th January. In this paragraph it is stated that the komitajis chiefly responsible for the outrages at Cavalla were the individuals Tcheropoeief and Tchakof.

You should inform the Bulgarian Government unofficially that information to this effect has reached His Majesty's Government. You should add that the reports of these outrages are attracting increasing attention in this country, and express the hope of His Majesty's Government that those who can be proved to have been responsible for them will be dealt with as justice demands.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2873] No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 25.) *Foreign Office, February 4, 1913.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade,* enclosing a report from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica respecting the damage inflicted by the allied troops in the districts in their military occupation.

You should take an opportunity of taking action similar to that reported by Sir R. Paget in paragraph 2 of his above-mentioned despatch.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4664] No. 65.

Sir Edward Grey to Servian Chargé d'Affaires.

Foreign Office, February 4, 1913.

Sir,

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Servian chargé d'affaires, and has the honour to inform him that some weeks ago His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade was instructed to protest to the Servian Government against the imposition of customs duties on British goods imported into the Turkish territory now occupied by the Servian military forces.

By agreement made under the capitulations the maximum duty payable by British goods on importation into Turkish territory is fixed at 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, and this limitation in the amount of the duty payable cannot be invalidated by the mere fact that Turkish territory is in the occupation of foreign military forces.

Sir R. Paget was instructed to point this out to the Servian Government, to add that the Turkish customs duties were already largely pledged as security for various Turkish obligations, and to represent that duties should only be levied on the goods at the port of entry (*e.g.*, Salonica) and not at other points, such as Gheygheli and Uskub, and finally, that the duties should not be in excess of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*.

The Servian Government professed to agree entirely with the views of His Majesty's Government, and gave Sir R. Paget to understand that an arrangement on the subject was about to be concluded between the Servian and Greek authorities.

The Servian Government further intimated that the necessary instructions had been issued to the officials at Gheygheli and Uskub.

Sir E. Grey has been painfully impressed by the receipt of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade, to the effect that the complaints of His Majesty's consular officers at Salonica and Uskub with regard to the action of the Servian officials at Gheygheli and Uskub are continuous, and that those officials continue the vexatious

* Part IV, No. 556.

interference with British goods, either by refusing entry, by confiscation, by delay, or by the imposition of unjustifiable duties. He cannot doubt that the Servian Government will now issue precise and urgent instructions to the officials concerned, and he has to request M. Grouitch to be so good as to communicate with the Servian Government by telegraph, since the representations of Sir R. Paget have proved unavailing.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5494] No. 66.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 74.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 31, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an extract of the *procès-verbal* of the sitting of the 3rd (16th) January of the Administrative Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, relative to the seizure of the funds deposited with the Imperial Ottoman Bank at Salonica.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 66.

Extract from Procès-Verbal of Meeting of Administrative Council of Ottoman Public Debt held January 3 (16), 1913.

Services de l'Administration à Salonique: Démarches des Syndicats concernant la Saisie-arrêt indûment pratiquée sur les Fonds déposés à la Banque Impériale ottomane de cette ville.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT expose au conseil qu'il avait, en conformité de la décision relatée au paragraphe 4 du Procès-Verbal No. 31 du 15 (28) décembre, 1912, écrit au Syndicat des Porteurs français, en même temps qu'aux autres syndicats, pour faire lever la saisie-arrêt indûment pratiquée par les autorités helléniques sur les fonds de la Dette publique déposés à la Banque Impériale ottomane à Salonique. De la lettre en date du 6 janvier, 1913, qu'il a reçue, en réponse de M. le Baron Hottinguer, président du syndicat français, il ressort que ce dernier, qui avait été déjà saisi de la question par la Banque Impériale ottomane, en a fait l'objet de deux communications adressées, les 21 et 23 décembre dernier, au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France.

M. le président donne connaissance également au conseil (1) d'une lettre en date du 8 janvier, 1913, par laquelle M. Bleichröder, président du Syndicat des Porteurs allemands, informe le conseil qu'il a entretenu le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, lequel lui a donné l'assurance que le Gouvernement allemand s'en occuperait; (2) d'une lettre en date du 11 janvier, 1913, par laquelle le Syndicat des Porteurs austro-hongrois l'informe qu'il est intervenu dans le même sens auprès de son Gouvernement.

M. de La Boulinière fait enfin part au conseil d'une lettre adressée, à la date du 31 décembre, 1912, au Ministre de Grèce à Paris par le président du Conseil des Ministres français.

Dans cette lettre, M. Poincaré signale le préjudice sérieux qui pourrait résulter pour l'Administration de la Dette publique si les fonds déposés par elle dans les caisses de la Banque Impériale ottomane devaient continuer à être immobilisés pour la raison qu'une partie peut en revenir au Gouvernement ottoman à titre d'excédents.

Le président du Conseil des Ministres français fait remarquer à ce propos que les recettes encaissées jusqu'à ce jour par la Dette publique ne sont pas suffisant: pour assurer, au titre de l'exercice en cours, le service normal des emprunts gérés par l'administration; que c'est seulement en fin d'exercice que l'on peut établir si les encaissements de la Dette publique laissent ou non des excédents, et, enfin, que ces excédents eux-mêmes ont reçu une affectation qui peut les absorber en totalité. Dans ces conditions, pendant toute la durée de l'exercice, aucune partie des recettes de la Dette publique ne saurait être séquestrée, puisqu'il ne peut s'agir encore que d'un droit éventuel. Les réserves expresses formulées par les autorités helléniques en ce qui concerne les excédents non affectés au service des emprunts et qui ne peuvent

revenir au Trésor ottoman sont suffisantes pour tenir la question en suspens et prévenir des versements anticipés qui seraient faits à leur détriment.

Le Gouvernement de la république se plaît donc à espérer que le Gouvernement hellénique autorisera sans délai la succursale de la Banque Impériale ottomane à Salonique à se dessaisir des fonds déposés chez elle par l'Administration de la Dette publique, acte lui étant donné, en retour, des réserves formulées en ce qui touche les excédents éventuellement disponibles en fin d'exercice.

M. Poincaré attire ensuite l'attention du Ministre de Grèce sur la question du droit de douane auquel les autorités helléniques ont soumis les matières et fournitures que la manufacture de la Régie des Tabacs à Salonique reçoit du dépôt central de Constantinople. La Régie des Tabacs, déclare M. Poincaré, n'est qu'une société chargée aux lieu et place de la Dette publique de gérer le monopole du tabac, lequel fait partie des revenus concédés à l'administration, et toute entrave apportée à la marche normale de l'exploitation de la Régie est de nature à léser les intérêts légitimes des créanciers étrangers de la Turquie, comme toute entrave apportée au fonctionnement de la Dette publique.

M. le président du Conseil des Ministres français exprime, en terminant, l'espoir que le Gouvernement hellénique voudra bien donner sur ces deux points aux autorités chargées de le représenter dans les provinces occupées des instructions conformes aux vues ci-dessus exposées.

Le conseil prend acte avec satisfaction de ces diverses communications.

[5495] No. 67.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 75.)

Constantinople, January 31, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir giving a report on current events in that district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 67.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Monastir, January 23, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on current events in this district:—

1. *Military Information.*

(*a.*) *The Turks and Greeks.*—Information concerning the campaign in the Gorcha and Colonia districts is generally fragmentary and belated.

From the 23rd November till the 18th December there was no serious development. During that period Javid Pasha divided his forces between Gorcha and Liaskovek, Mustapha Pasha commanding at the former, and Mehmet Ali Pasha at the latter place.

Towards the middle of December there was an obscure encounter east of Liaskovek. Presumably the Greek troops engaged were of the 3rd division. Almost immediately afterwards that division joined the main body operating against Gorcha consisting of the 5th and 6th divisions, the 4th division having left for Salonica. By that time the Turkish position in Gorcha seems to have become precarious. Food was scarce and wholesale desertion was reported to be occurring. By the 18th December Javid Pasha seems to have decided to evacuate the place.

Reluctant to make any concession to the Greeks and hoping to enhance the antagonism well known to exist between the allies, he invited the officer in command at the nearest Servian outpost to send troops to Gorcha and inform the Greeks that the town was occupied by a Turco-Serb force.

Some negotiations on the subject appear to have actually taken place.

The same day (the 18th), by an attack possibly intended to mask the impending retreat, the Greeks were driven from their advanced position at Biklishta as far as Smerdesh on the Florina road. The attack was carried out by a force of local irregulars

with some stiffening of nizams under the leadership of Mustapha Pasha. Some Greek artillery is said to have been temporarily lost. The losses on either side are unknown.

The following day the remaining Turks, supposed to have been about 6,000 strong, evacuated the town, which was occupied on the 20th by the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Greek divisions.

About the same time some 2,000 Turkish soldiers and twelve officers surrendered to the Serbs at Svezda. They probably included most of those who had taken part in the encounter at Biklishta on the 18th. The Turks left behind three field-guns and 200 sick and wounded. The guns could not have been transported on the Liaskovek road, many bridges having been destroyed. The Turks retired by that road. They were followed by the 3rd and 5th divisions, accompanied by some cavalry and a horde of irregulars. Skirmishes were reported in the Kiari Hill district on the following days, but nothing certain is known of their result.

Javid Pasha is now reported to have established himself at Borova, a village south-south-west of Ersek. He is said to have received a reinforcement of artillery from Janina. Mustapha Pasha is believed to be at Ersek. The troops under Javid Pasha are said to number in all upwards of 12,000. The nearest Greeks are, according to all accounts, at Kinfasez and Elmisi.

The road between Liaskovek and Janina is said to be still open to the Turks, as well as the roads leading towards Argyrocastro, Perneti, and Berat.

Moskopolje (west of Gorcha) has been occupied by the Greeks. There is no news of their having penetrated further west.

Numbers of Moslem villages were destroyed or plundered—it is believed, with much unnecessary loss of life—by the Greeks in the Devol district between Biklishta and Gorcha. According to reports from missionaries in that region, the Moslems have been mercilessly treated both at Gorcha itself and in the villages. It seems probable that most of the excesses were committed by irregulars, but many of the latter wear uniform and cannot be distinguished from regulars. It is eloquent testimony to the terror inspired by these auxiliaries that some 2,000 Moslem families from the Biklishta, Kastoria, and Gorcha districts have fled to Zvesda and Poyani, which are in the Servian sphere.

The strength of the three Greek divisions which occupied Gorcha is estimated at about 20,000 men in all. The irregulars with them are said to have numbered about 10,000. The Greek 6th division left Gorcha almost immediately after its occupation for Florina and Salonica, where, is is understood, it was to replace troops sent to Janina.

There is no reliable information as to the whereabouts of Ali Riza and Karasaid Pashas. Zekki Pasha with 8,000 men of the Vardar army is believed to be at Janina.

Reliable news has now been received concerning the fate of Fethi Pasha. It was communicated to my Austrian colleague by the surgeon who attended him. He was wounded by shrapnel in the breast and arm during the fighting round Monastir, near the village of Kukurechani, whilst trying to stop the flight of his troops. He was carried to Kajan, where he died. He was buried in a mosque at Ressan I believe, with military honours—by the Serbs.

(*b.*) *The Serbs.*—The Servian troops in or bordering on this district are distributed as follows:—

1st ban Morava division: General Goikovitch; head-quarters, Monastir; garrisons the town of Monastir (about 6,000 men) and furnishes contingents for Ressan, Ochrida, Sturga, Svezda, and Kenali.

2nd ban Morava division: Colonel Neditch (absent); head-quarters, Kikandeleu; provides garrisons for Gostivar, Dibra, and Elbassan.

1st ban Drina division: General Yourishitch-Sturm (absent); head-quarters, Kavadar; garrisons Kavadar, Perlepé, and Krivolak; provides patrols for Morihovo district.

The fifty-two guns captured here from the Turks, including four taken by them from the Greek 5th division, some 24,000 captured rifles, and 35,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, have been sent to Servia. The Turkish prisoners of war have all been dispatched to the same destination. Only some 300 sick and wounded Turkish soldiers remain here.

The troops at Durazzo belong to the 3rd army.

There has been fighting in the Dibra district between the Servian troops and Malissors, the facts of which are tardily becoming known. It would appear that

about the 4th instant, as an outcome of an attempt to disarm the population, a Servian picket was surprised by tribesmen near Dervdyani (north-north east of Dibra), and lost fifty or sixty men killed and wounded, a captain and a lieutenant being killed. Reinforcements of two battalions from Dibra and two battalions from Ochrida with two field and two mountain guns were promptly dispatched and some twenty villages are reported to have been destroyed as a punitive measure. Nothing further is known, but eight battalions are being held in readiness by the 1st ban Morava division and others at Gostivar.

The decision to disarm the population of Dibra seems to have been the outcome of the discovery of rifles and ammunition under a load of straw in a cart issuing from the house of a Moslem notable of the town.

2. *Albanian Feeling.*

Apart from the incident near Dibra, the Albanians in this district have nowhere actively resisted either Greeks or Serbs. Although it is reported from Gorcha that there was Albanian bands in arms between Berat and Moskopolje and that Javid Pasha is stirring up resistance further south, no very serious development is expected. The vigorous measures of the Serbs are likely to overawe the Malissors, and the Tosks are not reckoned a fighting set.

The greatest hope of the Albanian nationalists in Monastir is in British support. They appear to fully recognise the price that must be finally paid for Italian or Austrian help.

They condemn the Albanians of the littoral who favour those countries, and believe that most of inland Albania at heart shares this disapproval.

Serbs and Greeks appear equally determined not to tolerate foreign propaganda in Albania, and view with the greatest suspicion the American missionaries at Elbassan and Gorcha, whose sympathies are openly pro-nationalist, and who—above all—are under Austrian protection. A few weeks ago Mr. Erickson, of the American Mission at Elbassan, was expelled by the Serbs. He was similarly treated on two occasions by the Turks.

A petition, signed by a number of Moslems of Dibra, was recently sent to the King of Servia, expressing a desire for Servian overlordship, "as the next best thing to a Moslem Government."

A similar petition, *mutatis mutandis*, seems to have been sent by Moslems of Gorcha to the King of the Hellenes.

This action is most unlikely to have been spontaneous.

Many leading Albanians are reported to have left various parts of this district for Valona. Abul Bey Uppi, president of the Albanian Club in Constantinople, and Fehim Bey Zavalani, an influential nationalist, recently left this town, probably for that destination. They have been unable to get beyond Gorcha.

The only Albanian districts now free from invasion are Valona, Argyrocastro, Berat, Liaskovek, Permeti, Frashari, Skrapar, and Lioushniya. Matiya and the Dibra Malissiva cannot be said to have been actually occupied, but they are invested.

3. *Relations between Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgars.*

The Serbs and Greeks continue to accuse one another of encroachment all along the front of their spheres. It is especially the case in the Florina and Morihovo districts.

(*a.*) *The Florina district.*—Buf (north-west of Florina), Papadijé (east-north-east of Florina), and Voshtaran (east by north of Florina), originally in Greek occupation, have all been occupied by the Serbs more or less under threat.

The Greeks retaliated by spreading reports of an impending Greek occupation of Monastir, to which the Serbs retorted by talk of expelling the Greeks from Florina. The latter threat was supported by considerable practical bluff, and on the 25th December the Prefect of Monastir went to Florina, apparently with instructions, if possible, to frighten the Greeks into withdrawing, and establish a Serb sub-prefect. The Greek Governor of Florina, however, stood his ground, and the Serb claim has not been further pressed.

A somewhat serious incident has occurred at Nakolets. That village, which lies on the eastern shore of Lake Presba, was occupied originally by the Greeks on the

1st December. A few days ago it was seized by two companies of Servian soldiers who disarmed and expelled a Greek company. The latter offered no resistance.

(*b.*) *The Morihovo District.*—The population of Morihovo is almost exclusively Slav, but Patriarchist propaganda of many years has succeeded in establishing schools and other interests.

When Monastir was occupied, the Serbs neglected to garrison or patrol it, whilst the Greeks sent a company of soldiers to Gradeshnitsa and another to Staravina with pickets as far north as Krushevitsa (a few hours' distance south-south-east of Perlepé). Elsewhere they sent parties of irregulars and began to divide up the district into administrative "communes."

This provoked the Serbs, who began to likewise send pickets to various points. These have recently been in collision with the Greeks at Krushevitsa and Staravina, where the Greek flag is reported to have been removed. So far as it is possible to ascertain, there has been no bloodshed, the Greeks retiring.

In order to define the temporary limits of the Greek and Servian spheres, a commission of two Greek and two Servian officers has been formed. One of the Greek commissioners is a Lieutenant-Colonel Hadji Anesti, a half-brother of the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, chief of staff of the 3rd division.

The ill-feeling over the Morihovo district has been embittered by the arrest and imprisonment by the Serbs of one Risté Kirmak, a native of Nakovo (Morihovo), of Greek sympathies. He was accused of inciting the inhabitants to sign a petition in favour of annexation to Greece. The prefect of Monastir assures me that the petition was found in Kirmak's pocket and that it was entirely worded in Bulgarian.

The Greeks complain that persons of Greek leanings are mysteriously disappearing in Morihovo.

The Bulgarians cling to a belief that Monastir will fall to their lot. Possibly their hope is encouraged by the Russian acting consul (M. Kokhmansky).

Their komitajis, whose predatory habits are now subject to considerable restraint, consider themselves hardly used and accuse the Serbs of ingratitude. My Russian colleagues states that a deputation from them recently waited on him to explain that life here is becoming so unprofitable that emigration is likely to be their only resource.

Great indignation has been caused amongst the Bulgarians by the disappearance of one Athanas Lutviev, a native of Perlepé, who was employed as a Bulgarian schoolmaster at Salonica. He recently returned to Perlepé to visit his friends. The following account of the incident is generally credited here.

On the birthday of the Crown Prince of Servia a banquet was given by the Servian authorities at Perlepé to which Lutviev was invited. During the banquet he made a speech, in which allusion to the success of the Servian arms and any expression of satisfaction at the Servian occupation were conspicuously absent. Consequently his hosts were annoyed. In the course of the evening he disappeared from the company, and was seen by a waiter being hurried away by four soldiers, gagged, towards the Servian school. He was not again seen.

A Bulgarian who slept that night in an upper room at the Servian school heard a commotion in the cellar underneath, and the cries and groans of a man apparently undergoing torture. Nothing further is certainly known.

The Serbs now fear that the Bulgarians, as compensation for any concession made to Roumanian demands, may insist on having Monastir.

4. *The Moslems.*

Most of the Moslems appear resigned to a change of régime. Some may emigrate. M. Protitch, formerly Servian vice-consul in Monastir, tells me it will be the deliberate policy of his Government to encourage Moslem emigration.

Since the komitajis have been disbanded the Moslem inhabitants of the villages have less to fear. Several complaints have, however, been received of blackmail and threats by Christians. The blackmail is said to generally take the form of a request addressed by a Christian to a Moslem requiring him to sign an admission that he owes a certain sum. That done, he is persecuted until payment is made. Or the Moslem may be reminded that his grandfather owed a certain sum, and requested under threat to pay it over to some descendant of the alleged original Christian creditor. Happily the Servian authorities are not known to have been privy to any case of the kind.

In Monastir itself it seems certain, though it is almost impossible to obtain proof, that better-to-do Moslems have been scandalously exploited by the "informers" used

by the Serbs. They are generally men of bad character, the dregs of the gang of former propagandists, who are now reaping a rich reward.

Despite these circumstances, of two evils the Moslems seem unanimously to prefer Serb to Greek rule.

5. *Administrative Measures.*

The following information has been received as to the administrative distribution of the territories occupied by the Serbs :—

Bitoli (Monastir) department (Okrug) includes the sub-prefectures of Perlepé, Krushevo, Ochrida, Ressna or Presba, and Florina (at present Greek).

Dibra department includes the sub-prefectures of Mat and Rekalar.

The maritime department (Primorski Okrug) includes the sub-prefectures of Durazzo, Elbassan, Alessio, Tirana, and Kavaja.

Apart from the judicial and municipal authorities the central administrative staff of a department should consist of the prefect ("nachalnik"), secretary-general ("pomotchnik"), administrative secretary ("sekretar"), and treasurer ("blagainik nachelstva").

The corresponding staff of a sub-prefecture should consist of a sub-prefect ("sreski nachalnik"), a treasurer, and a registrar ("pisar").

No regular tribunals have yet been established in this district. In pursuance of a recent ukase the president of a court of first instance (civil and criminal) has arrived, but his staff (a judge, secretary, and registrar) are lacking. No step has yet been taken towards the formation of a court of appeal, although one apparently exists already at Uskub, where the judicial system is reported to be nearer completion.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

P.S.—Whilst the municipal officials are generally selected from amongst the local inhabitants (former Servian schoolmasters and other propagandists), the civil officials, I am informed, have nearly all come from Servia.

C. A. G.

[5496] No. 68.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 76. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 30, 1913.*

HAVING received a note from Prince Said Halim informing me that he had been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, I yesterday went and presented my respects to him.

The Prince is a relative of the Khedive of Egypt, but is not on good terms with him, and when the Khedive comes here visits are not exchanged. He is an ardent member of the Union and Progress party, and his house is frequently selected for its meetings.

The selection as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Prince Said Halim Pasha, who is also secretary-general of the Committee of Union and Progress, is certainly peculiar and of no good augury, in view of his past intrigues with Egyptian extreme nationalism.

He is said to have made large financial sacrifices in favour of the committee. He has been previously President of the Council of State, but this is the first occasion on which he has accepted an important portfolio, and his absence of all administrative experience would seem to indicate that he will not fill the office to the advantage of the State.

My colleagues and I were, by our visit to his Highness yesterday, impressed by the fact that the Minister, although a good French scholar, seemed to be so strange to his new surroundings that he was indisposed to converse on any political subject, and the interviews were limited to the exchange of mere compliments expressed in the briefest form.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[5497] No. 69.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 31, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir on the subject of the attitude of the Servian authorities towards the Ottoman Public Debt.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, January 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Ernest Grenier, principal inspector of the Ottoman Debt, has been some days in Monastir endeavouring to secure the resumption of the service which has been suspended since the occupation of this town by the Serbs, as reported in my despatches Nos. 83 and 84 of the 9th and 16th December last.

His representations have been addressed verbally to the Servian authorities in Monastir and telegraphically to M. Balukji, a former Servian consul-general at Salonica, who is at present attached by the Servian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the head-quarters in Uskub.

Like my French colleague and myself, he has on every occasion been assured that a favourable solution is imminent.

It is invariably postponed.

After exercising the greatest patience, he is now hopeless of any result and is leaving Monastir convinced that nothing short of diplomatic representations will be of any avail.

The Servian attitude is difficult to explain, unless—by Russian advice, and relying on Russia as a medium for future borrowings—the Servian Government proposes to repudiate all obligations toward the Debt, risking the odium of the powerful interests concerned. Russia might welcome a financial tutelage of the kind.

As an outcome of the war and the subsequent suspension of the service in this district, the receipts for September, October, November, and December, 1328 (Turkish), show a deficit of 7,905,906 fr. as compared with the corresponding period of 1327. A further sum of about 35,000 fr., representing salaries and working expenses, has been wasted.

Perhaps some indication of Servian intentions may be found in the fact that the fisheries of Lakes Ochrida and Presba, which bring in considerable revenue to the Debt, have been let by the authorities.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[5499] No. 70.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 79.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 1, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul general at Salonica, reporting on the attempted creation of a Bulgarian bishopric in that town.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 70.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 5.)

Salonica, January 23, 1913.

Sir,

A NEW and unexpected, but by no means unimportant, subject of dissension has arisen between the Greeks and Bulgarians in this place through the establishment here of a metropolitan bishopric by the latter.

As your Excellency is doubtless aware, there have hitherto been seven metropolitan dioceses under the Exarchate in Macedonia, viz., those of Okrida, Veles (Kiupruli), Uskub, Nevrocop, Monastir, Dibra, and Strumnitza, the three last-named having been created during the Greco-Turkish war of 1897. The spiritual chief of the Bulgarian community in Salonica, like those of Istib, Kilkish, Melnik, Petritch, Ghevgheli, Doiran, Vodena, Yenidje-Vardar, and Kastoria, bore the title simply of "presidetel," or president of the communal council.

About ten or fifteen days ago the board over the residence of the presidetel in this city was replaced by one bearing the inscription "Bulgarian metropolitan bishopric," a sentry being posted at the door with an obvious view to preventing any possible interference on the part of the Greeks. The latter, however, being unwilling to raise a new and delicate question at so critical a moment, took no apparent notice, and, as the building in question is situated in a somewhat out-of-the-way quarter, the general public does not seem to have been even aware of the change. The matter was brought to a head on the 19th instant, the Orthodox feast of the Epiphany, when the newly created metropolitan celebrated a solemn mass in the mosque of Saint Sophia, the ceremony of the blessing of the waters taking place at the fountain in the courtyard of the mosque in the presence of all the Bulgarian troops at present quartered in Salonica.

When the Greeks entered the town on the 9th November, all the mosques, many of which are converted churches, were filled with refugees, who for the first day or two were left undisturbed. The arrival of the Bulgarian troops on the 10th was shortly followed by a somewhat unseemly scramble for the possession of these buildings, the Greeks finally securing Saint Dimitri and the Bulgars Saint Sophia, and the idea was then mooted of reconsecrating them as Christian places of worship. Owing very largely to the counsels of the foreign consuls, the Greek authorities decided to defer this operation, and informed the Bulgarians of their decision. On the 14th, however, as reported in my despatch No. 155 of the 15th November, 1912, the Bulgarians attempted to hold a religious service at Saint Sophia, and the determination of the Greeks to prevent them very nearly led to an armed conflict between the two nationalities, after which incident the supreme authorities on both sides came to an agreement to leave the mosques for the present *in statu quo*. The action of the Bulgarians in celebrating their Epiphany service in Saint Sophia is therefore regarded as a breach of faith, and the Greeks have felt themselves compelled to take official notice of it. I understand that on the 21st instant the prefect addressed a note, couched in very moderate terms, to the Bulgarian vicar, pointing out the irregularities committed and calling for an explanation. So far no answer has been received, but there can be no doubt that more will be heard of the subject before long.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S.—Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Britannic Majesty's Legations at Athens and Sophia.

H. H. L.

(5501) No. 71.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 81.)

Constantinople, February 1, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 59 of the 30th of last month, I have the honour to enclose herewith, for convenience of reference, copies of the collective note regarding the solution of the peace negotiations and the question of Adrianople, as also of the Sublime Porte's reply thereto.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 71.

Collective Note addressed to Sublime Porte, January 17, 1913.

LES soussignés, Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie, d'Allemagne et d'Italie, ont été chargés par leurs Gouvernements de faire à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan la communication suivante :

"Désireuses de prévenir la reprise des hostilités, lesdites Puissances croient devoir appeler l'attention du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman sur la grave responsabilité qu'il assumerait si, par sa résistance à leurs conseils, il empêchait le rétablissement de la paix. Il n'aurait qu'à s'en prendre à lui-même si la prolongation de la guerre avait pour conséquence de mettre en question le sort de la capitale et peut-être d'étendre les hostilités aux provinces asiatiques de l'Empire. Dans ce cas, il ne pourrait pas compter sur le succès de leurs efforts pour le préserver contre les dangers auxquels elles l'ont déjà disculpé et le détournent encore de s'exposer.

"En tout état de cause, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman aura besoin, après la conclusion de la paix, de l'appui moral et matériel des Grandes Puissances européennes pour réparer les maux de la guerre, consolider sa situation à Constantinople et mettre en valeur les vastes territoires asiatiques dont la prospérité contribuera de force la plus effective. Pour entreprendre et mener à bien cette œuvre pacifique, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan ne saurait encore compter sur l'efficacité du bienveillant appui des Puissances qu'autant qu'il aura délégué à leurs avis, qui s'inspirent des intérêts généraux de l'Europe et de ceux de la Turquie.

"Dans ces conditions, les Grandes Puissances européennes croient devoir émettre collectivement au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman le conseil de consentir à la cession de la ville d'Andrinople aux alliés balkaniques et de s'en remettre à elle du soin de statuer sur le sort des îles de la Mer Egée.

"En retour de ces concessions, lesdites Puissances s'emploieront à assurer la sauvegarde des intérêts musulmans à Andrinople et le respect des mosquées, édifices et biens religieux existant dans cette ville. Elles feraient également en sorte que la solution donnée par elles à la question des îles de l'Archipel excitât toute sa vue pour la sécurité de la Turquie."

Constantinople, le 17 *janvier*, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 71.

Reply of Sublime Porte to Collective Note.

LE soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, a pris connaissance du contenu de la note collective de leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie, d'Allemagne et d'Italie, qui ont bien voulu remettre à son prédécesseur en date du 17 courant.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman n'hésite pas à reconnaître que la conclusion de la paix répond aux vœux et aux intérêts de tous, et il se rend compte que c'est de mettre, le plus tôt possible, un terme à une lutte qu'il n'a nullement provoquée.

Dans leur communication, les Grandes Puissances ont jugé utile de conseiller au Gouvernement Impérial de consentir à la cession de la ville d'Andrinople aux alliés balkaniques, et de s'en remettre à elles du soin de statuer sur le sort des îles de la Mer Egée.

Le Gouvernement Impérial croit devoir relever qu'il a deux fois de preuves irréfutables de son esprit de conciliation en cédant un à chacune des guerres.

Andrinople étant une ville essentiellement musulmane et la seconde capitale de la Turquie et se trouvant exceptionnellement avoir de grandes relations avec l'Empire, la rumeur même de sa cession a provoqué un sentiment de réprobation dans tout le pays et une effervescence telle qu'elle a amené la démission du précédent Cabinet.

Néanmoins, pour donner un suprême témoignage de son esprit pacifique, le Gouvernement Impérial est disposé à s'en remettre aux Grandes Puissances en ce qui

concerne la partie de la ville d'Andrinople qui est sise sur la rive droite de la Maritza en conservant la partie située sur la rive gauche.

Les mosquées, mausolées et autres souvenirs historiques et religieux se trouvant dans la partie de la ville sise sur la rive gauche de la Maritza, la conservation de cette partie sous la souveraineté directe ottomane est pour le Gouvernement Impérial une nécessité, dont il ne peut ne pas tenir compte sans exposer le pays à une commotion qui pourrait entraîner les plus graves conséquences.

Quant aux îles de la Mer Egée, le Gouvernement Impérial se permet de faire observer que tandis qu'une partie de ces îles sont, à cause de leur voisinage immédiat au détroit des Dardanelles, indispensables à la défense de la capitale, les autres faisant partie intégrante des possessions asiatiques de l'Empire n'en sont pas moins indispensables à la sécurité de l'Asie Mineure.

Toute solution qui tendrait à amoindrir l'autorité du Gouvernement Impérial dans ces îles aurait pour résultat de les transformer en autant de foyers d'agitation qui ébranlerait leur action sur le littoral avoisinant. La conséquence en serait la création d'un état de perturbation analogue à celui qui existait en Macédoine et qui a menacé et menace encore la tranquillité de l'Europe. Indépendamment de l'effet déplorable qu'elle produirait sur l'opinion publique ottomane, une pareille solution irait à l'encontre des vues des Grandes Puissances elles-mêmes, qui ont à cœur l'établissement d'une paix durable et la consolidation ainsi que la prospérité de l'Empire.

Par conséquent, la Sublime Porte pourrait adhérer à ce que les six Grandes Puissances voudront bien statuer sur le sort des îles occupées par les alliés balkaniques en tenant compte des considérations qui précèdent et du soin qu'il faut apporter à l'intégrité de la position des Dardanelles, ce que la Sublime Porte estime être une question du haut intérêt européen.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est persuadé que les Grandes Puissances, dans leur esprit de justice et d'équité, voudront bien reconnaître l'étendue des sacrifices déjà consentis et croient que la Sublime Porte serait en droit de rejeter toutes nouvelles exigences ou prétentions qui éventuellement pourraient être soulevées par les alliés balkaniques.

La Sublime Porte prend acte avec une réelle satisfaction des dispositions et promesses bienveillantes des Grandes Puissances en ce qui concerne leur appui moral et matériel pour réparer les maux de la guerre, et mettre en valeur les ressources naturelles de l'Empire.

A cet effet, il est indispensable que les Puissances reconnaissent d'ores et déjà le droit à la Turquie de procéder en toute liberté à l'adoption d'un tarif autonome de douane, à la conclusion de traités de commerce sur la base des principes du droit moderne et à l'application à l'égard de leurs sujets des lois fiscales ottomanes auxquelles seront soumis les sujets ottomans, et qu'elles consentent, en attendant, à la majoration de 4 pour cent des droits de douane.

La Sublime Porte croit qu'il est non moins indispensable d'arriver à l'abolition des bureaux de postes étrangers existant en Turquie à des conditions qu'il serait facile de déterminer en vue d'offrir au commerce toutes les garanties de célérité et de sécurité nécessaires au point de vue postal. Elle estime en outre qu'une déclaration des Puissances sur le désir de mettre fin au régime des Capitulations dans l'Empire ottoman et l'ouverture après la conclusion de la paix de négociations pour étudier en commun les moyens propres à réaliser ce but, formera avec les matières économiques ci-dessus énumérées un ensemble de mesures permettant la réalisation des promesses des Puissances exposées dans leur note susmentionnée.

Constantinople, le 30 janvier, 1913.

[5646 No. 72.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 37.) *St. Petersburgh, February 5, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me that in conversation with him yesterday Prince Hohenlohe had assured him that Austria desired nothing so much as cordial relations with Russia. During the late crisis new facts had arisen, and it was impossible for her to be indifferent to what was passing on the other side of her frontier, but none of the measures which she had taken had been inspired by any

hostile feeling to Russia. Austrian Government were most anxious to do nothing to disturb Austro-Russian relations.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had replied in similar friendly terms. His Excellency had then explained that Russia, from historic traditions, could not be indifferent to what happened to the Balkan Slavs. After great sacrifices which they had made she was bound to do all she could to help them to derive as much profit as possible from their victories. She had, however, recognised the special interests which Austria has on the Adriatic, and, in order to meet her wishes, had yielded on the question of the Servian port. After this sacrifice and after the correct attitude adopted by Servia, she had expected to see some diminution of Austrian armaments. In this she had been disappointed.

Prince Hohenlohe had then explained that in view of the tone of the Servian press, Austria had no guarantee that Servia would abstain from all provocative acts. Austria, moreover, was not a homogeneous State, and difficulties of her internal situation rendered it imperative for her to neglect no precautions.

On my enquiring whether his Excellency anticipated any good results from this visit, he said that it was a "geste pacifique," and as such was satisfactory. The Prince was not competent to discuss any of the questions at issue, though he had been authorised to state that Austria consented to the monastery in which Russia was specially interested between Ipek and Jakova being left to Servia. In the reply to the Emperor of Austria's letter the Emperor of Russia had expressed the hope that by common efforts on the part of the two Governments and by mutual concessions an arrangement satisfactory to both would be arrived at.

[5645] No. 73.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 65.) *Constantinople, February 5, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MILITARY attachés and war correspondents are not to be allowed to proceed to the front, but will be furnished with information by special officials at Ministry of War.

[5640] No. 74.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 70.) *Constantinople, February 5, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 43 of 25th January.

On the application of the Italian Embassy, firman has been issued for the passage through the Dardanelles of two Italian ships of war, and the French Ambassador has to-day applied for the passage of the "Victor Hugo." I would propose, with your sanction, to apply for the passage of one of the two of His Majesty's ships now at Besika Bay. She would presumably be provisioned as to coal, &c.

I submit that it would be inadvisable that a British admiral should come up, as the French admiral here has been all along charged with the necessary arrangements.

[5620] No. 75.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 42.) *Sophia, February 5, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 23 of 1st February.

I and all my colleagues have acted in the sense of the above-mentioned telegram.

Bulgarian Government is willing to consent to suggestion that a representative of the Sultan be appointed at Adrianople after the cession of the town.

In view of action of the Russian Minister reported in my telegram No. 36 of 3rd February, this step is known here as "Russian *démarche*."

(Sent to Constantinople.)

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[5642] No. 76.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey. (*Received February 5.*)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, February 5, 1913.*

BRITISH vice-consul at Cavalla reports compulsory conversion of Mahommedan population of Ruptchos and Nevrocop districts by the Bulgarian population and petty local authorities.

[5307] No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

SIR H. BAX IRONSIDES telegram No. 37 of 3rd February and your telegram No. 12 of 23th January: Balkan war indemnity.

You should enquire as to the Bulgarian Prime Minister's statement respecting the alleged views of French Minister of Finance as to an indemnity.

[5954] No. 78.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

IN general conversation with M. Cambon to-day, I repeated that I was strongly opposed to the claim of the allies to have an indemnity from Turkey. If Turkey was not to be swept away altogether, she should be set on her feet as regards the possessions left to her after the war. A bankrupt Turkey, which could not be given financial stability, would not be to the interest of the Powers, who desired to see her kept in existence.

[5258] No. 79.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 4 of 3rd February: Ships at Suda Bay.

I concur.

[4572] No. 80.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 92.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of a letter received from the Council of Foreign Bondholders urging that His Majesty's Government should address to the Bulgarian and Servian Governments a protest against interference with Ottoman Public Debt officials and interests,† and of a telegram which I have sent on February 1st to His Majesty's representatives at Athens, Belgrade, and Sophia instructing them to make a protest in the sense desired.

I have to request your Excellency to inform the Government to which you are accredited of the action taken by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 24), Sir E. Goschen (No. 59), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 41).
† Part IV, No. 537.

[5946] No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 105.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

I TOLD M. Cambon to-day that it was really no good to proceed with the meetings of Ambassadors unless we could make progress with the Albanian question. To-morrow we should find out how much the Austrian Ambassador had to offer. It would not satisfy Russia. The only suggestion which I could make would be that an international frontier commission should examine the question on the spot, taking into account ethnographical and geographical conditions, the positions of the pasturages of the various tribes, and the disposition of the population. The commission should then make a report as to what it considered the frontier should be. This was really the only sensible way of dealing with the question, and it would be much easier for any Government, whether the Austrian or the Russian, to make concessions if they were based upon such a report.

M. Cambon said that he did not find the idea at all a bad one, and he suggested that I might throw it out to-morrow as a suggestion at the meeting of Ambassadors.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5945] No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 55.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador informed me to-day that the German Ambassador in Constantinople gathered that the Turkish Government might give up the part of Adrianople on the right bank of the Tundja instead of the Maritza. The Grand Vizier would not give way about the town as a whole, but he might agree to a neutralisation of it. He feared, however, that Bulgaria was being encouraged by Russia and France not to listen to any compromise.

I said that I did not think this was so. Bulgaria had all through the negotiations said that she must have the town. In any case, she had now gone to war to see if she could take the town, and she would not listen to any compromise unless she found that she was mistaken in thinking that she could capture it.

Prince Lichnowsky agreed in this view, and also that there was nothing for the Powers to do but to remain neutral and let the allies and the Turks fight out the question of Adrianople. His Government had at first thought that the Bulgarians might accept the Turkish proposal, but they had found that this could not be; and in Vienna from the beginning it had been thought out of the question that Bulgaria should accept the Turkish reply to the Powers.

I told the Ambassador what had passed in my conversation with the Turkish delegates to-day.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5947] No. 83.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 56.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

I SPOKE to the German Ambassador to-day as I had spoken to M. Cambon about the Albanian question and the meetings of Ambassadors without, however, mentioning the suggestion of a frontier commission.

The Ambassador showed me on the map the further concessions which the Austrian Ambassador would be able to make: The Castrati tribes could not be given

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up to Montenegro, because they migrated far south for pasturage, and should not be made to come under a double system of taxation; but certain tribes to the north of them could go to Montenegro; Djakova must remain Albanian, but the frontier might be deflected so as to pass close to it and leave an important monastery to Servia; the town of Dibra also would have to be Albanian; but some territory near Lake Ochrida could be given.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5944] No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 5, 1913.

THE Turkish delegates asked me to-day to convey their gratitude, which they expressed in most cordial terms to the King for the kindness which had been shown them here. Both Reshid Pasha and Nizami Pasha spoke in the warmest terms of the consideration which they had received in society, and of the attitude of public opinion and the press.

I promised to tell the King what they had said. We had been most anxious to provide an atmosphere which would be impartial and favourable to peace.

The delegates informed me that two of them were leaving, but that Reshid Pasha would remain for the present.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5550] No. 85.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 5, 1913.

M. SKOULOUDIS, the second Greek peace delegate, called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 3rd February to say that he had heard from the Bulgarian Minister, indirectly, that the Bulgarian Government, in consequence of advice given by the German and British Ministers at Sophia, had told the Turks that when Adrianople was ceded they would be prepared to recognise a representative of the Khalif in Adrianople to watch over the mosques, &c. The Bulgarian Government were awaiting the Turkish reply.

Sir A. Nicolson asked M. Skouloudis if he could tell him if orders had been sent to the Bulgarian military commandants to suspend hostilities pending the Turkish reply. M. Skouloudis said he had no information on that point.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5551] No. 86.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 5, 1913.

THE Roumanian Minister called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 3rd February to state that, not having been able to arrive at an agreement with M. Danef in respect to frontier "rectifications," a *procès-verbal* had been drawn up and signed recording the respective proposals of the two Governments with regard to the future frontier. The question would now be discussed between the two Governments. M. Misu said nothing as to referring the matter to the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5654] No. 86*.

Mr. Parker to Sir H. Babington Smith.

My dear Henry, *Foreign Office, February* 5, 1913.

SIR L. MALLET asks me to tell you that he spoke to Sir E. Grey about loans to Turkey. Sir Edward will be glad to hear what the views of the Deutsche Bank are. He himself sees no objection to your joining if the French and German banks wish to make small advances for strictly administrative purposes; but no large loan should be made unless arrangements for international control of expenditure, on approved lines, have first been agreed upon.

Yours sincerely,
ALWYN PARKER.

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[5258] No. 87.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 5, 1913.

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 10th ultimo relative to the protection of the Turkish flag at Suda Bay, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of further telegrams exchanged with His Majesty's consul-general at Canea on the subject.*

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are aware from copies of correspondence already forwarded to your department that Sir E. Grey considers it undesirable that His Majesty's Government should be placed in the position of sole guardian of the Turkish flag in Crete by being the only one of the protecting Powers represented there by a ship.

Sir E. Grey understands that His Majesty's ship "Yarmouth" has been sent to Suda Bay mainly to act as a repeater ship for wireless telegraph messages between Malta and Besika Bay, and I am accordingly to suggest that if any other station is equally convenient for this purpose the vessel should receive orders to go there instead of remaining in Crete.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[5732] No. 88.

Imperial Ottoman Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received February 6.)

26, *Throgmorton Street, London,*
Sir, *February* 4, 1913.

I AM directed to thank you for your letter of the 3rd February, with reference to the attitude of His Majesty's Government on the subject of advances to the Turks.

To avoid misunderstanding and for the purpose of record, I am to point out that the £T. 13,000,000, referred to in your letter as having been the subject of negotiation, did not represent a proposed cash advance or loan of that amount.

It included an eventual cash advance of £T. 1,500,000, the balance being merely a rearrangement of the floating debt (Treasury bills, &c.) outstanding.

I am, &c.
S. PEARCE, *Deputy Secretary.*

[5671] No. 89.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 60.)
Sir, *Paris, February* 5, 1913.

I ADDRESSED a memorandum to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 21st ultimo in the sense of your telegram No. 28 of that date on the question of loans to Turkey and of the increase of the Turkish customs duties.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note which I have received to-day from M. Jonnart, and in which the views of the French Government are fully explained.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

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* Nos. 45 and 79.

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Enclosure in No. 89.

M. Jonnart to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 29 janvier*, 1913.

PAR une note en date du 21 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu m'exposer les vues du Gouvernement britannique touchant diverses questions financières qui ont rapport à l'état présent des choses en Turquie.

En premier lieu, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique estime que les banques ne sauraient prendre des options ni ouvrir à la Sublime Porte la perspective d'importants emprunts à réaliser ultérieurement. Mon prédécesseur, partageant sur ce point les vues de Sir Edward Grey, a mis en garde les établissements français contre des négociations qui auraient abouti à prendre à option d'importantes opérations financières à venir. Dociles à ces suggestions, les établissements français n'avaient entamé de négociations qu'à l'effet de fournir une avance mensuelle au Gouvernement ottoman, limitée à la satisfaction des besoins administratifs immédiats. Ils envisageaient en outre les mesures à prendre en faveur des porteurs de bons du Trésor ottoman, qui arrivent à échéance au mois de mars prochain, et qui, s'ils ne sont pas renouvelés en temps utile, resteront impayés, mettant ainsi la Turquie dans la situation d'un banqueroutier au seul préjudice de ses créanciers. Dès qu'ils ont eu connaissance du renversement du Cabinet de Kiamil Pacha, les groupes financiers français ont spontanément suspendu toute négociation, même d'avances limitées, à la Turquie ; leur exemple, m'assure l'Ambassadeur de la république à Berlin, a été suivi par les financiers allemands, et il ne me paraît pas douteux que, de leur côté, les banquiers anglais imiteront cette abstention.

Se rendant compte que le moment viendra de fournir à la Turquie les larges ressources financières, dont le besoin se fait pour elle de plus en plus pressant, Sir Edward Grey estime qu'il ne serait ni raisonnable ni désirable de donner ce concours financier sans organiser au préalable un contrôle financier, qui mettrait un terme aux dépenses excessives faites par la Turquie en armements sur terre et sur mer. Comme le juge fort justement le Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté britannique, il est douteux que les financiers soient en mesure par eux-mêmes de faire accepter un semblable contrôle, et c'est en effet aux Puissances qu'il appartiendra, en échange du concours financier qu'elles pourront prêter à la Turquie, d'exiger d'un commun accord les mesures les plus propres à éviter le gaspillage des ressources que la Porte trouvera auprès des prêteurs étrangers. Le Gouvernement de la république, en ce qui le concerne, est disposé à étudier les propositions que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique croira devoir lui soumettre à cet égard ; il estime que, si les Grandes Puissances se mettent d'accord sur ce point, il sera possible d'arriver ainsi à rendre au crédit de la Turquie une élasticité et une vigueur suffisant à peu près à réparer les pertes que la guerre lui a fait subir. Je crois toutefois utile d'appeler l'attention du Cabinet de Londres sur l'avantage qu'il y aurait à ce que le contrôle à établir garde une forme assez discrète pour ne pas éveiller l'inquiétude de l'opinion ottomane, ni prendre l'aspect d'une mesure de défiance à l'égard d'une seule catégorie des fournisseurs de la Sublime Porte.

Enfin, Sir Edward Grey envisage que la question de la majoration des droits de douane en Turquie ne manquera pas de se poser à nouveau. Il rappelle que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique est disposé à donner son assentiment à cette mesure sous certaines conditions déjà connues de la Porte. Je ne vois pas d'inconvénient à renouveler à votre Excellence les assurances données par mes prédécesseurs qu'il est dans les intentions du Gouvernement de la république de n'accorder également son adhésion à la majoration douanière que sous la condition qu'un certain nombre de réclamations soient liquidées, et que certaines négociations économiques et industrielles aient reçu une solution favorable. La Grande-Bretagne et la France se trouvent parmi les Puissances qui n'ont pas reçu une compensation anticipée au préjudice que le relèvement des droits de douane en Turquie portera au commerce de leurs nationaux ; il est donc essentiel qu'en cette matière elles maintiennent leur entente et ne cèdent sur ce point que lorsqu'elles auront toutes deux obtenu pleine satisfaction.

En terminant, je remercie votre Excellence de m'avoir avisé que Sir Henry Babington Smith, représentant de la Banque nationale de Turquie, avait été engagé à maintenir un étroit contact avec la Banque ottomane et la Deutsche Bank ; j'en ai informé les groupes financiers français, et je veux espérer que ces relations plus étroites développeront entre les financiers français et anglais le sentiment d'une communauté

d'intérêts qui doit aboutir à des efforts concertés et à une action commune appuyée sur une confiance mutuelle.

Agréez, &c.
JONNART.

[5795] No. 90.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received February 6.)

THE Secretary to the Board of Trade presents his compliments, and, with reference to the Foreign Office letter of the 3rd February, begs to state that it has been ascertained confidentially that the "Eastfield" left Cardiff on the 19th November, 1912, with 2,957 tons of coal cargo and 405 tons in her bunkers for Constantinople.

On the 26th November, 1912, the "Southfield" left Cardiff for Constantinople with 5,119 tons of coal cargo and 490 tons in her bunkers.

Board of Trade, February 6, 1913.

[5681] No. 91.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 5*, 1913.

EX-GRAND VIZIER KIAMIL PASHA left yesterday for Egypt. When seeing him off he expressed to me his fears that refusal of his successors to accept the friendly counsels of Europe would eventually entail greater territorial and financial losses on Turkey. He said that he had hoped to save the guns and military equipment, stores, &c., of the Adrianople fortress, which had cost about £T. 2,000,000, and which would have been required for the fortifications of Chatalja, thus saving future necessary expenditure.

[5799] No. 92.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 6*, 1913.

HEAD-QUARTERS Staff report that engagement took place yesterday afternoon between Bulgarian and Turkish troops south of River Kavak, near neck of Gallipoli Peninsula. Turks were forced back to neighbourhood of Bulair, coast of the Sea of Marmora up to that point, it is claimed, falling into Bulgarian hands.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[5801] No. 93.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 6*, 1913.

ROUMANIA.

My telegram No. 38 of 3rd February.

The Roumanian Government have communicated to the Prime Minister that they would prefer negotiations should be continued at Sophia and not Bucharest, and that they hope that they may be terminated before the conclusion of peace.

The Prime Minister understands the latter wish as showing that Roumanian Government are less insistent than formerly. His Excellency would personally prefer negotiations to be carried on in Bucharest, but the matter will be discussed by the Cabinet.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

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[5797] No. 94.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 6, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 36 of 3rd February.

Newspaper reports to the effect that German Minister here acted separately from his colleagues in the late *démarche* are unfounded. Neither is there any truth in the published statements that King of the Bulgarians is suffering from acute neurasthenia. His Majesty enjoys good health and is in residence at the palace.

[5803] No. 95.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 6, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 27 of 4th February: Adrianople consuls' telegram.

I immediately carried out your instructions. The Bulgarian Government are consulting the military authorities, and promise a reply as soon as possible.

The French Minister is seeing the Prime Minister to-day on the subject.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[5704] No. 96.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 6, 1913.*

IN reply to a question in the Chamber, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Government had not abandoned their claim to Silistria, that there had been no question of their doing so, and that no one while in London had been authorised to declare that they would do so.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[5813 No. 97.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, February 6, 1913*

SCUTARI.

Operations are being resumed.

The King has been opposed to any general assault being delivered and seems to hope still to get into the place by diplomacy, but pressure is being brought to bear on him by his Ministers, aided by Servians, and I understand that a general attack by both armies is now being planned.

[6128] No. 98.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 6, 1913.*

THE utmost concessions that we have been able to obtain from Austria were described at the meeting of Ambassadors to-day, and Russian Ambassador is presumably telegraphing them to St. Petersburgh. The German Government, and especially the German Ambassador here, have exerted considerable pressure to induce Austria to consent to some of these modifications of the Austrian line originally proposed. Russian

Ambassador does not consider them sufficient compensation for abandonment of Scutari.

On the other hand, I am informed by such independent information as I can obtain from people who know the country that the town of Scutari is undoubtedly Albanian, and would be an unmanageable possession for Montenegro; also that Djakova is practically a purely Albanian town.

It appears to me that the information is so conflicting as to ethnographical and geographical conditions and the habits of the tribes, &c., that I doubt whether a decision could be arrived at on all disputed points without an enquiry on the spot by some international commission. I think this suggestion is worth considering in case it is found impossible to arrive at a complete agreement by any other means.

I have pointed out to German Ambassador the difficulty of expecting Russia to give way on all points—Adriatic port, Scutari, Djakova, and Dibra—and Minister for Foreign Affairs will therefore see that I have put forward Russian standpoint. German Ambassador, on the other hand, urges that Austria made a great concession in giving way about sanjak, which it was assumed a few months ago she would not allow Servia and Montenegro to take, and thereby to bar all territorial access for Austria to Salonica; also that Ipek and Prisrend are concessions, as they might reasonably have been claimed, especially Ipek, as Albanian; and he says concession as to certain tribes near Lake Scutari has only been obtained with great difficulty from Austria.

I shall be glad to know view of Minister for Foreign Affairs as to further discussion or as to any proposal that he wishes to make.

[5654] No. 99.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 104.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 6, 1913.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I have to inform your Excellency that I told Sir H. Babington-Smith on the 5th instant that I saw no objection to small advances, for strictly administrative purposes, being made now to the Government, if the National Bank of Turkey desired to co-operate with the Deutsche Bank and the Imperial Ottoman Bank in such a course, though the financiers must decide for themselves on the expediency of such a course. I added that, in my opinion, no large loan should be made unless arrangements for international control of expenditure, on approved lines, had first been agreed upon.

You should inform the French Government accordingly.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5729] No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 6, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 32 of the 1st February, the Turkish Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 4th February and recurred to his idea in respect to the Powers acting as arbiters or mediators in regard to peace conditions. His Highness asked whether I had been made acquainted with his suggestion. Sir A. Nicolson replied in the affirmative, and said that I would study it. Sir A. Nicolson remarked that I could hardly lay it before the Ambassadors unless it came as a proposal from his Highness's Government and not merely as an individual expression of opinion. Again, if the Turkish Government wished the Powers to act as mediators, and assuming the latter were willing to undertake the rôle, the assent of the allies would have to be secured.

Tevfik Pasha's idea appeared to be rather that the Powers should not mediate but arbitrate.

* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 54), *mutatis mutandis*.

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Sir A. Nicolson asked if his Highness had mentioned the matter to any of the Ambassadors. Tevfik Pasha replied that he had put it before the French, Russian, and Italian Ambassadors, who had all thought the idea a good one. He would now telegraph to his Government to ascertain if they would authorise him to bring the proposal officially before me.

M. Cambon told Sir A. Nicolson that, in his opinion, the Powers could well mediate as to Adrianople, as, indeed, they have already practically done, but that he hardly thought it would be practicable for the Powers to discuss and settle the broad lines of a peace settlement, as these discussions would be interminable owing to diversity of views.

M. Cambon added that the Marquis Imperiali was enthusiastic in regard to Tevfik Pasha's suggestion.

Sir A. Nicolson had not seen Count Benckendorff on this subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[6540] No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 6, 1913.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires told me to-day that he was instructed to put before me the Servian case about Djakova. The majority of the population in Djakova was now Albanian. There was, however, a monastery in the region that was practically Russian, and in Djakova itself there were Servian schools, and even a separate Orthodox municipality. Though the majority of the population was now Albanian, this was because during the last twenty or thirty years of Turkish rule Servians had been dispossessed of their lands by Albanians. The Turks had even gone so far as to begin a cadastral survey, saying that they would give the lands to those who could prove their rights by title-deeds; but, as the enquiry proceeded, it had shown that so many Servians had title-deeds that the Turks had said that they could not face the great transfer of territory which would be involved, and they had discontinued the survey. He was instructed to ask me to support the Servian claim to Djakova.

I said that there were many very difficult questions connected with the Albanian frontier; I was willing to receive information, but I could not say more than this at present.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5839] No. 102.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Sophia, February 3, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 20 of the 28th ultimo, and to your telegram No. 24 of the 1st instant, instructing me to protest against interference on the part of the Bulgarian authorities with the officials of the Ottoman Public Debt, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a *note verbale* presented by me to-day to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of the above instructions.

I have also the honour to transmit copies of correspondence received from the British vice-consul at Dedeagatch relating to action taken by him in the same connection, in accordance with the instructions sent to him, as reported in my despatch No. 154 of the 31st December last.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 102.

Note verbale communicated to Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

HIS Majesty's Minister presents his compliments to his Excellency the President of the Council, and has the honour, with reference to his note of the 23rd November (13th December) last, to bring to his notice the following facts, which have been reported to His Majesty's Government, regarding the manner in which the authorities of the allied Governments have hindered and prevented the officials of the Ottoman Public Debt from carrying out their duties.

In the territories occupied by the Bulgarian army, it appears that at Dedeagatch the Moslem staff of the Debt Agency were robbed by komitajis and the agency was required to supply salt to the Bulgarian troops against receipts the payment of which is postponed to an indeterminate date. On the other hand, the Bulgarian authorities supplied themselves with salt at the salt works of Musselim without giving any receipt. The wine dealers have been requested to pay licence duties to the Bulgarian authorities, and the Debt officials have not yet been able to collect the tax on the manufacture of spirits. The customs surtax of 3 per cent. is paid by the Bulgarian customs officials, together with the Bulgarian customs duties, to the Bulgarian Bank, and the Debt official has had to give up his work.

At Dedeagatch also the local Ottoman authorities having decided to deliver to the flour mill Protopapas, as part payment of a debt contracted by the Ottoman Government with this establishment, a stock of 36,000 chiniks (decalitres) of cereals in depôt at Dedeagatch and Feredjik, being the product of the tithes affected to the kilometric guarantee of the Constantinople-Salonica Junction Railway Company, the Debt Administration has advised the Ministry of Finance of this in order to prevent the carrying out of this transaction. The Bulgarian army, however, having occupied Dedeagatch a few days later, the flour mills Protopapas seized the opportunity of taking possession of these cereals in question. The Debt agents protested to the Bulgarian authorities against this illegal seizure, but without result up to the present.

The fisheries of the district which are farmed out on account of the service of the 4 per cent. loan of 1903 are for the moment administered by the municipality of Dedeagatch.

At Serres the Bulgarian authorities have imposed various heavy taxes on the spirits and salt already existing or imported into the town without authorising the re-establishment of the services of the debt. The authorities have, moreover, taken the administration's offices for their customs service, and to the protest of the local director of the Debt Administration they have replied that the measure taken is irrevocable and that the interests of the debt will be a matter for discussion between the Bulgarian and Ottoman Governments after the conclusion of peace. It is the opinion of the debt officials specially sent into that region that the administration will not obtain satisfaction without diplomatic intervention, and even should the Bulgarian authorities permit the debt to resume operations these will have to be limited, unless order and security is restored in the country, to the agencies in the more important centre.

His Majesty's Minister begs to point out to the president of the council that, although no formal answer has been returned to this legation on this subject a verbal assurance (the substance of which has been communicated to His Majesty's Government) was recently given to the secretary of this legation at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the matter had been taken into consideration by his Excellency the Minister of Finance, and that it had been decided by the Bulgarian Government that the "rights of the Ottoman Public Debt would be duly taken into consideration."

In view therefore of the above-mentioned facts His Majesty's Minister has the honour to point out, acting in accordance with the instructions which he has received from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government feel bound to protest against the state of affairs, which is in direct contradiction to the assurances, and, it is understood, the wishes of the Bulgarian Government, and must request the latter to be good enough to do all that may lie in its power to prevent the recurrence of any such acts on the part of the authorities concerned which can but give rise to further claims on behalf of the bondholders of the Ottoman Public Debt by the Governments concerned.

British Legation, Sophia, February 3, 1913.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 102.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Sir H. Box-Irousside.

Excellence, *Dédéagatch, le 21 janvier*, 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de vous remettre sous ce pli copie de trois protestations qui m'ont été transmises par M. l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane en cette ville, et que je me suis empressé de communiquer aux autorités militaires de ma résidence.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 3 in No. 102.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

M. le Colonel, *Dédéagatch, le 21 janvier*, 1913.

JE me permets de vous remettre ci-joint trois protestations que vient de m'adresser M. l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane en cette ville.

Je ne doute pas que vous ne voudrez bien donner les ordres nécessaires pour ne pas léser les intérêts de l'administration qui se trouve sous la protection des Grandes Puissances.

En vous priant de bien vouloir m'accuser réception de la présente, j'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 4 in No. 102.

Inspector and Mudir of Ottoman Public Debt to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

M. le Commandant, *Dédéagatch, le 7 (20) janvier*, 1913.

DEPUIS l'occupation de Dédéagatch par l'armée bulgare, c'est grâce à nos démarches réitérées auprès des autorités militaires, tout d'abord auprès de son Excellence Kovatchef et en dernier lieu auprès de vous, M. le commandant, que le droit de perception du bureau de la Dette a été reconnu. C'est enfin plus tard, par l'intermédiaire du consulat britannique en notre ville, je soumettais une protestation contre les entraves apportées au fonctionnement de nos services. C'est encore à vous, M. le commandant, que nous nous sommes adressés pour que nos agents à Enos et Musselim puissent reprendre leurs postes.

Par la lettre en date du 30 décembre, 1912 (v.s.), le bureau de l'accise nous ordonnait de verser à la Banque nationale bulgare toutes les sommes encaissées sur la surtaxe depuis le commencement de la guerre au 6 novembre, 1912, et depuis le 7 novembre, —date de l'occupation de la ville par l'armée bulgare—au 31 décembre, 1912 ; ainsi que la recette de ce chef qui sera perçue dorénavant.

Par notre lettre du 1er janvier, 1913, nous fîmes remarquer au bureau de l'accise que nous encourrions une très grave responsabilité envers l'Administration de la Dette publique si nous nous conformions à l'ordre du bureau de l'accise sans l'autorisation préalable de notre direction centrale à Constantinople. Nous avons même rédigé le texte d'une dépêche dans le but d'obtenir cette autorisation, mais il ne nous fut pas accordé de transmettre cette dépêche.

La surtaxe sur le sel et les spiritueux est sans doute une affectation d'un emprunt garanti par la Dette publique ; nous la percevons sans distinction spéciale au même titre que les autres revenus concédés.

C'est pourquoi nous regrettons de ne pouvoir remettre à la Banque nationale bulgare comme le voudrait le bureau de l'accise—ce revenu sans autorisation préalable de notre administration, à moins que vous-même, M. le commandant, vous ne nous en donniez l'ordre par écrit.

Lors de l'occupation de cette place, le Général Kovatchef nous avait bien déclaré que notre administration était bien libre de percevoir tous les revenus qui lui étaient concédés.

Le premier empiétement a été fait sur notre revenu des pêcheries, sur lequel la municipalité puis le capitanat du port ont successivement fait mainmise. Dernièrement,

sur un ordre parvenu au capitanat du port, ce droit a été de nouveau rétrocédé à notre bureau ; ceci prouve d'une façon manifeste qu'en haut lieu on reconnaît les droits imprescriptibles de la Dette publique.

Tandis que dans son No. 44 du 30 décembre, 1912, le bureau de l'accise nous ordonnait de lui livrer la recette, par son No. 3, en date du 3 janvier, il nous faisait défense de percevoir cette surtaxe à partir le 1er janvier, 1913 (v.s.). Le bureau de l'accise nous met également en demeure de livrer la recette de la surtaxe, soit 37,392 piastres, à la Banque nationale bulgare lorsque depuis l'occupation de la ville il a été livré à l'armée bulgare une contrevaleur de 133,210 piastres de sel contre des récépissés.

Le bureau de l'accise perçoit de tous les débitants de boissons alcooliques un droit de vente. L'impôt de patente sur débits de boissons alcooliques est une branche du revenu des spiritueux concédé à la Dette. Nous protestons également contre cette façon d'agir du bureau de l'accise, d'autant plus que les débitants de boissons ont déjà acquitté à la Dette publique la licence semestrielle jusqu'à fin février 1913 (v.s.).

Le bureau de l'accise s'arroge le droit de nous demander les raisons de la remise à la Banque ottomane de la surtaxe de guerre. Nous n'avons fait qu'une seule remise de fonds sur la recette globale à la Banque ottomane depuis l'occupation de la ville, pour la simple raison que la garde des Bulgares nous a été enlevée et que nous ne pouvons dans un simple coffre-fort en tôle conserver un numéraire trop élevé. D'ailleurs, nous avons de l'autorité hiérarchique, dont nous dépendons exclusivement, des instructions très sévères nous prohibant de laisser s'accumuler un numéraire trop considérable.

Le bureau de l'accise nous menace si nous continuons à percevoir les droits en conformité des conventions nouvelles d'avoir recours aux autorités militaires.

Le bureau de la Dette publique ne se juge pas tenu de correspondre séparément avec chaque bureau de l'Administration civile bulgare ; en conséquence nous vous prions de bien vouloir nous autoriser à ne fournir les renseignements et à ne recevoir des communications des bureaux de l'accise et des finances que par l'intermédiaire de l'autorité militaire, qui la première a reconnu le fonctionnement indépendant de la Dette publique administrative internationale.

L'Inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane,
E. DUSSI.
Le Mudir,
ISMAIL HAKKI.

Enclosure 5 in No. 102.

Inspector and Mudir of Ottoman Public Debt to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

M. le Commandant, *Dédéagatch, le 8 (21) janvier*, 1913.

NOUS avons l'honneur de vous informer que, sur les ordres parvenus de Sophia et que M. le lieutenant de vaisseau vous a communiqués, les droits de pêche gérés depuis l'occupation de la ville par la municipalité et puis par le capitanat du port ont été rétrocédés depuis le 1er janvier, 1913 (v.s.), à la Dette publique.

Sur la demande que nous a faite l'adjudication des pêcheries Kiriaco Papa Atanach, nous venons vous prier de bien vouloir intervenir auprès de l'Administration civile bulgare de Gumuldjina afin que les droits de Maronia—qui, quoique dépendant administrativement de Gumuldjina, ont été cédés en même temps que ceux de Dédéagatch et Macri au susdit adjudicataire—soient rétrocédés également à la Dette publique et que la gestion en soit de nouveau reconnue à l'agent de Papa Atanach domicilié à Maronia Atanach Pandimmeno.

Veuillez, &c.
L'Inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane,
E. DUSSI.
Le Mudir,
ISMAIL HAKKI.

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Enclosure 6 in No. 102.

Inspector and Mudir of Ottoman Public Debt to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

Dédéagatch, le 8 (21) *janvier*, 1913.

M. le Commandant,

NOUS avons l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le 3 novembre, 1912, le vapeur "Gastein," de la Compagnie de Navigation du Lloyd autrichien, avait débarqué, au nom de Dimitro Staikidès, commissionnaire en cette ville, 5 fûts d'alcool marqué "ANB," *sub* No. 149, 150, 157, 158 et 162, d'un poids total de 2,860 kilog. net de tare.

Le susdit D. Staikidès a signé notre registre après le pesage des fûts par les agents de la Dette publique et ceux de la douane turque, reconnaissant ainsi l'accomplissement de cette formalité administrative.

Trois jours après l'occupation de la ville, M. D. Staikidès fit enlever les 5 fûts en question, sans toutefois en acquitter le droit de miri, s'élevant à 5,362·50 piastres.

Le 31 décembre, 1912, le susdit commissionnaire mandé à la douane, en présence du personnel des dépôts de la douane, de M. Socrate Benardakis et de notre agent Kiamil Effendi a déclaré avoir enlevé les 5 fûts, sans acquitter les droits revenant à la Dette publique.

Nous prions, par conséquent, M. le commandant militaire, d'inviter M. Dimitro Staikidès à acquitter dans le plus bref délai le miri d'alcool dont nos registres le débitent.

Par la même occasion nous vous prions d'inviter aussi M. le directeur des douanes bulgares à Dédéagatch à nous fournir les noms des personnes qui depuis l'occupation de la ville ont importé de l'alcool étranger afin que les droits de l'Administration de la Dette publique puissent être sauvegardés. En même temps, nous nous permettons de rappeler à la direction des douanes de Dédéagatch qu'elle est tenue de nous donner avis toutes les fois que des spiritueux, poissons, cocons et autres articles intéressant les revenus concédés à la Dette publique passeraient par la douane, afin que nos agents puissent effectuer les formalités requises et percevoir les taxes prévues par les règlements de notre administration.

Veuillez, &c.
ISMAIL HAKKI.
E. DUSSI.

Enclosure 7 in No. 102.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Dédéagatch, le 24 *janvier*, 1913.

Excellence,

J'AI l'honneur de vous remettre ci-inclus copie d'une requête qui m'a été adressée par M. l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane en cette ville, et que je me suis empressé de faire la communication aux autorités militaires.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 8 in No. 102.

Inspector of Ottoman Public Debt to Vice-Consul Badetti.

Dédéagatch, le 10 (23) *janvier*, 1913.

M. le Vice-Consul,

JE viens d'être informé que notre bureau à Démotica n'a pas été autorisé à fonctionner depuis l'occupation de la ville par les armées bulgares.

La ville d'Andrinople étant investie, il n'est pas possible d'avoir recours au consulat britannique de cette ville. Par conséquent, je viens vous parler de transmettre à M. le commandant militaire la lettre ci-incluse, afin que l'autorité compétente fasse parvenir les ordres à Démotica pour que nos bureaux y puissent de nouveau fonctionner librement.

J'apprends également qu'une partie de la dime des cocons prélevée en nature en dépôt dans nos bureaux a été enlevée. Je vous prie d'attirer l'attention des autorités bulgares également sur ce point.

Veuillez, &c.
L'Inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane
en mission à Dédéagatch.
ÉMILE DUSSI.

Enclosure 9 in No. 102.

Inspector of Ottoman Public Debt to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

Dédéagatch, le 10 (23) *janvier*, 1913.

M. le Commandant militaire,

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que, par un de nos agents arrivé de Démotica, j'apprends que notre bureau en cette ville n'a pas été autorisé à fonctionner. Je prends, par conséquent, la liberté de vous prier de transmettre, en même temps que la copie ci-incluse de la lettre que j'adresse en date d'aujourd'hui au Gouverneur de Démotica, ma réclamation présente aux pouvoirs compétents, afin que le bureau de cette localité soit autorisé à fonctionner ainsi qu'il est fait déjà dans toutes les autres régions occupées.

Dans le ferme espoir que vous prendrez ma demande en considération, veuillez, &c.
L'Inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane
en mission à Dédéagatch.
ÉMILE DUSSI.

Enclosure 10 in No. 102.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

Dédéagatch, le 10 (23) *janvier*, 1913.

M. le Commandant,

J'AI l'honneur de vous remettre ci-joint une requête que vient de m'adresser M. l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane, en mission ici, au sujet de la fermeture du bureau de Démotica de cette administration, dont les intérêts sont placés, comme vous le connaissez, sous la protection des Grandes Puissances.

Je vous serais obligé, monsieur, en donnant des ordres voulus pour la réouverture et le libre fonctionnement du bureau en question.

Par la même occasion je porte à votre connaissance qu'une partie de la dime des cocons prélevée en nature et se trouvant en dépôt a été enlevée indûment. Je vous prie d'attirer également sur ce point l'attention du Gouverneur de Démotica aux fins de la restitution.

Vous priant de vouloir bien m'accuser réception de la présente, veuillez, &c.
BADETTI.

Enclosure 11 in No. 102.

Inspector of Ottoman Public Debt to Governor of Demotica.

M. le Gouverneur,

LES bureaux de la Dette publique ottomane, administration qui se trouve sous la protection des Grandes Puissances, à la suite d'ordres venus de l'état-major général bulgare, et des instructions transmises par la Légation britannique de Sophia au vice-consulat à Dédéagatch, fonctionnent librement dans les régions occupées.

J'ai l'honneur, par conséquent, de vous prier d'autoriser nos agents à Démotica à percevoir les droits sur les revenus qui ont été concédés à notre administration.

L'on m'a informé également que des cocons en dépôt dans nos bureaux et qui représentaient une partie de la dime perçue en nature ont été enlevés. La maîtrise sur ces cocons étant un acte qui lèse les intérêts de notre administration, je me permets d'attirer votre attention sur ce point.

Veuillez, &c.
L'Inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane
en mission à Dédéagatch,
ÉMILE DUSSI.

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Enclosure 12 in No. 102.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Dédéagatch, le 29 janvier, 1913.

Excellence,

J'AI l'honneur de vous remettre, Excellence, ci-inclus copies de trois requêtes que vient de m'adresser l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane, en mission ici, et que je me suis empressé de faire suivre à nos autorités bulgares militaires.

J'ai, &c.
BADETTI.

Enclosure 13 in No. 102.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

Dédéagatch, le 29 janvier, 1913.

M. le Colonel,

JE me permets de vous remettre ci-inclus une requête que m'a adressée M. l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane, en mission ici, et vous serai obligé en facilitant la rentrée à leur poste à Ferré des agents de cette administration internationale.

Veuillez, &c.
BADETTI.

Enclosure 14 in No. 102.

Inspector of Ottoman Debt to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

Dédéagatch, le 28 janvier, 1913.

M. le Colonel,

J'AI l'honneur de réitérer ma lettre en date du 12 courant, par laquelle je vous priais de vouloir bien délivrer à nos agents de Ferré un ordre aux autorités locales de Ferré de permettre la réouverture de notre bureau, fermé depuis l'occupation de la ville. Cependant, cet ordre n'a pas pu être encore exécuté et notre bureau de Ferré reste toujours fermé. Il est vrai que sur un permis délivré par la place nos agents de Ferré réfugiés ici se sont présentés à la gare, mais le chef de gare ne les a pas laissés partir.

Je viens vous prier, par conséquent, de vouloir donner de nouveaux ordres afin que l'autorisation de voyager par chemin de fer jusqu'à Ferré leur soit accordée et que les autorités locales non seulement leur permettent d'exercer librement leurs fonctions, mais que même, au besoin, de transporter ici les archives et autres pièces officielles qui nous seraient nécessaires.

Veuillez, &c.
L'Inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane,
ÉMILE DUSSI.

Enclosure 15 in No. 102.

Inspector and Comptroller of Ottoman Debt to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

Dédéagatch, le janvier, 1913.

M. le Commandant,

LORS de l'occupation de la ville par les armées bulgares, je m'étais présenté au directeur des douanes en ma qualité de contrôleur de la surtaxe de la Dette publique, et nous nous mîmes d'accord pour que je m'occupe de mes fonctions et pour que les recettes de la surtaxe hebdomadaire soient remises à la banque pour compte de la Dette. Après deux jours, M. le directeur des douanes se ravisant m'invite à ne plus me présenter à la douane et même me fit remettre les registres de mon service.

Je laisse à votre appréciation bienveillante le soin de juger le procédé de M. le directeur des douanes, tout en vous priant de faire transmettre par qui de droit

des ordres pour que je sois autorisé à exercer de nouveau mes fonctions de contrôleur de la surtaxe auprès de l'Administration des Douanes.

Veuillez, &c.
L'Inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane,
EMILE DUSSI.
Le Contrôleur, &c.,
MICHEL YOUAN.

Enclosure 16 in No 102.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

Dédéagatch, le 29 janvier, 1913.

M. le Colonel,

J'AI l'honneur de vous remettre ci-joint une requête de l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane au sujet des fonctions de contrôleur au service de la douane.

Vous aurez la bonté, M. le commandant, de vouloir bien donner vos instructions à qui de droit à cet égard.

Avec mes remerciements anticipés, veuillez, &c.

BADETTI.

Enclosure 17 in No. 102.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Commandant at Dedeagatch.

Dédéagatch, le 29 janvier, 1913.

M. le Colonel,

JE vous remets ci-joint une protestation de l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane d'ici au sujet de la mainmise à l'affermage des pêcheries par les autorités de Maronia.

Je vous prie de vouloir bien faire parvenir, avec les instructions nécessaires, au Préfet de Gumuldjina la lettre ci-incluse aux fins de faire cesser cet acte illégal.

Je vous prie, &c.
BADETTI.

Enclosure 18 in No. 102.

Inspector of Public Debt to Prefect of Gumuldjina.

Dédéagatch, le 15 (28) janvier, 1913.

M. le Préfet,

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que les droits de pêche de Dédéagatch, Macri et Maronia relèvent de la gestion des revenus concédés à la Dette publique, administration qui, comme vous ne l'ignorez pas, se trouve sous la protection des Grandes Puissances.

Notre administration depuis le 1er mars, 1912, a affermé à Kiriaco Papa Atanach, domicilié à Dédéagatch, les droits de Maronia, et le nommé Atanach Pandremenos est qualifié pour percevoir les droits sur le poisson pêché dans les eaux de Maronia pour compte de Papa Atanach.

Lors de l'occupation de Dédéagatch par les armées bulgares, la municipalité et puis le capitanat de port avaient retiré des mains de notre affermeur l'exercice de son droit.

Vers la fin de décembre 1912, le capitaine de port de Dédéagatch, M. le Lieutenant de Vaisseau Fournadjiet me fit savoir que, d'après les ordres qu'il avait reçus, les droits de pêche jusqu'à nouvel ordre étaient rétrocédés à l'Administration de la Dette publique. En effet, depuis le 1er janvier, 1913, ainsi d'ailleurs qu'il a été établi par procès-verbal dressé au capitanat du port, c'est notre affermeur Kiriaco Papa Atanach, qui, au nom de la Dette publique ottomane, prélève les droits de pêche. Or, les droits de pêche du rivage de Maronia, localité qui relève de la préfecture de Gumuldjina, sont compris dans l'affermage des pêcheries de Dédéagatch dont le bail est reconnu à Kiriaco Papa Atanach.

Hier cet affermeur nous a présenté un reçu qu'un poissonnier de Maronia le nommé Xanthopoulos Politis (ci-inclus copie), lui a exhibé, prétendant avoir acquitté les droits aux autorités de Maronia. Nous ignorons d'ailleurs si ce reçu lui a été effectivement remis par les autorités, aucune trace de timbre mobile n'y figurant dessus.

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Je viens, par conséquent, vous prier de vouloir bien transmettre des ordres à l'autorité de Maronia, afin que le nommé Atanach Pandremenos, agent de Papa Atanach, soit seul autorisé à prélever les droits de pêche revenant exclusivement à la Dette publique ottomane. Du moment que dans toutes les régions occupées le fonctionnement de l'Administration de la Dette publique a été reconnu par les Puissances balkaniques.

Dans le ferme espoir que vous prendrez ma demande en considération bienveillante, veuillez, &c.

L'Inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane,
ÉMILE DÜSSI.

[5957] No. 103.

Sir N. Helme, M.P., to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

Dear Sir Edward, *House of Commons, February 6, 1913.*

TO-DAY I have received enclosed communication, following on the one sent you. It shows the anxiety of those on the spot whose business is so handicapped.

On consideration, I thought it better to delay putting the question on the paper, as you kindly suggested, but rather wait until you might be able to report.

Yours truly,
NORVAL W. HELME.

Enclosure in No. 103.

Letter received by Sir N. Helme, M.P.

Gentlemen, *Salonica, January 31, 1913.*

MY circular of the 2nd instant.

I thank you for the communications that you made me in your favour of the 22nd of this month.

I thought that the agents and representatives abroad of His Britannic Majesty were more perspicacious in the exercise of their work; but I regret that lately I have had to change my opinion on this subject.

It shows from the communication I made you on the 2nd instant that the Servians levy customs duty upon the goods coming out of Salonica. Now, the goods have already paid one customs duty upon their import into Salonica, as in the past; in passing these goods to the territories occupied by the Servians (ex Turkey in Europe) they must again pay duty, which is not just.

Therefore, if these goods are imported in the original Servian territory, they undergo the customs duty of the autonomous Servian tariff.

The Government of His Britannic Majesty will have therefore to intervene (as all the other Governments are doing, and in a very energetic manner) so that these duties arbitrarily levied by the Servians are abrogated.

I tell you, on this opportunity, that, being a member of the council of the administration of an English society here, which is occupied with the making and commerce of cigarette papers—the Mair de Botton Cigarette Paper Company (Limited) —I have had to occupy myself lately very specially with this question. The society made to intervene here and at Uskub, where they have a branch, the British consuls, who referred it to the British Embassy at Belgrade. It appeared from communications of these English representatives, as *per* the promises of the Servian Government, that the above society would not be hindered by the Servian authorities in occupation in the exercise of their commerce in the territories occupied. The society then sent two train-loads of goods for Uskub with a special letter of recommendation from the English consul here. Well, the Servian customs authorities have prohibited the introduction of these goods in the territory occupied by them, saying openly that they ignored the papers and recommendations of the English consulate.

Such a state of affairs causes very grave prejudice to the aforesaid society; naturally, we expect England to safeguard better her interests, and, what is more important, that she is respected.

It would not be surprising if Germany, by her activity and tact, happened before long to completely beat the English commerce in the Orient.

Lately the commercial circles of Salonica have had the conviction that the Germans and the Austrians know better how to safeguard their commercial interests than the English.

If you think it necessary you can communicate the contents of this letter to your friend in Parliament, but I beg you, and I adhere formally to what I have said above, not to mention my name in any of this affair.

[5950] No. 104.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 7.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February 7, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated the 7th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 104.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Admiralty, February 7, 1913.*

SEND "Zealandia" to Constantinople as soon as His Majesty's Ambassador, who is being instructed by Foreign Office, informs you that he has obtained desired firman for British ship to come to Constantinople from Besika, and that ship is required. As French admiral has so far been senior naval officer at Constantinople, Foreign Office do not wish a British flag officer to go there.

Acknowledge.

[5951] No. 105.

Sir R Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, February 7, 1913.*

ITALIAN ships "Pisa" and "San Marco" have gone to Constantinople at the request of the Italian Ambassador, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs is sceptical as to necessity.

[5961] No. 106.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic) R. *Cettinjé, February 7, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

A general attack by Montenegrins and Servians is in progress.

[5955] No. 107.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 7, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 46 of 6th January.

The Bulgarian Government are unable to accept either of the proposals made by consul at Adrianople. The French Minister has been informed in this sense.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

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[5958] No. 108.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 7, 1913.*

THE Prime Minister of Greece, who visited Sophia yesterday on his way to Salonica, was cordially received by the King of the Bulgarians and the Prime Minister.

I gather that no arrangement has been reached with regard to the future of Salonica, but, in view of continued residence of the Greek Royal Family in that town, there is a growing tendency here to admit the possibility of its eventual internationalisation.

[5956] No. 109.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Sophia, February 7, 1913.*

GENERAL Staff report as follows:—

"Turkish ships took part in engagement Kavak without causing much harm to Bulgarians. At Chatalja several Turkish battalions, supported by heavy artillery fire, advancing on Issedin and attempting to reach right bank Karasu, were repulsed by Bulgarian outposts. Turks regained their positions with considerable loss. Bombardment of Adrianople continues."

(Above has been repeated to Constantinople.)

[5962] No. 110.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 7, 1913.*

I HAVE reason to believe that the Bulgarian Government now intend to demand Midia–Rodosto line as one of the preliminary conditions of peace. Fully aware that this will probably be opposed by at least one of the Great Powers, they will use the non-satisfaction of this demand as a lever to obtain indemnity, and perhaps even attempt to evade financial responsibilities in connection with the Ottoman Public Debt.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[5931] No. 111.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, February 7, 1913.*

FOLLOWING telegram received from Dardanelles last night:—

"Aeroplane flew over fleet this morning and dropped four bombs. No hits."

[5960] No. 112.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Belgrade, February 7, 1913.*

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 22 of 30th January.

Servian authorities now impose in occupied territories a "war contribution" tax, heavily affecting monopolised and other articles. I have protested and asked for explanations.

The Servian Government apparently endeavour to justify their action by articles 48 and 49 annexed to fourth convention of Hague Second Conference.

[5970] No. 113.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, February 7, 1913*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 5th February.

Fugitive from Ruptchos declares that forcible conversion of Mussulman population is proceeding under personal direction of the military commander and of civil governor of Ruptchos, and also complains of wholesale violation of Mussulman women.

I believe his narrative is essentially veracious, and I venture to submit that urgent representations at Sophia are desirable. Report follows by post.

[5953] No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 7, 1913.*

THE three Turkish delegates urged very strongly that the Powers should intervene, and not allow the allies to disturb the tranquillity of Europe indefinitely. Even if Adrianople fell, the allies would persist in other demands and peace would not be secured.

I said that the idea of the Powers was to preserve the tranquillity of Europe by remaining neutral themselves, and there was no chance of their intervening before the cession of Adrianople. I could not say what the Powers would do if other questions arose after that, or that there were no circumstances in which they would intervene.

The delegates urged the difficulty or impossibility of Turkey ceding Adrianople, to which I could only reply that the war must decide its fate.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 62; Paris, No. 58; St. Petersburgh, No. 102; Rome, No. 49; and Vienna, No. 45.)

[5640] No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 70 of 5th February: Ship for Constantinople.

You may apply for firman for passage of one ship.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, is being warned by telegraph and told that flag officer should not be sent up.

[6541] No. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 7, 1913.*

THE French Ambassador read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 7th instant a telegram from the French Minister at Bucharest reporting on an audience which he had had of the King of Roumania, and on interviews with the Prime Minister and M. Take Jonesco.

The King had said that he and the above two Ministers were alone in the Cabinet in favour of a moderate and pacific solution of the difficulty with Bulgaria; that public opinion was being worked up against the moderate attitude he and the two Ministers were adopting, and that it was quite likely that eventually they would have to yield. His Majesty know, he said, that his popularity was suffering owing to his refusal to issue ultimatums to Bulgaria, but he did not attach importance to his personal popularity if he could find a peaceful solution to the question with that country.

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The King said that there were two courses open: (1), That the Powers should insist at Sophia on Bulgaria accepting Roumanian claims, or (2) that a frontier should be fixed giving to Roumania the environs and suburbs of Silistria and a larger seaboard on the Black Sea than that proposed by Bulgaria.

In reply to a request from M. Cambon for his opinion on the subject, Sir A. Nicolson said that as to (1) it would clearly be impossible to induce all the Powers to impose Roumanian demands on Bulgaria; as to (2), Roumania might make the proposal to Bulgaria: it was hardly the business of the Powers to do this. M. Cambon quite agreed.

The telegram also said that the Roumanian Government wished that M. Misu should be admitted to the Ambassadorial meetings to discuss the Koutzo-Vlach question, the Adriatic railway and Mount Athos.

M. Cambon observed that all were agreed that the Koutzo-Vlachs should have religious and educational autonomy. Mount Athos was already settled, and the Adriatic railway had not been dealt with as yet in detail.

M. Cambon said that complaints had been made at Bucharest that he had been the cause of M. Misu not having been admitted to the Ambassadorial meetings.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5732] No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Russian Ambassador, and has the honour to inform his Excellency that he has intimated to the directors of the National Bank of Turkey, in reply to a general enquiry as to his views on the report of advances to Turkey, that he now sees no objection to small advances, for strictly administrative purposes, such as the payment of salaries, should the National Bank be asked to co-operate with the Deutsche Bank and the Imperial Ottoman Bank in such a course, though the financiers must decide for themselves as to the pecuniary expediency of the transaction. Sir E. Grey has further expressed the opinion that no large loan should be made unless arrangements for international control of expenditure, on approved lines, had first been agreed upon; but this aspect of the question is not likely to engage attention till the conclusion of peace.

The National Bank has no information to show whether the French and German banks are disposed, in the present state of affairs in Turkey, to make even small advances; but Sir E. Grey considers it would be unwise to oppose such action, should they desire to take it, since the lack of funds even for the payment of civil salaries might lead to serious disorder.

Foreign Office, February 7, 1913.

[6022] No. 118.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 81.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 3, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna forwarding copy of a despatch from British vice-consul at Rhodes with reference to a demonstration at Rhodes in favour of Greek annexation of the Sporades.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir Gerard Lowther.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Smyrna, January 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch received from the British vice-consul at Rhodes with reference to a demonstration by Greek agitators during the Feast of the Epiphany in favour of the annexation of the Sporades to Greece, and describing the attitude of the Greek Metropolitan and the Italian authorities on that occasion.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 118.

Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Rhodes, January 20, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report certain incidents which took place in the suburb of Neohori at Rhodes on the eve of the Epiphany and on the following day.

It had been rumoured for some days that those persons who habitually get up Hellenic demonstrations intended to avail themselves of the annual ceremony of throwing the cross into the sea to make a political demonstration in favour of Greece.

On that day the Greeks of the other six suburbs and peasants from the different villages congregate in the church of Neohori, where the Metropolitan holds the religious service, and then proceed in full vestments to the seashore in order to throw the cross into the sea.

Although special invitations were sent by the political leaders to all the villages, only a few of the inhabitants of five or six of them, especially women, answered the call. In the meantime the leaders had prepared a great number of small Hellenic flags to be distributed to the people, and which they were told to keep concealed in their pockets. It further seems that they had also a large Hellenic flag which they intended to carry in front of the procession, which was to start from the church and proceed through the streets leading to the seashore, just in front of Government House, where the final ceremony was to take place. The intention of the promoters of this demonstration was to avail themselves of the very moment when the Metropolitan was throwing the cross into the sea to have all the small flags exhibited and to shout for union to Greece, long life to King George, and other similar demonstrations.

It is said that the leaders act on special instructions received from abroad and which have for their object to attract the attention of the Great Powers now that they are deciding the fate of the islands.

General Ameglio, on being informed of what was going to take place, called on the Metropolitan on the eve of the Epiphany, and informed him that it was his intention not only to allow the ceremony to take place, but to attend in person, provided he could be assured that no political demonstration would take place during the ceremony, which should be purely religious.

General Ameglio was the more justified in taking this course because the exhibition of so many Hellenic flags was sure to increase Mussulman feeling, which is already much excited at the present moment, and public peace might have been seriously disturbed.

The Metropolitan, who is sagacious and does not approve the proceedings of these hot-headed young Greeks, said he could not assume personal responsibility.

In the evening General Ameglio sent for some of the leading members of the Greek community, repeated to them what he had already told the Metropolitan, and insisted on their binding themselves in writing that no political demonstration should take place during the procession in the streets and on the seashore. They promised to give a reply next day. Yesterday morning, a negative answer having been given, General Ameglio informed them that no impediment whatever would be put in the way of the religious ceremony within the church, but that he would not allow a procession in the streets and on the seashore.

In order to render honour to the Metropolitan, General Ameglio had sent all the native Orthodox gendarmes, with their arms, under the command of two Italian petty officers. The only other foreign officer in the church was the head of the Italian Carabinieri.

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At the end of the religious service, as the Metropolitan did not leave the church to take the head of the procession, it is said that he was hustled by some of the congregation to induce him to do so, and cries of "Move on!" were raised in the church, but his Eminence still resisted. The chief of the Carabinieri succeeded in preventing further disturbance in the church. In the meantime two or three priests were induced to move on, but a squad of ten to fifteen Italian Carabinieri who were stationed in the street entered the courtyard and prevented the congregation proceeding further.

No other incident took place, thanks to the precaution adopted by General Ameglio of stationing a company of Bersaglieri in the streets to maintain order. His Excellency also issued a proclamation explaining in a few words to the inhabitants the motives which had compelled him to prohibit the procession outside the church.

General Ameglio, who on the previous day had granted a sum of 400 fr. for the benefit of the church and had intended to distribute a further sum on the Epiphany, appears now decided to use severe measures against the political leaders.

I have, &c.
A. BILIOTTI.

[6023] No. 119.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 3, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the representative of the British bondholders of the Ottoman Public Debt, complaining of the seizure by the Greek authorities of various cargoes of salt on neutral vessels.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Sir A. Block to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Constantinople, February 1, 1913.*

WITH reference to the representations which I understand His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has caused to be made at Athens regarding the attitude of the Greek authorities in the occupied provinces towards the Public Debt administration, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 9th November, 1912, the British steamer "Neva," with a cargo of 674 tons of salt from Phocea, destined for Panderma and Constantinople, was seized by the Greek naval squadron and taken to the Piræus. The council of the Debt requested his Excellency the French Ambassador to take steps at Athens for the surrender of the cargo of salt, seeing that that article is not considered contraband of war by the Greek Government. Up to the present the council of the Debt has no information regarding the result of M. Bompard's representations.

The Roumanian steamer "Stella," chartered for the transport of 910 tons of salt from Phocea for Caiffa and Tripoli (Syria), has also been seized by the Greek fleet, and the matter was brought to the attention of the French Ambassador on the 25th January.

The Roumanian steamer "Elizabeth," which left Phocea on the 23rd January with 946 tons of salt destined for Alexandretta, Latakia, and Beirout, has also been seized by the Greek fleet. I venture to bring these incidents to the knowledge of your Excellency, in the hope that steps may be taken in the proper quarter for the release of these cargoes. Not only is the action of the Greek fleet contrary to the assurances given that no prejudice will be caused to the interests of the bondholders of Turkey, but if this state of affairs should continue, the council of the Public Debt will be unable to supply salt for the population of the capital and other ports of the Empire.

The council of the Ottoman Public Debt will be compelled later to request the Governments of the Great Powers to support a claim for damages against the Greek Government.

I have, &c.
ADAM BLOCK.

[6011] No. 120.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Rome, February 5, 1913.*

WITH reference to the instructions contained in your telegram No. 13 to His Majesty's Minister at Cettinjé of the 29th ultimo, I learn that the Italian Government have been informed by the King's representative in Montenegro that no modifications have been introduced in the customs régime in occupied territories, and that, therefore, there are no grounds for addressing any remonstrance to them on the subject.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[5976] No. 121.

Count Mensdorff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(Translation.)
(Confidential.) *Austro-Hungarian Embassy, London, February 6, 1913.*

Your Excellency,

THE impending readjustment of the territorial *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula, involving the transfer to the allied States of territories which have hitherto been Turkish, will in several respects affect international shipping in the Levant, and the Austro-Hungarian Government therefore consider it desirable to take this question into serious consideration. They are of opinion that the international arrangements to be drafted by the conference of Ambassadors in London should contain provisions laying down once and for all the rights accruing to the shipping of European States in the harbours and territorial waters of the different Balkan States.

It is the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to instruct me to submit to the conference certain provisions relating to shipping in the Levant, the German text of which I have the honour to enclose herewith, accompanied by a French translation.

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that your Excellency will be so good as to bring these provisions confidentially to the knowledge of the British Government, and to inform me whether they are in a position to accept them.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are also approaching the other signatory States in the same sense.

I have, &c.
ALB. MENSDORFF.

Enclosure in No. 121.

Austro-Hungarian Proposals respecting Shipping in the Levant.

I.

IL y aura pleine et entière liberté de navigation le long des côtes et dans les ports de tous les États de la presqu'île balkanique.

En conséquence, il est expressément entendu que les bâtiments de tous les États européens, ainsi que leurs chargements, seront traités dans ces ports et dans ces eaux, sous tous les rapports, sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité, et il ne sera fait aucune distinction entre les bâtiments et chargements nationaux et ceux de tout autre pays, de sorte que toute faveur ou facilité accordée aux bâtiments ou marchandises d'un État quelconque sera simultanément et sans exiger des conditions ou des compensations étendue aux bâtiments et marchandises de tous les États européens.

II.

En ce qui concerne les droits et taxes qui sont perçues pour l'usage des ports, des bassins, des docks, des rades ou mouillages, ou comme droits de phare, de pilotage, de remorquage, de quarantaine, ou sous une autre désignation quelconque, les bâtiments de

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tous les États européens de même que leurs cargaisons ne seront traités d'une manière moins favorable que les bâtiments nationaux et leurs cargaisons ou ceux de tout autre pays.

Les droits et taxes de cette espèce qui auraient le caractère de rétribution pour services rendus ne pourront être perçues en tant que les services dont ils constituent la rétribution ont été effectivement rendus à la navigation.

Les bâtiments étrangers pourront toujours pour les opérations de chargement et de déchargement employer leur propre matériel et leur personnel, et ils pourront dans ce but faire stationner dans les ports des allèges et des remorquers sous leur pavillon national.

III.

Les marchandises de toute espèce et provenance dont l'importation, l'exportation, le transit ou l'entreposage est permit au pavillon national, pourront être également importées, exportées, chargées ou déchargées, en transit ou en entrepôt, par les bâtiments de tous les États européens, sans avoir à acquitter des droits de douane ou taxes différents ou plus élevés (soit que ces taxes seraient perçues au bénéfice de l'État, des municipalités, des corporations locales, des particuliers ou de n'importe quels établissements) que les marchandises de la même espèce et provenance transportées par les bâtiments nationaux ou étrangers de toute autre nationalité; le même principe sera appliqué en ce qui concerne les restrictions dont ces marchandises pourraient être l'objet.

IV.

Les bâtiments de tous les Etats européens auront le droit d'exercer sous leur pavillon national la navigation par tous les canaux maritimes, sur tous les fleuves qui se déversent dans la mer Adriatique, Ionienne et Égée, et sur tous les canaux (qui pourraient y être creusés à l'avenir), ainsi que sur les lacs reliés à ces rivières, en étant soumis aux mêmes conditions que les entreprises indigènes ou étrangères sans différence de pays.

[6016] No. 122.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 66.)
Sir, *Paris, February 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, as requested in your telegram No. 57 of yesterday's date, I communicated to Sir Henry Babington Smith the substance of my despatch No. 60 of the 5th instant relative to the views of the French Government on the subject of loans to Turkey and the increase of the Turkish customs duties.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[6046] No. 123.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 8.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, February 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 5th instant, concerning the undesirability of His Majesty's Government being placed in the position of sole guardian of the Turkish flag in Crete, by being the only one of the Protecting Powers represented there by a ship, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that a ship is required either at Crete or in the vicinity for the purpose of passing wireless telegraph messages during the day from Besika Bay and the Syrian coast to Malta. If it is considered undesirable to retain a ship at Suda for this purpose, the commander-in-chief proposes to send a ship to Milo Island instead, and I am to enquire whether the Secretary of State sees any objection to this course being taken.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[5963] No. 124.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 7, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

My telegram No. 44 of 6th February.

It has now been decided that further negotiations be continued at Sophia. Bulgarian delegates will be M. Danef and M. Saraffof. It is understood here that Prince Ghika will be one of Roumanian delegates.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[6161] No. 125.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, February 8, 1913.*

KING left yesterday for the front, accompanied by Minister of Finance.

[6179] No. 126.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 8, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 49 of 7th February.

Head-quarters staff reports that Ottoman forces at Chatalja made an advance in three directions. All three attacks were effectually repulsed. Turkish troops made an attack on Yenikeui line, in neighbourhood of Lake Derkos, which also failed. Bombardment of Adrianople continues.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[6169] No. 127.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 8, 1913.*

EMPEROR handed to Prince Hohenlohe, in a farewell audience to-day, His Majesty's answer to Emperor of Austria's letter. Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me it is very friendly in tone. It lays stress on concession made by Russia in consenting to creation of an autonomous Albania and follows the lines indicated in his Excellency's conversation with the Prince, as reported in my telegram No. 37 of 5th February.

In reply to a question of mine, his Excellency said he had spoken to Prince about Scutari, and pointed out that were Montenegrins to capture it they would refuse to give it up. Prince had replied that situation would then be changed. His Excellency, however, does not attach any importance to this admission, as the Austrian Government would not consider themselves bound by it, seeing that they had even repudiated the suggestion made by their Ambassador here with regard to territorial situation between Montenegro and Scutari.

[6170] No. 128.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 8, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 38 of 6th February: Persia.

In conversation with M. Sazonof to-day I expressed the hope that, now that railway concession had been granted, Russian Government would make no further difficulties about advance.

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tous les États européens de même que leurs cargaisons ne seront traités d'une manière moins favorable que les bâtiments nationaux et leurs cargaisons ou ceux de tout autre pays.

Les droits et taxes de cette espèce qui auraient le caractère de rétribution pour services rendus ne pourront être perçues en tant que les services dont ils constituent la rétribution ont été effectivement rendus à la navigation.

Les bâtiments étrangers pourront toujours pour les opérations de chargement et de déchargement employer leur propre matériel et leur personnel, et ils pourront dans ce but faire stationner dans les ports des allèges et des remorquers sous leur pavillon national.

III.

Les marchandises de toute espèce et provenance dont l'importation, l'exportation, le transit ou l'entreposage est permit au pavillon national, pourront être également importées, exportées, chargées ou déchargées, en transit ou en entrepôt, par les bâtiments de tous les États européens, sans avoir à acquitter des droits de douane ou taxes différents ou plus élevés (soit que ces taxes seraient perçues au bénéfice de l'État, des municipalités, des corporations locales, des particuliers ou de n'importe quels établissements) que les marchandises de la même espèce et provenance transportées par les bâtiments nationaux ou étrangers de toute autre nationalité; le même principe sera appliqué en ce qui concerne les restrictions dont ces marchandises pourraient être l'objet.

IV.

Les bâtiments de tous les Etats européens auront le droit d'exercer sous leur pavillon national la navigation par tous les canaux maritimes, sur tous les fleuves qui se déversent dans la mer Adriatique, Ionienne et Égée, et sur tous les canaux (qui pourraient y être creusés à l'avenir), ainsi que sur les lacs reliés à ces rivières, en étant soumis aux mêmes conditions que les entreprises indigènes ou étrangères sans différence de pays.

[6016] No. 122.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 66.)
Sir, *Paris, February 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, as requested in your telegram No. 57 of yesterday's date, I communicated to Sir Henry Babington Smith the substance of my despatch No. 60 of the 5th instant relative to the views of the French Government on the subject of loans to Turkey and the increase of the Turkish customs duties.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[6046] No. 123.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 8.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, February 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 5th instant, concerning the undesirability of His Majesty's Government being placed in the position of sole guardian of the Turkish flag in Crete, by being the only one of the Protecting Powers represented there by a ship, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that a ship is required either at Crete or in the vicinity for the purpose of passing wireless telegraph messages during the day from Besika Bay and the Syrian coast to Malta. If it is considered undesirable to retain a ship at Suda for this purpose, the commander-in-chief proposes to send a ship to Milo Island instead, and I am to enquire whether the Secretary of State sees any objection to this course being taken.

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His Excellency said that he would see the Minister of Finance this evening, and try and induce him to give 200,000*l.* While admitting that such an advance could be made without any risk, his Excellency doubted whether Minister of Finance could take so large a sum from the only funds which he has at his disposal for unforeseen expenses (see my telegram No. 472 of 1912).

[6164] No. 129.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 23. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February 8, 1913.*

I HAVE been informed, most confidentially, by trustworthy Austrian, that the idea of addressing a letter to the Emperor of Russia was entirely due to Emperor of Austria's own initiative. It seems that he has for some time been worrying himself with the thought that should he die and leave his country on the verge of a war with Russia, his memory might be attacked and he might be accused of having failed in his duty to make use of every means in his power to secure peace. Sending of the letter therefore seems to have been really a question of conscience with the Emperor. His Imperial Majesty sprung the idea on the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, knowing the Emperor's present state of mind, thought better not to raise opposition; as no harm could be done by letting the Emperor have his way.

[6163] No. 130.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 31 of 7th February.

The German Ambassador said that, in his opinion, if Adrianople fall, the Powers should in some way collectively exercise some control over the peace conditions, so as to preclude the allies making demand for a war indemnity, which Russia, "under pressure of Slav opinion," might have to support, and that he had suggested this to his Government.

Protracted delay over preliminaries of peace has altered the situation and the point of view of the allies in the matter. As in the case of the Treaty of San Stefano, the preliminaries would presumably be subject to revision by the Powers, and any rectification which might delay their conclusion would be unadvisable, even in the interests of Turkey herself.

[6107] No. 131.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No 29.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, February 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 35 of 1st February.

In reply to protest, Servian Government have sent me a memorandum stating that they have taken over control of Ottoman Debt, basing their action on principles of international law. This document has been drawn up, I understand, by local jurists.

Copy by post to-night.

(Repeated to Vienna, No. 46; Paris, No. 60; Berlin, No. 63; and Rome, No. 50.)

[5978] No. 132.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cavalla, February 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 1st February just received.

Eleven per cent. is being levied on all imports from Salonica without distinction.

[6107] No. 133.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 8, 1913.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 29 of 8th February: Ottoman Debt.

Ask views of Government to which you are accredited.

[6172] No. 134.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 101 of 6th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that, in conversation yesterday with the German Ambassador on the subject of Albania, he had observed that Austria had taken up an attitude which it was beyond her strength to maintain if left single-handed. It was knowledge that she could count on support of Germany that gave her courage, and her present policy was one of blackmail. Ambassador had replied that Russia was equally counting on French support, and referred to language held by Grand Duke Nicholas when he visited the fortress of Toul last autumn. Minister for Foreign Affairs had then reminded the Ambassador that this comparison did not hold good, as Russia did not look to support from France in a war with Austria unless Germany intervened. Finally, Ambassador had suggested that his Excellency should put forward fresh proposals for a settlement of Albanian question.

This his Excellency proposes to do, and will telegraph them to Russian Ambassador. His idea seems to be that for eastern frontier line River Drin should be taken as a compromise between the original line proposed by Servia and supported by Russia and the line proposed by Austria. He admits the correctness of your contention that most of the towns mentioned in your telegram are really Albanian, but contends that they are but islands and that the surrounding districts are Servian. As regards northern frontier he still claims the two banks of the Boyana for Montenegro.

I observed that, while fully appreciating the conciliatory attitude that he had adopted in regard to Servian port and Scutari, the general settlement would be so greatly in Russia's favour that it might be easier for her than for Austria to make concessions on some of points still in dispute. His Excellency admitted that Russia had reason to be satisfied with outcome of the war, and that question as to whether some particular town was to be Albanian or not was of no intrinsic importance to her. She had, however, to think of Servia, and Montenegro could not accept any settlement that might lead to overthrow of Montenegrin dynasty. It was the latter consideration that made him view with apprehension possibility of fall of Scutari, as were its capture to involve much loss of life King Nicholas would lose his throne if he gave it up. Russian public opinion was not at present much excited about Scutari, but it was very anti-Austrian. Any pressure, therefore, brought to bear at Austria's dictation to make Montenegro withdraw from Scutari, if captured, might be the last straw.

[6166] No. 135.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 9, 1913.*

ITALIAN war-ships "Pisa" and "San Marco" arrived this morning.

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 47), Sir E. Goschen (No. 64), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 51).

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[6167] No. 136.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 9, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 47 of 7th February.

I and my French, Austrian, and Russian colleagues have received what purport to be further telegrams from consuls at Adrianople stating that continuous bombardment of town is "contrary to principles of humanity."

There is a strong suspicion that these telegrams may be apocryphal, and intended to put Bulgarian Government in a position of appearing to act contrary to dictates of humanity.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[6183] No. 137.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, February 9, 1913.*

I GATHER, from hints dropped during the course of a conversation with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day, that his Excellency may shortly put forward a suggestion to you to the effect that joint action should be taken by His Majesty's Government and the German Government for the purpose of bringing about a compromise between Roumania and Bulgaria.

The above is confidential.

[6184] No. 138.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, February 9, 1913.*

SECRETARY of State informed me to-day that deputation from German banks had pressed him to allow them to advance money to Turkey as "pension alimentaire." He had replied that Imperial Government could only consent if British and French banks joined with sanction of their Governments.

[6180] No. 139.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 9, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 51 of 7th February.

I understand that instructions for the negotiations were sent to Prince Ghika last night by messenger, and that he is to hasten negotiations as much as possible.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[6181] No. 140.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, February 9, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 20 of 4th February.

(Confidential.)

Russian Minister is no longer so hopeful. He thinks that terms which he could have induced Roumanian Government to accept some days ago would not stand so good a chance if offered now, for chauvinist feeling in the country is increasing and makes it every day more difficult for the Government to waive demand for Silistria.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[6374] No. 141.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 13. Treaty.)
Sir, *Salonica, February 3, 1913.*

WITH reference to my No. 8, Treaty, of the 17th ultimo, and to other despatches in this series, I have the honour to report that during the past few days the Servian customs authorities at Ghevgheli appear to have been levying on certain articles, in addition to the import duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, a fresh octroi or "contribution de guerre," of which the following has been given to me as the tariff:—

Articles—	Per 100 kilog. Fr.
Alcohol	117
Vins fins	200
Liqueurs	100
Brandy	50
Cigarette paper	281
Matches	120
Petroleum	54·65
Salt	17·60
Coffee	100
Sugar, chocolate, and confectionery	30
Oil, beer, and raisins	20
Candles	18
Olives, oranges, and lemons	10
Figs	8

In a letter published in one of the local papers to-day, the Servian customs official justifies the application of these duties by reference to articles 43, 48, and 49 of The Hague Convention of the 18th October, 1908 (?).

Since the 31st ultimo a similar tariff has been imposed also on goods forwarded from Salonica to Monastir, where there had previously been no custom-house at all. Forty truck-loads of goods are stated to be detained at Monastir station pending payment of these charges.

On the 30th ultimo a British company trading with the interior complained to me that 119 cases of sugar and fruit dispatched by them to Uskub on the 17th were detained by the Servian authorities at Ghevgheli, whilst three truck-loads of sugar dispatched some four days earlier, though allowed to pass through Ghevgheli, had been confiscated on arrival at Uskub. The complainants handed me a formal protest, which I transmitted to His Britannic Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub for communication to the Servian authorities, but I am not yet aware whether any attention has been paid to it.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[6326] No. 142.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Bucharest, February 5, 1913.*

TO-DAY'S the "Roumanie," M. Také Jonesco's organ, repudiates the charge so freely made in the British and French press, that Roumania has increased her demands in regard to a rectification of frontier.

"Roumania," the "Roumanie" says, "has never had occasion to increase her demands. Such action would be absolutely inadmissible. Nor has Roumania had occasion to reduce her demands, as she has never received an offer serious enough to elicit fresh proposals. Such fresh proposals might evidently have been less than the original demands, but never could possibly have been more. All that the European press has said to the contrary, whether it has attributed the alleged increase in Roumania's demands to the Roumanian Government or to M. Také Jonesco individually, is absolutely untrue."

In view of the fact that the protocol recently signed in London by M. Danef and M. Misu comprises among Roumania's demands the claim to a frontier from Turtukai

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to Baltchik, and seeing that in M. Také Jonesco's conversation with you on the 4th ultimo, recorded in your despatch No. 4, that gentleman made no mention of either Turtukai or Baltchik when informing you of what he intended to ask, the "Roumanie's" denial that Roumania has increased her demands would not seem to be strictly in accordance with the facts of the case I should, however, mention that when the Russian Minister pointed out to M. Maioresco that the inclusion in the protocol of a demand for a frontier from Turtukai to Baltchik would produce an unfavourable impression in Europe, and would be interpreted as an attempt by Roumania to take advantage of the difficult situation created by the recent *coup d'État* at Constantinople, M. Maioresco made it clear that the demand had only been embodied in the protocol as it was thought well to record in it the maximum of what Roumania had claimed, and that Roumania would be content with considerably less.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[6223] No. 143.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 41.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 5, 1913.*

THE "Novoe Vremya," in discussing the possibility of a general war in its issue of to-day, declares that the result of such a war will depend entirely on the attitude adopted by Great Britain.

If war broke out between Russia and France on the one side and Austria and Germany on the other, British statesmen would be placed in a great dilemma. They might consider that in every war those who do not fight derive the greatest advantage. A conflict involving millions of troops would weaken Europe. Whoever won the forces of the continent would be so exhausted on the conclusion of peace that Great Britain must become the arbiter of the future of Europe. From this point of view English Ministers would in all probability wish to retain for their country the advantages of a more or less masked neutrality. And if they came to such a decision it would hardly be fair to accuse Great Britain of a breach of faith. Every State guarded its own interests by the means it deemed most advantageous. Such was the first possible solution of the difficulty; but there was a second possible solution.

The British Cabinet might say that the Russo-Japanese war had shown that naval engagements to-day end in the complete annihilation of the weaker party. A German Franco-Russian war might possibly end in a comparatively slight diminution of the German fleet and in the entire destruction of the French fleet. Germany would then demand such an indemnity and impose such fantastic terms of peace as would render her undisputed mistress of the continent. From this point of view it would be to the advantage of and even necessary for Great Britain to take part in the war and destroy the one Power on the continent whose interests were diametrically opposed to her own. The result of a general European war would be doubtful only so long as Great Britain refrained from taking part therein. The question was therefore whether she would take part in such a war or not The answer must probably be in the affirmative, not because of any sentimental reasons, but because it would be to England's advantage to fight.

The "Novoe Vremya" then discusses the relative strength of the British and German naval forces now and in seven or eight months' time. Whilst at present the balance was decidedly in favour of England, her position in the near future would actually be a dangerous one, especially when it was remembered that in October the French time-expired men would leave the ranks of their army. All that was taking place now was a device to gain time for the German General Staff to complete its preparations for the appointed moment. The article concludes as follows: "If there is a European war, from which of course may God preserve us, the active participation of England in it seems to us inevitable. In such case the last word must rest with the Triple *Entente*. The consequences which accrue from this are self-evident."

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[6224] No. 144.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 42.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 5, 1913.*

PRINCE GOTTFRIED HOHENLOHE, formerly Austrian military attaché at this court, arrived at St. Petersburgh on the 4th instant and was received in audience the same afternoon by the Emperor, to whom he presented an autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph.

In speaking to me last week of the Prince's approaching visit, M. Sazonof remarked that the Austrian Government were somewhat alarmed at the intense feeling of hostility which their attitude during the Balkan crisis had provoked in this country. They were afraid that this feeling was shared by the Emperor, and that unless something was done to counteract it, it might seriously affect the future relations of the two Empires In a conversation which he had had a little time ago with the Austrian councillor of embassy, during the illness of the Ambassador, he had told him that after Servia had bowed to the wishes of the Powers and renounced her claims to territory which she had conquered by her arms, the military precautions which Austria was still taking was quite incomprehensible. The mission with which Prince Hohenlohe had been entrusted was, his Excellency seemed to think, the direct outcome of these remarks, as the Austrian Government were evidently anxious to assure the Emperor of their pacific intentions and to persuade His Majesty that their attitude had been misunderstood.

Strong as is the anti-Austrian feeling in St. Petersburgh, it is, if I am correctly informed, even still stronger in the provinces; and it has now reached such a dangerous pitch that it would almost appear as if a growing section of the nation was in favour of war.

In a recent conversation with the German Ambassador, M. Sazonof gave expression to this general feeling of irritation, when he told Count Pourtalès, as reported in my telegram No. 25 of the 24th ultimo, that if Germany was going to allow Austria to direct the policy of the Triple Alliance, Russia's feelings towards Germany would undergo a radical change. My French colleague has since told me that on M. Sazonof referring in the course of this conversation to the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and to the military party in Austria, Count Pourtalès had at once said that the Archduke's one idea was to revive the alliance of the three Emperors. To this M. Sazonof had replied that it would be undesirable to effect any change in the present grouping of the Powers. On my asking M. Sazonof, in a conversation which I had with him on the 3rd instant, whether he thought that Prince Hohenlohe would endeavour to enlist the Emperor's sympathies in favour of a return to the *Dreikaiserbund*, his Excellency said that if he attempted to do so he would meet with no encouragement. The Archduke no doubt would do all he could to resuscitate that alliance, but Russia's past experience of it had not been such as to make her anxious to renew the experiment. It had been dropped by the Emperor Alexander III; and the Emperor Nicholas, who held to the traditions which he had inherited from his father, was not likely to renew it. I have already, in my telegram No. 37 of the 5th instant, informed you of what passed in the conversation which M. Sazonof had had with Prince Hohenlohe on the preceding day. The Prince's mission, his Excellency remarked to me, constituted a *geste pacifique*, and as such, was satisfactory; but the friendly assurances which had been interchanged were rather in the nature of "de l'eau bénite de cour." The Prince had not been empowered to discuss any of the questions at present in dispute, nor was he, indeed, competent to do so. The only concrete result of his visit was the statement which he had been authorised to make, that the Austrian Government would consent to the old monastery in which Russia was specially interested, between Ipek and Diakovo, being handed over to Servia, together, he presumed, with the adjacent territory.

Prince Hohenlohe is to be received again in audience by the Emperor before leaving for Vienna on the 8th of this month.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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[6199] No. 145.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 91.)
Sir, *Constantinople February 6, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch I have received from the Military Attaché to this Embassy, reporting on the alleged disturbances among the troops at Chatalja, supposed to have been occasioned by the recent *coup d'Etat* at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 145.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 4, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a week or ten days ago a certain number of wounded soldiers being transported in carts were seen on various occasions about the town.

This circumstance gave rise to various rumours, one of which was that there had been serious fighting in the army at Chatalja between the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress and those who, in addition to being opposed to that party in principle, objected to the assassination of Nazim Pasha. Another was that there had been fighting between the Bulgarian and Turkish outposts. The latter theory was supported by reports to that effect in the local press, and was probably an attempt to divert public attention from the truth.

I have recently had reliable information that about 150 wounded men were in fact sent down here from Chatalja on the 27th and 28th January, and were taken to the Selimiyah hospital. None of these men were suffering from bullet wounds which disposes of the tale that there had been outpost fighting between the two armies. All were suffering from sword or bayonet wounds, stabs, cuts, and contusions.

This points clearly to the fact that there had been some sort of quarrel or faction fight in the Turkish army. At the same time it does not follow that the fight was on political lines. It may have been a quarrel between two adjacent battalions, or between Circassian and Kurdish volunteers. If so, it would have been a curious coincidence arriving when it did just after the change of Government here, and apart from the inherent improbability of the explanation. I have since received information (though from a less reliable source) that when the circumstances under which the change of Government had been effected and Nazim Pasha had been killed, were fully known at Chatalja, a pretty serious fight actually did take place, on Monday the 27th January, which was only stopped after some difficulty by the personal intervention of some of the generals, and during which fifty men were killed.

Whatever the truth may be, I think that the army has as a whole now made up its mind to lay aside internal differences for the moment, in view of the continuation of the war, and I do not think there will be a repetition of such events as described above, until either the army has been defeated again or peace has been declared.

Nor do I think there were sufficient grounds for a report which was current that Abuk Pasha, or some other general, who was a friend of Nazim Pasha's, was ready to march with his corps on Constantinople to avenge the death of the Minister of War. The day of reckoning on that account will be postponed till the questions arising out of the war are settled.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL.

[6200] No. 146.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 5, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 69, Confidential, of the 28th ultimo, and to my telegram No. 62 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that the Committee of Union and Progress, which styles the Mahmoud Shevket Pasha Cabinet the "Cabinet of National Defence," has also formed a committee of national defence on the lines of the French revolutionaries in 1793 and the Communists in 1870. They have issued rousing appeals to the "nation" and all parties to rally to the cry of the "country in danger," and have declared the whole Ottoman nation in a state of mobilisation. When the Committee of Union and Progress speaks of the "nation" or "Ottoman people," it generally means itself, and in the present instance the real Ottoman people are either quite apathetic or disinclined to a renewal of hostilities, especially on offensive lines. As, however, the committee is in power, the people either remain silent or pretend to follow the lead given them by it. The committee of national defence, composed of Talaat Bey and other such "die-hard" elements, is raising subscriptions and organising the country for a "last ditch" effort. Many, especially Christians, who have already paid the military exemption tax, are again being forced to buy themselves out. The new Sheikh-ul-Islam has sent a religious appeal, for the defence of the Moslem fatherland, to his subordinates in the provinces, while committee agents have been preaching a holy war in Saint Sophia and other mosques, and the Hamidieh Kurdish cavalry, now quartered in the vicinity of the capital, have been invited to join in a "jihad." A fresh requisition of transport animals has been started, while it is stated that 90 per cent. of the provisions in the capital will also be requisitioned with the apparent hope of inconveniencing foreigners and forcing them to bring pressure to bear, through their Governments, on the Balkan allies to abate their demands.

A sort of delirium seems to possess the inside committee circles and the fiercer spirits among the military, and, judging by appearances, they would seem to be bent on risking and perhaps destroying what is left of the Ottoman Empire, thus adding to the havoc wrought during the last four years. The capture of Adrianople may have a sobering effect, but, as the destinies of Turkey seem now to be in the hands of men who have discarded the dictates of common sense, more decisive events may have to occur in the neighbourhood of the capital or the Dardanelles before they exhibit an accommodating or yielding mood. In military encounters with the Bulgarian, &c., troops, the Turks will probably fight with more desperate courage than during the first phases of the Balkan war, but real, steady determination and organisation for extensive offensive operations would seem to be lacking, and defective in comparison with those of the allies.

The present Cabinet's reply to the collective *démarche*, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 81 of the 1st instant, would appear to have been written with the assistance of the outgoing Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Effendi, and with some prompting from German and Austrian sources. In the matter of Adrianople it does not differ materially from the draft prepared by the last Cabinet, and as regards the Ægean Islands the phrase "occupied by the allies" seems to have been added on the inspiration of the Austrian Embassy, and with the idea of excluding the islands under Italian occupation. The demands for the agreement to the 4 per cent. customs duties, the liberty to tax foreigners without the consent of the foreign missions, to abolish the Capitulations, and the foreign post-offices have no direct connection with Balkan events, and would seem to be an attempt to trade on Europe's desire for peace and make her pay, so to speak, a war indemnity against the acceptance of her advice to cede Adrianople and the Ægean Islands. As Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance, is committed to restore the Sporades Islands to Turkey, while the Powers of the Triple *Entente* have shown signs of a desire to see all the islands left to Greece, it is hoped in certain circles here to show the Turks that the Triple Alliance is more favourable to Ottoman interests in the matter than the Triple *Entente*. Similarly, in the question of a 4 per cent. customs increase, Germany has already consented in return for the Bagdad Railway and other concessions; Austria has given her consent against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Italy as part of the Tripoli settlement, while the Powers of the Triple *Entente* have not yet received their *quid pro quo*.

Though in equity Turkey is entitled to her economic liberty, and His Majesty's Government have given their adherence in principle, the other demands of the Turkish

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note, *e.g.*, the abolition of the Capitulations and foreign post-offices, which were not specified in the draft reply of the ex-Cabinet, are of course preposterous. Viewed from one standpoint, the breaking-off of peace negotiations, and the resumption of hostilities may have relieved Europe, and especially the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, from a somewhat embarrassing position. It would, perhaps, be ungracious to recall that the consent of the Powers to the imposition of the extra 3 per cent. was for a limited term to expire in 1914, and was contingent on its proceeds being devoted to reforms in Macedonia.

As regards the internal policy of the new Committee Cabinet, though ushered in with signs of violence, its present professions are to avoid political persecution and to invite all parties to unite for the common defence of the country, but it has been noticed that many of their political opponents, who after previous internal upheavals remained on in the capital, have on this occasion fled the country. This phenomenon is by some explained by the fact that the formation of a National Defence Committee in France in 1793 was followed by the "Terreur" at Paris with its accompaniments of wholesale political prescription, the guillotine, &c., and the fear that the present mild policy of the Cabinet of Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, may, under certain circumstances, undergo a sudden reversal. This contingency might arise in the event of the fortunes of war being again adverse to Turkish arms, and there are many rumours as to the likelihood of serious internal trouble.

In my despatch No. 875 of the 18th October last, I had the honour to remark that "it is generally felt that should the war lead to another internal upheaval, the latter must result in a change of Sultan," and it has lately been asserted on good authority that the inner circle of the committee has only postponed its decision to depose the present Sultan and "appoint" Prince Abdul Medjid Effendi as Sultan, thus passing over the Heir-Apparent Yussuf Izzedin and the two princes next in succession, Vahdeddin and Selaheddin. On the other hand, it would appear that in non-committee, *i.e.*, in genuine Moslem circles, the idea is secretly entertained that the present Sultan and the Heir-Apparent should be induced to abdicate their rights in favour of Prince Vahdeddin, who is a younger brother of Abdul Hamid, was born in 1861 and is reputed to share the intelligence and firmness of character of the ex-Sultan, while being more broad-minded and liberal in character.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[6201] No. 147.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 6, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy relative to the present Ottoman military arrangements.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 147.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 5, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on recent military preparations.

Ferik Izzet Pasha, chief of the General Staff, has become commander-in-chief of the armies in the field, while Mahmud Shevket Pasha remains in Constantinople as Minister of War. Izzet Pasha left for Chatalja on the 1st instant, accompanied by the head-quarter staff.

The Turkish forces (excluding the garrisons of Adrianople and Scutari and the army round Yanina) may be considered, for the purposes of the present moment, as consisting of four groups: the army at Chatalja, the army in the Gallipoli peninsula, the force watching the coast about Smyrna, and the force in readiness on the Gulf of Ismid and at Panderma.

Advantage has been taken of the long period of truce to reinforce and complete the armies at Chatalja and Gallipoli, while the other two groups have been entirely formed

during the same period. There has been time to reorganise the dislocated units, to bring them up to strength, and to get rid of weakly and undesirable elements. Time was the chief thing wanting to the mobilisation of the army in October, and now that time has been given it must be considered that the army is in a much better state, as regards organisation and preparedness, than when the war began.

At Chatalja there are six army corps. A few days ago I saw Hamdi Pasha, commander of the IInd Army Corps, who told me that he now had thirty-five battalions, each 900 strong. Assuming the other army corps to be about the same strength, this would give about 180,000 rifles. It is probable that the three reserve army corps are weaker than those in the first line, but taking into consideration the artillery and auxiliary services, we shall probably not be far wrong in estimating from 180,000 to 200,000 as the strength of the army in the lines of Chatalja.

There are really no data on which to base estimates of the forces at Gallipoli and Smyrna, but it is probable that the former has 50,000 or 60,000 men, while of the latter I can only say that the Sivas redif division, 7,000 strong, is at Menemem.

As regards the fourth group mentioned above, this is the Xth Army Corps, on the formation and probable object of which I have previously reported, and to the command of which Ferik Khurshid Pasha has now been appointed. The strength of this army corps should be between 20,000 and 30,000. Of its divisions, the 32nd (nine battalions, about 7,500) is at Panderma and Artaki, and the 31st and the Kharput redif are in the Gulf of Ismid. Preparations are now being made to embark these. Three large transports left here, ostensibly for Ismid, a few days ago, three more left to-day, of which one at least was for Artaki; and three more were lying here this evening ready to start. The interesting question is where these troops will be disembarked. What indications I have been able to get point to its being somewhere between Gallipoli and Rodosto, probably Sharkeui. It is true that some of the shipments now being made at Ismid are reported to be for Buyuk Chekmeje, in which case they would be to reinforce the army at Chatalja, but it does not follow that these relate to the Xth Army Corps.

As regards the possibility of an offensive movement from the Chatalja position, I think that the weather and the state of the country put it out of the question. The Turks now say that the Bulgarians are abandoning their position and retiring to Cherkesskeui, a proceeding which seems most unlikely, though it is possible that they are withdrawing every man that they can spare to reinforce the army before Adrianople or to mass troops against Gallipoli.

There is one difference which strikes me between the situation now and that which obtained when hostilities were on the point of breaking out in October. It seems to me that the new Government is approaching the business of war in a more serious spirit than did the last one, and is paying more careful attention to the point of educating popular opinion and raising the moral of the nation. There are, to be sure, none of the noisy processions which one used to see, but a quiet propaganda is going on, patriotic manifestoes and stirring proclamations are continually being issued, among which may be noticed one by the Sheikh-ul-Islam calling upon the mollahs to pray more earnestly for Divine assistance, while the question of Adrianople and the attitude of the Great Powers have to some extent brought home to the army and the nation the necessity of putting forth every effort.

Deeply though the canker of political strife may have eaten into the army, it seems to me that this is now pretty well united in a resolve to support the present Government and to sink all differences till the war has been decided.

Another natural and obvious precaution which was previously omitted, but which has now been taken, is the prohibition of all cypher telegrams within the theatre of operations, which has been very liberally defined. It is for this reason that we have no certain news of the fleet, but I am confident that it has left the Dardanelles and that the bulk of it is now in the Marmora, to assist the transport and debarkation of the Xth Army Corps and to support the armies at Chatalja and Gallipoli as occasion arises.

A cruiser arrived here this morning, and I am informed that the battle-ship "Messudiyeh" passed up the Bosphorus for the Black Sea last night.

120,000,000 rounds of Mauser ammunition and 20,000 shrapnel have recently been ordered from Germany, and negotiations are in progress for the supply of 4,500,000 rations of condensed soup from France.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[6225] No. 148.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 43.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 6, 1913.*

THE second Slav banquet, which was to have taken place on the 2nd instant, was prohibited by the police authorities, at the wish, so it is stated in the press, of M. Sazonof. At the first banquet, as reported in my despatch No. 367 of the 12th December, 1912, patriotic songs were sung and fiery speeches were made, and it would appear that the Government, continuing their policy of keeping under strict control and of suppressing as far as possible any public manifestation of Slav sympathy, forbade the banquet in order to avoid any possible anti-Austrian demonstrations or speeches which might encourage the Slavs. M. Sazonof's action forms the subject of much comment, and the organisers of the banquet, such as Count Bobrinsky, have expressed themselves in the press in indignant terms thereon.

The "Novoe Vremya" of to-day's date states that it is authorised to explain that the banquet was not, strictly speaking, forbidden, but that the Minister of the Interior expressed to its organiser, M. Bashmahof, who is an official of that Ministry and the editor of the "Official Messenger," his opinion that it was undesirable for one in his position to be so prominently connected with what was really a political manifestation, and therefore thought it advisable to stop the banquet. This view of the Minister did not, however, mean that he was opposed to Government officials being present at public dinners in connection with Slav questions in general, or that he would prohibit private persons from organising such dinners so long as they were not accompanied by political demonstrations.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[6205] No. 149.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 47.)

Sir, *Berlin, February 7, 1913.*

EVER since the overthrow of the late Turkish Government and the arrival of the party of "Union and Progress" to power, isolated articles have appeared in the German press calling attention to the fact that during the war the Balkan States have received financial help from France and Russia, whereas, in deference to wishes expressed by the Imperial Foreign Office, the German banks have refrained from following their natural inclination to advance money to Turkey.

In a recent issue of the "Vossische Zeitung," the well-known publicist, Dr. Friedjung of Vienna, published an article, partly on this subject and partly dealing with relations towards each other of the Powers of the Triple *Entente*.

He began by stating that owing to the determination of the German Government to observe strict neutrality in the Balkan war, the Deutsche bank had had to renounce its intention of advancing a considerable sum to Turkey in return for a concession for a Constantinople municipal railway, and that in setting their face against this transaction, the German Government would seem to have forgotten that ever since the war began European financial neutrality had been a dead-letter.

The article then gives a list of the sums advanced by the French banks to Bulgaria and Servia, and says that these sums only represent a certain portion of the amounts advanced, as money was also forthcoming for those States from St. Petersburgh, while it was not necessary to point out that, considering the state of her finances, Montenegro could not have kept her army for four months on a war footing without financial support from Russia.

Dr. Friedjung added that while the exact sums advanced by French and Russian banks to the four allied States were not actually known, enough had transpired to to show that without the assistance of the French banks the Balkan war could not have taken place. So that if the German banks were to advance money to Turkey they would only be following the example given by their French and Russian rivals of whose financial neutrality the less said the better.

Leaving on one side what he calls the moral side of the question, viz, whether France, owing to her first proposals, was not perhaps bound more than any other Power to keep within the strict bounds of neutrality. Dr. Friedjung then proceeded to discuss the political reasons which may have urged the French Government to consent to the advances made by the French bankers. He rejected as most improbable the theory so often put forward that France was anxious to bring about the downfall of Turkey in order to lay her hands on Palestine and Syria, and was still less inclined to attribute her one-sided attitude to sympathy for Christian States struggling to throw off the Turkish yoke; the real motive for her action was, in his opinion, rather to be found in her relations with Russia.

He then writes as follows:—

"During the last months, Russian friendship has become more necessary for France than ever. Formerly, England was regarded as the chief bulwark against any combination which might be dangerous to France. Of course, it is a mistake for France to fear an attack from Germany, but one has to reckon with the fact that she really does feel anxiety on that head. Now England appears to be going her own way and to be working in the direction of friendly relations with Germany. This has given France food for reflection and she desires to make certain of Russia at almost any cost. She has therefore adopted the Russian standpoint in the Balkans with feverish energy and, as far as she can do so without overstepping the bounds of international etiquette, she is placing her diplomatic influence and her financial resources at the disposal of allied Balkan States. Whether this policy is more to the advantage of Russia than of France need not be discussed. Moreover, it would be idle to endeavour to prove to the French that it would be far wiser for them to place their relations with Germany on a better footing, than to be continually striving for a closer alliance one day with Russia and another day with England. Setting aside all sentiment, and adhering solely to facts, French policy can only be understood by a study of those elements of which the political judgment of French public opinion is composed. Should it ever come to an agreement between London and Berlin, and this is a question on which only the initiated can permit themselves to give an opinion, the French Republic will presumably cling to Russia more closely than before."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[6207] No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 49. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, February 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of a Vienna telegram which appeared to-day in the "Frankfurter Zeitung." It deals chiefly with the autograph letter addressed by the Emperor of Austria to the Czar, but it also alludes to the want of decision displayed by Count Berchtold in his conduct of affairs during the present crisis, especially with regard to the Albanian question.

It is impossible to judge how far rumour is correct in attributing this telegram to German official inspiration in Vienna; I can only say that the views it expresses with regard to Count Berchtold are very similar to those entertained at the Imperial Foreign Office. Both Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann have on several occasions spoken to me of his vacillating policy and of their vain endeavours to elicit from him a clear expression of his views on the various questions they have put before him respecting Scutari and the eastern frontier of Albania. Up till quite lately, they informed me, they had not been even able to obtain any definite idea of the line which he proposed that frontier should follow.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

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Enclosure in No. 150.

Extract from the "Frankfurter Zeitung" of February 7, 1913.

(Translation.)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND RUSSIA.

THE pessimistic atmosphere respecting the Imperial autograph letter continues and is giving rise to the most extraordinary rumours. As we said in our first telegram on the subject of that letter, it is not so much a question of the letter itself as of its bearer. It is not far from the truth to say that a mission like that entrusted to Prince Hohenlohe is especially valuable from the fact that he can talk with the Czar *tête-à-tête* and dispel many a false idea as to Austria's policy. One remembers from the history of Bismarck how difficult it is for the Russian autocrats to distinguish true and false information, surrounded as they are by a perfect network of intrigue. If it were really a fact that the Czar had been given the alleged proof of Austria's thirst for war, and Prince Hohenlohe had now been able to discount this proof, a great service would have been rendered to the cause of peace, though of course there is no guarantee that some subsequent visitor would not produce the contrary impression to that given by Prince Hohenlohe. Consequently, the fact of the letter having been sent must neither be regarded with too much optimism nor again with an excessive pessimism.

This pessimism is, however, probably only the general dejection which is being caused here by the official policy of Count Berchtold. This policy is regarded as being too weak, and its author is already being called the "Benedick of Diplomacy." It is an open secret that the Russian Ambassador in London has been causing an absolute sensation among his colleagues by his challenging attitude, and that he has not received the snub he deserves. Political circles are dejected at Count Berchtold having allowed himself to be forced into a defensive attitude on the question of the delimitation of Albania and at his having given the impression in Europe that he was now quarrelling about that miserable spot. The opinion is that that course was wrong from the beginning, and that Austria, as the Power most nearly interested in the west of the Balkan peninsula, ought never to have allowed herself to be drawn into a discussion with the Triple *Entente* as to the delimitation of Albania. The autonomy of Albania, so readily offered, would, it is maintained, only be of value to Austria if a strong Albania could be established, and one which could be considered as a counterpoise to Servia. It is held that Austria ought to have found the energy to declare that, as the only Power interested, she would undertake the settlement of the frontiers by her ethnological experts, and would, if necessary, enforce that settlement by recourse to arms. If Russia were determined to have a war about this question, it were better to have it at once. It is hoped even now that Count Berchtold will display in the subsequent negotiations more decision than he has hitherto done.

[6215] No. 151.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 9, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Very considerable embarkations of troops during the past few days here and at San Stefano, whilst troops and guns have come down from Chatalja. This is in addition to the embarkation of the Xth Army Corps.

"Foreign ships arriving from the Dardanelles report that disembarkation was being carried out at Eregli from eight or ten transports, protected by the fleet. Turkish cavalry appeared to be already landed, while Bulgarian field guns were in action on the hills. Cannot say whether this disembarkation is of the Xth Army Corps or of troops from Chatalja, nor whether any other disembarkations are being carried out, but I consider it unlikely now that any disembarkation would be attempted west of Rodosto."

(Sent to Sophia.)

[6234] No. 152.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 9, 1913.*

THE following is a résumé of official communication in official journal to-night:—

"The Turks advanced on 8th February against the Bulgarian positions before Bulair. After a fierce engagement, the Bulgarians advanced and drove back the Turks to Bulair fortifications. Many dead and wounded. Turkish prisoners state that six Turkish divisions took part. Towards evening the Turkish troops attempted to land near Sharkeui. About twenty Turkish steamers were visible. The Turkish troops disembarked, but were repulsed with considerable loss. The fleet shortly afterwards disappeared.

"The bombardment of Adrianople continues. All Turkish attacks at Chatalja repulsed. The Turkish attempt to land at Podima on the Black Sea also repulsed with a loss of fifty killed."

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[6469] No. 153.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 10, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 54 of 9th February: Gallipoli.

Head-quarters staff reports twenty Turkish officers killed; colours, as well as large quantities of machine guns, rifles, ammunition, &c., left on the field.

Bulgarians lost 2 officers killed and 5 wounded, 412 men wounded. The number of men killed reported insignificant.

[6471] No. 154.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 10, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has applied for an audience with the Sultan to thank His Imperial Majesty for his condolences on the death of Archduke Rainer. The German Ambassador has asked for a similar audience to thank the Sultan for his kind enquiries as to the accident to the train of Prince Eitel.

This style of audience, frequent under the old régime, has been most unusual during the last few years and is calculated to convey to native mind the impression that the Central European Powers are supporters of the existing state of things.

Local papers have also recently recorded the visits of German and Austrian Ambassadors [group undecyphorable] to the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[6303] No. 155.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinje, February 10, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

My immediately preceding telegram of 7th February.

Severe fighting has been going on for the past three days; it is claimed that important outlying positions have been captured.

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[6475] No. 156.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, February 10, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 13 of 29th January: Customs duties in occupied territory.

Montenegrin Government inform me that at San Giovanni di Medua they levied duties according to Montenegrin tariff, which they state is lower than the Turkish.

[6473] No. 157.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 10, 1913.*

I UNDERSTAND from the Grand Vizier that a proposal, coming from Turkish Ambassador in London, that Turkey should place her cases in the hands of the Powers to find solution on basis of the Porte's reply has been agreed to, and instructions accordingly telegraphed to the Turkish Ambassador at London. The Grand Vizier states that the Foreign Ambassadors in London had been sounded on the matter, and all had approved; that all demands in Porte's reply had not been taken "au pied de la lettre"; that Turkey would be satisfied with some economic advantages in the matter of foreign post offices—for instance, use of Turkish stamps; but that economic liberty, temettu, octroi, &c., were essential, while an assurance as to the judicial side of Capitulations would suffice at present. (End of R.)

As one of the objects of this move may be to avoid signature of the preliminaries of peace between Turkey and the allies, the latter may be unwilling to agree.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, and Bucharest.)

[6468] No. 158.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 10, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 6 of 5th February, last sentence, and my immediately preceding telegram of 9th February.

Although I have little doubt that the King and leading members of the present Cabinet would be in favour of an appeal to the Powers or to arbitration, should the present negotiations with Bulgaria not result to Roumania's satisfaction, there is always the danger that their hands may be forced by the war party.

As this party seems likely to increase, it is to be hoped that Bulgaria, if she can be brought to increase her offer, will lose no time in doing so.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[6447] No. 159.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 10, 1913.*

MILITARY attaché learns that Roumanian Government have bought 60,000 Mannlicher rifles and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition for immediate delivery from Austria.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[5970] No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 10, 1913.*

MR. LAMB'S telegrams No. 7 of 5th February and No. 8 of 8th February: Treatment of Mussulman population.

You should bring these reports unofficially to notice of Bulgarian Government.

(Repeated to Salonica, No. 7.)

[5978] No. 161.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 10, 1913.*

IT appears that 11 per cent. import duty is being levied at Cavalla on British goods which have already paid a similar amount at Salonica.

You should point out to the Bulgarian Government that such action is inconsistent with British rights under the Capitulations, and express the hope that it may be discontinued.

[6650] No. 162.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 10, 1913.*

PLEASE communicate following to Sir H. Babington Smith and telegraph his reply:

"Your memorandum of 30th January: Turkish finance.

"The method of calculating the shares of the allies on basis of actual or average yield of assigned revenues seems preferable to Treasury in interests of bondholders. Is it quite out of the question to attempt it, as Treasury suggest that if French proposals are accepted with German proviso, which latter seems indispensable, calculation of produce of assigned revenues, to which you indicate objections, will in any case be necessary?"

[6481] No. 163.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 10, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 82 of 7th February: Ship for Constantinople.

Admiralty hear that French admiral now at Constantinople is to be replaced on 15th February by another officer, who will be junior to German senior naval officer, so that the latter, who, they are told, is incompetent, will be in charge of the foreign ships unless we send up British admiral.

Admiralty believe above report to be true, and have accordingly sent immediate provisional instructions to admiral at Besika Bay that, if you confirm report, "King Edward VII" should go up to Constantinople instead of "Zealandia."

Please therefore ascertain at once whether report is correct, and communicate direct with admiral at Besika Bay.

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[6120] No. 164.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 107.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 10, 1913.

THE following is the record of what passed at the meeting of Ambassadors on the 6th February :—

"Sir Edward Grey informe la réunion d'une proposition qui lui a été communiquée par le Prince Lichnowsky pour la délimitation de l'Albanie au nord et à l'est. La frontière à partir de l'Adriatique suivrait le cours de la Boïana jusqu'à un point situé entre Ruskuli et Samric, puis elle se dirigerait vers le lac de Scutari en laissant Tarabosch à l'Albanie ; elle traverserait le lac jusqu'à la baie Liceni Hotit et laisserait au Monténégro les Hotis et les Groudas, et à l'Albanie les Castratis, les Clémentis et les Serènes. Plava, Goussigne, Ipek et le monastère Visokivetcheni resteraient en dehors de l'Albanie ainsi que Prizrend, à l'exclusion du territoire de Luma. Diakovo, Dibra seraient à l'Albanie ; la frontière passerait ensuite sur la rive gauche du Drin sur une certaine longueur jusqu'au lac d'Ochrida.

"Le Prince Lichnowsky dit qu'il est à la connaissance de son Gouvernement qu'à Vienne comme à Saint-Pétersbourg les dispositions sont des plus conciliantes et qu'avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie il a étudié ce tracé à titre de compromis. Le Comte Mensdorff dit que c'est en s'inspirant du désir d'arriver à une solution transactionnelle qu'il s'est, non sans peine, rallié à ce projet. Il fait observer que le Monténégro pourra gagner des terrains fertiles grâce aux travaux de dessèchement et d'irrigation dont il a déjà été question dans une réunion précédente et qui pourraient être opérés par une société internationale.

"L'Ambassadeur d'Italie appuie avec plaisir la solution proposée, qui répond aux vues de son Gouvernement.

"Les Ambassadeurs de France et de Russie se réservent de consulter leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

"Sir E. Grey dit qu'en présence des difficultés provenant pour certains districts de leurs diversités ethnographiques, géographiques et des usages des tribus qui les habitent, on peut douter de la possibilité d'arriver à une décision sur les points en litige sans une enquête locale confiée à une commission internationale. Cette suggestion lui semble devoir être prise en considération dans le cas où l'on reconnaîtrait l'impossibilité d'arriver à une entente par d'autres moyens."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[6880] No. 165.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 114.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 10, 1913.

M. CAMBON told me to-day that the Austrian Ambassador in Paris had informed M. Jonnart that the proposals which Count Mensdorff had made here about Albania were Austria's last word. M. Cambon considered this to be serious. Count Mensdorff had always said that they were Austria's last word, but we had deprecated this being formally put on record. Now, however, there had been this communication in Paris. He asked me whether any such communication had been made in St. Petersburgh.

I said that none had been made up to Saturday night, the 8th, for a telegram from Sir George Buchanan that evening stated that M. Sazonof had told him that the German Ambassador had suggested to M. Sazonof that Russia should put forward fresh proposals for a settlement of the Albanian question. This M. Sazonof proposed to do, and he would telegraph his proposals to Count Benckendorff.

M. Cambon said that Count Benckendorff had, so far, not received anything, and wished the meeting of Ambassadors to-morrow to be adjourned.

* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 59), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 26), Sir R. Rodd (No. 46), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 70).

I said that this was impossible because the Turkish Ambassador had just informed me officially that the Porte would leave it to the Powers to fix the conditions of peace on the express base laid down in the Porte's reply to the collective note of the Powers. I had promised the Turkish Ambassador to bring this before the meeting of Ambassadors to-morrow, though I had warned him that all they would do in the first instance would be to refer it to their Governments.

M. Cambon suggested that we should discuss to-morrow points connected with the international railway and the port on the Adriatic.

I said that there was no harm in this, but it seemed otiose to discuss these points, which could easily be settled after the Albanian question had been arranged, but on which we felt that any settlement come to would be worth nothing and entirely swept away if no agreement should be made about the Albanian frontier.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[6879] No. 166.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 48.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 10, 1913.

THE Turkish Ambassador gave me to-day the accompanying communication :—

"Le Conseil des Ministres approuve la suggestion de votre Altesse. Nous la prions, en conséquence, de vouloir bien voir Sir Edward Grey et lui dire que le Gouvernement Impérial, désireux de prouver encore une fois à l'Europe ses dispositions pacifiques ainsi que son esprit de conciliation et animé du réel désir de prévenir une nouvelle effusion de sang et dissiper toute crainte de complications, a décidé de confier aux Grandes Puissances le mandat de fixer les conditions de la paix sur la base expresse des propositions contenues dans notre note responsive."

I pointed out that the Powers would not intervene about Adrianople, and therefore could not intervene on the express base of the Porte's reply to them. The fate of Adrianople must be decided by the war.

The Ambassador was evidently prepared for this difficulty, and said that his personal opinion was that the Powers might tell the Porte that they could not go back on the advice which they had given about Adrianople or intervene about it, but that with regard to other matters they were willing to arrange a settlement.

I said that I would bear in mind what he said, and would tell the Ambassadors to-morrow at their meeting here ; but any negotiations between six Powers took a good deal of time, and I was sure that all the Ambassadors would do in the first instance would be to refer the matter to their Governments.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5044] No. 167.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 10, 1913.

WITH reference to the second paragraph of your despatch No. 10 of 30th January, you should, if the subject of a war indemnity is again mentioned to you by the Bulgarian Government, say that it is at least doubtful whether Turkey could pay an indemnity, and that the demand would probably be regarded by the Powers who have financial and commercial interests in Turkey as prejudicial to those interests.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[4434] No. 168.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 57.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 10, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador handed to me on the 27th ultimo a communication, of which the accompanying is a copy, respecting a suggestion which has been put forward in the foreign press in connection with the question of an indemnity to be levied on Turkey by the Balkan federation on the conclusion of the present war.

I observed to Prince Lichnowsky that the terms of peace must not contain any condition that would be specially injurious to the interests of one of the Powers; otherwise the unity of the Powers could not be preserved. I was, as his Excellency knew, opposed to an indemnity.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 168.

Note communicated by Prince Lichnowsky, January 27, 1913.

IN discussing the question of the war indemnity, the foreign press has lately on several occasions intimated the idea that the interested Powers and financial groups could procure an indemnity for the Balkan federation by leaving to the Balkan States which are to take the place of Turkey, the surplus of the special revenues pledged to the Public Debt.

The surplus of the revenues of the Public Debt is pledged to the Bagdad loan, and forms the indispensable basis of this enterprise.

It goes without saying that therefore the Imperial Government could never give its consent to such a solution, which would not only deal a deadly blow to the Bagdad scheme, but would also have the effect of compromising Germany.

German Embassy, London,
January 27, 1913.

[7108] No. 169.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 10, 1913.*

I TOLD the Roumanian Minister to-day that when, some time ago, I instructed you to give conciliatory advice in Bucharest, I had at the same time expressed in Sophia the view that the discouraging attitude then adopted by Dr. Danef tended to deprive conciliatory advice in Bucharest of any effect. Negotiations had proceeded since then, and I thought it difficult for any other Powers to intervene or to do otherwise than leave it to Roumania and Bulgaria to settle matters direct with each other. But as the question was one of anxiety to several of the Powers, I should be glad to have the latest information.

M. Misu informed me that negotiations were being continued in Sophia; that his Government were tired of the tergiversations of Bulgaria, and must have a definite decision soon; and that Roumania demanded Silistria and Balchik.

I observed that this was more than I gathered from M. Take Jonesco as Roumania's demand, and it would be difficult for Bulgaria to concede. It would be a great pity if there was war between Bulgaria and Roumania that might drag in other Powers. If any of the Great Powers were involved, the interests of the smaller Powers would be entirely sacrificed to the result of the war between the Great Powers.

The Roumanian Minister expressed the personal opinion that it might do good if I advised patience in Bucharest, and conciliation in Sophia.

I said that it was difficult to give advice unless one could show that it was to the interest of the countries in question to follow the advice, and the only consideration to this effect was that which I had stated above about the risk of a wider war.

I also told M. Misu that though the meetings of Ambassadors discussed this question, they had not attempted to deal with it. In fact, they had not dealt with the

question of the Koutzo-Vlachs or any other question affecting Roumania. But if they did so I would let him know.

In speaking of guarantees which Bulgaria might give that she would not attack Roumania, M. Misu said that it was necessary for Roumania to have material guarantees, which would be afforded by her possession of the fortifications of Silistria; it would not be enough if the fortifications were simply demolished.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[6501] No. 170.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 25.)
Sir, *Athens, February 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 14 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit a copy of a note which, in obedience to the instructions contained in your telegram No. 16 of the 1st instant, I have addressed to the Greek Government protesting against the manner in which the officials of the Ottoman Public Debt have been hindered and prevented from carrying out their duties in the territories occupied by the Greek forces.

The note is practically a transcript of Sir A. Block's letter of the 20th January to Sir G. Lowther so far as it concerns the Greeks. I have, however, omitted the statement that "there are at present no law courts in operation" in Mitylene, as it has been recently announced in the press that law courts have been set up there, and it appears to me dangerous to admit by implication that they have jurisdiction in the matter at issue.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 170.

Sir F. Elliot to M. Coromilas.

M. le Ministre, *Athens, February 4 (January 22), 1913.*

I AM instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to call your Excellency's attention to the following statement received from the British delegate on the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt respecting the manner in which the officials of the Debt have been hindered and prevented from carrying out their duties in the territory occupied by the Greek forces.

At Chios five officials of the Debt Administration were illegally made prisoners of war, and are now interned at Halkis.

At Mitylene the inhabitants no longer take out licences for the sale of spirits; they oppose the gauging of wines and delay the payment of the tax on alcohol. All steps taken with the Greek authorities to obtain satisfaction have proved fruitless. The stamp and salt revenues are no longer producing anything as the result of the use of Greek stamps in the first case, and of the insecurity which reigns in the neighbourhood of the only salt pan in the island in the second case. At Mitylene itself the Debt Administration no longer collects the duty on alcohols brought into the town (not including the war tax) or on fish sold in the market. In the village of Calonia the agent of the Public Debt was ill-treated by brigands, who, together with some Greek soldiers, took from him the keys of the agency and completely pillaged it.

At Salonica the Greek authorities do not hand over to the Debt Administration the receipts from the 3 per cent. customs surtax, nor the duties on imported alcohol. M. Raktivan, moreover, the representative of the Greek Government in Macedonia, alleging that in this region his Government has replaced the Ottoman Government, has requested the agency of the Debt to pay to the Greek authorities the sums collected for the war tax on salt, and has demanded the handing over of the amounts encashed under this heading from the date of the occupation of Salonica up to the 30th November (o.s.).

At Corfu the Greek fleet has seized and landed as contraband of war two weigh-bridges destined for the salt-works at Vallona, which were on board the Austrian ship "Meran."

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I have the honour, by direction of Sir Edward Grey, to enter a formal protest against the interference with the officials and interests of the Ottoman Public Debt specified above.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[6523] No. 171.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Bucharest, February 6, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday's session of the Chamber was occupied with the question of the negotiations with Bulgaria.

M. Michelesco, a Conservative deputy, asked whether there was any truth in the report that during the negotiations in London the Roumanian Government had abandoned their claim to Silistria, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government had not renounced their claim to the town, so that there had been no question of their doing so, and that no one while in London had been authorised to declare that they would do so. This reply, which was received with general applause, was followed by an interpellation by M. Virgil Arion, a Conservative deputy, in which the speaker, in a speech of considerable length, taxed the Government with want of energy, and said that from the moment that the great Powers had abandoned the formula adopted before the war, prescribing the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* in the Balkan Peninsula, it had been the imperative duty of the Roumanian Government to abandon their policy of abstention.

M. Maioresco replied, defending the Government against the charge of want of energy. He said the Cabinet had never relaxed their activity in regard to the rectification of the frontier and in regard to the position of the Koutzo-Vlachs, and he repeated the declaration which he had made in reply to the interpellation reported in my despatch No. 15 of the 30th ultimo, as to the fulfilment of the assurance contained in the King's speech at the opening of Parliament, that Roumania's voice would be listened to when the time came for a settlement of the questions raised by the Balkan crisis.

It will be noticed that in his declaration with regard to Silistria M. Maioresco did not expressly say that Roumania would not renounce her claim to that town, but merely that there had been no question of her doing so, and that no one had been authorised to say that she would do so. I fear, however, that the war party have interpreted his words in their most chauvinistic sense as implying that the Government will make of the acquisition of Silistria a *sine quâ non*, and that what M. Maioresco said has strengthened the hands of those who are opposed to any compromise which would leave the town to Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[6521] No. 172.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Belgrade, February 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to Sir R. Paget's despatch No. 19 of the 30th ultimo, enclosing copy of a note which he had addressed to the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the irregularities committed by the Servian Customs authorities at Uskub or Ghevgheli, and reserving all rights to claim compensation and otherwise in the event of losses to British firms, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a note which I have received in reply.

The authorities attribute the delays and detention of goods at Ghevgheli to lack of means of transport, but give no explanation for the imposition of unjustifiable duties.

In the meanwhile, having been informed by His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub that the local authorities were endeavouring to impose, from the 31st ultimo, a new tax under the name of "contribution," I at once protested at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking how the Servian authorities could justify the application of such a tax. M. Stefanovitch said he would enquire; and yesterday he informed me that the tax in

question was a "war contribution," and that the action of the Servian Government was justified by articles 48 and 49 of the annex to the fourth convention of The Hague second Peace Conference, to which they were a party. M. Stefanovitch has promised to send me a memorandum exposing the arguments of the Servian Government.

I have also the honour to enclose copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham, transmitting copy of the official notification of customs arrangements addressed to the consular corps at Uskub, and certain queries raised by the latter.

As regards query 3, I called the attention of the Servian Government on the 4th instant to the specific case of the Mair de Botton cigarette-paper manufactured at Salonica, and pointed out that the imposition of duties on such articles of Turkish origin was unjustifiable.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

P.S.—Articles 48 and 49 above mentioned are enclosed herewith for convenience of reference.

C. B.

Enclosure 1 in No. 172.

M. Pasitch to Sir R. Paget.

(Translation.)
M. le Ministre, *Belgrade, January 23 (February 5), 1913.*

IN accordance with your note of the 17th (30th) January, I at once took the necessary steps to examine the attitude of the Servian Customs authorities towards British firms on the importation of goods, and I have received a reply justifying the detention of goods at Ghevgheli. Owing to the scarcity of means of transport, which are engaged for the conveyance of military material, both the transport and clearance of goods is retarded, hence the occurrence of a certain delay. The Royal Customs Direction of the Ministry of Finance has taken the necessary measures to accelerate, as much as possible, both the transport and clearance of goods at Ghevgheli, and, notwithstanding all the delay caused by the war conditions, to bring things to their normal state.

I have, &c.
NIK. P. PASITCH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 172.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Uskub, January 23, 1913.*

WITH reference to the pending question of the action of the Servian Customs authorities established in Ottoman territory, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the official notification of customs arrangements sent to me by the delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the 27th instant my colleagues and I in a consular meeting discussed this, and decided to raise certain points which are not made clear by it. I enclose list of these points as raised in the consular meeting. No. 1 directly concerns British interests, the British company, Fils de C. A. Errera (Limited), having a large stock of merchandise at Salonica which had paid duty to the Turks. No. 2 is probably of no direct interest to British trade, but No. 3 is, the Mair de Botton Cigarette-paper Company (Limited) having a factory in Salonica, the produce of which should, in my humble opinion, enter the Servian zone free. With regard to No. 4, M. Voutchkovitch told me that no duty was collected on Servian goods entering the occupied territory.

Naturally I should have addressed these queries to the local authority, but I have found by experience that such action is perfectly useless, and am even beginning to suspect that M. Voutchkovitch's real duty is not to facilitate but to retard consular business.

I would draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that it is merely stated that importers can claim a refund from the Greeks; no guarantee is given that they will get it. Personally I am of opinion that, as it is the Servians who have established a

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supplementary customs frontier, it is their duty to provide against the levying of double duty.

Two further points occur to me. Although I have no proof, I have a strong suspicion that the Customs refuse the entry of objects of Servian State monopoly when imported by native merchants who have no consul to protect their interests. But foreign interests suffer therefrom, as the whole foreign community is having to pay enhanced prices, due in part, it is true, to the war, but also, in part, to arbitrary Servian action.

And I have heard rumours which lead me to believe that the Servians are favouring goods imported through Servia by railway manipulation; there are stories of shortages of trucks for the Salonica trade. I have pointed out to the agents of British firms here that a refusal to supply trucks based on the exigencies of military movements is no ground of complaint, but that any differentiation against a British firm in the matter of supplying trucks should at once be reported to me.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

P.S.—I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica.

W. D. P.

Enclosure 3 in No. 172.

Delegate of Servian Foreign Ministry to Vice-Consul Peckham.

M. le Consul, *Skoplje, le* 10 (23) *janvier*, 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de vous communiquer, ci-dessous, la décision ministérielle du Royaume de Serbie, en ce qui concerne la question douanière ayant pour objectif les marchandises expédiées par voie de Salonique et entrant sur les territoires occupés par l'armée serbe :—

1. Par ordre du Ministère des Finances, on a établi sur la voie ferrée Uscub-Salonique (gare de Ghévgheli) une succursale de la douane de Ristovatz pour la perception des droits de douane sur les marchandises entrant dans les territoires occupés par l'armée serbe.

2. Toutes les marchandises expédiées par voie de Salonique seront, désormais, soumises aux mêmes prescriptions à l'ancien tarif turc : à savoir, 11 pour cent sur la valeur de la marchandise.

3. L'importation de toute espèce de marchandises sur les territoires occupés, et même de celles qui sont monopolisées sur le territoire du Royaume de Serbie, est désormais autorisée, mais subordonnant, toutefois, ces transports aux exigences inhérentes aux nécessités des transports et des approvisionnements militaires de l'armée serbe.

4. Toutes les marchandises importées dans les territoires occupés par l'armée serbe seront soumises au payement des mêmes droits que ceux de la douane turque, sans qu'il soit pris en considération si ces marchandises avaient déjà acquitté des droits à la douane de Salonique. Néanmoins, les propriétaires des marchandises importées sur les territoires occupés par l'armée serbe peuvent réclamer à la douane grecque le remboursement des sommes perçues par la douane de Salonique, puisque leurs marchandises ont seulement transité sur les territoires grecs.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Vice-Consul,
YOVAN VOUTCHKOVITCH.

Enclosure 4 in No. 172.

Queries of Consular Corps in the matter of Customs.

QUEL traitement est appliqué aux marchandises importées à Salonique avant le commencement de la guerre, et sur la valeur desquelles il a été déjà prélevé par les autorités douanières turques un impôt de 11 pour cent?

2. Les marchandises importées du continent par voie de Belgrade sont-elles soumises aux prescriptions de l'ancien tarif douanier turc—à savoir, à un impôt de 11 pour cent—ou bien les dispositions du tarif douanier serbe entrent-ils en vigueur par rapport à ces marchandises?

3. Les marchandises représentant des produits des territoires turcs occupés par les armées alliées sont-elles susceptibles de l'impôt de 11 pour cent à l'entrée sur les territoires occupés par les troupes serbes?

4. Quel traitement est applicable aux marchandises de source serbe importées dans les territoires occupés par les troupes serbes?

Enclosure 5 in No. 172.

THE HAGUE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE.

Convention IV.

Annex.

ARTICLE 48.

IF, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls payable to the State, he shall do so, as far as is possible, in accordance with the legal basis and assessment in force at the time, and shall in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as the National Government had been so bound.

ARTICLE 49.

If, in addition to the taxes mentioned in the above article, the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, they shall only be applied to the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in question.

[6522]

No. 173.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February 8*, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the verbal note which I handed over to the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 3rd instant, protesting, in accordance with your instructions, against the interference by the Servian authorities with the officials of the Ottoman Public Debt and interests at Durazzo and the salt works of Cavaya, as stated in your despatch No. 8 of the 28th ultimo.

From the reply thereto, likewise enclosed, it will be seen that the Servian Government state that they have taken over the control of the Ottoman Debt, basing their action on the following principles of international law:—

1. The right of the conqueror to change the authority in occupied territories previously belonging to the enemy.
2. The right to recover and employ all dues and taxes in occupied territories.
3. The right to prevent any measures which would be of advantage to or reinforce the enemy.

This document has, I understand, been drawn up by local professors of international law, who have been consulted by the Government in regard to various questions raised since the occupation of the conquered territory.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 173.

Note verbale communicated to Servian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

HIS Majesty's Government have been informed that the Servian military authorities at Durazzo have on two occasions taken the funds at the agency of the Ottoman Debt there, amounting to 90,049 piastres 19·50 paras. It is true that they have given receipts for this amount, and have ordered the staff of the agency to continue operations and authorised them to pay themselves out of the local receipts, but they have stipulated that the balance should remain at their disposal.

The Servian military authorities have also, it is stated, taken possession of the salt works of Cavaya (bash mudirlet of Durazzo), besides seizing a sum of 895 piastres 25 paras at the agency there.

Under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, His Majesty's chargé d'affaires has the honour to call the attention of the Servian Government to the above cases of interference with the officials of the Ottoman Public Debt, against which His Majesty's Government protest.

Belgrade, February 3, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 173.

Memorandum communicated to British Legation at Belgrade.

EN réponse au mémorandum que la Légation Royale a bien voulu me soumettre, le 21 janvier (3 février) courant, concernant la réclamation de la Dette ottomane, j'ai l'honneur de lui communiquer ce qui suit :—

La Direction de la Dette ottomane est une institution purement turque et nullement internationale, ce dont la Turquie elle-même a, en son temps, avisé les Grandes Puissances. Nos autorités militaires avaient dès lors le droit de procéder avec elle tout comme avec les autres pouvoirs turcs, c'est-à-dire se substituer à elle ou la placer sur leur propre contrôle. Mais, par des raisons de déférence, nos autorités ont choisi la seconde alternative et ont laissé la Direction de la Dette ottomane continuer ses fonctions comme par le passé, mais à notre profit et non plus à celui des Turcs. Comme ladite direction tirait tous ses droits du Gouvernement turc, ces droits ne sauraient être plus grands ni autrement garantis que ceux dont disposait le Gouvernement lui-même.

Aussi ne saurait-on contester ou limiter le droit de nos autorités militaires, auquel il vient d'être fait allusion que si le Gouvernement ottoman avait en cas de guerre des privilèges spéciaux.

Il apparaît dès lors que la conduite tenue par nos autorités militaires se justifie pleinement en la forme et est de tous points correcte ; en agissant comme elles l'ont fait, elles ne sont nullement allées à l'encontre des règles établies par le droit international.

Comme la Direction de la Dette ottomane exécutait deux sortes d'opérations : (1) recouvrement des impôts publics et (2) service par annuités d'une partie de la dette—lesquelles incombent maintenant au pouvoir d'occupation—seuls pourraient être encore objets à contestation :

1. Le droit d'effectuer la première opération (recouvrement de l'impôt) ; et
2. Les garanties éventuelles pour la dette (service des annuités).

Le premier point ne réclame aucune justification spéciale non plus qu'une augmentation indirecte ; car, d'après le droit de guerre, il est expressément reconnu au vainqueur le pouvoir de lever tous impôts et autres taxes sur la région occupée en vue de suffire aux frais administratifs et militaires.

En ce qui concerne le service de l'annuité, les autorités militaires n'ont pas cru devoir s'en désintéresser, attendu que, en le prenant en main, c'était la seule façon d'empêcher que ne sortît du territoire occupé un argent dont la Turquie indirectement eût pu tirer le plus grand parti ; nos autorités n'ont donc fait là qu'user de leur droit de prendre toutes mesures destinées à prévenir un renforcement quelconque—financier

y compris—de l'adversaire. Quant aux garanties, qui *stricto jure* ne devraient pas faire ici l'objet d'une mention spéciale, il va de soi que le Gouvernement serbe, en raison déjà de sa propre considération et de son propre crédit, veillera avec le plus grand soin à la sauvegarde des intérêts des créanciers étrangers. C'est ce qui vient d'ailleurs confirmer ce fait, signalé du reste dans le mémorandum lui-même, que nos autorités délivrent régulièrement des quittances pour toutes les sommes reçues.

Pour pouvoir répondre aux besoins les plus urgents, nos autorités ont dû placer sous leur contrôle direct la Direction de la Dette ottomane. En agissant ainsi elles se sont inspirées des trois principes suivants, qui dans le droit international sont reconnus par tous :—

1. Droit du vainqueur à changer les pouvoirs dans les régions occupées et appartenant antérieurement à l'ennemi ;
2. Droit à recouvrir et employer tous impôts et taxes dans les régions occupées.
3. Droit à empêcher tout ce qui irait au profit de l'ennemi et le renforcerait.

Le Gouvernement Royal examinera la question des salines de Cavaja aussitôt qu'il aura reçu tous les renseignements demandés concernant cette affaire.

Belgrade, le 23 janvier (5 février), 1913.

[6481] No. 174.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 11.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February* 11, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram dated the 10th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 174.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, February* 10, 1913.

FRENCH admiral at Constantinople is about to be relieved by an officer junior to German admiral, who will thus be senior officer of international squadron unless vice-admiral third squadron proceeds to Constantinople. Subject to concurrence of Ambassador, therefore, he is to do so, as soon as firman is obtained, leaving "Zealandia" at Besika and proceeding himself in "King Edward VII."

[6476] No. 175.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

[By Post.]

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February* 10, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 55 of 5th February.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that French Minister of Finance merely listened to what Bulgarian Minister of Finance had to say as regards a war indemnity, and replied that he must make all reserves on the subject.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[6484] No. 176.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February 10, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 26 of 4th February.

The Prime Minister is greatly perturbed at news he received yesterday from St. Petersburgh as to the possibility of Dibra and Djakova being included in new Albania. To this his Excellency maintains that neither the military nor the people would ever consent. He himself was already sufficiently attacked for concessions he had made. He would have to resign, and under such conditions no Government could be found to take his place. The military would then assume power, and they would refuse to give up any territory occupied by Servia, including the Adriatic littoral; force alone would compel them to submit, and this meant war with Austria. They would be beaten, but better that than live on as they were threatened to do. Servia had made enormous sacrifices out of deference to the wishes of the Powers, but there was a limit to everything, and on the question of Djakova and Dibra they could not possibly yield. Geographically these centres were of vital importance to Servia.

The Prime Minister begged me to telegraph to you in the above sense. He was very earnest, so was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whom I also saw. A Cabinet meeting had been held to discuss the situation, and I gather that the above communication from the Prime Minister was the outcome of their deliberations.

My conviction is that the worst may be feared should Djakova and Dibra be allotted to Albania.

[6498] No. 177.

Sir C. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 11, 1913.*

AN iradé has been issued for the passage of Austrian man-of-war "Admiral Spaun."

[6529] No. 178.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 11, 1913.*

THE local papers give the text of an appeal by Turkish women to the Queen of England and consorts of other sovereigns praying for intervention in the matter of alleged atrocities of the armies of the allies.

Authors appear to represent but a small clique, and the inspiration to be the same as in exaggeration of atrocities in the campaign in the non-Turkish press here.

[6689] No. 179.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 11, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 87 of 10th February.

My French colleague informs me that it has been arranged that French admiral should stay on after 15th February, owing to his special knowledge of local conditions. I have already applied for firman for His Majesty's ship "Zealandia."

[6690] No. 180.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 11, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 54 of 9th February.

The "Official" here announces that Charkoui has been occupied by Turkish forces.

I am informed that the "Assar-i-Tewfik" has gone ashore at Karaburun, near Derkos, and is badly damaged.

(Sent to Athens and Sophia.)

[6691] No. 181.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 56. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 11, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

My telegram No. 51 of 7th February.

Roumanian Minister informs me that he has received instructions to negotiate with the Bulgarian delegates immediately.

As M. Danef has just left Sophia for a few days the Roumanian Minister has arranged to commence negotiations to-morrow with M. Saraffof. He tells me very confidentially that he has been instructed to demand the cession of territory up to a line drawn from Kavarna to Silistria, including both those towns.

He added that, should the negotiations meet with difficulties, he has also been instructed to ask for Baltchik. The policy of the Bulgarian Government will be as foreshadowed in my telegrams No. 10 of 10th January and No. 16 of 17th January.

(Secret.)

Roumanian Minister told me privately that in eventuality of an unfavourable reply his Government would occupy all the territory demanded, and that he would leave Sophia early next week.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[6693] No. 182.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 11, 1913.*

BRITISH vice-consul at Philippopoli reports that barbarous attempt is being made to compel Pomaks by means of violence to become Christians. He states that, although their ancestors were Christians in comparatively recent history, they are to-day fanatical Mahometans. He has received repeated appeals from villagers and has unofficially called the attention of the local authorities to the outrages, but he considers nothing, short of categorical instructions from Sophia, will avail to check the evil, which has at present, at least, he states, the appearance of official benediction.

Your telegram No. 33 of 10th February.

Shall I mention the facts related by the vice-consul when I make unofficial representations in accordance with your instructions?

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[6703] No. 183.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, February 11, 1913.*

REFERRING to your conversation with Sir H. Babington Smith reported in your despatch No. 54 of 6th February, Secretary of State would be glad to know whether the French Government share your views as to small advances to the Turkish Government. He was under the impression that they were opposed to such.

[6688] No. 184.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, February 11, 1913.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 29 and your telegram No. 51 of 8th February: Ottoman Debt.

The Italian Government are still considering their answer, having regard to the attitude adopted in principle by them in the Ægean islands, which seems to have been to maintain functionaries of the Debt, but under Italian surveillance.

[6046] No. 185.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 11, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 3 of 5th February: Ship at Suda Bay.

We do not wish to be placed in position of being sole guardian of Turkish flag, and "Yarmouth," which is chiefly required as repeater ship for wireless telegraph messages between Malta and Besika Bay, will therefore be moved to Milos.

[6882] No. 186.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 11, 1913.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF gave me very confidentially to-day information as to his instructions with regard to Albania. M. Cambon was present.

As a result of our discussion, I said that it appeared to me that Russia should make her counter-proposition, of which the chief point would be that, if Scutari went to Albania, Djakova and Dibra should be excluded from it. There would be great difficulty about this, and if an agreement should not be come to, I should propose later on the international commission, to which Count Benckendorff was instructed to agree. I proposed to tell the German Ambassador in the interval before we met on Friday, the 14th instant, that this was how the situation stood, and to urge upon him that Germany should be prepared, if Austria could not be induced to give way about Djakova and Dibra, to use her influence in Vienna to get the principle of an international commission accepted.

I am, &c
E. GREY.

[6881] No. 187.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 11, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day, I referred to the following communication from the Turkish Ambassador:—

"Le Conseil des Ministres approuve la suggestion de votre Altesse. Nous la prions, en conséquence, de vouloir bien voir Sir Edward Grey et lui dire que le Gouvernement Impérial, désireux de prouver encore une fois à l'Europe ses dispositions pacifiques à agir dans un esprit de conciliation, et animé du vif désir de prévenir une nouvelle effusion de sang et dissiper toute crainte de complications, a décidé de confier aux Grandes Puissances le mandat de fixer les conditions de la paix sur la base expresse des propositions contenues dans notre note responsive."

I told the Ambassadors that I had promised the Turkish Ambassador to communicate this to them, but I had pointed out the difficulty created by the final words, beginning at "sur la base expresse." Tewfik Pasha had remarked that these words were not part of his original suggestion, and he had expressed the hope that the Powers would not fix upon them and make them the reason for an absolute refusal. The Powers might find a way of giving an answer without treating these words as the essential condition of the Porte's communication.

The Ambassadors all felt the impossibility of the latter words of the Turkish communication. There was a general opinion that the first part was well enough, but that the last words spoilt it.

I gave as my personal opinion that we might reply that the Powers could not do anything except upon the base of their collective note; if the Porte would accept the advice given in that note the Powers would enter into communication with the allies with the view of arranging a peace.

The Ambassadors all considered that this reply might be adopted; and they suggested that, if their Governments approved of it, it might be given to the Turkish Ambassador by me.

I said that I should be ready to communicate to him whatever information they gave me.

I informed the Ambassadors that I had promised the Roumanian Minister to let him know if we dealt with anything that affected Roumanian interests, but that so far we had not dealt with anything specially affecting Roumania, not even the Koutzo-Vlach question.

It appeared from what some of the Ambassadors said, that M. Misu had construed my words as a promise to invite him to the meeting of Ambassadors, whereas I had only promised to inform him.

The German Ambassador said that his Government were of opinion that the Roumanian Minister should be present at the meeting of the Ambassadors if the question of the ecclesiastical and scholastic Roumanian communities in Macedonia was discussed. It was considered that we should ask the Roumanian Minister for his views if we dealt with these matters, as we might have to do with regard to Albania.

The Russian Ambassador remarked that to deal with them as regards Macedonia would be to interfere between the allies, which would be a new departure.

There was some mention of the difficulties between Bulgaria and Roumania, but no one during the meeting of the Ambassadors suggested that the Powers should intervene.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 115), Sir E. Goschen (No. 31), Sir R. Rodd (No. 14), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 74).

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[6715] No. 188.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 91.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 53 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the representative of the British bondholders of the Ottoman Public Debt giving further details of the prejudice caused to interests of the debt by the action of the allies.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 188.

Sir A. Block to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Constantinople, February 5, 1913.*

WITH reference to my letter to your Excellency of the 26th January, I have the honour to submit for your information further details of the prejudice caused to the Public Debt Administration through the action of the allied Governments.

Our inspector sent specially to Macedonia reports that the Servian authorities at Monastir are delaying the settlement of the question of the reopening of the debt agencies situated in the territory conquered by the Servian army. He is of opinion that the authorities are acting upon instructions from Belgrade, and he feels that a solution will only be arrived at as a result of diplomatic action on the part of England and France. M. Protich, the representative of the Servian Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Monastir, has informed our inspector that permission has not been granted for the reopening of the debt agency at Uskub, where, however, our officials are allowed to occupy the building, but not to encash any revenue. Authorisation has been asked for to allow our agents to occupy the office at Resna on the same conditions in order to enable them to bring the books, registers, &c., up-to-date, and to place in security the moneys and stamps which are still there.

M. Mavroudi, the Prefect of Florina, has promised our inspector the aid of the Greek authorities, but at the same time pointed out that the situation of the country at present is not of a nature to permit the collection of the revenue ceded to the Public Debt Administration.

At Mitylene the receipts continue to diminish owing to the refusal on the part of the population to pay taxes, and the inaction of the Greek authorities who fail to support the debt officials in the prosecution of the delinquents.

I have, &c.
ADAM BLOCK.

[6716] No. 189.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 95.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 6, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram, No. 69 of yesterday's date, reporting the departure for Egypt of the ex-Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha.

I went on board the Khedivial steamer to see him off, and found him naturally despondent as to the future of Turkey. His Highness expressed the opinion that if the rest of the Empire is to escape further disintegration, it is indispensable that Parliament should be prorogued until the restoration of a normal condition of things, the decisions and decrees of the Council of Ministers having the force of provisional laws until Parliament can be reassembled.

He also declared it as his opinion that some financial control was indispensable, and thought that the Ministry of Finance should draw up the budget for military and civil expenditure in concert with, or under the control of, the administration of the Public Debt. He further stated that the Imperial Ottoman Bank should be authorised to carry out the *trésorerie* of the Empire as provided in its statutes and as proposed by M. Laurent.

Kiamil Pasha complained that the Germans had been thwarting his plans for concluding peace and had been urging a continuance of the war through indirect

agencies. He instanced a letter, of which a translation is herewith enclosed, written to the Sultan by a German Jew called Richard Lévie some days before the *coup d'État* of the 24rd January. He recently stated, that many Jews had made offers of money for continuance of the war, their ultimate object being to prevent Salonica remaining in Greek hands. The apparent calculation is that if the Bulgarians do not get Adrianople, the Greek claim or case in respect of Salonica would be considerably weakened.

He also alluded to the fact that the German Ambassador was the only one of my colleagues, including the American and Persian Ambassadors, who had omitted to call on him after his recent abrupt dismissal at the hands of Talaat Bey and Enver Bey, the agents of the occult irresponsible Committee of Union and Progress.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—I am informed on good authority that the following is the verbatim report of a passage in a speech delivered by the German Ambassador at a dinner given to the German colony here on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday :—

"Unsere wirtschaftlichen Interessen in Anatolien, die sich mit den türkischen Interessen decken, bilden ein *Noli me tangere* der deutschen Politik. Das möchte ich an dieser Stelle zum Ausdruck gebracht haben."

G. L.

Enclosure in No. 189.

Letter addressed to the Sultan.

(Translation.)

Your Majesty, *Herzberg-Elster, Saxony, January 11, 1913.*

I, THE undersigned, on behalf of thousands of German men, venture humbly to express to your Majesty the heartfelt sympathy of all of us in the struggle which your Majesty's troops are now engaged in, against the Balkan States.

May God, the Almighty, grant to your Majesty's Government His protection and support during these days of stress and trial for Turkey.

Thousands of Germans are now looking to Constantinople, hoping anxiously that your Majesty's glorious soldiers are now strong enough so be again able to begin the battle.

As, when 100 years ago Prussia lay humbled in the dust, the King and people rose to conquer the oppressor, so may victory accrue to your Majesty's standards in some new fight, and may you mete out to the enemies, who have treatied your Majesty's subjects in so fierce, so inhuman a way, their just and fitting punishment.

Let your Majesty rest assured that our honoured Emperor and his whole people are the truest friends of your Majesty, and that an alliance between your Majesty's Government and ours would be a blessing and a boon for Turkey.

Your Majesty's most humble servant, &c.

RICHARD LÉVIE,
Municipal Councillor.

[6717] No. 190.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 96.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that at a meeting of the Committee of National Defence held yesterday various sub-committees were formed for the purpose of collecting funds from different sections of the public. One such sub-committee was to exploit the Imperial princes, the Khedive's mother, and the Egyptian princesses, another was to devote its attention to those who have married members of the Imperial family, while others were appointed for obtaining funds from the banking community, the high official world, and the senators.

The president of the committee announced that he had addressed letters to Egypt and India inviting subscriptions to the war chest, and I have the honour to transmit herewith a list taken from to-day's "Turquie" of the persons to whom such letters were addressed.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 190.

Extract from the "Turquie" of February 7, 1913.

LE Chéref Ali Haidar Bey a envoyé des lettres en arabe et en anglais, en Egypte et aux musulmans des Indes, pour les inviter à souscrire en faveur de l'armée.

Voici la liste des personnes en Égypte à qui des lettres ont été adressées : Son Altesse le Khédive Abbas Hilmi Pacha, Izzet Pacha Holo, Aziz Izzet Pacha, Ali Fehmi Hâlil Bey, Kiamil Djélai Pacha, Mâhmoud Bey Ennédeb, Mansour Youssouf Pacha, Emer Bey Sullar, Moustapha Pacha Halil, Moustapha Pacha Halifé, Mahmoud Suléiman Pacha.

Aux Indes : à Calcutta, Gulham Husséine Arif, président du Croissant-Rouge ; à Bombay, Ser Kassim Behvi Ibrahim, président du Croissant-Rouge ; à Médarin, Abdul Aziz Pacha, consul intérimaire de Turquie ; à Ceylan, El-Hadj Mehmed Kena, consul intérimaire de Turquie ; à Lahore, El-Hadj Muchi Mehmedan Chahallar, propriétaire du journal "Vatan" ; à Delhi, El-Hadj Mehmed Ali, propriétaire du journal "Koumra" ; à Dinlène, Mehmed Ahmedil Mevlévi ; à Nikelho, Djémal Mueyad-ul-Islam ; à Kiradj, El-Hadj Abdullah Haroun.

[6712] No. 191.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 12.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February 11, 1913.*

WITH reference to your communication of to-day, forwarding a copy of a telegram, No. 84, received from Sir G. Lowther, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram dated the 11th February, 1913, which has been sent to the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 191.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, February 11, 1913.*

CANCEL my No. 50. "Zealandia" is to proceed to Constantinople as previously ordered, since it is stated by the French Ambassador at Constantinople that French admiral will not at present be relieved.

[6779] No. 192.

Imperial Ottoman Bank to Foreign Office.—(Received February 12.)

26, Throgmorton Street, London,

Sir, *February 11, 1913.*

DURING the interview at the Foreign Office last Friday, Colonel Lawrence was informed by Sir Arthur Nicolson that, subsequent to Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 3rd February, His Majesty's Government had come to the conclusion that there were no objections to a small advance being made to the Turkish Government.

In view of this and of Sir Arthur Nicolson's courteous promise to Colonel Lawrence that the Foreign Office in future would keep the Imperial Ottoman Bank informed of their views on similar matters, I am now directed to inform you that, according to information received from Paris to-day, the French Government is not in favour of any financial assistance being given to any of the belligerents.

It is understood further that the German Government is in accord with the Quai d'Orsay.

Consequently, the financial groups concerned have decided to suspend the negotiations for the advance.

I am, &c.
S. PEARCE, *Deputy Secretary.*

[6736] No. 193.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 11, 1913.*

ALBANIA.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this afternoon, and showed me on the map line of delimitation proposed by the German Ambassador and the one which he was telegraphing to London as a compromise. The former, he said, was virtually an Austrian one under the German flag, and he trusted, therefore, that the latter would be put forward by the French Ambassador and have your whole-hearted support. Austrian Councillor of Embassy having spoken to him of the former line as if it was Austria's last word, his Excellency had remarked that this was a very dangerous tone to adopt, as Russia might then have to put forward a counter-proposal as her last word. His Excellency repeated that Austria would never act as she was doing could she not count upon Germany's support, and added that if Russia were free to deal with her single-handed the matter would soon be settled.

On my enquiring whether his present counter-proposal was to be regarded as his last word, his Excellency said that it made considerable concessions and that if Austria adhered to her line he would have to adhere to his. There was, however, room for mutual concessions, and perhaps you or the French Ambassador might by some happy inspiration find a way out of the deadlock. The situation would, he thought, only become really dangerous were Scutari to fall and were Austria to attempt to eject Montenegrins by force.

Roumanian question was also entering on a dangerous phase. Roumanian Minister had just told him that his Government was claiming the line Silistria-Baltchik, and this, as he had warned the Minister, they would never get without war. His Excellency did not say what Russia's attitude would be were war to ensue, but I gathered that he conveyed a serious warning to the Roumanian Minister.

[6868] No. 194.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 12, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 79 of 10th February.

I gather that mission of Hakki Pasha is to discuss Bagdad Railway matter, which through 4 per cent. customs increase is connected with Porte's recent reply to collective note of the Powers, and thus perhaps leading to resumption of negotiations for the preliminaries of peace on the basis of that reply.

Present committee is apparently very anxious to avoid having to sign preliminaries direct with the allies (see last paragraph of my telegram No. 80 of 10th February).

I gather that Hakki Pasha's instructions are to be accommodating as regards *desiderata* set forth in your note of 18th July last.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[6872] No. 195.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 34.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, February 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 64 of 8th February acted on.

I received a message from German Foreign Office yesterday morning that German Minister at Belgrade had reported that Servian Government had imposed duties on various articles of consumption, basing their action on Hague Convention, and German Minister had been instructed to join in British Minister's protest.

In the evening I reminded the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that what I had asked for was views of Imperial Government on Servia's action in taking over control of Ottoman Debt. He told me that they had at once protested; but as he seemed very uncertain, I had further enquiries made at the Foreign Office this morning. It appears that on receipt of Sir A. Block's circular letter of 20th January German

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Government telegraphed to capitals of Great Powers to ask if they would join in protest. They received reply from London that you had already protested, and were preparing to send instructions accordingly to Balkan capitals on 6th February, when the Austro-Hungarian Government asked them to wait, as they wished to propose longer formula of protest. German Government could therefore only send instructions by post on 10th February, so that protest will be made at Belgrade to-day or to-morrow. I am assured that Austrian formula does not weaken protest, but is long and reserves possible claims for losses. Servian memorandum in reply has therefore not yet been received by German Government.

[6864] No. 196.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, February* 12, 1913.

ROUMANIAN Minister tells me that his Government will not yield respecting Silistria, and have let the Bulgarian Government know that their conditions are the irreducible minimum. He considers the situation grave, as he does not anticipate that Bulgaria will agree to surrender Silistria.

[6848] No. 197.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Bucharest, February* 12, 1913.

I LEARN that the Austro-Hungarian Minister was told by the King of Roumania last night that, although a week ago it might have been possible for His Majesty to impose on this country some settlement which did not include Silistria, to do so now might place his throne in danger, as the public demand to acquire Silistria was now so strong.

The above should be regarded as very confidential.

(Repeated to Sophia and Constantinople.)

[6849] No. 198.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February* 12, 1913.

ALTHOUGH Minister for Foreign Affairs has not mentioned the matter to me, it is evident from the language he uses to my Russian colleague that the Roumanian Government are greatly annoyed that the Roumanian Minister has never once been invited to take part in Ambassadors' meetings.

[6870] No. 199.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, February* 12, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 10th February: Turkish finance.

Following from Babington Smith:—

"Calculation of actual or average yield raises difficult question, but is not impossible. It is true that this calculation is necessary for applying German proviso, but if French method gives substantially higher figure unnecessary to agree to exact result. Suggested method of calculation of actual yield should be obtained from Sir A. Block. This would throw light on question."

[6693] No. 200.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1913.

FORCED conversion of Pomaks.

Your telegram No. 57 of 11th February, last paragraph.

Yes.

[6473] No. 201.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 80 of 10th February.

I gave the Ambassadors yesterday a copy of Turkish Ambassador's communication, which is as follows:—

"Le Conseil des Ministres approuve la suggestion de votre Altesse. Nous la prions en conséquence de vouloir bien voir Sir Edward Grey et lui dire que le Gouvernement Impérial, désireux de prouver encore une fois à l'Europe ses dispositions pacifiques ainsi que son esprit de conciliation et animé du réel désir de prévenir une nouvelle effusion de sang et dissiper toute crainte de complications, a décidé de confier aux Grandes Puissances le mandat de fixer les conditions de la paix sur la base expresse des propositions contenues dans notre note responsive."

The unanimous opinion was that the concluding words were impossible. My own opinion is that the Powers can do nothing except on the basis of their collective note. If Turkey would accept that, the Powers might then enter into communication with the allies with a view to arranging peace. The other Powers are being consulted.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 67; Paris, No. 65; Vienna, No. 49; Rome, No. 52; and St. Petersburgh, No. 123.)

[6484] No. 202.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Barclay.

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 30 of 10th February.

Servian public opinion seems to take no account of the great gains that are already practically assured to her. These include the sanjak, which till a few months ago it was assumed that Austria would never allow to pass into any other hands than her own. Servia will also gain largely by conquests in Macedonia. Prisrend and Ipek can probably also be obtained, and I suppose Servia and Montenegro will both benefit by this. We have given and shall continue to give diplomatic support, but if these very substantial gains are assured, and it becomes evident that Djakova and Dibra cannot be obtained except by resort to force, it would be out of the question that His Majesty's Government should consider these two places a *casus belli* or sufficient justification for a European war.

I understand the desire of Servia to possess Djakova and Dibra, but it seems to me that it would be little short of madness to risk in a war to obtain these all that Servia has gained, and may still gain by diplomatic support. Servia will emerge from the war with Turkey not only with large present gains, but with the prospect of a still more prosperous future. All this, and even her present existence, may be menaced if she forces war with Austria. You should speak in this sense to the Prime Minister, making it clear that I do so as a friend.

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[5901] No. 203.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 72. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1913.

THE Russian Ambassador handed to Sir A. Nicolson on the 5th instant the text of a telegram from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of which is enclosed, and stated that it was the reply to a telegram which he had sent reporting that the German Ambassador and I were endeavouring to find a basis for a compromise on the question of the boundaries of Albania.

M. Sazonof had apparently thought that Prince Lichnowsky was authorised by the Austro-Hungarian Government to discuss the terms of a possible settlement with me, but Count Benckendorff has telegraphed to explain that this is not the case, and that the informal conversations between the Prince and myself have as yet led to no definite result, as the influence of His Majesty's Government on that of Austria-Hungary has not been very effective.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 203.

Telegram from M. Sazonof.—(Communicated by Count Benckendorff.)

(Très Confidentiel.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 5 février*, 1913.

CROYONS certainement qu'appui allemand dans question délimitation désirable. Peut-être Sir Edward Grey trouverait-il possible entamer conservation avec Berlin. Nous ne saurions prendre initiative pourparlers directs, mais n'aurions aucune objection à ce que Secrétaire d'État, qui connait bien notre point de vue sur question de délimitation dans son ensemble, discute cette question avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, surtout si Prince Lichnowsky est, lui aussi, autorisé de le faire de la part de l'Autriche. On pourrait peut-être arriver plus aisément à un compromis en traitant question dans son ensemble. Après toutes les concessions faites, continuer à en faire nous serait bien difficile. Notre opinion publique ne comprendrait pas les raisons motivant de nouveaux sacrifices infligés aux coreligionnaires alliés. Les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris devraient se rendre compte du danger pour nous d'être débordés par notre opinion publique. Sir Edward Grey doit être bien assuré de notre ferme désir d'éviter toute situation isolée. Ce désir nous permet d'attendre le plus ferme appui diplomatique de la part des deux Puissances, dont notre opinion ne devrait pas être tenté de douter, après tous les efforts pour la paix que nous avons faits.

[7110] No. 204.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 76. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1913.

THE Russian Ambassador communicated to Sir A. Nicolson on the 12th instant a telegram from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggesting that, after consultation with the French Government, an exchange of views should take place between the Powers as to the possibility of steps being taken to terminate hostilities by proposing to the Porte the frontier line of Enos-Midia.

This idea appears to have emanated from Sophia, but M. Sazonof does not wish that its source should be disclosed to the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7338] No. 205.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 122.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1913.

THE French Ambassador read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 12th instant a telegram from his Government recording a memorandum left by the Servian chargé d'affaires at Paris with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The memorandum was in substance similar to what His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Belgrade reported in his telegram No. 30 of the 10th instant, regarding his conversation with the Servian Prime Minister.

There was, however, in the memorandum an additional paragraph to the effect that "Public opinion in Servia now demands that Bulgaria, after the conclusion of peace with Turkey, should aid Servia in occupying the Adriatic littoral even at the cost of a war with Austria-Hungary."

M. Jonnart apparently made no comments on this communication.

M. Vesnitch repeated the contents of it to M. Cambon, who told him that Servia was committing an act of folly and would not be able to count upon the support of any power or of her allies if she adopted an aggressive attitude, and I understood from M. Cambon that Count Benckendorff had used very much the same language to M. Vesnitch.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7109] No. 206.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 66.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 12, 1913.

THE German Ambassador told me to-day that his Government were anxious about the difficulty between Roumania and Bulgaria. The wisdom and moderation of the King of Roumania had hitherto made for peace, but there was a fear that the situation might get out of hand. The German Government thought that it was possible that England and Germany might usefully give advice or offer some form of mediation, and the Ambassador was instructed to ask me whether I could make any suggestion. He himself felt that it was not much use to intervene unless one could do so with some suggestion. The line for which Roumania was asking at present, which included Silistria and Balchik, was out of the question; and he had understood from Dr. Danef that Bulgaria would fight rather than give up even Kavarna. On the other hand, what Dr. Danef had offered was really too small. It was no good asking Bulgaria to give up something which she was determined not to concede, but the Ambassador thought, personally, that some line leaving the town of Silistria to Bulgaria, and running to a point north of Cape Kaliakra might be possible.

I told the Ambassador what had passed in my conversation with M. Misu on the 10th instant. I said that there was a difficulty in two Powers taking separate action. If Germany and England gave advice, Roumania and Bulgaria would both know that Germany and England were not likely to follow their advice by any action in a case of this sort, and the advice would not be so effective as anything that Russia and Austria might say. Russia had, I knew, done her best to promote a settlement, and had at one time been anxious that we should intervene with advice in Bucharest; but I had been very reluctant to interfere in the matter.

The Ambassador asked me to think the matter over, and suggested that we might talk about it to M. Misu and the Bulgarian Minister here.

I said that I would ask them to come to see me separately to-morrow. I would let the Ambassador know on Friday, the 14th, what information I could obtain, and what the situation was.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[6889] No. 207.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Athens, February 7, 1913.*

M. COROMILAS rather astonished me yesterday by the energy with which he insisted on the determination of the Greek Government that their new frontier should begin on the west from the island of Saseno and Cape Linguetta. Good evidence had, he said, been collected proving the transference of the rights over the island from the Venetians through the English to the Greeks. "Prescription" did not exist in international law, and the omission to establish effective occupation did not matter. Rights of property had been exercised there by private Turkish subjects, never by the Ottoman State.

I gathered, however, that his Excellency's idea was to establish the legal right to Saseno with a view to compensation elsewhere, not to assert it irrevocably in the face of Austrian and Italian opposition.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[6890] No. 208.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Athens, February 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to state that a list has been published of the villages in Epirus destroyed by Mussulman Albanians. It appears to be official, and contains the names of 188 villages. The number of persons who lost their lives in them is not given, as it is said to be impossible, for the present at least, to arrive at a computation of them even approximately accurate.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[6883] No. 209.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Paris, February 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 9 of the 24th January, copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs replying to the one which I addressed to him under the instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 20 of the 15th January, and to previous communications which I had made to him in regard to the improper levy of import duties by the Servian authorities in territory occupied by Servian troops.

M. Jonnart acquaints me with the proposals which the Greek Government have made to the Servian Government with a view to settling the relations between the various customs administrations in the territory occupied by the forces of the allies. His Excellency considers that these proposals offer satisfaction to the legitimate requirements of foreign commerce and expresses the hope that His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade may be instructed to join in the representations which his French colleague has been directed to make with a view to urge the Servian Government to hasten the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 209.

M. Jonnart to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 8 février, 1913.*

VOUS avez bien voulu à plusieurs reprises, et notamment par une note en date du 16 janvier, attirer l'attention de mon département sur l'établissement irrégulier, par les autorités serbes, de droits de douane à l'entrée du territoire occupé en Macédoine par les armées Royales.

Le Ministre de la république me fait connaître que le Gouvernement grec vient de transmettre au Gouvernement serbe les propositions suivantes en vue de régler les rapports réciproques des diverses administrations douanières à la limite des zones actuelles d'occupation en Macédoine.

D'après les renseignements transmis par M. Descos, trois catégories de marchandises devraient être distinguées :—

1. Les marchandises déjà dédouanées sous le régime turc et destinées aux provinces de l'intérieur, mais demeurées en magasin à Salonique, faute de pouvoir être réexpédiées à cause de l'encombrement des voies ferrées, entreraient en franchise de douane dans les zones serbes et bulgares, pourvu qu'elles soient munies d'un certificat délivré par les autorités grecques. Ces sortes d'expéditions ne pourraient avoir lieu que pendant une certaine période à déterminer, et les taxes jusqu'ici perçues par les autorités serbes et bulgares devraient être restituées.

2. Les marchandises, dédouanées à Salonique et sur lesquelles les autorités grecques de Salonique auront perçu les taxes douanières, pourront entrer en franchise en cas de réexpédition dans les zones serbe ou bulgare ; mais elles devront être accompagnées d'un certificat délivré par les autorités grecques, qui assurera leur libre passage et permettra aux autorités serbes ou bulgares de réclamer à l'Administration grecque le remboursement du droit de 11 pour cent déjà payé.

3. Les marchandises directement expédiées aux zones d'occupation serbe ou bulgare pourront débarquer à Salonique et traverser la zone d'occupation grecque en libre transit.

Le Gouvernement grec demande par réciprocité la liberté de transit pour les marchandises venant par voie de terre à destination de Salonique.

Le Ministre serbe des Affaires Étrangères serait disposé à accepter ces propositions, tout en réclamant partiellement la faculté d'installer à Salonique ses propres fonctionnaires des douanes chargés de délivrer les certificats prévus dans les cas 1 et 2, ce qui serait de nature à conférer à ces certificats une garantie plus réelle de sincérité.

Ces propositions semblent donner satisfaction aux légitimes revendications du commerce étranger lésé par les récentes mesures prises à la douane de Gheyghéli et assurer, dans ces conditions équitables, le libre transit des marchandises venant de Salonique ou s'y dirigeant.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de signaler à Sir Edward Grey l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à ce que le Ministre de Sa Majesté britannique à Belgrade fût invité à joindre ses démarches à celles que M. Descos a été chargé de faire en vue de presser le Gouvernement serbe de hâter un accord qui mettra fin à la situation douanière irrégulière dont souffre particulièrement le commerce des Puissances neutres.

Agréez, &c.
JONNART.

[7025] No. 210.

National Bank of Turkey to Foreign Office.—(Received February 13.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *50, Cornhill, London, February 13, 1913.*

WE beg to enclose copy of a telegram received this morning from our head office in Constantinople.

Since the interview which Mr. Hugo Baring had with Sir William Tyrrell yesterday, we have been in communication with Sir Henry Babington Smith, in Cairo, and we heard from him this morning to the effect that, notwithstanding the French attitude in connection with the negotiations for the advance of 500,000*l.* to the Turkish Government, he considers it important to keep the group together in view of the larger

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questions which will arise in the future, and which cannot be dealt with excepting by agreement between all the parties concerned. He does not think that we should take part in the advance with the Deutsche Bank alone, unless we should receive a distinct request to that effect from the Foreign Office.

We have, &c.
(For National Bank of Turkey),
R. HECHT, *Manager.*

Enclosure in No. 210.

Copy of Telegram received from Constantinople by National Bank of Turkey.

Constantinople, February 12, 1913.

CONSEILLER financier and Turkish Government affirm refusal French Government to advance is owing entirely to Régie Ottomane des Tabacs question, and official explanation neutralité merely pretext. If no argent forthcoming Turkish Government will télégraphier provinces suspendre paiement all appointement, and in the case revenue departments conséquence may be sérieux for all interested finance turque. At conseiller financier suggestion and with approval German Ambassador at Constantinople, Deutsche Bank, Constantinople, is telegraphing Berlin asking whether an advance on Bon Trésor may be made by them as a purely banking operation, and if so to what amount. At conseiller financier request we hereby ask whether National Bank of Turkey will do likewise and to what extent. His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople says he has no objection. If Français see that Anglais and Allemand are determined to proceed would they not probably reconsider decision?

[7023] No. 211.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, February* 13, 1913.

ROUMANIAN papers state that Hakki Pasha passed through Bucharest yesterday by Orient express from Constantinople.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[7022] No. 212.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February* 13, 1913.

MY telegram No. 53 of 9th February.

General Staff states that Turkish forces attempted sorties from Adrianople on 10th February and 12th February, but were repulsed, Turks losing over 1,000 men.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[7041] No. 213.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, February* 13, 1913.

DELEGATE of Mount Athos, representing the seventeen Greek monasteries, called upon me for the purpose of protesting against Russian proposals for their autonomy under the control of the Orthodox States.

They demand incorporation of peninsula with Greece or else international or neutral control of its civil administration, with full guarantees for their monastic privileges.

[7030] No. 214.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 13, 1913.

RUSSIAN Minister of Foreign Affairs last night told me that the Bulgarian Government had asked him to intervene at Bucharest, but that he had replied that he could do nothing unless they would make some more substantial concession. His Excellency would evidently like them to give up the town of Silistria, but fears that the Grand Sobranje would not ratify such a cession.

A friend of mine, who had an audience of the Emperor two days ago, tells me that His Majesty is very angry with the Roumanians and said that they were trying to take from Bulgaria what Russia had given her. His Majesty added that they would not act as they were doing unless they had a Great Power behind them.

The President of the Council, whom I also saw last night, took a very despondent view of the situation and spoke as if he almost feared the worst. He told me that the reports current about the internal situation are much exaggerated, and said that there was nothing to fear so long as peace could be maintained. It might be different were war to break out, as the financial loss which it would entail on the industrial classes would breed discontent.

[7024] No. 215.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February* 13, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 12th February and my telegram No. 80 of 10th February.

Official agency [group undecypherable] quotes the Grand Vizier as saying that, while continuing the war "as long as judged profitable," present Cabinet will endeavour to find means to make peace "on conditions safeguarding, as far as possible, the interests of the country," and on basis of the Porte's reply to the Powers.

Absence of distinct successes in military operations, condition of Adrianople, and financial straits would seem to be determining cause of these pacific utterances so shortly after Jingo attitude reported in my telegram No. 62 of 1st February.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[7036] No. 216.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February* 13, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 37 of 12th February.

I have spoken to the Prime Minister in the sense desired. He asks me to convey his thanks for your friendly message and his appreciation of efforts being made by His Majesty's Government on Servia's behalf. But he thinks it right also that Servia's friends should realise the state of feeling in this country and know her final decision, namely, that she cannot yield on the point of Djakova and Dibra. Servia had quite made up her mind she would resist by force, even single-handed, any attempt to deprive her of these areas, although well aware of all the risks involved.

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[7212] No. 217.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 13, 1913.*

I INFORMED Bulgarian Minister to-day of substance of second paragraph of my telegram No. 11 to Sir G. Barclay of to-day, repeated to you.

Bulgarian Minister said Roumania demanded Silistria, and this was impossible. Dr. Danef had made a proposal which ought to satisfy Roumania. Bulgarian Minister did not seem very favourable to mediation of any Power. I pointed out that it would be preferable that Roumania should appeal to mediation rather than go to war, and that mediation was not intervention. I hoped Bulgaria would, in interests of peace, make the best offer she could to Roumania; I supposed Dr. Danef's offer could be increased without sacrificing Silistria. Bulgarian Minister seemed to think some further concession on the coast not impossible, but it must not be such as would weaken the power of defending Varna.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 70; Bucharest, No. 12; Paris, No. 71; Rome, No. 54; St. Petersburgh, No. 128; and Vienna, No. 51.)

[6870] No. 218.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 13, 1913.*

PLEASE make following communication from Treasury to Sir A. Block, with reference to his letter enclosed in your despatch No. 1082 of 18th December, and telegraph his reply:

"Two methods have been suggested for computing the contribution of allies to Turkish Debt. Firstly, contribution should be the equivalent of actual or average sums drawn from ceded territory in the past for the service of Debt; secondly, allies should contribute to Debt charge in the ratio borne by total revenues of ceded territory to the total revenues of the Ottoman Empire.

"The first method would give for all classes of bondholders security equivalent to present security, but one objection advanced is that it would probably involve elaborate and contentious calculations.

"The second method is simpler and more generally preferred, but we have no figures to show whether the aggregate contribution arrived at by this method would be as great as that obtained by method one, or whether second method produces no substantial alteration of the ratios in which the various portions of the ceded territory have contributed to the Debt.

"Unless these two conditions are satisfied, second method must to some extent prejudice either the bondholders as a whole, or some particular classes of bondholders.

"So far as you can judge, would the second method satisfy these two conditions, and would it be really practicable to arrive at any generally agreed figures for purpose of method one?"

[7027] No. 219.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 13, 1913.*

I AM informing French Ambassador, and also informing both the National Bank and the Ottoman Bank, that His Majesty's Government are of opinion that no objection should be raised to the banks making small advances if they all agree to do so at their own risk; but that His Majesty's Government do not desire to advise the banks to make such advances.

You should furnish German Minister for Foreign Affairs with a copy of this telegram.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 66.)

[6849] No. 220.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 13, 1913.*

I TOLD Roumanian Minister on the 10th that I would inform him if meeting of Ambassadors proceeded to deal with anything that affected Roumania, such as Kutzo Vlachs. Ambassadors have hitherto been occupied with questions that affect interests of Great Powers or might cause difficulties between any of them.

[7212] No. 221.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 13, 1913.*

I HAVE told Roumanian Minister that I was surprised to hear that a line giving Silistria and Baltchich to Roumania was the minimum of Roumanian demands. I had been under the impression that less than this would be accepted as a settlement, and I supposed Bulgaria could not give up Silistria and Baltchich.

I urged upon Roumanian Minister that, while a settlement by direct negotiation between Roumania and Bulgaria was far the best solution, yet if that failed a resort to the mediation of all or some of the Powers would be preferable to a resort to war. War between Roumania and Bulgaria would be very serious; it might involve some of the Great Powers, and if once any of the Great Powers were involved in war the smaller Powers were sure to lose, which ever side won. If the Great Power befriending a small Power was defeated, the small Power lost territory; if the reverse happened, the small Power paid in political influence.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 69; Paris, No. 70; Rome, No. 53; St. Petersburgh, No. 127; Sophia, No. 37; and Vienna, No. 50.)

[5182] No. 222.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 13, 1913.*

PRINCE AHMED FUAD PASHA called on the 13th instant in connection with a letter which he had addressed to me, and of which a copy is enclosed.*

As to the question which interested him most directly and personally, Sir A. Nicolson, who received His Highness, told him that before the Powers could consider what form of Government to give to the future Albania it would have to be decided what was that Albania, *i.e.*, to define its limits, and this latter question was engaging the attention of the Powers. He therefore could express no opinion as to the future Government or the future head of the Albanian State.

Prince Fuad expressed to Sir A. Nicolson in the course of conversation the hope that in delimiting Albania the Powers would not think alone of Servia or Montenegro, or of Russia or Austria, but also of the Albanians. There would be endless trouble if Albanians were to pass under the rule of Slavs.

His Highness said that Scutari was not fully invested. People could pass in and out, and it could hold out for months. The commander-in-chief there was an Albanian, and out of the 40,000 troops in the town, 35,000 were Albanian. He had sent an emissary to the commander-in-chief to recommend the latter to hoist the Albanian in place of the Turkish flag. If this were done all the Albanians in the vicinity would rally to its relief.

He also said that all the Albanians had risen in the rear of the Servian garrisons on the Adriatic littoral and had taken to arms, and that the Servians could not withdraw from the coast if they wished to do so. The atrocities committed by the Servians had aroused the country-side.

* No. 38.

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The Greeks, he said, would be able to make no progress in Epirus. They would never have taken Salonica if they had not bought the Turkish commander-in-chief for 80,000*l*. Even the Bulgarians had come pretty well to the end of their resources, and as a new and invigorating energy had been infused into the Turkish troops, who were now taking the offensive, the tide might turn.

His Highness added that he was not a Young Turk, and was horrified at Nazim Pasha's murder, though the latter, if he had lived, would have within an hour shot Enver Bey, and as many of the conspirators as could have been arrested.

It is of course impossible to test the accuracy of all His Highness's statements, which are of some interest if well founded.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7580] No. 223.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**

(No. 78.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1913.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF and M. Cambon came to see me to-day together.

I told them what had passed in conversation with Count Mensdorff this afternoon.

Count Benckendorff was apprehensive that, if the new Russian proposals were made at the meeting of Ambassadors to-morrow, Count Mensdorff might have to say that he could not accept them. Count Benckendorff therefore thought that it would be better that, just as Prince Lichnowsky had informed me beforehand of the Austrian line, so I should inform him privately of the Russian line. I might also inform the Austrian and Italian Ambassadors in the same way.

I said that I saw no objection to this, provided that I could inform them in such a way that they could refer the matter to their Governments.

Count Benckendorff agreed to this.

M. Cambon also was in favour of this procedure.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7581] No. 224.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1913.

THE Bulgarian Minister, when I was speaking to him to-day about the difficulty with Roumania, said that, if Roumania occupied the Bulgarian territory which she claimed, Bulgaria would be unable to resist her action now, and would proceed to finish the war with Turkey. But it would be very unwise for Roumania to take this step as, though she might take advantage of the situation now, Bulgaria would embark on a *revanche* to recover the occupied territory later on, when she was able to do so. Roumania really had no claim to anything. She had stood by when the war began, and had indeed been rather pro-Turkish, instead of helping Bulgaria.

I said that the Roumanian contention was that it had always been understood that, if Bulgaria acquired a large accession of territory, she would give Roumania something on the frontier

The Bulgarian Minister deprecated the idea that there had been such an understanding, and said that in any case Dr. Danef had made a certain offer.

The rest of our conversation is recorded in my telegram No. 38 of to-day to you.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 124).

[7578] No. 225.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1913.

THE Austrian Ambassador came to see me to-day.

After telling him that I hoped to know to-morrow what the Russian line for the frontier of Albania would be, but that no doubt it would not coincide with the Austrian line, I recurred to the idea of an international "commission d'enquête" as a last resort if no settlement could otherwise be reached.

The Ambassador said that he was not favourable to this idea, and he did not think that his Government would be favourable to it.

I enquired whether this was because of the danger of massacres?

He replied that it was. He would not like to be a party to anything that would produce such dreadful consequences.

I said that I did not believe that massacres would take place after the setting up of a commission, especially if we warned the Servian Government in advance that, if any disorders occurred or massacres took place before the commission reported, these events would be taken as evidence that Servia was not fit to have possession of the disputed territory. I should not propose a commission except as a last resort, but, if everything else failed, it would be the only suggestion which I could make. It would not be an aggressive proposal; it would be made in the interests of peace; and I should have to ask in the last resort that it should be submitted to the Austrian Government.

I impressed upon Count Mensdorff that, as the Austrian solution of the Adriatic port question had been accepted, it was not possible for Russia to give way on all of the three remaining notable points in dispute: Scutari, Djakova, and Dibra. This was the crux of the difficulty.

Count Mensdorff contended that these should not be regarded as the only points in dispute. It should be taken into account that Austria had ceded Prisrend and Ipek.

I observed that it had rather been assumed that these two places would not be claimed for Albania.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7579] No. 226.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1913.

I SPOKE to the Italian Ambassador to-day about the Albanian difficulty, much as I had just spoken to the Austrian Ambassador, as recorded in my despatch No. 30 to Sir F. Cartwright.

The Italian Ambassador informed me that the Italian consul in Scutari, who was not pro-Austrian, reported that it was not the case that the bishop and people of Scutari wished to go to Montenegro. They were reticent at present because they feared being replaced under Turkish rule, but they were strongly opposed to being given to Montenegro, and they desired autonomy. There was no doubt that this was the truth.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[7582] No. 227.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 53.)
Sir. *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1913.

THE Italian Ambassador informed me very confidentially to-day that the Italian Minister in Cettinjé had information that the King of Montenegro was now very much afraid of Servian and Montenegrin territory being contiguous. He thought that this

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would end in the absorption of Montenegro by Servia; and he therefore intended, after peace was declared, to give to Austria a strip of the sanjak, which would be a wedge between Servia and Montenegro, receiving in exchange some rectification of the frontier with Herzegovina. Such an arrangement would be disagreeable to Italy; it would enrage Servia, and make Russia very angry.

I said that I quite understood that this was the light in which it would be regarded.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[7339] No. 228.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 123.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1913.

I TOLD the Russian and French Ambassadors to-day of Mr. Barclay's telegram No. 30 of the 10th February from Belgrade, and of my telegram No. 37 to him of the 12th February.

The Ambassadors told me that they had each spoken to M. Vesnitch here in the same sense as I had spoken.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7027] No. 229.

Foreign Office to Imperial Ottoman Bank.†

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1913.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary E. Grey to inform you that His Majesty's Government are of opinion that no objection should be raised to the banks concerned making small advances to the Turkish Government if they all (French, German, and English) agree to do so, and if they do so at their own risk; but His Majesty's Government do not desire to advise the banks to make such advances.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[6046] No. 230.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, relative to the guardianship of the Turkish flag in Crete, and to state that he concurs in the proposal to remove His Majesty's ship "Yarmouth" from Suda Bay and send one of His Majesty's ships to Milos instead, to undertake the duty of passing wireless telegraph messages between Besika Bay and the Syrian coast and Malta.

I am to transmit to you herewith for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of a telegram which Sir E. Grey has addressed to His Majesty's consul-general at Canea on the subject.‡

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 77). † Also to National Bank of Turkey.
‡ To Consul-General Wratislaw (No. 4, Telegraphic), February 7, 1913.

[7073] No. 231.

Minute by Sir Edward Grey.

COUNT MENSDORFF asks me whether I have any objection to a resolution being adopted at the meeting of Ambassadors to the effect that it would be desirable that the articles enclosed should be incorporated in the terms of peace between Turkey and the allies.

I presume there is no objection, but the department should let me know.

E. G.

Foreign Office, February 13, 1913.

Projet d'Articles.

1. Chacun des États signataires du présent traité, qui reçoit cession d'une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman, supportera une part de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois derniers exercices financiers.

La quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera incessible, insaisissable et ne pourra faire l'objet de compensation; des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles dont le maintien sera reconnu impraticable, seront données par les États cessionnaires pour la garantie des créanciers.

La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée, sera convertible en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent.

2. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemins de fer et autres ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité; ils s'engagent également à remettre les compagnies intéressées en possession immédiate des lignes exploitées par elles avant la guerre, nonobstant tout règlement qui pourrait être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord entre les intéressés; ils s'engagent, en outre, dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valablement consentis par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités compétentes.

3. Les détails d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront consignés dans des protocoles annexés au présent traité et élaborés par une commission internationale, où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances et qui se réunira à , le .

[7143] No. 232.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 51.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 10, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 43 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the second Slav banquet took place at the "Hôtel Regina" last night. About 500 persons, including many members of the Progressive, Octobrist, Nationalist, and Right Duma parties were present. Several members of the Council of the Empire, and many well-known public men were also present. Before dinner a telegram expressing loyalty was sent to the Emperor, and subsequently telegrams were sent to the Kings of Servia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro, expressing great satisfaction at the fresh victories of the allies, and the sincerest wishes of the senders that the task begun by the allies should be carried through to the end. Speeches were made by prominent Slavo-phils, amongst them being Count Bobrinsky and M. Briantchaninof, and a resolution was passed unanimously to the effect that those present, convinced that they were expressing the feelings of the great majority of the Russian public, welcomed the fresh victories of the allies with enthusiasm, and hoped that the great task of bringing the whole Balkan peninsula back to Christianity and civilisation might be successfully concluded. The mistake of summoning a conference of the

Great Powers must not be repeated after the fresh victories of the allies, and Russia, who was indissolubly bound up in the Balkan question by her thousand-year-old dream of placing the cross over St. Sophia, could and must not be guided in her decisions by considerations of fruitless pacificism, the interests of speculators, and a wish to defer at all costs the settlement of historic questions through fear of internal revolutionary disorders should it become necessary for her to defend her prestige and interests by armed force. The resolution concluded as follows:—

"Indignantly refuting the idea of the possibility of a wholesale revolutionary movement in the event of war as an undeserved slander of the Russian people, those attending the banquet affirm that the Russian people do not desire war, but are not afraid of it, and that to yield to Austria-Hungary or to save Turkey from final disintegration is not compatible with the national prestige and interests of Russia, or with the best traditions of Russian history."

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[7208] No. 233.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 14.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February 14, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram, dated the 14th February, from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 233.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Malta, February 14, 1913.*

"ZEALANDIA" left Besika Bay for Constantinople. "Dartmouth" arrived Besika Bay.

[7216] No. 234.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 91 of 13th February: Ottoman debt.

Sir A. Block is personally of opinion that the first method is the simpler, and he prefers it. He does not share idea that it would be difficult to arrive at generally agreed figures for purpose of putting it into execution. He is consulting his colleagues, and will draw up memorandum for Treasury as soon as possible.

[7223] No. 235.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, February 14, 1913.*

M. VENIZELOS tells me that armistice will not again be granted. If the Turks want cessation of hostilities they must sign preliminaries of peace, including cessions of territory and war indemnity.

[7224] No. 236.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, February 14, 1913.*

I READ to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning translation of your telegram No. 11 of 13th February.

His Excellency answered that in saying what you had to him "vous enfonciez une porte ouverte," as he himself was all for a peaceful settlement, but he had to count with feeling in the country. He had been much blamed in Roumania for Government's inaction in the autumn, when a more energetic attitude in favour either of Turkey or of allies would have secured for Roumania what she was now asking.

Their inaction had been due to assurances given him in all good faith in October by representatives of Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia as to the maintenance of *status quo*, a formula which Europe had abandoned in November. Roumania consequently felt that she had been let in by Europe, and public opinion was sceptical as to the benefit of following advice of Great Powers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was about to see the King, and said he would inform His Majesty of what you had said.

[7218] No. 237.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 126 of 13th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that language which you have instructed His Majesty's representative at Belgrade in your telegram No. 37 of 12th February to Belgrade to hold to Servian Government is almost all identic with that which he himself has been holding to them.

[7225] No. 238.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 14, 1913.*

SALONICA.

My telegram No. 48 of 7th February.

I hear that Greek Government and Servian Government have agreed that the town and district of Salonica be constituted a condominium among the allies. The Bulgarian Government have not as yet agreed to above, but the other allies believe their adhesion to this plan will eventually be obtained.

[7227] No. 239.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 14, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 52 of 8th February.

The King has returned here from the front. His presence is considered desirable in view of the state of Roumanian negotiations.

[7228] No. 240.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 14, 1913.

THE progress of the siege of Adrianople has suffered from lack of heavy artillery, and application has consequently been made by the Bulgarian Government to the Servian Government for the loan of guns of position to be used against that fortress, and for the men to work them. They have also asked that the losses in the Servian contingent of the investing force may be made good, and for the use of the sanitary train, of which they stand greatly in need. The Servian Government have complied with all the above requests, and are sending from Nish to Adrianople forty-four Creuzot siege guns, most of which are new, together with the necessary ammunition. To an enquiry from the Bulgarian Government as to the consideration which the Servian Government would demand to receive in return for this assistance, the latter replied that they would expect compensation later.

I have it on the best authority that the compensation demanded will be territorial, and will consist of the towns and districts of Perlepe Kuprulu and Monastir which are at present occupied by the Servian forces, and the acquisition of which would go far to reconcile Servian public opinion to the fulfilment of the promises given by the Servian Government to evacuate North Albania and the Adriatic littoral.

[7211] No. 241.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Canea, Crete, February* 14, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 4 of 11th February.

His Majesty's ship "Yarmouth" having been ordered away, commanding officer did not hoist flags on Suda Bay Island this morning, and handed them over to consular body.

Unless the Powers make reserves at Athens, it is possible that the Governor-General may take this opportunity of seizing Suda Bay Island, which he has already designed for a lazaretto. My colleagues are telegraphing in the same sense.

(Sent to Athens.)

[7229] No. 242.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, February* 14, 1913.

MY telegram No. 34 of 12th February.

I have received note from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stating that German Ministers at Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade have been instructed to enter a protest against encroachments on rights of Ottoman Public Debt, and to hold Governments responsible for all losses which might be occasioned to Turkish State creditors through action of authorities of those Governments. German Ministers have also been instructed to keep in touch with their British colleagues in making these representations.

[6473] No. 243.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 14, 1913.

MY telegram No. 90 of 12th February.

All the Governments except the German agree to the answer proposed to be given to the communication of the Porte.

German Government think that we should first assure ourselves that the Balkan States accept the basis of the collective note.

There can be no doubt that Bulgaria will accept what the collective note proposed about Adrianople, and it seems to be loss of time to enter into communication with

allies till we can do so on the basis of acceptance by Turkey of the collective note. The Powers will then be in a much stronger position to urge the allies to make peace, and to deprecate new or increased demands on their part. It is most important not to lose time, and German Ambassador has been requested to put this consideration before his Government, and the reply to the Porte will be given to the Turkish Ambassador here as soon as German Government agree.

You can inform Minister for Foreign Affairs when you hear this has been done.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 57; Berlin, No. 73; Paris, No. 73; St. Petersburgh, No. 130; and Vienna, No. 53.)

[6883] No. 244.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Lamb.

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 14, 1913.

FRENCH Government consider certain proposals recently made by Greek Government to Servian Government for settlement of customs question satisfactory, and ask for British support at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to adopt them. The proposals are:—

1. Goods passed through customs during Turkish régime, but, owing to lack of transport facilities, still warehoused at Salonica, should enter duty free the Servian or Bulgarian "zone" (*i.e.*, the Turkish territory occupied by Servian or Bulgarian troops), provided they are accompanied by a Greek certificate, and the duties already levied by Servian or Bulgarian authorities should be paid back.

2. Goods on which the Greeks have levied duties at Salonica should enter the Servian or Bulgarian zone duty free, provided they are accompanied by a Greek certificate to enable the Servian or Bulgarian Government to recover from the Greek authorities at Salonica the duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* paid there.

3. Goods sent direct to the Servian or Bulgarian zone viâ Salonica should pass in free transit the Greek zone, presumably paying duty on arrival at the Servian or Bulgarian zone.

Before agreeing to these proposals I wish to be furnished by telegraph with any objections (such as those indicated in your telegram of 24th January) you may see to any of them, and if you do make objections you should submit alternative proposals which you consider preferable.

Are the limits of Greek, Servian, and Bulgarian zones well known at Salonica, or is confusion likely to arise on this point?

(Repeated to Belgrade, No. 39; Athens, No. 19; Sophia, No. 39; Berlin, No. 71; Paris, No. 72; Rome, No. 56; St. Petersburgh, No. 129; Vienna, No. 52; and Constantinople, No. 94.)

[7584] No. 245.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 14, 1913.

THE record of the meeting of Ambassadors to-day is as follows:—

L'Ambassadeur d'Italie a reçu de son Gouvernement l'instruction de chercher avec ses collègues un moyen de régler le différend roumano-bulgare.

Sir F. Grey dit qu'il a reçu hier les visites successives de M. Misu et de M. Madjarof. Il leur a conseillé à l'un et à l'autre de faire leur possible pour éviter un conflit, et leur a indiqué la possibilité d'un recours à la médiation des Puissances. Il a télégraphié dans ce sens aux agents britanniques à Bucharest et à Sophia.

La réunion considère que, vu la gravité de la situation, il serait urgent que tous les Gouvernements fissent parvenir à leurs représentants auprès des Cabinets roumain et bulgare des instructions dans le même sens.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 125), Sir E. Goschen (No. 68), Sir R. Rodd (No. 51), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 79).

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[5976] No. 246.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Mensdorff.

(Confidential.)
Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, February* 14, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 6th instant, left at this Office the next day by the councillor of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, relative to the effect which the impending transfer of territory in European Turkey from Ottoman sovereignty to that of the Balkan States may have on international shipping in waters adjacent to that region.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, in reply, that your communication and the draft of the provisions enclosed in it, which it is proposed eventually to submit to the conference of Ambassadors, will receive the early and careful consideration of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[5976] No. 247.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 14, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith translation of a note from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at this court, which was left at this Office by the councillor of the embassy on the 7th instant, relative to the effect which the impending transfer of territory in European Turkey from Ottoman sovereignty to that of the Balkan States may have on international shipping in waters adjacent to that region.†

The note submits for the confidential consideration of His Majesty's Government the draft of certain provisions which the Austro-Hungarian Government propose to submit to the conference of Ambassadors at present sitting in London, and states that the Governments of the other Powers interested are being similarly consulted.

In communicating this note, Count Trauttmansdorff explained that his Government considered it important to maintain, in favour of all the Powers, national treatment for their shipping in all the territories in European Turkey about to pass from Ottoman sovereignty, and considered that the best way to attain this end was that the general treaty which would eventually have to be signed by all the Powers should contain the provisions necessary to secure this. The Austro-Hungarian Government, before approaching the conference of Ambassadors, desired to assure themselves of the concurrence of Great Britain, which had important interests in the territories in question. They were anxious that the matter should be dealt with as quickly as possible, and hoped that His Majesty's Government would express their opinion on the draft without delay.

Count Trauttmansdorff added that an official of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was an expert in shipping matters, had come to London to offer any information or assistance which might be required in the discussion of the matter, and that the services of this gentleman would be at the disposal of His Majesty's Government should they desire any further explanations or particulars.

I am accordingly to request that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will take Count Mensdorff's note with its enclosure into their consideration, and furnish at their earliest convenience any observations on it which they may have to offer.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Also to Board of Trade, *mutatis mutandis*.

† No. 121.

[7327] No. 248.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received February 15.)

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Salonica, February* 7, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of the forced conversion of Mussulmans to Christianity in the districts occupied by Bulgarian troops. The irregularity of postal communication with Constantinople is my excuse for forwarding it direct, instead of in the usual manner.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 248.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Salonica, February* 7, 1913.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that this morning a native of Baden, a village of some 250 houses in the Ruptchos district, came to see me and narrated that he had escaped at the risk of his life to inform the foreign consulates here of the attempts that are being made in that region to compel the Mussulman population to embrace Christianity.

According to his story, on Monday, the 27th ultimo, some 80 or 90 inhabitants of his village were rounded up and driven to the small town of Shiroka Laka on the Bulgarian side of the frontier and there forcibly baptised. After three days they were taken back to Devlen, the chief town of their circumscription, and made to figure as voluntary converts for the encouragement of the rest, being compelled by threats or actual violence to sign a written declaration that they had themselves petitioned for admission into the Christian Church.

Similar proceedings, he declared, had taken place at Breza, Mibalkova, Tchurukova, Laskova and Seltche, and were taking place in all the 26 villages of that district, in all of which the Mosques were closed, the women compelled to cast aside their veils, and the moukhtars and imams removed and kept under surveillance at Devlen. All this was done, he assured me, by gendarmes and reservists under the personal direction of the military commandant and Civil Governor of Devlen, who declared that it was by order of King Ferdinand that there should be no more Mussulmans on Bulgarian soil.

My informant went on to say that the Pomak population, speaking Bulgarian and recognising their kinship with their neighbours across the border, were ready to submit to Bulgarian rule, to pay whatever taxes and to obey whatever laws might be imposed upon them, so long as their religion and the honour of their women were respected. The stories which he related to me on the latter point I refrain from reproducing. They are of a type which is, unfortunately, familiar to all acquainted with this country but of which the individual details are very rarely capable of substantiation. It is enough to say that I believe his statement to be essentially veracious and that it is in general confirmed by information that has reached me from other, thoroughly trustworthy and unprejudiced, sources. The story is sure to be widely spread and to produce a most undesirable effect throughout the whole Mussulman world; and, as it is not possible for us to exert any direct influence in the matter, I have thought it my duty to bring it telegraphically to the notice of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom I am also transmitting a copy of this despatch direct.

It is very possible that the Bulgarian Government will declare that, if these things have taken place at all, it has been the work of irregulars, and will endeavour to disclaim responsibility. I am, however, satisfied that the crimes committed by the Macedonian komitajis to the detriment of the Mussulman population are as a general rule (though there are a few honourable exceptions) connived at, if not openly approved by, the constituted authorities; and I maintain that the central Government cannot escape responsibility for the conduct of those to whom it has deliberately handed over the temporary administration of the occupied territories. There seem to be only too good grounds for the belief that the Balkan Governments, and more especially that of Bulgaria, have become in a manner subservient to the Macedonian committees, of whom

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on the one hand they are afraid, whilst on the other they feel that in the near future they will have need, and intend to make full use, of them for the purposes of that inter-racial contest which is destined to be fought to a finish on the old familiar lines.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Sophia for the information of His Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[7276] No. 249.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 98.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 8, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 71 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a French translation taken from to-day's "Jeune Turc" of the law for the issue of Treasury bonds.

The most striking feature of the new law is the fact that the amount of the issue is calculated on a sterling basis, presumably with a view to facilitating subscriptions in Egypt and India.

Attached to the law is an appendix entrusting the Committee of National Defence with the task of placing the bonds on the market, and prescribing the manner in which this is to be effected. It will be seen that committees and sub-committees are to be appointed, and that the scheme bears a close resemblance to those already adopted for the collection of subscriptions to the war fund and for the working of the new requisition law (see my despatches Nos. 96 and 102 of the 7th and 8th February). Thirty such sub-committees have already been formed.

I think that this system of working through committees and sub-committees, which I need hardly point out is thoroughly characteristic of the Union and Progress party, merits more than passing attention. Apart from the transference of all administrative power from the nominal Government to the Committee of National Defence, which is only the extreme part of the Committee of Union and Progress under another name, it means the formation of a whole network of adherents of the committee, wielding great power without official responsibility. The committee have, in fact, come out into the open and given legislative force to the methods which, conducted in secret, have for so long proved baffling to their opponents.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 249.

Extract from the "Jeune Turc" of February 8, 1913.

(Traduction.)

LA LOI SUR L'ÉMISSION DES BONS DU TRÉSOR.

ARTICLE 1er. Il sera émis des bons du Trésor pour 550,000,000 de piastres dans les conditions prévues dans l'arrêté ci-joint.

Art. 2. Cet article de loi provisoire est applicable à partir de sa publication.

MEHMED RÉCHAD.

Le Grand Vizir,
MAHMOUD CHEVKET.

Le Ministre des Finances,
RIFAAT.

Arrêté.

Arts. 1er, 2 et 3. En vertu de la loi du 19 janvier, 1328, des bons du Trésor pour 550,000,000 de piastres sont émis. Leur garantie est constituée par les impôts immobiliers. Les bons sont de 110 piastres or, ou 11. ou 25 fr. Il y a des demi-bons. Les coupons sont payables tous les 1er novembre, à partir de l'année 1329 (v.s.); il est accordé 5 pour cent d'intérêt.

Arts. 4, 5 et 6. Les coupons échus seront payés en Turquie par les "mal-amlaues." (caisses de l'État) et à l'étranger, par les maisons de banque indiquées par le

Gouvernement. Les caisses de l'État seront tenues d'accepter ces coupons en payement de l'impôt immobilier.

Aucune réduction ne sera faite sur les coupons payés. Les coupons devront être présentés en même temps que les actions pour éviter des payements partiels.

Les coupons présentés au payement des impôts seront recueillis par le Ministère des Finances et annulés.

Arts. 7, 8 et 9. L'intérêt des bons court à partir du 1er décembre, 1328. On ne demandera pas de différence d'intérêt pour les bons vendus six mois après cette date. Passé ce délai, l'intérêt de six mois devra être acquitté lors du payement du montant des actions achetées.

Le Gouvernement se réserve le droit d'annuler les bons du Trésor avant l'expiration de la période de cinq ans en payant leur valeur ainsi que les intérêts.

Les bons et les coupons sont, en Turquie, exemptés de tous droits de timbre.

Art. 10. Les bons, actions et coupons non présentés cinq années après leur expiration seront périmés.

Appendice.

Les bons sont au nombre de 4,511,000 de 25 fr. chacun.

Une commission de 1 pour cent sera accordée aux banques étrangères chargées de la vente des bons et des coupons.

Les maisons de banques de Turquie auront également une marge, qui sera fixée par une décision spéciale du Conseil des Ministres.

Voici le texte de l'instruction réglementant les rapports entre le Comité de la Défense nationale, chargé, comme l'on sait, du placement des bons du Trésor, et le Ministère des Finances :—

"Article 1er. Le Comité de la Défense nationale est chargé du placement à Constantinople et dans les provinces, de préférence à toute autre souscription, des bons du Trésor émis pour 550,000,000 de piastres en vertu de la loi du 19 janvier, 1328 (v.s.). Le comité est chargé de faire auprès du public toutes les démarches utiles tendant à favoriser le placement des bons.

"Art. 2. Le Comité de la Défense nationale formera à Constantinople des commissions de placement dans tous les centres où il le jugera opportun, sous la réserve d'en informer le Ministère des Finances, qui déléguera un et, au besoin, deux fonctionnaires-comptables auprès de chacune de ces commissions.

"Art. 3. Les bons demandés par les commissions seront remis par l'autorité financière aux délégués-comptables chargés de tenir les écritures.

"Art. 4. Les membres des commissions seront munis de bordereaux spéciaux, sur lesquels ils enregistreront les bons placés, les noms des acquéreurs, ainsi que le montant perçu, qu'ils devront verser intégralement au premier bureau du Mahé contre reçu parafé.

"Arts. 5 et 6. Le devoir des délégués-comptables consiste à garder les bons demandés par les commissions de placement, à les distribuer régulièrement à ceux qui en font la demande et à tenir les comptes à jour.

"Art. 7. Les membres des commissions sont tenus de se présenter au plus tard tous les trois jours au délégué-comptable pour lui rendre compte de leurs opérations."

[7278] No. 250.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 100.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 97 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Cavalla reporting further on the closing of the Austrian and French post-offices at that place.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 250.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Cavalla, January* 20, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the closing of the Austrian and French post-offices has caused, as was natural, much inconvenience to local commerce. I have just received from the local merchants and bankers a letter, copy of which is enclosed, complaining of the state of affairs. A similar letter has been addressed to the local authorities and to the other consular representatives.

Since the closing of the foreign post-offices some three weeks ago, communication with Europe has been difficult, and with Constantinople and Asia Minor almost impossible. The ostensible reason for the action of the Bulgarian authorities was that they were unable to exercise any supervision or censorship over letters arriving by foreign post-offices, and that it was desirable in time of war and, in view of the feelings of the local Greeks towards the Bulgarian occupation, to excercise a censorship over mails arriving at or leaving Cavalla. At the same time they stated that consular mail would be immune from all supervision or censorship.

The real reason no doubt is that the Bulgarians do not consider it necessary to await the end of the war before entering on the task of abolishing Capitulations and the privileges of foreigners, and the fact that many Bulgarian laws are now in force in this town and Bulgarian taxes collected both from natives and foreigners seems to confirm this.

The parties directly interested in the matter are of course Austria and France, but as all British mail for Cavalla arrives by Austrian post and as British postal matter has for the last month been accumulating in the Austrian mail bags, which remain on board the Austrian steamers plying between Salonica and Constantinople and have not been delivered, the postal dispute inconveniences British subjects as much as other foreigners.

The Bulgarian authorities are willing to receive the Austrian and French mail bags and to distribute their contents, but reserve to themselves the right to seize such letters as they may think desirable. This suggestion is not entertained by the other parties, who decline to hand over the mails to any but the local Austrian or French post-office.

Although three weeks have gone by since the closing of the post-offices, the Austrian and French Governments seem as yet to have accomplished nothing in the matter. However, it is desirable that a solution of the difficulty should be speedily found.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 250.

Joint Letter addressed to Acting Vice-Consul Morgan.

M. le Vice-Consul, *Cavalla, le* 15 *janvier*, 1913.

LES soussignés ont l'honneur d'attirer votre attention sur les dommages qu'ils subissent du chef de la non-distribution des courriers autrichiens et français depuis plus de quinze jours. Ce retard dans la prise de livraison des sacs postaux destinés à Cavalla se prolongeant, ils se voient obligés de faire leurs réserves quant aux dommages qu'ils pourraient subir de ce fait et vous prient de bien vouloir communiquer ce qui précède à qui de droit.

Les soussignés font le vœu que les autorités intéressées, tenant en considération les énormes préjudices que la prolongation de cet état de choses pourrait occasionner à tout le commerce en général de la place de Cavalla, prennent les mesures nécessaires afin que les plis arrivant par les susdits courriers soient distribués sans retard ultérieur.

Ils saisissent, &c.
(Suivent 34 signatures.)

[7279] No. 251.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 101.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 9, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 94 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting that the Bulgarian authorities in that district are collecting the taxes assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 251.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 4/10.)

Sir, *Cavalla, January* 31, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in spite of the fact that the local authorities have been advised by the consular representatives here that the revenues assigned to the Public Debt administration are under the protection of the Powers, and that they themselves have received orders from their own authorities to respect the Public Debt, Régie, &c., no steps have yet been taken by them to help the Public Debt officials in their task.

On the contrary, the Bulgarian authorities are collecting for themselves the taxes assigned to the Public Debt.

The local offices of the Public Debt have been opened, and the registers deposited at the Imperial Ottoman Bank and elsewhere have been handed over to the Public Debt officials. But seeing that they no longer collect any dues the offices might with equal advantage have remained closed.

In the matter of stamp dues the Bulgarian authorities have issued an order that all cheques, drafts, petitions, official papers and permits must bear Bulgarian stamps. In most cases the stamp duties are twice as heavy as in former times. There being no compulsion on anyone to use Public Debt stamps, these latter are naturally not affixed. The stamp fees are retained by the Bulgarian authorities.

Both Captain Doucof, the military governor of the town, and General Vulkof, military governor-general of Macedonia, who has been here on a short visit from Serres, while admitting that they had orders to respect the Public Debt administration, saw nothing inconsistent with this in the collection and retaining of stamp and other duties by the Bulgarian authorities. They both urged as a final argument the fact that it would not be appropriate that Bulgarian documents and petitions should bear Turkish stamps.

Again, in the matter of fishing dues, the Bulgarian harbour-master is willing to allow the Public Debt officials to issue permits to fish, but insists on collecting the fees himself.

The Public Debt interests are ignored again in the matter of the salt monopoly. As is known, no duties were collected on salt in the past but Public Debt dues. Customs duties are now collected on cargoes of salt arriving here from Salonica or Smyrna, in spite of the fact that Public Debt dues have already been paid on them. As a consequence merchants are planning to import salt from Greece, in which case only customs duties would be levied on it.

To sum up, the Bulgarian officials, while respecting the existence of the Public Debt administration, are bent on collecting in these districts as much money as they can, and in spite of orders issued by higher authorities—orders which would appear never to have been intended to be carried out—are helping themselves to the revenues of the Public Debt and anything else they can lay their hands on.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

FO 424/243 ALL WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

[7280] No. 252.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 102.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 8, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 92, Confidential, of the 5th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a provisional law on the right of requisition, which has been published in the local press.

The very wide powers for the seizure of practically everything in exchange for simple receipts, conferred by article 2 of this law, has evidently caused considerable alarm, for the "Turquie" hastens to-day to publish an explanatory article, which is evidently officially inspired. It states that the law refers only to requisitions such as are practised in all countries in a state of war, and that its sole aim is the requisition, in case of urgent need, of necessary objects which it would be difficult to obtain immediately by direct purchase. The article closes with the remark that "the law contemplates in fact a temporary subscription for the army, but a subscription which will be repaid after the war. There is therefore no cause for alarm." It remains to be seen whether this rather naïve description of the proposed seizures will satisfy the general public when the inevitable rise in prices occurs.

In the case of foreigners, this law, if really applied, will be likely to give rise to endless difficulties in connection with their rights under the Capitulations.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 252.

Extract from the "Turquie."

LE DROIT DE RÉQUISITION.

LE Gouvernement vient de publier une loi provisoire extrêmement importante réglant le droit de réquisition. Nous en donnons ci-après la traduction :

"Article 1er. Il appartient à l'autorité militaire de déterminer, le cas échéant, les localités où aura lieu la levée des impôts militaires de réquisition.

"Art. 2. Une commission spéciale sera formée dans les localités où la levée des impôts militaires sera décrétée. Cette commission sera composée de deux fonctionnaires de l'autorité civile et financière et d'un délégué de l'autorité militaire ou, à son défaut, du commandant de gendarmerie de l'endroit. Les conseils administratifs et municipal délèguent ; également un membre chacun.

"Cette commission laissera à la population la quantité d'objets suffisante à ses besoins et opérera la réquisition du reste contre reçus délivrés aux propriétaires.

"Art. 3. Le fonctionnaire civil le plus élevé en grade de la localité où le droit de réquisition est proclamé convoque sans retard une commission composée de membres des conseils administratif et municipal et de la Chambre de Commerce. Cette commission fixe des prix à tous les objets susceptibles d'être réquisitionnés en prenant pour base les cours du jour. Les listes de ces objets avec les prix en regard sont cachetées par les susdits membres et remises à l'autorité locale.

"Art. 4. Dans les reçus délivrés aux négociants et commerçants on devra faire mention du montant des objets réquisitionnés suivant les prix indiqués dans les listes.

"Art. 5. Cette loi est applicable à partir de la date de sa promulgation.

"Art. 6. Les Ministres de la Guerre, de l'Intérieur et des Finances sont chargés de l'exécution de la présente loi.

"J'ordonne que cette loi soit mise en vigueur à titre provisoire quitte à être soumise à la sanction des Chambres à leur rentrée.

"MEHMED RECHAD.

"Le Grand Vizir et le Ministre de la Guerre,
"MAHMOUD CHEVKET.

"Le Ministre de l'Intérieur,
"ADIL.

"Le Ministre des Finances,
"RIFAAT.

"*Le 24 safer*, 1331 (*17 janvier*, 1328)."

[7281] No. 253.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 104.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout reporting on local feeling regarding the fall of Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet.

A committee is now sitting in Constantinople to consider reforms in the administration of Asiatic Turkey on decentralising lines. Its convocation, however, perhaps naturally, does not inspire in non-Turkish elements any confidence that the Committee of Union and Progress, with its notorious policy of turkification of the last four years, is really determined radically to alter its methods on the lines desired by the Arabs, &c. Many, indeed, believe that its professions of adopting decentralisation are merely a bid for support until its position is strengthened, especially in view of the renewal of hostilities.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 253.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12. Confidential.)
Sir, *Beirout, January 20, 1913.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report that the news of the downfall of Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet and the return of the Unionists to power caused great surprise and widespread consternation, and the general impression seems to be that instead of peace there will be a continuation of the war with further losses to the Empire.

The former policy of the Unionist party having been unsympathetic towards the Arabs and against local reforms partaking of the nature of decentralisation, it is feared that the attempts to secure the measures alluded to in my despatch No. 8 of the 24th instant will not be favourably considered by the present Government.

There was not much sympathy towards the late Turkish Government, in all its difficulties, on the part of the Moslems of Syria, not to mention the ill-disguised exultation of the Christian population, and, with the return of the Unionist party, a recrudescence of separatist ideas may be expected.

In the town of Beirout the general feeling is that all hope of a betterment of their position must now be abandoned, and that the occupation of this region by a foreign Power is only a matter of time, and the continued presence of French and other foreign war-ships tends to strengthen this idea.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[7282] No. 254.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 105.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 9, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting on the taxes collected by the Bulgarian authorities.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Enclosure in No. 254.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 2/9.)
Sir, *Cavalla, January* 30, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that a number of Bulgarian taxes are now being levied in the towns in this district both on natives and on foreign subjects. The latter are inclined to resent the imposition of these new taxes on the ground that the country has not yet been officially annexed by Bulgaria or formally recognised as forming part of Bulgaria by the Powers, but at the same time have paid the taxes demanded to avoid trouble and stoppage of their business.

Among the new taxes are the Commercial Registration tax, increased stamp fees, and the 11 per cent. customs duty against goods from Salonica.

The first of these taxes is a graduated tax imposed on all merchants, shopkeepers, &c., and ranges from 20*l.* downwards. On payment of these fees a "patent" is delivered to the merchant, authorising him to transact business freely. All agents, travellers, &c., of the merchant must be provided with a power of attorney from him duly legalised at the town hall.

In the matter of the stamp fees an order has been issued that all cheques, drafts, &c., should bear Bulgarian stamps. The charges are about twice as much as in the past. No compulsion is put on anyone to buy Public Debt stamps, but Bulgarian stamps are compulsory. As a consequence only the latter are affixed.

The 11 per cent. duty on goods coming from Salonica is felt to be a hardship, as in many cases 11 per cent. duty has already been paid on such goods on their arrival from abroad in Salonica.

Further taxes are in preparation, such as municipal road taxes, taxes on tobacco, "manipulation" rooms, &c.

The fact that this part of the country not having yet been formally annexed, it seems hardly just to impose new taxes, and that in parts under Greek and Serbian occupation, such taxes seem not to have been imposed, has caused much discontent among merchants, but so far their protests, and consular protests, have been unavailing in the face of orders received by the local authorities from higher quarters.

If by chance Cavalla does not remain in Bulgarian hands it seems doubtful whether the amounts paid for such taxes will be refunded by the Bulgarian Government or whether the new authority will take into account the fact that such taxes have been paid.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[7283] No. 255.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 106.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February* 10, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem, reporting on public feeling with regard to the present political situation.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's agent and consul-general at Cairo.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 255.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Jerusalem, January* 29, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the news of the Young Turk *coup d'Etat* at Constantinople has been received here without enthusiasm, as the entire population, exhausted by the economic distress now prevailing, has long been desiring peace at any price without regard to its political consequences.

The committee organisation which had at no time any real support in local public opinion, broke up entirely on the advent to power of Kiamil Pasha. Very shortly afterwards the Unionist Club was closed, and the governor, Muhdi Bey, who, although professing patriotic Albanian sentiments, was nevertheless an ardent exponent of Young Turk chauvinism tempered by extreme deference to Zionist views, was dismissed, to the general satisfaction.

There is now, unfortunately, every prospect that Tahir Bey, the newly appointed Governor of Jerusalem, will be sacrificed to party jealousy, and I am informed that he has already volunteered his resignation, which is all the more to be regretted, as he had produced a favourable impression on the population by his engaging personality and by his knowledge of the Arabic language. There are also signs that the remaining members of the committee are preparing to assert themselves anew, notwithstanding the dislike which they have so richly deserved.

There is, however, no reason to apprehend anything in the nature of disturbances or of an active political agitation such as is said to be afoot in Syria, where I am told that a congress having as its object the presentation of a demand for a highly decentralised administration is being, or is about to be, held. It is also unlikely that, should any such movement lead to further developments in Syria, it will spread to Palestine, where, outside the comparatively insignificant Latin communities under French influence, the one desire of the population seems to be some sort of union with Egypt.

That this desire is shared by the Jewish element I have lately been assured by one of the most cultivated and zealous leaders of the Zionist movement here, who, in commenting upon a recent letter to the "Times" by Dr. Max Nordau, and also upon various editorial utterances of that and other English journals on the supposed pro-German and pro-Ottoman sympathies of the Jews in Palestine, declared with emphasis that they did not voice the opinions either of the responsible leaders or of the mass. He said that the Jews had at one period hoped for much from the Turks, and even after this hope had been abandoned, considerations of policy had naturally compelled them to continue wearing the mask of Ottoman patriotism. In the same way they had been obliged to work the Zionist movement through German Jews, these being the natural leaders of a Yiddish-speaking race; but they had always striven to secure the protection of the British flag for their institutions, being convinced that under no other auspices could they hope to attain their object, viz., the settlement of a Hebrew-speaking Jewish population in the land of their fathers.

I need hardly say that I have carefully abstained from doing or saying anything that might be interpreted as an encouragement of these ideas, and have, in fact, taken some pains to contradict the various rumours of impending occupation that have been current for the last six months. I may also remark that I have no reason to believe that any other Power has been working here to promote suspicion of British or Anglo-Egyptian designs, the prevailing opinion being that, in the event of Turkish rule ceasing to exist in this part of the Empire, the Power that holds Egypt and the Suez Canal would be compelled by force of circumstances to extend its authority to Palestine.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[7555] No. 256.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 25.)
Sir, *Belgrade, February* 10, 1913.

WITH reference to Sir R. Paget's despatch No. 17 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of despatches which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, reporting on the ill-feeling existing in his district between Serbs and Bulgars, also on the want of conciliatory spirit shown by the Servian authorities in the occupied territories.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 256.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Uskub, January 28, 1913.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 2, Confidential, of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to report that on Sunday last, the 26th, Neophyt, the Bulgar Metropolitan of Uskub, called on me. This prelate is accused by the Servians of Bulgar propagandism here, and I can well believe it; but it is rather a case of the cauldron calling the kettle black, as every Servian here seems diligently engaged on Servian propaganda.

I took the opportunity of asking for the exact facts about the Epiphany services, and understood that the Servians had offered to make a joint ceremony of the blessing of the waters, but that Neophyt refused on the ground that the first steps towards reunion must come from the Patriarchate and Exarchate, and not from two provincial Metropolitans. He appeared to have been somewhat offended at the orders of the Servian Metropolitan that divine service was to take place in all churches at a given time. "I, and not he, have the right to order when service shall take place in Exarchist churches."

He expressed his opinion that "there would be a fresh revolution," owing to the way in which the Servians were treating the Bulgars. I suggested that a more efficient Government would render impossible the band action so prevalent under the Turks. "What can they do when the whole people is against them?" The Bulgars will join hands with the Albanians." (An Albano-Bulgar *entente* would be no new thing. See my despatch No. 31, Confidential, of the 28th April, 1912, to Salonica.)

Before leaving, Neophyt gave me the three memoranda of which I have the honour to enclose copies. The first refers to Perlepe; the second to Uskub. I am not sure where the third refers to.

That same afternoon M. Ivan Popof, the Protestant pastor here, called on me. As I shall probably be quoting this gentleman frequently in the near future, I may say that, though I tend in general to regard the native Protestant with some suspicion, I am convinced of the sincerity and trustworthiness of M. Popof. The facts that he is a Bulgarian subject; that the bulk of his acquaintance here is Bulgar; and that the Servians have not been over-tolerant to native Protestants in Kossovo, would tend to render him somewhat Exarchist in sympathy, but I do not believe that he would either lie or exaggerate intentionally.

The story which he told me, and which he had heard from Pop Angelko himself, was as follows:—

"On Christmas Day (o.s.) Pop Angelko Daskalof held service in the Exarchist church of Nerez, a village close to Uskub. A member of the congregation, apparently a detator in Servian pay, informed the Government that he had told the congregation that 'by arrangement with the Crown Prince Alexander, Uskub was entirely Bulgar, and only the Government was Servian.' He was summoned to the prefecture here, and kept waiting for eleven days in the corridors before he was admitted to the presence of Prefect, M. Tscrovitch. The latter then used to him language which, in my humble opinion, no administrative official, however exalted, should use to any minister of religion, however schismatic. The priest was subsequently imprisoned, but released two days later."

I have, of course, no legal proof of the truth either of this story or of those contained in Neophyt's memoranda; but there is nothing in what I know of Servian character in general, or of that of M. Tscrovitch in particular, which would induce me to say that they were improbable. And, true or false, they are, beyond doubt, firmly believed by the Exarchist element here—a fact which would make the task of conciliation difficult for the Servians, even if they abandoned their present policy of conversion by the bayonet and the big stick.

I have, &c.

W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 256.

Memorandum communicated by Bulgar Metropolitan.

Disparition mystérieuse de l'Instituteur bulgare Athanas Lutvief de Perlépé.

LE soir du 4 décembre (v.s.), dans le café de Jordan Crabo, a eu lieu un banquet en l'honneur de la fête du Prince héritier de Serbie. Y ont été invités: soixante notables, tous les instituteurs et institutrices, des officiers, le préfet de la ville, Commandant Tihomir (?) Milijkovitj, major de l'infanterie du 6e bataillon de la division du Danube. Mon fils, Lutvief, Athanas, instituteur à Salonique, rentré le 2 décembre, y a été invité de la part du maire de la ville, M. Stéfo. Plusieurs personnes, environ 300, ont été présentes à ce banquet. De nombreux toasts ont été tenus. Mon fils en a aussi tenu un et il a dit à peu près ceci: "Vive le Roi Ferdinand! Vive l'armée bulgare!" Vive le Roi Pierre et l'armée serbe!" &c.

Vers 1 heure après minuit mon fils a été invité dans la cour du café et pris par trois gendarmes; il a été emmené par force dans l'école serbe; il a voulu crier, mais on l'a bâillonné. Le garçon du café qui était sorti chercher des cornemuseurs pour la fête et qui rentrait en ce moment a vu les gendarmes qui le traînaient. Il avertit le tenancier du café et celui-ci en fit de même à quelques invités, mais, de peur, personne n'a osé rien dire. Cinq minutes durant la porte a été barrée par un gendarme.

L'insurgé ("tchetnik") Traiko de Bonteké, qui a dormi cette même nuit dans l'école serbe, raconte l'avoir vu maltraiter par le chef de bande serbe. Mon fils a reçu cinquante coups de bâton. La bande est partit le lendemain pour Kouprili.

Le lendemain nous sommes allés le chercher et protester auprès du Gouvernement, mais nous n'avons reçu aucune réponse sur sa sort.

Le 6 décembre nous sommes allés nous plaindre à Monastir auprès de M. Nouchitch, mais là non plus nous n'avons rien obtenu.

Le 7 décembre un soldat serbe vendait le chapeau de mon fils; nous l'avons pris et porté au commandant, mais il n'a fait aucune recherche. Nous sommes de nouveau allés à Monastir, et là on nous a dit (sans garantie) qu'il était vivant dans la prison militaire à Uscub. Nous avons fait des démarches à Salonique, à Serrès, à Uscub, et à Pleume qu'il est toutes nos démarches n'ont donné aucun résultat.

(Récit de la mère de Athanas Lutvief.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 256.

Memorandum communicated by Bulgar Metropolitan.

LE 7 (20) janvier le nommé Dimé Yovtchef, d'Uscub, se trouvait à la gare au moment où les soldats grecs et arméniens de l'armée ottomane, faits prisonniers par l'armée serbe, étaient laissés libres pour s'en aller chez eux, tandis qu'aux soldats bulgares on disait qu'ils ne seraient pas laissés libres tant qu'ils ne se déclaraient pas être Serbes. Dimé Yovtchef fit remarquer aux soldats et officiers serbes que cela n'était pas juste, et pour cela il a été emmené au carracole de la gare, et de là, après avoir été questionné par un commissaire de police et accusé qu'il avait parlé contre l'armée et l'État serbe, il a été emmené à la prison centrale, où un caporal lui a donné deux gifles. Le lendemain il a été relâché, après avoir été interrogé par le commandant.

Le même jour le même fait s'est passé avec un jeune homme du quartier Karabag qui se trouvait à la gare et avait osé faire la même remarque.

Le 1er (14) janvier, vers 6 heures du soir, les jeunes gens Dimitché Steftchef et Petré Philipof, d'Uscub, ont été attaqués sans aucun prétexte par des bandits serbes. Ils ont eu les têtes atrocement mutilées. Des bandits serbes, armés jusqu'aux dents, se promènent dans la rue pour semer la terreur parmi la population.

Ordre a été donné par la préfecture de la ville que pour le recensement la population bulgare soit désignée comme serbe.

Ainsi les instituteurs Todor Christef, du village de Racotinsi, et Gheorghi Popvassilef, du village de Dobridol, près d'Uscub, secrétaires dans les communes desdits villages, ont été appelés par le préfet pour recevoir des instructions pour le recensement et autres. Il leur a été répété que si la population est présentée dans les listes comme étant bulgare, et non pas serbe, les listes seront retournées

FO 424/254 ALL WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE INFRINGE

Le 11 (24) janvier, Yovan Bogsef (?) et l'instituteur Christé Arsof, du village de Tchrechovo, près d'Uscub, ont été appelés par le préfet de la ville. Il leur a été demandé qui avait fait les listes de recensement, et quelle nationalité ils étaient, et qui leur avait dit de désigner la population comme étant bulgare. L'instituteur a répondu que comme secrétaire il avait dressé les listes suivant les indications des paysans. A cela le préfet lui dit, comment lui, qui savait qu'ils étaient délivrés par les Serbes, osait dire que la population était bulgare? Yovan Bogsef a été encore accusé d'avoir dit du mal contre les Serbes et l'État serbe. Il a répondu que c'étaient des calomnies. Il a été laissé libre, mais avec la menace de bien faire attention.

Enclosure 4 in No. 256.

Memorandum communicated by Bulgar Metropolitan.

LE 6 (19) janvier, vers midi, l'employé serbe Mano Coundouradji, un employé du poste de police, et un soldat sont entrés pour faire le recensement dans la maison de Tasse Petref, originaire de Debréi-bala (?). Après lui avoir demandé son nom et quand il a répondu qu'il se nommait Tasse Petref, et non Petrovitch, on lui a dit comment il osait s'appeler ainsi et qu'il en serait responsable auprès des autorités. Vers 2 heures de l'après-midi il a été appelé au poste de police Moladjir, et là avant toute question il a été giflé, battu à coups de poing sur la figure et à coups de pied d'une manière atroce. Après on l'a questionné et sommé de devenir Serbe. Dans ce but on lui promit de le nommer président du quartier, qu'il serait bien rémunéré et qu'il vivrait bien. On l'a averti que s'il osait raconter à qui que ce soit ce que venait de se passer pendant son arrestation dans ce poste, il serait sûrement supprimé sans que personne sache ce qu'il est devenu. A 7 heures du soir il a été relâché.

Enclosure 5 in No. 256.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Uskub, February* 3, 1913.

IN my despatch No. 14, Confidential, of the 12th December, 1912, I had the honour to express the opinion that "however well the higher commands may have succeeded in matters of strategy, they have failed signally in the not less important qualities required for the pacification and conciliation of a conquered country."

Recent experience has only served to confirm this my opinion. I have already had occasion to report (No. 8, Telegraphic, of the 17th January; No. 2, Confidential, of the 23rd January; No. 3, Confidential, of the 28th January) the Servian attitude towards the local Bulgar. I hope shortly, if my other manifold duties permit, to address to your Excellency another report on Albanian feeling, and propose to confine myself in this despatch to certain actions of Servian authority in Uskub.

My French colleague informs me that several dead horses have been interred in a Mahommedan cemetery, while in another cemetery, equally Mahommedan, close to the main bridge over the Vardar, latrine trenches have been dug, and the tombstones of the faithful are used to give the Servian soldier a surer foothold when poised on the edge.

Very shortly after the entry of the Servian troops, persons unknown, presumably native Christians, wantonly broke a great number of tombstones in a Moslem cemetery close to my house; and about a week ago the municipality, which is displaying generally commendable activity in the matter of street improvement, took a number of these fragments, which anyone could recognise at a glance, to use for mending the roads and making-up pavements.

My Italian colleague, in a private letter, drew M. Vuchkovitch's attention to this act of vandalism and sacrilege, and received in reply an assurance that the stones had already been collected and put back in the cemeteries; that they had been originally broken by children at play, and that it was the contractor to the municipality and not the municipality itself who had taken these, rather than get stone from the municipal quarry, in order to save a few francs. Unfortunately for this explanation it is evident to the meanest capacity that the original breaking of the stones was the work of grown men, and I have certain information that the municipality is working direct, and not through a contractor, on the paving and repair of the streets of the town.

The motives for this conduct are various; the average Servian military man seems incapable of realising that the feelings of the civil population must be taken into account or the State will sooner or later suffer; and the tombstone breakers and the mayor were presumably influenced by feelings of revenge against the religion which had dominated Kossovo for so long. But whatever the motives may have been, the effect on the Moslem population cannot be anything but unfavourable, and the fact that the higher commands have left these offences against religion unpunished makes them practically partners in guilt. They would, in my opinion, have consulted the interests of Servia by making a public example of the mayor, Spiro Effendi Hajiristitch.

I have, &c.

W. D. PECKHAM.

[7556] No. 257.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February* 10, 1913.

THE Servian delegates to the Peace Conference returned to Belgrade on the 3rd instant. M. Venizelos followed two days later and spent several hours here, in the course of which he was received in audience by King Peter, and was entertained at luncheon by M. Pasitch. Just before he left Belgrade M. Venizelos, whose intention it had been to return to Salonica, received a telegram from M. Gueshof pressing him with much insistance to come to Sophia, where King Ferdinand particularly wished to see him.

I might here mention that considerable soreness has been felt in Servian Government circles from the fact that neither M. Danef nor M. Theodorof deigned to stop in Belgrade for a few hours on their way through. It is possible that with a view to marking Servian resentment at this supposed slight the Bulgarian representative here was not invited to meet M. Venizelos at the luncheon given in the latter's honour.

It is very difficult to ascertain exactly what passed between M. Pasitch and M. Venizelos. From conversations, however, which I have had in usually well informed quarters, it would appear that the two Prime Ministers agreed that, in view of the grasping attitude of Bulgaria, it was to the common interest of Servia and Greece to draw closer together; that, however, the time had not arrived for coming to any separate agreement, and that until peace was concluded nothing should be done by them which might give rise to any suspicions or misinterpretation.

In the course of conversation with M. Novakovitch two days ago I alluded to the lead taken by M. Danef in the peace negotiations in London. His Excellency said that those negotiations had afforded the allies the opportunity of showing to the world how steadfastly they adhered to the mutual obligations, entered upon prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

In the course of further conversation M. Novakovitch raised an interesting point with regard to Scutari, to the effect that this fortress once in Montenegrin hands King Nicholas would consider possession nine points of the law, and would have to be turned out by force. (Under such circumstances it does not seem quite clear why the Servians should now have sent reinforcements to this theatre of operations).

This somewhat arbitrary theory as regards military occupation implying subsequent retention led me to enquire of M. Novakovitch whether Servia would apply the same principle to Monastir, Prilep, Ochrida, and other places which Bulgaria would claim in accordance with previous arrangements. To this he replied that when peace was concluded Bulgaria would have to recognise that the agreement concluded between the two countries before the war could not be considered altogether binding in view of the overwhelming successes of the allied armies, resulting in an acquisition of territory which far exceeded the most sanguine expectations. The alliance had been concluded for a common cause and not for the benefit of any individual ally. There was such a thing as balance of power in the Balkans, and a readjustment of frontiers such as would not give crushing superiority to any one of the allies would be an absolute necessity. Present Bulgarian demands would give that country an unduly preponderating influence in the Balkans.

The above opinion reflects the general feeling here, and it is therefore but natural that the uneasiness aroused by Bulgaria's insatiable attitude should be giving Servia and Greece just cause for alarm. There can be no doubt that force of circumstances

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is drawing these two countries closer together, but whether actual proposals were made, or plans for their future conduct sketched during M. Venizelos's visit, has not yet transpired.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[7300] No. 258.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 27.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February 11, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 23 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum which I handed in at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 4th instant at M. Stefanovitch's request, asking how the Servian authorities could justify the application of a "war contribution" in territories occupied by the Servian troops, and copy of the reply of the Servian Government defending their action on principles laid down in articles 43, 48, and 49 of the annex to the fourth Convention of The Hague second Peace Conference.

A list furnished by Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham of the articles upon which the "war contribution" is levied is herewith enclosed.

I have also the honour to transmit copy of a memorandum I presented to M. Stefanovitch yesterday morning on receipt of a complaint from Messrs. Fils de G. A. Errera and Co. (Limited), through His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, demanding the delivery of sugar which the local authorities had refused to clear at the same time as other goods belonging to that firm which had arrived at their destination before the application of the "war contribution."

M. Stefanovitch has told me that the Servian Government had been obliged to do something to protect themselves from the importation of goods on a scale out of all proportion to local requirements which was being carried on by certain firms; these goods were not only stored for a future period, but also easily smuggled from the occupied territories into Servia proper, as there was now no dividing line.

This was admitted to me by Errera's agent, who was here two days ago. He confessed to having cleared £T. 800 out of one consignment of matches, and allowed that large profits could still be made even under the rates of the "war contribution," save with regard to matches and cigarette-paper.

Although it in no way affects the point at issue, I may mention that I understand from Mr. Peckham that the capital of Messrs. Errera is little, if any, British, but they are registered as a British company; moreover, that the shortage of railway trucks at Ghevgheli, about which there had been complaints at Salonica, has not affected this firm, who apparently understand how to make a judicious use of "baksheesh."

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 258.

Memorandum communicated to Servian Government.

LA Légation d'Angleterre apprend que les autorités serbes établies sur le territoire occupé par les troupes serbes imposent depuis le 17/30 janvier une taxe de "trosharina," aussi appelée localement "contribution."

La Légation d'Angleterre a l'honneur de prier le Ministère Royal des Affaires Étrangères de l'informer comment les autorités peuvent justifier l'impôt d'une telle taxe.

Elle serait aussi désireuse de savoir quels objets sont frappés par cette taxe et son montant.

D'autre part, il paraît que des articles fabriqués en Turquie—tels que le papier à cigarettes fabriqué à Salonique par la Compagnie anglaise Mair de Batton—sont frappés de droits de douane à Ghevgheli. Il semble inutile d'observer que ceci n'est pas justifiable.

Légation d'Angleterre, Belgrade,
le 22 janvier (4 *février*), 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 258.

Memorandum communicated by Servian Government.

LE Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de répondre ce qui suit à la démarche faite par la Légation Royale d'Angleterre au sujet de l'introduction de la contribution de guerre dans les territoires occupés:—

D'après le droit international public l'occupant est obligé de rétablir et de faire régner l'ordre public dans les territoires occupés (l'article 43 de l'annexe à la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, convention signée par la Serbie).

Pour pouvoir s'acquitter de cette obligation, l'occupant a le droit:

1. De percevoir à son profit tous les revenus de l'État dont le territoire est occupé (l'article 48 de la convention de La Haye);
2. De prélever des contributions de guerre (article 49).

La perception des impôts existants dans les territoires occupés par l'armée serbe se fait avec beaucoup de difficultés en raison de la situation économique et administrative de ce pays.

C'est surtout le cas des impôts directs, dont le recouvrement suscite de très grandes difficultés à cause:

1. De l'indigence de la population imposée;
2. De l'organisation féodale turque; et
3. Aussi à cause des procédés de ce recouvrement: pour la perception de ces impôts on employait le système de la ferme ou bien on les percevait en nature.

Les mêmes difficultés surgissent à l'occasion de la perception de la plupart des contributions directes. Pour ces raisons la Serbie a renoncé à profiter de ces contributions.

En raison de cet état de choses, nous nous sommes vus contraints d'ordonner le prélèvement des contributions de guerre pour pouvoir faire face à nos obligations de l'article 43. Ne pouvant pas se servir de procédés de perception employés pour le recouvrement des impôts directs, et cela pour les mêmes raisons qui en ont empêché le prélèvement, nous avons décidé d'établir des contributions indirectes. Cette décision est fondée en droit, étant en conformité avec l'article 49 de la convention de La Haye, ainsi conçu:—

"Si en dehors des impôts, visés à l'article précédent, l'occupant prélève d'autres contributions en argent dans le territoire occupé, ce ne pourra être que pour les frais de l'armée ou de l'administration de ce territoire."

La convention ne défend pas le prélèvement des impôts sous la forme de contributions indirectes. Elle ne fait que prescrire l'emploi qui doit être fait de ces prélèvements.

Dans le choix des procédés à employer par la perception de ces contributions, nous avons été guidés par les principes suivants:

Il faut toujours s'efforcer d'établir les impôts qui seront le moins vivement ressentis par les contribuables, c'est-à-dire les impôts qui tiennent compte de la capacité financière et de la situation générale des citoyens. Seule la contribution indirecte sur les articles de consommation remplit toutes ces conditions. La consommation d'un contribuable est en rapport avec ses propres besoins: il peut la restreindre ou l'augmenter d'après sa situation économique. Par là il détermine sa part de contribution à payer.

La marchandise de provenance indigène en est exempte pour deux raisons: l'imposition de cette marchandise, comprenant les articles de première nécessité, aurait été très lourde pour la population déjà trop appauvrie sous le régime turc; en outre, la quantité relativement petite de cette marchandise produite est impropre, et incapable de fournir les sommes nécessaires à couvrir les frais de perception. Nous nous sommes décidés à imposer la marchandise de provenance étrangère.

Il y a deux procédés de recouvrement de cette contribution:

1. La marchandise pourra être frappée au moment de son introduction dans la circulation commerciale;

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2. Ou bien au moment de son entrée dans le territoire occupé.

Les difficultés techniques empêchent l'adoption du premier système. Le second est préférable, puisque avec lui on peut employer les anciens agents de perception.

La perception d'une contribution au moment de l'importation des articles imposés ne change pas la nature de cette contribution. La contribution de guerre a son fondement juridique dans l'article 49 de la convention de La Haye ; l'établissement des droits de douanes se justifie par l'article 48 de la même convention, quoique, en même temps, on les prélève indépendamment les unes des autres.

Belgrade, le 28 janvier (10 février), 1913.

Enclosure 3 in No. 258.

New Servian Tariff imposed January 31, 1913.

	Dinars, par 100 kilog.
Café	100·00
Sucre	50·00
Bonbons	300·00
Allumettes	125·00
Alcool	117·00
Cognac	50·00
Champagne	100·00
Huiles	20·00
Olives	10·00
Citrons	10·00
Papier à cigarettes	2850·00
Pétrole	5·65
Savons	30·00
Sel	17·50
Liqueurs	100·00
Cigares	800
Raisin sec	20·00
Bougies	18·00
Sardines en boîtes	30·00

Enclosure 4 in No. 258.

Memorandum communicated to Servian Government.

LA Légation d'Angleterre a l'honneur d'avoir recours aux bons offices du Ministère Royal des Affaires Etrangères dans le cas suivant :—

Trois wagons, Nos. 3,013, 1,627, 1,456, chargés de 80 sacs et 120 caisses de sucres et d'autres marchandises, appartenant à la compagnie anglaise C. A. Errera (Limited), sont arrivés à Uscub le 23 janvier (N.S.). Les marchandises contenues dans ces wagons ont été débarquées sans encombres à l'exception du sucre, sur lequel les autorités réclamaient les droits de "troscharina." Les intéressés naturellement refusèrent de payer ce droit, qui n'était pas légal en territoires occupés.

Or, il paraîtrait que les autorités serbes ont décidé d'appliquer depuis le 31 janvier (N.S. une taxe, dite "contribution de guerre," qui frappe, entre autres, le sucre.

Sans entrer dans la question de la légalité de l'application d'une telle taxe, au sujet de laquelle la Légation d'Angleterre réserve tous ses droits, il est évident que les marchandises arrivée avant cette date, et en particulier le sucre susmentionné, qui faisait parti du même envoi que d'autres articles qui ont été livrés, ne peuvent être frappés d'une taxe qui n'existait même pas lorsque les intéressés ont voulu obtenir livraison de leurs marchandises.

La Légation d'Angleterre a donc l'honneur de prier instamment le Ministère Royal de bien vouloir faire donner les ordres nécessaires pour l'admission du sucre en question libre de droits, soit "troscharina," soit "contribution de guerre."

Légation d'Angleterre, Belgrade,
le 26 janvier (8 février), 1913.

[8136] No. 259.

Note communicated by German Embassy, February 15, 1913.

(Translation.)

IN place of the troscharina (excise tax) previously introduced in the occupied districts and removed again as a result of diplomatic representations, the Servian military authorities have levied as a war tax since the 1st February a so-called contribution. This affects the principal articles of consumption such as sugar, alcohol, coffee, substitutes for coffee, tea, cigarettes, petroleum, cigarette-paper, and matches, and is of a prohibitive character. The scale varies between 30 and 100 fr. per 100 kilog., for example, tea 100 fr. per 100 kilog., sugar 30 fr. per 100 kilog.

The Imperial Minister at Belgrade has reported to the German Government that his British and Italian colleagues have, upon telegraphic instructions received from their Governments, lodged a protest against this new measure. He has been directed to join in the protest of his colleagues.

[7809] No. 260.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, February 15, 1913.

Résumé d'une conversation entre le Grand Vizir et l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople, le 13 février, 1913.

MAHMOUD CHEFKET PACHA s'est plaint d'être traité par les Grandes Puissances plus rigoureusement que ses prédécesseurs ; il prétend mériter leur appui.

M. Bompard lui a fait remarquer que la note collective des Puissances contenait un avertissement pour le cas où leurs conseils ne seraient pas suivis et il lui a demandé pourquoi il avait subordonné le mandat qu'il offrait à l'Europe à la réserve que la note responsive de la Sublime Porte serait prise comme base expresse des conditions de la paix.

"Les conditions dans lesquelles j'ai pris le pouvoir," a répondu Mahmoud Chefket, "m'imposaient cette réserve ; mais les Puissances sont libres de la décliner. Seulement si elles la déclinaient en proposant comme base leur note collective, je me verrais à mon tour dans l'obligation de la refuser, puisque c'est l'acceptation de la note collective qui a déterminé la chute du précédent Cabinet."

"Pourriez-vous agréer," a dit M. Bompard, "une combinaison, qui tracerait la frontière turco-bulgare au sud d'Andrinople, cette ville recevant un régime spécial ?"

"Oui," a répondu le Grand Vizir, "j'admettrais qu'Andrinople fut enclavée dans le territoire bulgare ; Andrinople pourrait être neutralisée comme le suggère Sir Edward Grey. Mais cette combinaison, quelle qu'elle soit, doit être proposée par les Puissances et non par moi, qui suis lié par ma note du 30 janvier. Ne faites donc pas état de ma confidence."

De cette conversation, M. Bompard conclut que le Grand Vizir est disposé à conclure la paix et résigne aux sacrifices nécessaires à cet effet. Il demande qu'on voile de quelque manière la perte d'Andrinople.

M. Bompard ajoute encore que l'accord ne se réalisera que si les discussions avec Hakki et Tewfik Pachas sont menées rapidement et confidentiellement ; car il faudrait mettre l'opinion turque en face d'un fait accompli.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 15 février, 1913.

[7412] No. 261.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.

(No. 89.) *Constantinople, February 15*, 1913.
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

"ZEALANDIA" arrived here this morning.

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[7431] No. 262.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February 15, 1913.*

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 24 of 31st January.

I learn that Servia is sending Bulgaria a reinforcement of heavy artillery, consisting of guns, howitzers, and mortars, together with necessary personnel. Included in above are the new French guns recently delivered at Saloniea. It appears that no compensation has, for the present, been asked of Bulgaria for this assistance. The question will come up later on, when the Bulgarians make a request for more troops, which, I understand, they will be obliged to do.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[7445] No. 263.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, February 15, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has told French Ambassador that he has information that fall of Scutari is imminent, and he is much preoccupied fearing that accomplished fact will, on the one hand, make Russia intractable, and, on the other hand, lead to Austrian intervention to prevent its annexation to Montenegro.

[7438] No. 264.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 15, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 24 of 1st February: Ottoman Public Debt.

My French and German colleagues have received copy of arrangement which they state that it is proposed to make with the Balkan Powers respecting the future administration of this Debt, and which they are instructed to present at Sophia.

My French colleague is anxious to know whether he is to act with me, as he has been informed from Paris that I am to be instructed in the same sense.

[7439] No. 265.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 15, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

I have carried out instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 38 of 13th February. Prime Minister is personally inclined to mediation, but is meeting with much opposition.

Both my Russian and French colleagues called on him yesterday and expressed hope that Bulgaria would in the interests of peace make the best offer she possibly could to Roumania; I had spoken previously in the same sense.

This morning, at the urgent request of my Russian colleague, I met him and French Minister at the French Legation. Russian Minister informed us that he received a visit last night from M. Danef and that the latter had shown himself quite obdurate as regards making any further proposal to satisfy Roumania than that which he had made in London. My Russian colleague had, he said, spoken to him for an hour, but in vain, and had ended by informing him that he was in

no sense a negotiator, and he could not understand why he had put himself forward in that capacity. Russian Minister had then seen the King's "chef de cabinet" and had asked him to inform His Majesty that if the Bulgarian Government did not make some further offer at the meeting which is to take place this afternoon a rupture of the negotiations would most certainly occur. We all three agreed that M. Danef is working entirely for his own hand as President of the Sobranjé and chief of an important political party. Russian Minister then suggested that in view of the critical situation he should write as soon as possible unofficial letter to the Prime Minister pointing out the gravity of the situation and expressing the earnest hope that the Bulgarian Government would make a further offer to the Roumanian Minister, including at least extension of territory on Black Sea littoral up to and including Shabla, lying north of Kavarna, together with Medjid Tabia.

He added in the note that the above offer would meet with the approval of the Russian Government, presenting as it did an opportunity for further negotiations; and that if the Bulgarian Government remained entirely obdurate they would to a large extent forfeit the support in this question of the Russian Government and of the other Governments now well disposed towards them.

My French colleague and I have both approved, in view of urgency of the matter, contents of Russian Minister's letter, offering as it does a slight hope of peaceful conclusion of the negotiations.

I trust that my action in this matter will meet with your approval. I understand that my Russian colleague purposes attempting on his own account to persuade M. Danef to resign in favour of another delegate.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[7433] No. 266.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 15, 1913.*

I UNDERSTAND from the Russian Minister that on his recommendation Russian Minister at Sophia has been instructed to press the Bulgarian Government to offer a frontier from Silistria to Shabla, including former town. The Russian Minister, in making his recommendation, suggested to his Government, as an alternative which the Roumanian Government might be induced to accept, a line not including Silistria, but reaching to Kalakria, the question of the town of Silistria being left for subsequent discussion.

The Austrian Minister, whom I have just seen, tells me that he has throughout exerted his influence here in favour of moderation, but that in consequence of the pressure of the war party in the Cabinet, who are at one with the Liberals in their insistance on the acquisition of Silistria, he sees little chance of shaking the Government's determination to make of Silistria a *sine quâ non*. I understand after seeing the Russian Minister yesterday that he telegraphed recommending his Government to urge Bulgaria to cede that town.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[7355] No. 267.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Canea, Crete, February 15, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 14th February.

Yesterday afternoon, by order of the Governor-General, the Greek flag was hoisted on Suda Bay Island.

(Sent to Athens.)

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[7687] No. 268.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1913.

I COMMUNICATED to German, Austrian, and Italian Ambassadors privately, but for information of their Governments, the line that Russia would accept. Austrian Ambassador was very much disappointed, and dwelt especially on the fact that Russian line excludedTarabosh, plain of Luma, and both Djakova and Dibra from Albania.

On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that Russian line does for the first time admit giving town of Scutari to Albania; that this when known is sure to cause an outcry and severe criticism in Russia of Russian Government and even of Emperor; and that, if following upon this Servia loses both Djakova and Dibra, the situation of Russian Government will be impossible.

I observe that both at Djakova and Dibra the Russian line comes very close to the Austrian, so that it is merely a question of the towns, not of any great extent of territory. The difficulty is that the towns, whatever their intrinsic value, have become centres of controversy, and Russia, being known to have accepted Austrian solution of Adriatic port, having further to face abandonment of Scutari, must have some concession on points remaining.

My impression is that if towns of Djakova and Dibra could be conceded Russia could be induced to give way about Tarabosh and plain of Luma.

I am impressing on Russian Government that as soon as Austrian criticisms on Russian line are received there must be no delay in bringing negotiations to a conclusion. I still hope that on lines indicated above an agreement may be reached, but, if not, I can see nothing for it but an international commission d'enquête to report on the facts, ethnographical, geographical, &c., of points in dispute.

The more I see of this controversy the more difficult it seems without expert and local information to say what on the merits would be the best frontier of Albania, but the more I feel also that it is unreasonable and intolerable that any Great Powers, even those most directly concerned, should be involved in war over the points in dispute.

The question of an Adriatic port did involve some important strategic considerations for Austria; the town of Scutari is perhaps essential to an autonomous Albania, but I cannot believe that the towns of Djakova and Dibra have the same importance.

We have now reached a difficult place in the negotiations, but it comprises the only remaining difficulties about Albania that are likely to be critical; it is therefore worth while to make every effort to find a way through, and I am especially anxious to maintain the friendly co-operation with Germany for this purpose.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[7211] No. 269.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.[*]

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1913.

MR. WRATISLAW'S telegram No. 6 of 14th February: Turkish flag at Suda Bay.

Ask Government to which you are accredited whether they think it necessary to make reserves at Athens.

(Repeated to Canea, No. 5, and Athens, No. 20.)

[7688] No. 270.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic. *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1913.

MY telegram No. 136 of 14th February to Sir G. Buchanan.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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[*] Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 135) and Sir R. Rodd (No. 60).

[7216] No. 271.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 88 of 14th February.

It is desirable that Treasury should be in possession of Sir A. Block's views by Monday. You should therefore ask him for concise statement of his views on points in question, in order that you may telegraph it verbatim. He should deal with each point raised in my telegram No. 91 of 13th February.

[7686] No. 272.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1913.

THERE is a tendency to reproach us with delay in negotiations about Albanian frontier, the impression being that they have been deliberately delayed in hope of seeing Scutari taken. I do notthink fall of Scutari would ease the situation; it would, probably make the Austrians more difficult; and, as soon as Austrian criticisms on Russian line are received, there should be no delay in replying.

There will be much force in Austrian objections about Tarabosh and plain of Luma and I should hope that, if Austria could be inducedto give way about towns of Djakova and Dibra, Russia would agree on the other points.

[7688] No. 273.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 15, 1913.

I HAVE communicated privately to Austrian, German, and Italian Ambassadors the line proposed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs for Albanian frontier. This was the procedure desired by Russian Ambassador.

Austrian Ambassador expressed greatest disappointment that Russian line differed so widely from last Austrian proposal, which, he reaffirmed, was put forward as making greatest concessions that Austria could yield on frontier originally proposed by her. I was pressed to say whether the line now put forward was Russia's last word. I said I could not be the medium for saying it was the last word, but it was the utmost I had been able to ascertain that Russia would concede, and that I regarded it as impossible that Russia should give way on all three points of Scutari, Djakova, and Dibra.

I foresee that the strongest objection will be taken to giving Tarabosh to Montenegro, as it dominates town of Scutari, which, it is said, cannot be held apart from Tarabosh. There will also be great objection to excluding plain of Luma from Albania.

My personal impression is that Austria will be ready to concede Djakova or Dibra, but not both towns (though I am urging on German Government that both should be conceded), and that Austria will insist on Tarabosh and Suma being included in Albania.

I have said to three Ambassadors that there appear to me to be only two courses left: either to find some compromise between Russian line now proposed and the Austrian line, which was said to be Austria's last word, but on which, I think, she would concede either Djakova or Dibra; or else to propose an international commission d'enquête. Austrian and Italian Ambassadors are not favourable to a commission, saying that it would involve delay and lead to massacres, but I have said that if deadlock occurs I shall propose a commi-sion.

Austrian Ambassador agreed to refer the Russian line to his Government, though he said it was impossible they should accept it. I urged that they should not simply say the line was impossible, but should state their criticisms upon it. I would pass these on to Russian Ambassador, but hoped they would be as few as possible.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 77.)

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[7755] No. 274.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.**

(No. 59.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 15, 1913.*

SIR A. NICOLSON communicated to the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Italian Ambassadors the proposed reply to the Turkish note, modified in accordance with the information received by M. Cambon from Constantinople. I transmit to you herewith a copy of the draft reply in question, which the Ambassadors telegraphed to their respective Governments. Sir A. Nicolson did not tell the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors the source of our information from Constantinople, M. Cambon not having authorised him to do so. The Italian and Russian Ambassadors had been informed by M. Cambon.

Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that he had been desired by me to see his Highness and to explain that the Powers were examining with "'empressement' and the closest attention" the reply to be made to the Turkish responsive note. The Powers had not yet come to a final decision as to the reply, but it would probably state that the Turkish responsive note could not be taken as a basis; but that if the Ottoman Government wished to accept the advice of the Powers, the latter would be able to communicate with the allies with a view of bringing about peace. Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha not to take what he had said as an answer; but he wished to let his Highness know that the communication of the Turkish Government had by no means been forgotten and was being taken into serious consideration, and that he had given merely an outline of what the reply of the Powers might possibly be.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 274.

Draft Reply to Turkish Note.

LES Puissances ne peuvent rien faire sur la base de la note responsive de la Porte. Si elle se montre disposée à accepter leurs avis, les Puissances se mettront en communication avec les alliés dans le but d'arriver à la paix.

[7443] No. 275.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, February 15, 1913.*

THE following is confidential:—

In conversation with Lord Granville to-night, the Emperor stated that Prince Carol of Roumania had just received a telegram from his mother, the Crown Princess of Roumania, to the effect that the order for mobilisation might be given at any moment, as the situation was most critical. In accordance with His Majesty's instructions, a telegram has been sent counselling prudence at Bucharest, and a telegram has also been sent to St. Petersburgh pointing out that the only remaining hope for the maintenance of peace is to let the Balkan States fight it out among themselves, and begging the Russian Government to remain neutral in the event of a war between Bulgaria and Roumania.

Instructions have further been sent to the German Ambassador in London to beg you to do your utmost in the same direction with a view to averting a European war.

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 33), Sir E. Goschen (No. 71), Sir R. Rodd (No. 56), Sir F. Bertie (No. 148), dated 15th February; No. 849.

[7440] No. 276.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 15, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

My telegram No. 63 of to-day.

I gather that, at meeting of delegates just concluded, Bulgarian Government made an offer in writing to agree to a rectification of the frontier, to cede portion of Black Sea littoral with hinterland north of Shabla, together with Medji Tabia.

Roumanian Minister tells me that Bulgarian delegates gave him to understand that this was the last offer of their Government. He states that he is submitting it to Bucharest, and will await further instructions. He tells me that he does not think that offer will be accepted, as it is practically the same as was made previously in London.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[7441] No. 277.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 16, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 47 of 7th February.

I am continuing with my French colleague to urge Bulgarian Government, unofficially, to grant permission for consuls and foreign communities in Adrianople to leave the town.

Bulgarian Government are now taking steps to find out number of foreigners who wish to leave, and there seems to be hope that military authorities will allow their departure.

They have facilitated my communicating direct with His Majesty's consul.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[7434] No. 278.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 16, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 28 of 12th February.

The King remarked to me yesterday that the Roumanian Minister had never once been invited to attend Ambassadors' meetings. I informed His Majesty of the substance of your telegram No. 10 of 13th February, and he replied that he understood from the press that the limits of Albania had been already under discussion, and this question interested Roumania because of the Kutzo Vlachs.

[7435] No. 279.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 16, 1913.*

IT is rumoured here that two Servian divisions are being sent to Varna.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

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[7436] No. 280.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 16, 1913.*

AT an audience with which I was honoured by King Charles last night, His Majesty spoke in strong terms regarding the conduct of M. Danef throughout negotiations. He described him as occult, tricky, and obdurate.

His Majesty alluded to the publicity given to Roumanian demands by Bulgaria. This had roused Roumanian national sentiment, and had made acceptance of a more modest cession of territory now difficult. His Majesty said that Conservative section of the Cabinet, with the exception of the Prime Minister, were even more warlike than the Liberals.

His Majesty spoke of the ingratitude of Bulgaria, who owed so much to Roumania in the past.

(Sent to Sophia and Constantinople.)

[7430] No. 281.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 16, 1913.*

AGENCE ottomane (official agency) to-day announces that commander of British cruiser at Canea has, in the name of the Powers, hauled down all flags, including Ottoman, and that Hellenic flag has been hoisted in their stead.

If this is not true I would be inclined, with your sanction, to have it contradicted through the same agency?

Your telegram No. 2 of 11th January to Canea.

Would it not be possible, in the absence of ship, that local authorities should guarantee respect for Ottoman emblem until international status of the island is finally settled?

(Sent to Canea.)

[7432] No. 282.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 16.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February 16, 1913.*

FOLLOWING received from Monastir, dated to-day, No. 5:—

"Second regiment of the independent Morava brigade, about 4,000 strong, arrived here from Uskub on 14th February with two mountain batteries, four machine guns, and a squadron of cavalry. It has left for Elbassan. I am informed that about 2,000 Turkish troops with considerable numbers of Albanian irregulars are between Berat and Elbassan."

[7439] No. 283.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February, 16, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 63 and 64 of 15th February.

Your action approved. Continue to urge moderation and prudence.

[7443] No. 284.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 16, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 14 of 16th February to Sir G. Barclay.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[7439] No. 285.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 16, 1913.*

SIR H. BAX-IRONSIDE'S telegrams Nos. 63 and 64 of 15th February and my telegram No. 41 of 16th February to him.

Inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, and ask that similar instructions be sent.

[7443] No. 286.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 16, 1913.*

SIR E. GOSCHEN'S telegram No. 38 of 15th February.

You should, in conjunction with your colleagues, take any steps which you think desirable in view of counselling prudence and patience to Roumanian Government.

[7443] No. 287.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.†

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 16, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 14 of 16th February to Sir G. Barclay.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and ask that similar instructions be sent.

[7503] No. 288.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, February 6, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, on receipt of your telegram No. 23, stating that it had always been understood that Bulgaria, while claiming the cession of the town of Adrianople, would give Turkey conditions, especially such as would safeguard her prestige and give satisfaction to her susceptibilities regarding the tombs and mosques, I immediately called on my French colleague, and asked him if he had received any communication in the sense of your telegram. His Excellency informed me he had received no instructions as yet.

This occurred on Sunday, the 2nd instant, and I considered it, therefore, advisable to wait till the following day before sounding my other colleagues.

On Monday morning the German Minister called upon me and stated that he had been instructed to speak to the Bulgarian Government in the same sense as myself. M. de Below asked me what I intended to do, and if I proposed calling at once on the Prime Minister. He added that the Italian Minister had received instructions in the same sense, namely, to point out that the reply of the Porte to the collective note was a

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 86), Sir R. Rodd (No. 68), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 145), and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 91).

† Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 82), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 57), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 64).

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step in advance, that seemed to provide an opportunity for Bulgaria to state at once to Turkey the conditions that she would be prepared to concede respecting Adrianople.

I decided to make representations with M. de Below on the same day. I therefore called on M. Gueshof and prefaced my conversation by asking him if he had any news of interest to give me. His Excellency told me that he had received a visit on Saturday, the 1st instant, from the Russian Minister; that M. Nekludof had informed him that, acting in accordance with instructions which he had received from M. Sazonof, he wished to point out that the Russian Government considered that the present was an excellent opportunity for the Bulgarian Government to make a fresh offer respecting the cession of Adrianople; that they thought that a "naib," or "commissaire," could be appointed to guard the sanctuaries, and that Bulgarian consent to such an appointment would tend to smooth Ottoman susceptibilities. The Russian Minister had added that the plan emanated entirely from St. Petersburgh, and that he trusted the Bulgarian Government would see their way to accepting the Russian suggestion, stating further that he had been instructed to press for an immediate reply.

M. Gueshof then told me that the Cabinet had met the same evening, *i.e.*, on the evening of the 1st instant, the very day on which the meeting of the Ambassadors had taken place in London, and the Government had agreed to the suggestion put forward by M. Nekludof, on the conditions mentioned in my telegram No. 36 of the 3rd instant, namely, "a boundary well known to the Powers," a war indemnity, and the immediate conclusion of peace.

I thereupon stated to his Excellency that one of my objects in calling upon him was to make a suggestion of a similar description, that I was acting not as an individual foreign Minister, but in conjunction with my colleagues, several of whom, as his Excellency was aware, had already received instructions in a similar sense. As the Bulgarian Government had, however, already acted on the suggestion of the Russian Minister made two days previously, our representations had, I feared, come somewhat late. M. Gueshof replied that this was certainly the case, but that he believed that, in this particular case, my Russian colleague had acted in accordance with instructions received from his Government.

The German and Italian Ministers saw M. Gueshof directly after me. All my other colleagues subsequently carried out their instructions in this sense, with the exception of M. Nekludof, who continues to adhere to his statement that his instructions contained no reference to any joint action based on the decision arrived at by the council of Ambassadors in London, but had been decided upon separately and at an earlier date in St. Petersburgh.

Shortly after my visit to the Prime Minister, M. Nekludof called at His Majesty's Legation and explained at considerable length the reasons for his action in this matter. The point that his Excellency especially insisted on was that the suggestion to appoint a "naib" had originally emanated from St. Petersburgh. Although M. Nekludof endeavoured to make his position clear he was somewhat embarrassed, and he evidently felt that his explanations did not carry much weight.

The above is only a further instance of the difficulty which has always existed in Sophia of inducing any Russian Minister to act in concert with his colleagues.

They have always regarded Bulgaria as the child of Russia, and have endeavoured to create a special position for themselves, thus causing discontent amongst many of the foreign representatives without at the same time succeeding in ingratiating themselves with the Bulgarian Government.

I have, &c.
H. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[7546] No. 289.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, February 8, 1913.*

IN the course of last month the Vienna Correspondence Bureau announced that the Montenegrin delegates to the Peace Conference had handed to you a memorandum in support of the Montenegrin claims to the possession of Scutari. In answer to enquiries here it was officially stated that the document had been drawn up by the delegates in London and that the text was not in the possession of the authorities at Cettinjé. In view of the usual practice of the King to keep foreign affairs entirely in

his own hands and his habitual reluctance to leave any discretion in such matters to others, this reply of the Foreign Office appeared strange.

On receipt of the "Times," containing extracts from the memorandum, it appeared to me to be necessary to inform you that I could not confirm the impression which the memoradum sought to convey to you with regard to the attitude of the Albanian population in question. So far from assisting the Montenegrins in the operations against Scutari the Malissor tribesmen withdrew from the Montenegrin forces in the course of last November and since then have maintained an attitude of neutrality as regards the seige. Reports, for which I cannot obtain confirmation, were current last month at Podgoritza that a meeting had been held at which the tribesmen, with the exception of the Gruda, under Sokol Batchi, who for years has been a pensioner of King Nicholas, decided to take no further common action with the Montenegrins. On the other hand, an announcement has been made in the Cettinski Vjesnik that the chiefs of the Malissors have waited on the King at the camp at Gruda, assuring him that they will share good and evil fortune with Montenegro, from which no one shall separate them, and that to their regret their name has been used abroad in support of action against Montenegro, a country which they regard as their own, its King being their Sovereign.

For the moment I have no independent confirmation of either of these conflicting accounts. The truth of the latter appears to me to be improbable. As regards the Albanian population of Montenegro, there is considerable discontent at the action of the Montenegrin Government in forbidding the teaching of the Albanian language in the Government schools, even in Albanian districts, and preventing the Albanians from providing any instruction in it at their own expense. The Albanian Catholic clergy complain, moreover, of such vexations as the prohibition to allow the funerals of their parishioners to be conducted except by the clergy of the Orthodox National Church.

The Russian Minister informed me confidentially that he has been desired by Count Benckendorff to ascertain on what occasion the tribes and the population of Scutari has, as stated in the memorandum, asked for Montenegrin protection. ("Dans une adresse collective à Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro, les chefs des tribus Malissores . . . . . la population de Scutari, par la voix de l'archevêque catholique de la ville, demandèrent en des termes emphatiques l'aide et la protection du Monténégro.") A promise was given that the required proof would be shown to him forthwith, but on the following day he was told that the document in question could not be found. M. de Giers added in strict confidence that he was disgusted at the methods to which, as he had found since his arrival here, the King was ready to resort.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

[7609] No. 290.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 1. Commercial.)
Sir, *Monastir, February 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that an 11 per cent. *ad valorem* custom duty has been imposed at Monastir railway station on all merchandise imported from Salonica, and that certain goods are subject, in addition, to octroi charges per 100 kilog. as follows:—

	Fr.
Alcohol	117
*Cigarette Paper	281
Chocolate and Extracts ("Dérivatifs") of Chocolate	30
Coffee	100
Coffee Extracts ("Dérivatifs")	20
Choice Wines ("Vins fins"), Champagne, Malaga, Cyprus	200
Cognac	200
Liqueurs, Rum, Essences of Spirit ("Essences spiritueuses")	100
*Matches	150
Oils (Olive, Cotton-seed, Sesame)	20
*Petroleum	34 00
*Salt	10 00
Sugar	40

* This is a monopoly in Servia.

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None of the foregoing items are imported from the United Kingdom.

Alcohol, salt, wines, and liqueurs hitherto have contributed to the revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt.

The charges on sugar, alcohol, and petroleum mainly affect Austrian and Russian trade.

These dues have been imposed although no agreement as regards goods in transit has yet been arrived at between the Servian and Greek authorities, so that all merchandise destined for Monastir at present pays custom duty both at Salonica and here, in each case 11 per cent. *ad valorem*.

Hitherto the cost to consignees of imports delivered here has been c.i.f. Salonica + 11 per cent. *ad valorem* Salonica custom duty + 2 per cent. *ad valorem* incidental expenses at Salonica + 2 per cent. *ad valorem* for transport thence to Monastir, that is to say, in all, c.i.f. Salonica + 15 per cent. *ad valorem*. To this is now added the Monastir custom duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* + 1 per cent. incidental costs, that is to say an additional 12 per cent. in all cases, whilst in the cases before enumerated there is the further burden of a heavy octroi.

The moment is ill-chosen for this imposition. The double custom duty can only be temporary, but it falls upon a population beggared by famine prices, and upon a surly mercantile community crippled by more than five months of commercial stagnation and faced with a most uncertain future, whilst no compensating advantages or sources of increased prosperity have as yet been opened up by the new authorities.

The harshness of the ill-considered measure is equalled by the utter inadequacy of existing facilities for its execution. There are at the Monastir railway station no custom-house, no sheds, very scanty sidings, and no trained officials. More than sixty truck-loads of goods are already standing in the open, the consignees abstaining from taking possession. The sidings are full.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

17504. No. 291.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 15. Secret.)

Sir, *Sophia, February 9, 1913.*

IN my telegram No. 25, Secret, of the 26th ultimo, I had the honour to state that, in my opinion, the Servian Government would probably not be prepared to give their further unconditional aid to the Bulgarian Government in the event of the resumption of hostilities beyond that already extended by the presence of 50,000 Servian troops at Adrianople.

At the risk of reiteration, I would again point out (*c.f.* my despatch No. 5 of the 6th January) that as long as Servian aspirations remain unsatisfied, and they are far from being fulfilled at present, South-Eastern Europe will remain in a turmoil, and the risk of a European war will always have to be considered.

When peace is concluded Bulgaria and Greece will both have gained large accessions of territory, in both cases more than they anticipated previous to the outbreak of hostilities, and the only important question remaining over for settlement between them will be the possession of Salonica.

Servia, on the other hand, who has been perhaps the most uniformly successful of the allies in her military operations, will find herself deprived, not only of the triangle of Old Servia, which comprises the towns of Kuprulu, Perlepe, and Monastir together with Dibra, and certain territory which it appears probable will be annexed to Northern Albania, but she will have failed in one of her most cherished objects, viz., the possession of the Adriatic Littoral.

A realisation of the status and political importance of the Servian kingdom is essential to the full comprehension of the Balkan situation. Servia stands out as the first bulwark of Slavdom in the West; as such she has always received, to some extent, at least, the support of Russia against Austrian expansion; the Serbs, unlike the Bulgars, are a purely Slavonic race; the aggrandisement of Servia can cause Russia no jealousy; her existence and prosperity are essential to the prestige of the Great Power. If Russia fails to support Servia, in any international crisis she will lose her position as champion of the Slav cause, and her very status as a European Great Power will be threatened.

Dangerous to the Imperial House as have been the social revolutions with which

Russia has been able to cope successfully in the past, these are of minor importance in comparison with the overwhelming force of a revolution based on national and Pan-Slav ideals. Were the Emperor and his Government to find themselves suddenly in opposition to a movment of this nature they would most certainly be swept away.

These facts are fully realised by the Servian Government, who are thoroughly convinced that in times of great crisis they may rely on this support, which Russia would not dare to refuse to them.

Should this conviction prove to be unfounded, nothing would remain for Servia to do except to submit, as a last resource, to incorporation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The importance that necessarily attaches, therefore, to the aims and aspirations of Servia becomes evident. It can hardly be said that the attitude adopted by the Powers in the present negotiations has been such as is calculated to give satisfaction to these aims. The country remains thoroughly discontented, and hence the many thorny questions that are still left over for settlement by Europe.

I have ventured to enter somewhat into detail regarding the general situation in order to give force to certain facts which I have been able to learn as regards the present Servian policy in connection with Bulgaria

The Servian Minister called on M. Gueshof on his return from a visit to Belgrade, and laid the situation from the Servian point of view fully before him.

Instead of attempting to bargain for certain territorial concessions in return for further active aid, M. Spalaikovitch informed the Prime Minister that, directly after the conclusion of peace, the Servian Government, acting in accordance with the treaty of alliance, would look to the Bulgarian Government for immediate aid and assistance to the extent of at least 200,000 men. The Prime Minister, who was naturally somewhat taken aback at this request, asked for further details, whereupon the Servian Minister replied: "We are so dissatisfied with the present situation, and with the manner in which we have been treated, that we do not intend to evacuate any of the territory now occupied by the Servian troops except the small portion including Kuprulu, Perlepe, and Monastir, a portion of Old Servia, which we promised to you. We know that this action will cause much discontent and dissatisfaction, and may even lead to a war with Austria, and, therefore, we now appeal to you as our friend and ally to help us." The Servian Minister added that, under extreme pressure, they might perhaps evacuate the town of Durazzo.

The Prime Minister replied that the Servian Government might rely on the support of the Bulgarian Government as her ally under all circumstances: on being asked, however, to state this categorically in writing his Excellency said that he must first consult the King and M. Teodorof and Danef. Here the matter ends for the time being as far as M. Gueshof is concerned, although I have reason to believe that his Excellency will secretly consult the Russian Government before giving his reply.

The Servian Government are fully convinced that the Bulgarian Government will return an evasive answer, as it is extremely unlikely that in her present exhausted condition she could contemplate with equanimity the renewal of hostilities with a fresh foe, much less with a great Power like Austria. If the reply is in the negative the Servian Government intend to inform Bulgaria that as she does not see her way to carrying out the terms of the treaty Servia in her turn will have to ask her to cede the portion of Old Servia mentioned above, and if Bulgaria refuses she will, while still remaining in occupation of the disputed territory, offer to submit the matter to the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia or of the Triple *Entente*. Should this suggestion be refused the Servian Government will then inform the Bulgarian Government that they cannot see their way to evacuate either Kuprulu, Perlepe, or Monastir.

Should it on the other hand be accepted, the Servian Government believe that, even if the matter were submitted to the arbitration of the Triple *Entente*, Russian influence would be strong enough to cause the decision to be given in their favour.

On the 8th instant, I learnt that M. Gueshof had instructed the Bulgarian Minister in Belgrade to discuss the whole matter with the Servian Prime Minister in that capital, a method of procedure distasteful to the latter, who would prefer that the negotiations should be continued in Sophia by M. Spalaikovitch, the Servian Minister here, in whom he places especial confidence.

M. Spalaikovitch has, therefore, been again called to Belgrade to discuss the question in detail, and to receive further confidential instructions.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

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[7464] No. 292.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir. Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 108.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 10, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 85 of the 3rd February, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further letter which I have received from Sir Adam Block, representative of the British bondholders on the Ottoman Public Debt, informing me of cases of interference on the part of the Greek authorities with the free transport of salt belonging to the Debt Administration.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 292.

Sir A. Block to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Constantinople February 8, 1913.*

WITH reference to my letter to your Excellency of the 1st instant, I beg to bring to your notice further cases of interference on the part of the Greek authorities with the free transport of salt belonging to the Debt Administration and carried in neutral bottoms.

The two Roumanian steamers, "Stella" and "Elizabeth," and the British steamer "Neva," mentioned in my previous letter, have been taken to the Pirœus and obliged to discharge their cargoes.

The owners of the Roumanian steamer "Galatz," chartered for the transport of 1,600 tons of salt to certain depôts on the Black Sea coast, have informed us by telegram from the Pirœus that the Greek Government have declared categorically that if they attempt to transport salt for the Debt Administration the cargo will be seized. They have asked us, therefore, to have their contract with us annulled.

The American Navigation Company of Smyrna, unfavourably impressed by the news of these various seizures, has refused to load salt which it was going to transport to the depôt of Anamour (Lebanon).

I have, &c.
ADAM BLOCK.

[7465] No. 293.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 110.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 11, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Constantinople, enclosing a letter addressed to him by the chairman of the Keshan Collieries and Enos Forest Syndicate, asking that permission may be obtained from the Bulgarian Government for the shipment of coal from Enos, as also that the Bulgarian Government may be approached with a view to compensation being granted for damage done to the property of these two companies.

A copy of this despatch and its enclosures has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 293.

Consul-General Eyres to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 10, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith three copies of a letter addressed to me on the 16th ultimo by Colonel Thomas English, chairman of the Keshan Collieries Company (Limited), and the Enos Forest Syndicate (Limited), both British companies,

registered at this consulate-general as formed with British capital and under British management, and to suggest that Colonel English's letter should be forwarded to the Foreign Office and to His Majesty's Legation at Sophia.

The object of the letter is to ask that permission be obtained from the Bulgarian Government for the shipment of charcoal from Enos, and it is possible that His Majesty's Minister at Sophia may be able to obtain this permission.

Colonel English requests also that His Majesty's Government will use its influence to obtain compensation from the Bulgarian Government for damage done to the property of these two companies. He estimates the amount of loss at about 2,000*l.* at Keshan and 1,000*l.* at Enos.

I have, &c.
H. C. A. EYRES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 293.

Lieutenant-Colonel English to Consul-General Eyres.

Sir, *Constantinople, January 16, 1913.*

I BEG to bring to your notice the following facts respecting the damage and loss suffered by the Keshan Collieries Company (Limited) and the Enos Forest Syndicate (Limited), after the passage of the Bulgarian army through Keshan and Enos, and I respectively request that, if possible, His Majesty's Government will use its influence to secure compensation from the Bulgarian authorities.

After the re-entry of the Bulgarian army into Keshan on the 14th (27th) November last no damage was done for some days, but on the 19th November (2nd December) they commenced appropriating all the coal they could find at the colliery, and using it to work the flour mills at Keshan and at Uzun-Keupri, seriously damaging the works in the process of extraction. Much of the plant and many tools were appropriated and removed. On the 27th December, 1912 (10th January, 1913), and the 28th December, 1912 (11th January, 1913), a large boring machine, valued at 1,000*l.*, was destroyed, and the accessories were stolen or burnt. It is believed that this damage was done by Bulgarian volunteers accompanying the troops for the purposes of plunder.

Between the 14th (27th) November and 30th December, 1912 (13th January, 1913), at the Enos Forest, a large quantity of cut oak timber and of charcoal was appropriated by the Bulgarian troops, and a great number of oak trees belonging to the Enos Forest Syndicate (Limited) were cut down and used for various purposes by them. On the 1st (14th) December, the local manager of both companies, Mr. Albert Zanardi, of Keshan, saw the officer commanding the Bulgarian troops at their head-quarters at Dedeagatch, and the latter gave orders that in future the Bulgarians should give receipts for all the charcoal and wood which they took, but obviously this does not affect the quantities taken before that date.

I am not in a position yet to give a definite statement of the amount of loss incurred, but it is approximately estimated at 2,000*l.* at Keshan and 1,000*l.* at Enos. I hope shortly to be able to give definite figures.

It would be of very great value to the Enos Syndicate if permission could be obtained from the Bulgarian Government, as soon as practicable, to remove by sea from the Enos Forest all the remaining charcoal which is there ready for shipment, and that Mr. Zanardi should be informed by them that vessels will be sent for that purpose.

The Keshan Company (Limited) and the Enos Forest Syndicate (Limited) are both *bonâ fide* British companies, and were in existence long before the war. The Enos Forest Syndicate is registered at Constantinople, the necessary papers for registering the Keshan Collieries Company are now in course of post from England.

I have, &c.
THOS. ENGLISH,
Chairman of the Keshan Collieries (Limited) and of the Enos Forest Syndicate (Limited).

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[7571] No. 294.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 55.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 13, 1913.*

WITH reference to my recent despatches in regard to public opinion in Russia during the present crisis, I have the honour to report that the tone of the press is becoming daily more outspoken in its expressions of hostility towards the two Great German Powers.

In one of its daily attacks on Austria, the "Novoe Vremya" comments on the futility of the exchange of autograph letters when no steps are taken for demobilisation, and it complains that by despatching instructors and munitions of war to Albania, Austria is making that country the advanced post of her influence in the Balkans.

In another article the same journal, while lamenting the apparent terror of Austria which prevails among the Russian public generally, declares that the mere sailing of the Black Sea fleet to the south is all that is necessary to put an end to the present situation, and that the sight of the smoke of the Russian battle-ships would suffice to bring Turkey to her knees.

The "Sviet" also publishes an angry article against Germany, to whom it attributes the entire responsibility of the recent *coup d'État*. It asserts that without German support Turkey would long ago have come to terms, and complains of the manner in which stores and war materials for the Turks are being landed in German ships. The article concludes by demanding one more effort in order to put an end at last to the German domination over the Slav races.

The "Official Messenger" of to-day's date publishes the text of the telegram sent to the Emperor by those attending the second Slav banquet (please see my despatch No. 51 of the 10th instant) together with the text of His Majesty's reply:—

"Those Russians and Slavs united by sympathy for their brethren in the Balkans, heroically fighting for the cause of Slavdom, make their first toast His Majesty the Emperor. The company beg Your Grace (Prince Koutchoubey) to bring before His Imperial Majesty the feelings of love, gratitude, and hope which inspire them with regard to the sacred person of the Tsar, and which always unite all Russians meeting in the name of the welfare of their beloved Fatherland."

The Emperor caused the following telegram to be sent in reply:—

"His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to order that his thanks be conveyed to all those Russians and Slavs united by sympathy for their brethren in the Balkans for the feeling expressed in their telegram."

The press comments in a somewhat extravagant manner on the Emperor's telegram, and contrasts it to the prohibition of the Slav banquet, reported in my despatch No. 43 of the 6th instant, which had, so the "Vechernee Vremya" declares, so painful an effect on all who cherish Slav ideals and was the outcome of inexplicable timidity and shortsightedness."

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[7505] No. 295.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, February 13, 1913.*

THE protocol signed in London between MM. Danef and Misu, for the continuation in another capital of the negotiations between Bulgaria and Roumania, was shown to me by the Prime Minister on the 3rd instant.

His Excellency especially drew my attention to the paragraph in which it is stated that M. Take Jonesco, personally, did not insist on the Roumanian demands, but would have been satisfied with smaller cession of territory. This paragraph proved, M. Gueshof considered, that the signature of the protocol was, on the whole, favourable to Bulgaria, as indicating a certain indecision on the part of Roumania as to what she really required.

The next question was to decide whether the negotiations should be conducted in Sophia or Bucharest. The Prime Minister was personally desirous that they should be conducted at Bucharest, on account of his private interests in Roumania, and the invidious position in which he himself would on that account be placed should he have to make any concessions to that country. The Roumanian Government, however, expressed the desire that Sophia should be selected for these conversations, and the Prime Minister after discussion with his colleagues acquiesced.

The Roumanian Government apparently at first intended that the matter should be discussed by two delegates on each side, and M. Gueshof nominated M. Danef and M. Sarafof, who was Bulgarian Minister in Constantinople up to the outbreak of the war, as the Bulgarian delegates, while it was understood that a senior delegate would be sent from Bucharest to collaborate with Prince Chika, the Roumanian Minister here.

For some reason or other this decision was not adhered to, and on the 10th instant Prince Chika informed me that he had received instructions to proceed at once with the negotiations.

M. Danef, having left Sophia, the first conversation took place on the 12th instant between Prince Chika and M. Sarafof.

The Roumanian instructions, which appear categorical and uncompromising, are—according to Prince Chika's statement made to me in strict confidence—to demand the cession of the strip of territory comprised between the present frontier line and a line drawn from Kavarna, on the coast, to Silistria, on the Danube, including both those towns. Should these negotiations fail to proceed smoothly, his Excellency had further instructions to demand the port of Baltchik.

In the event of an unfavourable reply, the Roumanian Government intended to occupy the whole of the territory demanded, and Prince Chika himself would—to use his own expression—leave Sophia "avec toute son argenterie" on the following Monday (17th February).

The Roumanian Minister has, on previous occasions, talked openly of the possibility of his impending departure from Sophia, together with his entire staff, but the situation is undoubtedly more critical now than at any previous moment.

The policy of the Bulgarian Government remains as outlined in my telegrams No. 10 of the 10th ultimo and No. 16 of the 17th ultimo. In the absence of the possibility of resistance at the present juncture they would, should the Roumanian demands exceed reasonable limits, submit to the occupation of this territory by the Roumanians, while reserving until a more favourable opportunity the vengeance which they will undoubtedly take for the insults offered them in their time of trouble.

Public sentiment among the Bulgarians, although undoubtedly very bitter towards their northern neighbours, whom they inwardly despise, remains outwardly extremely calm.

I have, &c.
H. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[7557] No. 296.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Belgrade, February 13, 1913.*

IN the course of a conversation with the Prime Minister on the 10th instant, his Excellency informed me that he had just received news from St. Petersburgh which indicated that Djakova and Dibra might be included in the new Albania. This he told me had produced a most disquieting effect in Government circles at Belgrade, and the present Cabinet felt they could not possibly continue in office if it were the case, and they were prepared to resign rather than face the indignation which would be aroused throughout the country. M. Pasitch added that he was convinced that no Government could be formed which would accept the odium attached to these further sacrifices of Servian interests; the only alternative would be a military dictatorship backed by extreme chauvinists, whose policy would be to resist by force any attempt to deprive Servia of her hard-won conquests, with the result that a most serious situation might arise, not only for Servia, but possibly for the whole of Europe. Servia had already made enormous sacrifices out of deference to the wishes of the Powers, but there was a limit to everything, and on the question of Djakova and Dibra she could not possibly yield.

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His Excellency showed me a map, and pointing out the areas in question laid stress on the fact that from a geographical and economical point of view, both Djakova and Dibra should form part of Servia.

The Servian contention is, as you, Sir, well know, that as far as possible natural boundaries should be followed, and that watersheds in these particular regions fulfil the condition of a natural frontier better than the small streams, which on the map are dignified by the title of rivers. These questions are affected by considerations of grazing areas and the traditional trend of trade, which in both cases has been away from the barren mountain ranges lying to the west of the river Drin and towards Uskub.

The inclusion of Djakova in the new Albania would constitute an enclave between Servian and Montenegrin territory, and would inevitably cause administrative complications, since the Albanian's Government would not unnaturally endeavour to direct the trade of this district from its natural and traditional outlet towards an Albanian centre. In the case of Dibra the same argument applies, and although the town itself may by some be described as Albanian, I have it on the authority of the French Minister, who has visited this region, that the Shav element predominates in the surrounding villages. It is feared that in both instances these districts would be hotbeds of intrigue directed against Servian rule.

I am aware that these points of view have already been laid before you, and only venture to recapitulate them at the express wish of M. Pasitch.

Since beginning this despatch I have received your telegram No. 37 of yesterday's date, and explained at length your views with regards to Djakova and Dibra to M. Pasitch, laying stress on the fact that Servia would in any way, under present circumstances, be acquiring considerable stretches of territory, while too grasping a policy on her part might result in disaster.

His Excellency, while fully recognising the friendliness and disinterestedness of your advice, recapitulated his former arguments, and stated that he is powerless in this matter, and that no further concessions can possibly be made.

I am inclined to think that should Djakova and Dibra be ultimately included in the new Albania the situation will become critical, in view of the somewhat excitable character of the Servian people, and the influence exerted by the army in all classes of the community. Military men are perhaps unduly elated by their recent successes, and, further, there is a dangerous tendency to underrate the Austrian army, and to count upon internal difficulties to still further weaken the military efficiency of the Dual Monarchy. Possibly the foregoing may explain the stubborn attitude of the Prime Minister, which I regret to say seemed in no way modified by your message.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

[7506] No. 297.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, February 13, 1913.*

UNTIL the 29th ultimo the Prime Minister continued to express himself as officially hopeful that peace might yet be concluded with Turkey, and he went so far as to ask my opinion as to the best means in which it would be possible for him to reopen negotiations were they to be broken off in London. Should the hostilities be resumed, his Excellency was of the opinion that every effort must be made to reduce the garrison of Adrianople, as the capture of that city would inevitably alter the complexion of events to an extent that would at once bring peace within a reasonable distance.

This slight hope, if it ever existed, was soon to be dashed to the ground, and on the 30th ultimo I had the honour of reporting that I had learnt that the armistice had been denounced, and that hostilities would be resumed on the evening of Monday, the 3rd instant.

The offer made by the Turkish Government to cede a portion of the city of Adrianople, namely, that on the right bank of the Maritza, was unacceptable to the Bulgarian Government, who were strongly influenced by the attitude of King Ferdinand, whose exaggerated fears for the future of his dynasty made him very chary of appearing in the light of an unsuccessful champion of the aspirations of a people that have never been distinguished by the quality of gratitude to their leaders and benefactors.

It seemed for a moment possible, it is true, that if considerable and immediate pressure could be brought to bear on the Bulgarian Government by the Great Powers, even at this late moment, they might have been induced to yield to the Turkish demands, at least as regards the town of Adrianople. Such pressure, however, to be successful should have made itself felt, in the first place, through Russia and Servia, whose respective attitudes towards Bulgaria at this moment were of the most vital importance to her: the former, because she might threaten Bulgaria with the bugbear of a military convention, the signature of which she has been holding over her as a threat for some time recently; the latter, because she has been seeking in her turn to gain some territorial advantage at the expense of her principal ally, in return for further military assistance, over and above that actually stipulated for in the military convention between the two countries. This latter phase of Bulgarian foreign policy and its developments in the last fourteen days has been treated fully in my despatch No. 15, Secret, of the 9th instant.

Another factor that might well have persuaded a less determined Government to accept the conditions offered existed in the attitude of Roumania, with whom negotiations have been so long in progress.

No action of the kind intimated was, however, taken by the Powers, and Bulgaria determined to continue the war. It is difficult to determine amongst people so little liable to ebullitions of public enthusiasm—although such do occur on occasion—to what extent popular feeling is on the side of this policy. It seems, however, safe to say that there is at least no opposition in any quarter, whilst the spirit and *morale* of the army are undoubtedly excellent.

On the 1st of February I had the honour to receive your telegram No. 23, stating that it had always been understood that Bulgaria, while claiming the cession of the town of Adrianople, would give Turkey conditions, especially such as would safeguard the prestige of Turkey and give satisfaction to her susceptibilities regarding the tombs and mosques, and instructing me to mention the matter of the possibility of Bulgaria's stating the terms she would be prepared to concede to Turkey in return for her "step in advance" in offering to partition the city of Adrianople should my other colleagues be similarly instructed.

I have had the honour to inform you of my action in the matter, both by telegraph and in my despatch No. 14, Confidential, of the 6th February, where I ventured to explain at some length the manner in which this joint *démarche* was anticipated by my Russian colleague.

The Prime Minister expressed himself as entirely willing to agree to the appointment of a Turkish "commissaire" to protect the sanctuaries at Adrianople on certain conditions. These conditions, which were obviously unacceptable, and were not even communicated to the Turkish Government, consisted of:—

1. That the Ottoman Government should agree to a "boundary well known to the Powers";
2. That a war indemnity should be paid;
3. That peace should be concluded immediately.

What the Prime Minister meant exactly by a "boundary well known to the Powers" I was unable to elicit. He considered that the Enos-Midia line was unsatisfactory, as its termination on the Ægean possessed certain important strategic disadvantages. He would not, however, specify any other point that would be more suitable.

The Bulgarian Government have never ceased to insist on the question of a war indemnity, and on the 3rd instant the Prime Minister informed me that M. Teodorof, the Minister of Finance, had succeeded in winning over the French Minister of Finance to the Bulgarian point of view as regards this question.

Although, as regards this particular statement, it may be only that the wish is father to the thought, I considered it worth while to telegraph to you (see my telegram No. 37 of the 3rd instant) that any such support would have a deplorable effect, inasmuch as it would encourage Bulgaria to adopt an attitude of uncompromising hostility to any suggestions made subsequently by the Powers as regards the financial responsibilities with which her conquests have saddled her. The integrity and good faith of Bulgaria in financial matters is, I fear, incapable of withstanding any strong temptation in which her self-interest is involved, and it is much to be feared that the thorny question of her financial obligations will, in any case, prove a sufficiently difficult one, without any impetus being given to her rapacity by an appearance of sympathy with her in her demands on this point.

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The proposals of the consuls in Adrianople regarding the establishment of a neutral zone in the besieged city and the possibility of arrangements being made for neutral non-combatants to leave the town were duly submitted to the Prime Minister, who, as was only to be expected, informed me, after reference to the military authorities, that neither of the proposals was acceptable.

On the 6th instant, M. Venezelos, the Greek Prime Minister, visited Sophia on his way back to Salonica and Athens. He was cordially received by the King and the Cabinet, and a luncheon was given him by the Prime Minister, to which were invited the Servian and Greek Ministers at this capital. I had the opportunity of meeting M. Venezelos, and from conversation with him and from other sources I gather that the Greek Prime Minister was much pleased with his reception in London and the consideration shown to him on all sides. He has brought away the impression that the policy of His Majesty's Government favours Greece rather than Italy in the question of the future ownership of the islands. I also heard that no arrangement of any kind had been come to regarding the future of Salonica, although it would appear that the continued residence of the Greek Royal family has resulted, to some extent, in accustoming the Bulgarian Government to view with comparative equanimity the prospect of this rich city not falling to their lot, and the tendency to admit the possibility of its eventual internationalisation is becoming correspondingly greater. From all sources I continue to receive news of almost daily brawls and disagreeable incidents between the Bulgarian and Greek soldiery in that town.

The continuation of the war, and the reported successes of the Bulgarian troops, has naturally had the effect of stimulating the appetite of the Bulgarian Government for further concessions from Turkey as an indispensable condition of peace. This attitude, which has, I gather, been openly expressed in conversation by M. Danef, is undoubtedly an important factor to be reckoned with, and I have every reason to believe that Bulgaria now intends to demand the Midia–Rodosto line as a preliminary condition of peace. That this frontier will not meet with the approval of the Russian Government is no secret to the Bulgarian Government, who, it is only natural to suppose, intend, should they be baulked of their desire in this respect, to use the fact as an argument in favour of concessions in the nature of a pecuniary indemnity, and may even be led to an attempt to evade, on the grounds of ill-treatment, their financial responsibilities in connection with the Ottoman Public Debt.

The military operations of the Bulgarian troops appear to have met with considerable success up to the time of writing this despatch. The prime object of the Bulgarian military authorities has remained the reduction of the fortress of Adrianople, with which object in view an almost continuous bombardment, which is daily reported to be "proceeding satisfactorily," has apparently been directed against the city.

The defensive attitude, which it was understood was to be adopted in the other spheres of military activity, has, according to the reports of the general staff, resulted in a series of victorious counter-attacks on the part of the Bulgarians. In the engagement which took place on Saturday last, the 8th instant, in the neighbourhood of Bulair, the official reports issued from time to time intimate that the Turks suffered immense losses, while the Bulgarian losses are given as two officers killed and five wounded, the casualties amongst the men being given as amounting to 412.

The latest official reports, published to-day, declare that the bodies of six thousand Turks have already been buried by the Bulgarians on the battle-field of Bulair, while the Turkish losses at Adrianople in the recent sorties on the 10th and 11th instant amounted to one thousand.

No military attachés are allowed to accompany the troops or see any of the military operations in progress, the only exception being in favour of M. Romanovsky, the Russian military agent, who has, I understand, left for Adrianople as a member of the Russian Red Cross Mission.

This action has not failed to increase the irritation already felt by these officers with regard to the treatment they have already received at the hands of the Bulgarian Government, and they complain of the lack of consideration shown them by the Government in allowing them to continue to hope that they would be permitted to see some of the fighting up to the moment of the renewal of hostilities.

I have, &c.

H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[7467] No. 298.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 112.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 13, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Dedeagatch, reporting on the general condition of that district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 298.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 3.)

Sir, *Dédéagatch, le 7 février, 1913.*

PAR ma dépêche No. 1 du 20 de l'écoulé je vous faisais savoir, Sir, que les autorités militaires bulgares étaient d'une sévérité rébarbative pour empêcher à ce que des nouvelles soient expédiées d'ici.

Profitant du départ du steamer "Axminster," je me fais un devoir de vous adresser ma présente dépêche pour vous faire connaître notre situation—situation en tout cas peu enviable.

Depuis l'occupation de notre ville par les armées bulgares la misère n'a fait qu'accroître. Grâce aux réquisitions, moyennant billets, et jamais au comptant, toutes les denrées premières et indispensables à la nourriture de la population ont servi à alimenter les soldats, ou prennaient la voie ferrée pour les stations intermédiaires. Cet état de choses a eu pour conséquence que tout a surenchéri à des proportions inattendues; le sucre, qui au début se payait 3 pésétas l'oque, a atteint les 12 pésétas, ainsi que de suite, et à tel point que les magasins, faute de marchandises, ont dû fermer.

Tout le bétail a été pris aux villages et des troupeaux en quantité sérieuse transitaient la ville pour les parages de Tchataldja. Sous ce rapport le pays est totalement dégarni, et qu'il vous suffise de savoir que—chose inconnue dans les annales le lait manque totalement à la ville, sans compter aussi la grande difficulté pour avoir de la viande nécessaire à nos besoins.

Nous avons beaucoup d'émigrés turcs traversant une misère noire et aux abois. La municipalité leur donne du pain; déjà c'est quelque chose; mais, avec les rigueurs de l'hiver, ayant été volés de tout ce qu'ils possédaient, il vous sera facile de comprendre dans quelles transes ils passent. Dimanche dernier j'ai eu la visite de notre vice-consul, W. Young, venu de Gumuldjina expressément, et nous fîmes une distribution de fonds; mais, pour soulager tout ce monde, il faudra encore beaucoup faire. Je n'ai pas manqué aussi de m'intéresser au malheureux sort d'une quarantaine de militaires blessés qui manquaient de tout. Ma première soin a été de leur fournir les médicaments indispensables pour le pansement des blessures et qui leur faisaient défaut. Leur état est vraiment piteux; je les ai visités et, en leur offrant à chacun du tabac, la reconnaissance était visible dans leur avide visage. Les rues sont pleines de petits marmots en loques qui pratiquent la mendicité. Avec cet état de choses, vraiment on risque d'être gratifié de quelque épidémie contagieuse aux premières chaleurs.

L'intendance bulgare depuis un mois environ reçoit des très grandes quantités d'approvisionnements—houille de provenance anglaise, farine, biscuits, lard, foin, avoine, sucre, orge de Fiume, Odessa et Marseille. Je vais tenir une statistique des arrivages, que je vous soumettrai à la fin de ce trimestre.

Depuis lundi dernier, de nouveau, la consigne est des plus sévères ici, à cause de la reprise des hostilités. L'état de siége est appliqué avec une rigueur extraordinaire; à 7 heures du soir personne ne doit circuler dans les rues. Cette sévérité, à mon avis, ne doit pas être attribuée exclusivement à la cause citée plus haut; il faut tenir aussi compte que la conduite morale de certains officiers et soldats y est pour beaucoup, car il y a eu de plaintes de la part des femmes turques qui ont eu à souffrir d'exigences bestiales.

Notre ville avait une mosquée attenante aux bâtisses gouvernementales; il y a une quinzaine de jours le minaret a été démoli jusqu'à la partie où le hodja fait l'appel à la prière. Le tombeau de Dédé, dont la ville lui doit son nom, a été rasé et il

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ne reste plus que l'arbre de chêne: deux actes qui certainement ne font pas honneur aux combattants!

Actuellement notre garnison n'est composée que de miliciens, vulgaires paysans dans leur costume habituel, sabre-baionnette et cartouchière par le milieu du corps et les armes bulgares sur le calpak. Toute la journée ils sont occupés à opérer des charges de portefaix pour débarquer les allèges et charger les wagons. On s'en sert aussi à bord des vapeurs comme journaliers.

J'ai, &c.
BADETTI.

[7530] No. 299.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bucharest, February 14, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report by the military attaché to this legation on the courses open to the Roumanian Government should they decide on taking military action against Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 299.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 5. Confidential.) R.

Sir, *Bucharest, February 12, 1913.*

IT seems to be not unlikely that the negotiations which are at present taking place between Bulgaria and Roumania may break down. Should this occur, and if the Roumanian Government decide to take immediate military action, there appear to be several courses open to them.

It is generally assumed that Roumania would occupy the territory that she is demanding, viz., that which lies north of a line drawn from Turtukai on the Danube to Balcik on the Black Sea. There would, however, be objections to confining military action to this occupation. Not only would such an operation do so little harm to Bulgaria that she might well ignore it until such time as she felt herself ready to deal with the Roumanian army; but also there is no well defined defensive line which could be fortified by the Roumanians with a view to holding the country that they had occupied.

It would, therefore, appear to be desirable for the Roumanians to adopt some other plan of campaign. Any attack on Sophia appears to be unlikely, as it would necessitate a long line of communications in a hostile country, as well as the crossing of the Balkans. It seems likely that Roumania would consider her best plan to be the seizure of that portion of Bulgaria which lies north of the line Rustchuk, Shumla, Varna. She could then place these old fortresses in as good a state of repair as possible, and would be in a favourable position to await Bulgarian action. Bulgaria could not well ignore the occupation of such an important piece of her territory, particularly of the port of Varna.

The Roumanian bridging material for crossing the Danube is kept at Calarasi, opposite to Silistria. The first operation of war would, therefore, probably be the seizure of Silistria as a bridgehead, and the construction of a pontoon bridge at that place. The seizure of Silistria at the present time would not be a difficult operation, as its garrison is composed of men who are unfit for service at the front. I am also informed by an officer of the Roumanian general staff that there is only one gun in the Bulgarian forts.

The Bulgarians possess no means of crossing the Danube, as the material that they have is insufficient for such a large river. The Roumanians on the other hand are not only in possession of materials for constructing a pontoon bridge, but I understand they can also make a bridge with the big lighters that they use for river transport.

With regard to the Roumanian demands for territory, it is probable that the

important thing for them to obtain is as long a bit of coast line as possible. The object of doing so would be to enable a naval port to be constructed at Mangalia. The roadsteads of Kavarna and Balcik are much exposed, and could only be made into harbours at great cost. At Mangalia, however, there is a deep lagoon, and it is thought that by constructing a canal connecting it with the sea a good harbour could be made for ships of war. If this was done it would be desirable to have Mangalia as far from the frontier as possible.

Silistria is not at the present time of much use to either country, part of its defensive positions being on the Roumanian side and part on the Bulgarian. The place would, however, be of value to Roumania in the event of a Bulgarian attack on the Dobrugea. If it is assumed that such an attack is inevitable, Roumania is undoubtedly wise to try and acquire the town and the heights that dominate it. The latter would afford protection to a bridge at the entrance to the Dobrugea, and on the flank of a hostile advance from Bulgaria.

The Roumanian Government have just obtained 60,000 Mannlicher rifles and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition for them. I recently reported that there was a shortage of rifles in the army, and that 100,000 had been ordered from Messrs. Steyer. These would not, however, be ready until the end of the year, as the first batch is not to be delivered until July. The rifles that are now being received are therefore urgently needed. Though I cannot speak with certainty I believe that these rifles are being provided by the Austrian Government, and that their calibre is different from that of the Roumanian rifles.

I have, &c.
F. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

[7531] No. 300.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 22. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bucharest, February 14, 1913.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of to-day, I have the honour to transmit herewith a report from the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon points out that the 60,000 Mannlicher rifles and ammunition are being offered to the Roumanian Government by a Jewish firm in Austria and not by the Austrian Government.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 300.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 6. Confidential.) R.

Sir, *Bucharest, February 14, 1913.*

WITH reference to my report No. 5 R of the 12th instant, I have now some further information regarding the Mannlicher rifles referred to.

It appears that the Austrian Government have not provided the 60,000 rifles and the ammunition, and there is some doubt as to whether the Roumanian Government will accept them. They are being provided by a Jewish firm in Austria and are not in good condition.

The Roumanian Government, however, recently asked the Austrian Government to use its influence with Messrs. Steyer in order to secure an early delivery of the 100,000 rifles ordered from that firm in November last. This the Austrian Government did, and the delivery of the rifles is to commence next month instead of in July.

My authority for the above is the Austrian military attaché.

I have, &c.
F. LYON,
Military Attaché.

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[7558] No. 301.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February 14, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 27 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a revised list, obtained from the Ministry of Finance here, of the articles upon which the "War Contribution" tax is levied in the territories occupied by Servia.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 301.

"War Contribution": New Tax applied on Imports into Territory occupied by Servia.

(Applied January 31, 1913.)

	Dinars.
Salt	17·60 per 100 kilogs.
Petroleum	5·65 ,, ,,
Matches	126·00 ,, ,,
Alcohol	117·00 ,, ,,
Cigarette paper	283·00 ,, ,,
Sugar	30·00 ,, ,,
Coffee	100·00 ,, ,,
,, substitutes	30·00 ,, ,,
Chocolate	30·00 ,, ,,
Oils (edible)	20·00 ,, ,,
Beer	20·00 ,, ,,
Fine wines (champagne, &c.)	200·00 ,, ,,
Liqueurs, rum	100·00 ,, ,,
Cognac (brandy)	50·00 ,, ,,

[7559] No. 302.

Mr. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February 14, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 27 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, reporting the inability of working of the Ottoman Public Debt and the Tobacco Régie in the territory occupied by Servian troops.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 302.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Uskub, February 3, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegrams No. 2 of the 4th January, and No. 17 of the 3rd February, I have the honour to call your Excellency's attention to the fact that two important international institutions, the Ottoman Public Debt and the Tobacco Régie, are prevented from working in the territory occupied by the Servian military forces.

It is true that, under pressure, the Servian authorities here have restored to the officials of the Public Debt their offices, stamps and cash in hand, but they refuse to give it that support which it has always had from the executive, and without which it cannot fulfil its duties. It is idle for instance, to say that the Stamp Act is in force when the executive authority will not take steps to enforce it. I would also note that in the tariff of the recently introduced "kontributzia," a tax is placed on salt, which is a monopoly of the Public Debt.

With regard to the Régie the position is simple; it is allowed to export tobacco from the Servian ravon, but not to import or to sell any. On the other hand, the Servians have already introduced their own tobacco régie here, and this in spite of the fact that the Ottoman Régie has a monopoly of the sale of tobacco in the Ottoman Empire.

I have been unable to keep in touch with all the developments of this affair, the officials of the Régie and the Debt having generally applied to my French colleague rather than to myself. The latter has, I know, frequently addressed himself to the local authority, but without any success, and is now bringing the matter to the attention of the French Legation at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[7489] No. 303.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 65.)

Sir, *Berlin, February 15, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 36 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a note from the Imperial Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, informing me of the instructions sent to the German representatives at Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade in regard to the alleged encroachments on the rights of the Ottoman Public Debt.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 303.

Note communicated to Sir E. Goschen.

(Translation.) *Berlin, February 13, 1913.*

THE undersigned has the honour to acknowledge with his best thanks the receipt of his Excellency Sir E. Goschen's note of the 7th instant.

The Imperial Government, who have received a complaint from the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt similar to the letter from Sir Adam Block, have instructed their representatives at Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade to protest to the respective Governments against the encroachments on the rights of the Debt, and to hold them responsible for all losses which might be sustained by the Turkish State creditors as a result of the action of their authorities. The Imperial Ministers have been expressly enjoined to keep in touch with their British colleagues in making their representations.

The undersigned, &c.

VON JAGOW.

[7492] No. 304.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 68.)

Sir, *Berlin, February 16, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum by Lord Granville reporting a conversation which he had the honour to have with the Emperor last night on the occasion of the christening of the infant son of His Royal Highness Prince August Wilhelm of Prussia.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

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Enclosure in No. 304.

Memorandum by Earl Granville.

(Confidential.)

LADY GRANVILLE having been commanded by Queen Alexandra to represent Her Majesty on the 15th instant at the christening of the infant son of Prince and Princess August Wilhelm of Prussia, their Royal Highnesses graciously invited me too to assist at the ceremony.

Immediately after supper the Emperor sent for me to speak to me about the Roumanian-Bulgarian situation, and, as is often His Majesty's habit when he begins a conversation with one person, continued to talk to me till the Empress sent word to him that it was time to go home.

His Majesty told me that he was very anxious indeed about the situation in Roumania. Prince Carol, who was in Berlin for the christening, had received a telegram from his mother, Princess Ferdinand, that the outlook was as black as possible, and that the orders for mobilisation might be issued at any moment. His Majesty had given instructions to the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office to telegraph to St. Petersburgh to beg the Russian Government to abstain from interference, as the only hope of maintaining European peace lay in allowing the Balkan States to fight out their quarrels amongst themselves and in the Great Powers remaining strictly neutral. He had also had a telegram dispatched to Prince Lichnowsky instructing him to urge Sir Edward Grey to use all his influence to prevent Russia from interfering. His Majesty said he had from the beginning urged the King of Roumania to wait till the end of the war, and that he had cherished the belief that the King would not allow matters to go to extremes; but the fact was that the King himself and his Prime Minister were both old men, that they had not the strength to resist public feeling, and that they were "being run away with." They had, he said, some excuse, because he knew that they were asking, not for compensation, but for the redemption of a solemn promise made to them by King Ferdinand before the war began, a promise which they had unwisely accepted as binding without having it in black and white. But, His Majesty said, the promise did not include the town of Silistria itself; and he expressed great indignation with Roumania for demanding the cession of a town which out of 13,000 inhabitants contained 11,000 Bulgarians, and which had supplied one of the regiments which had most distinguished themselves in the war. If Roumania and Bulgaria chose to fight he did not much care provided others were not drawn in; but he was very seriously afraid that Russia would interfere, and if Russia moved so would Austria. I said it was a terrible idea that, after the way England and Germany had been working together to keep the peace and using their influence with their respective friends to prevent an outbreak, we might yet find ourselves at war. His Majesty exclaimed that such a thing was unthinkable. With enormous self-control he had refused all this time to take any steps towards mobilisation, but if he found his western frontier threatened he must take action. It was England's business, he said, to keep France quiet. I ventured to say that I was sure France would do nothing unless His Majesty joined Austria—could he hold aloof if Russia and Austria went to war? If Russia attacked Austria, he replied, of course he must fight. For twenty-five years he had resolutely kept the peace in spite of many provocations; he was convinced that he had been entrusted by Heaven with the mission of maintaining the peace of Europe, and he meant to do it, but if anyone dared to break that peace, "he would smash them—a very different kind of smashing from 1870." This last sentence His Majesty uttered with tremendous emphasis, his eyes gleaming, and his fist thumping the air. People amused themselves, he said, with sinister motives, in decrying his army, but anyone who believed such stories would have a rude awakening if the time came for him to strike.

His Majesty then went back to the old story of England's fatal mistake in attaching herself to France and Russia. If England and Germany stood together they could enforce peace on the whole of the rest of the world, and far from complaining of his fleet, we should wish it were stronger. As it was, what good did we get out of our friendship with Russia? We were losing whole continents to her; he knew for a fact that Russia had two whole army corps and a few troops besides in Persia, and she was steadily pushing forward her advanced guards up to the Afghan frontier; she was making no one knew what treaties with Chinese, Thibetans, probably Afghans. How could we trust the Russians? They were an Oriental race under a Western veneer; if you dealt with a Russian under the impression that he was a

European you were certain to fail—when he lied you were taken aback and put at a disadvantage; whereas he himself always remembered that they were Orientals, always knew that they would lie, and only wondered what lie they would tell. It was a terrible thing, he said, that the destinies of that huge Empire were in the hands of two such weak and incompetent men as the Emperor and Sazonof.

England, exclaimed His Majesty, had never had a statesman since Lord Salisbury; I resisted the temptation to ask what statesman Germany had had since Bismarck. Germany alone of all the countries in Europe had a clear conscience—she alone had never intrigued and never tried to "grab." At this I said I must protest—we had never either intrigued or tried to grab. "You are the worst of the lot," he replied, "your representatives have intrigued against mine everywhere." He had always held out his hand to England, and since the death of Queen Victoria he had always been rebuffed. After we had entered into our "precious" *entente* with France, he had once spoken to King Edward, and begged him to use his great influence, to say one word in France to get her to adopt a more amiable attitude towards Germany; King Edward had answered that he certainly would do so, but nothing more had been heard of it, and France and Germany still stood and glared at each other like "des chiens de faïence."

When His Majesty received the Empress's message, he returned for a moment to his anxieties about Roumania, and I promised to report what he had said at once to the Ambassador.

The conversation lasted a full hour or more, and I fear the above is but a bald account of it, but the Emperor repeated himself over and over again, and sometimes, I thought, rather contradicted himself. His Majesty was most amiable to me throughout, in spite of the violence of some of his remarks and some of his attacks on England and English policy, and he appeared to me to be in the best of spirits throughout the evening, notwithstanding the pessimistic view he took of the Roumanian situation. Many of his remarks did not carry conviction, but I am convinced of his firm belief in his mission to keep the peace, and of his ambition to be known in history as the Emperor of peace, and I may venture to add that I believe a war would be quite especially distasteful to him in this year of his Jubilee and of his daughter's marriage.

February 18, 1913.

[7996] No. 305.

Memorandum communicated by Count Trauttmansdorff, February 17, 1913.

(Translation.)

ON the 22nd January the British Ambassador at Vienna, acting upon a telegram received from the Secretary of State, proposed that collective representations should be made to the allies with a view to no higher duties than one of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* being imposed on foreign goods entering the Turkish territory in the occupation of the Greek or Servian forces.

A further communication from Sir F. Cartwright, dated the 31st January, stated that the British Government had given up the idea of such representations, as reassuring reports had been received from the British Minister at Belgrade.

It would appear, however, from the despatches received from the Austro-Hungarian consulates at Salonica and Monastir that the reassuring statements of the allies are not confirmed in practice. The situation is as follows:—

1. Goods imported by way of Salonica into the interior in the occupation of Servia or Bulgaria are required to pay the 11 per cent. import duty on the Servian or Bulgarian frontier line (in the case of Servia, Gevgheli, and Monastir), even when this duty has already been paid at Salonica.

2. Goods imported from Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria into the occupied territories are exempted from the imposition of the Turkish 11 per cent. *ad valorem* duty. Servian, Greek, and Bulgarian goods can thus be imported duty free into the greater part of European Turkey, whilst similar products of the Powers have the Turkish duties imposed on them. The export to European Turkey of those products in which the Balkan States have acquired a certain power of output is thus strangled, and a situation is anticipated which can only properly be brought about with the consent of the Powers, and not even then unless the new condition of affairs created by the war has received the sanction of those same Powers. Until

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this comes to pass, the Balkan States must respect the rights appertaining to the Powers by virtue of the treaties in European Turkey, including those Turkish territories which are in the occupation of the allies, one of these rights is the claim to most-favoured-nation treatment, secured to the Powers by the Capitulations. By virtue of this, any alteration in the established Turkish scale of duties operating to the prejudice of foreign imports must be regarded as inadmissible, and complete equality between foreign and Servian, Greek, and Bulgarian imports should be insisted on.

3. Servia has introduced excise duties and monopolies in the occupied Turkish territories. To representations on the subject the Servian Government have repeatedly replied that excise duties have not been levied in the occupied territories, nor have the Servian monopolies been introduced there. None the less, under the name of a "war contribution" high duties are levied by the Servian military authorities on several articles of daily necessity, and these duties, to judge from the nature of the goods and the manner in which the duties are levied, are nothing else than an excise duty or a customs surtax, which is equivalent to an alteration of the Turkish 11 per cent. *ad valorem* duty to the prejudice of foreign commerce. This prejudice must be doubly emphasised when goods of Servian origin, which are entirely exempt from the payment of duties, are also not required to pay these high surtaxes. From the reports received from the Austro-Hungarian consulates it appears that taxes of the amount indicated are imposed on the following articles:—

	Per quintal.
	Fr. c.
Coffee	100 00
Sugar	50 00
Alcohol	117 00
Salt	17 50
Beer	20 00
Wine in bottles	200 00
Liqueurs	200 00
Extracts	100 00
Cognac	50 00
Matches	125 00
Cigarette paper	281 92
Chocolate	30 00
Chick-peas	30 00
Oil	20 00

Reports from the Austro-Hungarian consulate-general at Salonica indicate that a surtax of 11 per cent. is imposed upon manufactured goods and hardware—that is to say, actually double the duty is levied—and the importation of sugar, petroleum, salt, alcohol, matches, and cigarette paper from Salonica is entirely forbidden. As these last-named articles, with the exception of sugar, are Servian monopolies, the tendency of the Servian Government appears clearly to be to introduce the Servian monopolies under guise of the so-called "war contribution," and, moreover, to prejudice foreign commerce by imposing high excise duties which promote the sale of their own products.

The Servian Government attempt to justify their measures by appealing to the provisions of articles 43, 48, and 49 of the "Règlement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre," signed at the second Hague Peace Conference. Although Servia cannot be denied the right of levying a war contribution in the occupied districts exclusively for the purposes of the army of occupation and of the local administration, the taxes levied under this heading ought not to impose a burden upon trade as such, and least of all should they be directed, in complete perversion of the character of the war contribution, towards prejudicing and overburdening foreign commerce to the advantage of their own. A tax which is levied on the frontiers of the occupied districts by the Servian custom-houses established there, just in the same manner as an import duty or a customs surtax upon goods arriving there, certainly can have no claim to be regarded as a war contribution.

4. In the case of Bulgaria it must be admitted that no such far-reaching measures have yet been adopted. Still we are informed by our nationals who are interested that orders for cigarette paper placed by their customers at Xanthi and Cavalla, before even the war had broken out, have had to be held over because the monopoly in this article is to be introduced into the occupied districts. Moreover, in the case of several articles of consumption, excise duties have been introduced which, in method of assessment and amount, are equivalent to the above-mentioned Servian war taxes, and in some cases surpass them. In spite of repeated representations made by the Austro-Hungarian

Minister at Sophia, it has so far been impossible to get any explanation of the matter from the Bulgarian Government, the latter shielding themselves behind the circumstance that the Minister of Finance was absent.

5. In the case of Greece the Turkish 11 per cent. *ad valorem* scale of duties seems to have been adhered to without essential alterations, and with merely the one exception of the preferential treatment of goods of Greek origin mentioned under 2. Prejudice is, however, caused to foreign commerce by the apparently arbitrary manner in which the value of the imported goods is fixed, their value as a rule being calculated too high and a heavier duty thus resulting, and by a deviation from the Turkish practice in fixing the fees. The damage thus caused to foreign trade is, however, far from being so severe as that which results, particularly for the trade of Salonica, from the proceedings of the Servian and Bulgarian authorities, and especially from the second levying of the 11 per cent. duty on the frontiers of the respective occupied districts.

In conformity with his instructions the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has the honour to invite Sir E. Grey to bring this matter before the meeting of Ambassadors in order that the result necessary for the commercial interests of the Powers may be brought about by categorical representations to be made as soon as possible and simultaneously by the representatives of the Great Powers at Belgrade, Sophia, and Athens.

London, February 17, 1913.

Minutes

As to the customs duties, we have asked the views of all the Powers as to certain proposals to meet the immediate practical difficulties, on the understanding that they shall not prejudice any ultimate settlement. These proposals are embodied in telegrams (sent in cypher "R"), and I think that it would be perhaps convenient if Sir E. Grey were to communicate copies of them to the Ambassadors at the conference.

There are, however, certain duties being imposed on foreign subjects enjoying capitulatory rights, and these duties are imposed under the guise of, *inter alia*, war contribution taxes. They appear, however, to be in effect merely enhanced and irregular customs duties. I think we have a double ground of protest to the allies: firstly, we can, by virtue of the Capitulations, oppose as illegal the imposition of customs duties, however disguised, on British imports in Turkish territory if those duties are over 11 per cent. *ad valorem*; secondly, we can, also by virtue of the Capitulations, oppose a war contribution tax even if it is *bonâ fide* such, as in Turkey, *in so far as it is imposed on foreign subjects*, it is contrary to the Capitulations. All foreigners in Turkey enjoy the protection of the Capitulations by specific treaty engagement, made either in the cases of some Powers by the Capitulations, and by others by most-favoured-nation treaty.

I therefore think we should jointly protest against the levy of any taxes on foreigners in the occupied territory, or on foreign imports, except in so far as such taxes existed prior to the occupation of the territory in question by enemy forces.

So much for the position up to the time when the cession of the territory to the several allied States is formally recognised by the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Berlin.

But the following sentence appears in the Austrian memorandum:

"..... and a situation is anticipated which can only properly be brought about with the consent of the Powers, and not even then unless the new condition of affairs created by the war has received the sanction of those same Powers."

It is very desirable that we should only recognise "this new condition of affairs created by the war" when our important commercial interests have, so far as is possible, been permanently safeguarded; the Board of Trade have submitted detailed proposals as to how this may be done.

Sir E. Crowe.

A. P.

Foreign Office, February 19, 1913.

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I am disposed to agree with the above views generally, but as grave considerations of law and treaties are involved, I think Sir E. Grey would like to be fortified by a legal opinion.

Would Mr. Malkin be so good as to advise?

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, February 19, 1913.

Although the customs question is reserved for separate treatment, it is a little difficult to consider the so-called "war contributions" as a distinct point, because the allegation is that they are so levied as to amount to "an excise duty or customs surtax."

The rules as to the levying of taxes, &c., in occupied territory are laid down in articles 48 and 49 of the 1907 convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land:

"Article 48. If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do it, as far as possible, in accordance with the rules in existence, and the assessment in force, and will in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory on the same scale as that to which the legitimate was bound.

"Article 49. If, besides the taxes referred to in the preceding article, the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, this can only be for military necessities or the administration of such territory."

Article 48 is based on the principle that the invader conducts the administration of the occupied territory as far as possible by means of the machinery which existed and on the principles which prevailed before his advent. He should not impose new taxes, &c., because the right to do so is an attribute of sovereignty, which he does not possess in the occupied territory. If necessary he may alter the mode of collecting the revenue, but I do not think he is justified in increasing the amount to be collected.

In my opinion, therefore, a simple increase in the customs dues is not permissible.

The Servian authorities appear, however, to justify their action in imposing extra duties on the ground that they are a "war contribution," and permissible under article 49. I doubt very much whether that article was intended to apply to such a case. I read it as only governing direct requisitions of money, because if the invader is entitled to raise the taxes, &c., to any figure he likes by calling the increase a "contribution," article 48 becomes practically useless. I am therefore very doubtful whether the Servian contention can be justified. In any case the contribution can only be levied "for military purposes or the administration of [the occupied] territory."

So far I have considered the point apart from the question of how far the rights of the invaders are affected by the Capitulations. It is clear that the treaty rights of foreigners in connection with customs, &c., form part of the "rules in existence" which must, as far as possible, be respected under article 48. But, further than this, it is, I think, generally admitted that the treaty rights of foreigners are not affected by the military occupation of the territory in which they are. They can only be affected by a change of sovereignty, and even when this takes place in the present case, it is apparently intended that the preservation of these rights shall be taken into consideration by the Powers. I think, therefore, that while the allies are in occupation of Turkish territory, they are not entitled to do there any act in relation to foreigners which the Turkish Government would have been prevented by the Capitulations from doing in similar circumstances.

The sole test of any act done by the allies in this connection would therefore appear to be its legality if done by Turkey, if she had remained in occupation of the territories in question during the war (with a possible exception in cases of urgent military necessity, which does not appear to apply to the conditions now under consideration). I think, therefore, for the various reasons given above, that a protest against these additional duties or contributions would be legally justified.

Sir E. Davidson.

H. W. M.

Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.

I agree. It is by no means an easy question, and is one of great importance. One would have liked to have been able to refer it to the Law Officers for confirmation or otherwise, but this is impossible within reasonable limitations of time, as they are both of them out of the country.

It is of very great practical importance in my opinion that the Powers should act and speak in concert, and that they should all say the same thing—whatever it is.

The whole of Lord Melbourne's maxim is perhaps not applicable, as it does matter very much *what we say*, but the latter half of it is very much in point where the Great Powers are acting more or less in concert—"for heaven's sake let us all say the same thing."

If we are disposed to give the Powers a tentatory lead, I think that it should proceed on the lines of Mr. Malkin's very clearly argued minute.

W. E. D.

Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.

Treaty Department to see.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, February 21, 1913.

A. N.
E. G.

[7642] No. 306.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 16, 1913.

I COMMUNICATED to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day the substance of your telegrams Nos. 132 and 136 of 15th February.

His Excellency was too pressed for time to discuss the question in detail, but insisted that both Djakova and Dibra must be added to Servia. If Austria would agree to this, his Excellency would, I think, eventually consent to Tarabosh and Suna being included in Albania.

From information given to him by a Russian officer who knows the country thoroughly, he does not think that there is any chance of Montenegrins capturing either Tarabosh or Scutari. This would simplify matters. They must, however, be given both banks of the Boyana and be allowed to retain Bardaniol, which they have already taken. The latter position, he is told, does not dominate Scutari.

[7680] No. 307.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 16, 1913.

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me to-day of the Roumanian question. German Ambassador, who had just been to see him, was much preoccupied by the difficulty of King Charles's position, as well as by the fear that Russia might eventually intervene.

I told his Excellency that the President of the Council had last night expressed to me apprehension that Roumania would occupy by force territory she claims, and I asked what the Russian Government would then do. His Excellency replied that they would inform Roumanian Government that Russia would never recognise any change in the territorial *status quo* that might be effected without her consent. He was, indeed, sending a circular telegram to Russian Ambassadors suggesting that the Powers should all join in making a declaration in the above sense at Bucharest and Sophia.

His Excellency approves the proposals put forward by the Italian Ambassador in London that the question should be referred to mediation of the Powers, but fears that Bulgaria will only accept it with considerable reserves.

From a remark which he made, his Excellency evidently contemplates the

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possibility of Russia having to intervene later on should Roumanian army enter Bulgaria, and I fear that in present state of public opinion their hands would be forced. On my asking whether he knew the terms of supposed Austro-Roumanian convention, his Excellency said that he believed that, by an exchange of notes between the Emperor and the King, Austria had engaged to come to Roumania's assistance should she be attacked.

[7585] No. 308.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 16, 1913.*

REPORTED failures so far of Enver Bey's expeditionary force to land on the north coast of Sea of Marmora have helped to increase Government's anxiety to make peace.

An early peace would seem imperative in Ottoman interests, especially in view of financial straits, which require urgent relief, as bills for some £T. 7,000,000 fall due next month.

Discussion of the Porte's reply would seem to open the door for delay, while collective note to the Sublime Porte offers smaller margin for prolonged discussion in essentials, except boundary, which is not alluded to in it.

Should the military operations continue to meet with failure and Adrianople fall, the situation may force Turkey to conclude preliminaries of peace direct with the allies, and this may prove to be the shortest course.

Government are forming a national guard for the capital composed in a great part of doubtful elements, and one of its objects is said to be for Government to protect itself against possible popular movement in the event of its having to conclude peace on terms contrary to its professions when it took office by the *coup d'Etat* of 23rd January.

German Ambassador quotes the Grand Vizier as stating that he cannot accept the advice of the Powers to cede Adrianople, and that if he does not insist on retention of portion of Adrianople his Cabinet would fall, to be succeeded by a more Radical Government. In view of the close connection between the present Minister for Foreign Affairs and the extreme Egyptian nationalists, the fall of the present Cabinet would not apparently be injurious to British interests.

(Sent to Sophia and Athens.)

[7696] No. 309.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 17, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 91 of 16th February.

Following from Sir A. Block :—

"Council of Ottoman Public Debt at to-day's meeting, at which delegates of all foreign bondholders were present, unanimously supported view expressed in my telegram of yesterday to the effect that computation of contribution by Balkan States to bondholders of the decree must be based on method (1), viz., payment of equivalent of actual revenues of the debt (ceded revenues) either by annuity or in capital. No other computation would be acceptable."

[7699] No. 310.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sarajevo, February 17, 1913.*

MR. C. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 28 of 7th February and despatch No. 27.

I informed Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day that my personal view was that levying of a war contribution on foreign subjects in occupied territory was altogether unjustifiable. My contention was that, as foreigners in Turkey enjoy

extra-territoriality under the Capitulations and taxes upon them can only be levied at certain rates by permission of the Powers, and as the Powers have insisted and Servia has agreed to respect privileges of foreigners under the Capitulations until annexation is formally recognised, therefore foreigners are not subject to any Servian taxation whatever, any more than they are subject to Servian jurisdiction. Articles 48 and 49 of annex to Hague Convention consequently do not apply where foreign subjects are concerned, though they would of course affect Turkish subjects.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that, so far as he could see, the contention was good.

Should I address a note or memorandum to Servian Government on these lines?

[7704] No. 311.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, February 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 64 and 68 of 16th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had already sent similar instructions to the Italian Ministers at Sophia and Bucharest.

He told me that Roumania had put forward suggestions that the issue with Bulgaria should be submitted to two arbitrators, with a third as umpire. Russia to be one of the Powers asked to undertake the duty, while Italy had been sounded with the same object. He would greatly prefer not to undertake this duty, but if it were necessary in the interests of peace would not refuse. At the same time the issue seemed hardly one for arbitration, as no question of right or contested interpretation was involved, and he preferred suggestion put forward by the Bulgarian Minister here that Great Powers should be asked or offered to examine the points at issue, and give their friendly counsel as to what would constitute equitable and reasonable solution. He thought that this would probably assist the Governments of both States, who would better be able to deal with public opinion if the solution proposed came from Great Powers. He believed this suggestion had not yet reached Bucharest.

(Repeated to Sophia and Bucharest.)

[7705] No. 312.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, February 17, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 26 of 15th February.

I think that French Ambassador must have misunderstood reason of preoccupation of Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has just told me news from Cettinjé does not warrant any Montenegrin optimism as regards progress at Scutari, and that conditions of garrison are unknown. He feels, however, that its fall into hands of Montenegro would reopen all the questions which he had hopes might be settled. His present information gives ground for hope, if Scutari holds out, that Russia would not insist on cession of town to Montenegro; that Austria would agree to exclusion from Albania of Ipek and Prisrend; but that she still holds to Djakova remaining Albanian, and probably Dibra.

[7697] No. 313.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 17, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 57 of 16th February.

Bulgarian Minister has informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government have reason to believe that Roumania will accept a line from Silistria to Shabla provided that the former town were ceded. He further stated that Bulgaria

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would not offer armed resistance should Roumania occupy Silistria by force, though she would never consent to its cession.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is somewhat relieved at latter statement, as he hopes that Russia would in such case be able to confine her action to a strong protest. He is, however, most anxious that Roumania and Bulgaria should agree to place matter in the hands of the Powers, as, though Bulgaria may not now be in a position to resist a forcible occupation of her territory, she will bide her time, and the war will only be postponed for a year or two.

[7701] No. 314.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 25. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, February 17, 1913.*

I HAVE received your telegrams Nos. 82 and 86 of yesterday respecting the tension of relations between Roumania and Bulgaria.

M. Jonnart, with whom I had an interview this afternoon, told me that the Russian Government's policy in the Balkans seemed to him to be inconsequent and incoherent. Alternately they had advocated that Turkey should keep and cede Adrianople. Some time since, M. Jonnart had made remonstrances respecting the menacing note addressed by the Russian Government to the Roumanian Government concerning the Roumano-Bulgarian dispute, and on the 15th instant the Russian Ambassador, in the name of his Government, made a communication to the political director at the Quai d'Orsay, requesting that the cession of Silistria to Roumania should be urged upon Bulgaria by the French Government, acting in conjunction with the British Government, to whom a like communication was being made.

I saw M. Paléologue, after my interview with M. Jonnart, and he informed me that on his expressing some surprise to M. Isvolsky at the Russian Government's change of attitude, denoted by their desire for the cession of Silistria to Roumania, the Russian Ambassador said that it was M. Sazonof's policy, in which he did not concur.

M. Jonnart told me that the worst possible impression had been created by M. Danef in his conversations in Paris, and that the great obstacle to Bulgaria and Roumania coming to an arrangement was presented by M. Danef's personal ambitions, which had similarly stood in the way at the London conferences of the restoration of peace.

Bulgaria and Roumania should, M. Jonnart considers, be left to settle their differences if possible without the mediation of the Powers, to which recourse should only be had in the last extremity. The French Ministers at Bucharest and Sophia have, however, been instructed to join with any of their colleagues who may be so authorised, in recommendations of patience and prudence, and in any advice likely to reconcile the two States' conflicting views.

[7702] No. 315.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, February 17, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 25, Very Confidential, of to-day.

The desire of the Russian Government that Bulgaria should be counselled to give up Silistria to Roumania seems to be accounted for by the recommendation made to the Russian Government by the German Emperor, as reported in Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 38 of the 15th, that Russia should remain neutral if war should break out between Roumania and Bulgaria.

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs is urging the Russian Government not to commit themselves, without full consultation with their ally, to any policy involving the risk of war.

[7703] No. 316.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, February 17, 1913.*

CRETE.

Your telegram No. 76 of 15th February.

The political director informed me this afternoon that an answer concerning Suda Bay Island had been sent through the French Embassy in London, and that the hoisting of the Greek flag on the island had practically settled the question.

[7691] No. 317.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 17, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 64 of 15th February.

Russian Minister, who saw Minister for Foreign Affairs last night, tells me that, although Bulgarian offer is considered insufficient by Roumanian Government, they do not contemplate precipitate action. They seem inclined to act on the suggestion contained in your telegram No. 11 of 13th February, and to resort to mediation of one or of two Powers, but not to that of the Ambassadors in London, where the atmosphere is perhaps regarded as unfavourable to Roumania.

The representatives of the Triple Alliance have received instructions to recommend recourse to mediation, and the German Minister has already acted. The Italian and Austrian Ministers are only to act when all their colleagues are similarly instructed, and the Russian and French Ministers have received no instructions.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[7692] No. 318.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 41 of 16th February: Roumania.

I understand that the Bulgarian Government propose instructing their Ministers to inform the Great Powers that they are willing to accept mediation: above is with a view to gaining time.

M. Danef has been attacked by two of his colleagues in the Cabinet for his yielding attitude in the negotiations.

The Roumanian crisis is attracting extraordinarily little attention among the public. The prevalent idea is to let Roumania occupy any territory she cares to, and then to eject her as soon as the present war is concluded.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[7683] No. 319.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 67. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 17, 1913.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 33 of 16th February.

Rumour that two Servian divisions are being sent to Varna is without foundation.

Present policy of the Bulgarian Government is not to oppose the Roumanian occupation during continuance of the war. They have informed their allies in this sense.

(Sent to Bucharest and Belgrade.)

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[7693] No. 320.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, February 17, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

Your telegrams Nos. 77 and 81 of 16th February.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs considers mediation as proposed by you best way to avoid complications. He has instructed German representatives at Bucharest and Sophia to support their English colleagues, and to preach moderation and prudence at both capitals.

His Excellency advocates arbitration respecting Silistria, and hints that, as it would almost certainly result favourably to Bulgaria, it might suit Russia to support the idea. He seemed to think that Roumania and Bulgaria could hardly refuse such a request if put by all the Great Powers.

He continues to receive disquieting reports as to the situation at Bucharest.

[7706] No. 321.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 57 and 61 of 16th February.

Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that he had given instructions to Austro-Hungarian Ministers at Sophia and Bucharest to join (as soon as similar instructions had been received by their colleagues) in making collective proposal to the Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments that they should ask for mediation of the Powers, and leave to them settlement of their differences. His Excellency foresaw, however, that the Powers would be placed in a very difficult position in coming to a decision on the point. Latest offers of Bulgaria were, he thought, quite inadequate. He informed me that position of King of Roumania was becoming very difficult, and that His Majesty found it more and more impossible to resist public opinion, which was running high against Bulgaria.

[7501] No. 322.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, February 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 8 of 14th February.

Greek proposals seem to me to be reasonable in principle, though first might be expanded to embrace any goods that could be proved to have been imported before the surrender of Salonica. As a matter of fact, there are probably few such goods still in warehouses.

In practice, I fear, the first two proposals would not be of much utility, except, perhaps, in case of goods imported in bulk, such as sugar, flour, and colonial goods, unless the Greeks were very liberal-minded in the matter of certificates, seeing that it will be extremely difficult to show whether any particular goods had been imported before or after the change of régime; but if the right of Servian Government to establish new customs zone is admitted, I cannot make better suggestion unless the Greek Government would agree to pay drawback on all imports reforwarded to other zones.

As regards concluding question, I do not anticipate any such confusion. Points of contact on the railway line are fixed, and the road traffic is inconsiderable.

[7695] No. 323.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, February 17, 1913.*

MY telegrams Nos. 7 and 8 of 5th and 7th February: Forcible conversion of Moslems.

Mr. Young sends me similar report concerning seven villages in district of Xuphli.

[7438] No. 324.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 62 of 15th February: Ottoman Public Debt.

You should defer action for a few days, as slight modification in mode of calculating one portion of Ottoman Debt may be necessary.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 88; Athens, No. 23; and Belgrade, No. 41.)

[7501] No. 325.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.[a]

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 17, 1913.*

INFORM Government to which you are accredited of proposals indicated in my telegram No. 8 of 14th February to Salonica, and say I should prefer modification suggested in the second paragraph of Mr. Lamb's telegram No. 10 of 17th February, but I recognise that this is perhaps a case in which "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien," and I am therefore prepared to agree to any settlement which will remove existing abuses and be acceptable to all the Powers.

As to the recognition of customs zones, provided such recognition is expressly stated to be provisional and informal, and does not prejudice the reservations which the Powers may consider necessary to safeguard their permanent commercial interests on conclusion of peace, I cannot see any valid objection. The point mentioned in the first paragraph of Mr. Lamb's telegram is sufficiently covered by the expression "during Turkish régime" in the first proposal in my telegram No. 8 of 14th February to him.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 90; Belgrade, No. 43; Athens, No. 25; Sophia, No. 46; Constantinople, No. 101; and Salonica, No. 9.)

[7501] No. 326.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 17, 1913.*

PLEASE inform French Government of my circular telegram respecting customs duties in occupied territory.

(Repeated to Belgrade, No. 44.)

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[a] Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 64), Sir R. Rodd (No. 70), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 152).

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[8148] No. 327.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.**

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 17, 1913.*

WHEN all your colleagues are similarly instructed, you are authorised to join in a collective proposal to the Roumanian (Bulgarian) Government that they should submit the solution of their differences to the decision of the Powers.

[8285] No. 328.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 17, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister gave Sir A. Nicolson to understand on the 17th February, though not very precisely, that his Government would be willing that the Powers should intervene in their difficulty with Roumania.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7905] No. 329.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 18, 1913.*

A MEMORIAL has been issued bearing half-dozen signatures of Salonica Jews and Moslems, requesting that Powers, on the analogy of the statement in their collective note respecting Moslem interests at Adrianople, should agree to grant autonomy on an ethnic basis to Moslems, Jews, and Kutzo-Vlachs of Salonica and its Macedonian hinterland. There is no evidence that signatories are representative. Confusion between religious character of proposal regarding mosque, &c., at Adrianople and an "ethnic basis" in the case of Moslems and some 80,000 mainly Salonica Jews is obvious. As the latter are still technically Ottomans, and a proposal of the sort has already been made by Ottoman peace delegates in London and rejected by Balkan allies, the memorial would seem to be a specious attempt to induce the Powers to start discussion of a practically insoluble problem on a basis already rejected by Balkan allies.

(Sent to Athens and Sophia.)

[7898] No. 330.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February 18, 1913.*

ALBANIAN delimitation.

The impression I have received from a conversation with the Prime Minister this morning is that the Servian Government are immovable upon the subject of Djakova and Dibra. His Excellency appeared scarcely to consider it worth while to discuss the contentions which I urged. He merely stated that it was impossible for Servia to yield and nothing short of force would bring about the retirement of Servian troops from these places.

The Austrian Minister tells me that after an interview with the Prime Minister he recently telegraphed in the above sense to Vienna. He has received no reply. I learn, however, from my German colleague that the Austrian Minister expects his Government will eventually give way.

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* Also to Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 41).

[7925] No. 331.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 18, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 11 of 13th February.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he accepted in principle your advice that, should direct negotiations fail, recourse should be had to mediation—advice which had now also been given him by the representatives of the other Powers. Minister for Foreign Affairs warned me, however, that now that he had accepted mediation it would greatly aggravate situation should Bulgaria not accept it. Minister for Foreign Affairs desires apparently that two Powers should mediate, and he mentioned Italy and Russia as acceptable to Roumania.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that formal negotiations at Sophia had been closed on Saturday, though informal conversations were still proceeding between delegates of the two States.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[7434] No. 332.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 18, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 32 of 16th February.

If an opportunity occurs, and you think it desirable to do so, you should explain that the discussion of Albanian limits has been hitherto restricted to northern districts, where, so far as we are aware, there are no Kutzo-Vlachs. It is necessary to settle these matters before proceeding to other points, otherwise a breakdown might occur and serious complications ensue, when the chances of Roumania being consulted would be remote.

[7936] No. 333.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 120.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 13, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of a paraphrase of a leading article in the "Tanin" from the pen of Ismail Hakki Babanzadé,* who visited England with Talaat Bey and other "Young Turks" in 1909, was received by you, and was the committee candidate for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The article is by way of comment on your recent answer in the House to a question concerning the alleged atrocities by the allies in the theatre of the Balkan war.

In general the atrocities campaign, which was started by the local Jewish organ, the "Jeune Turc," conveys the impression that not only the Macedonian irregular bands but also the regulars of the allied armies have perpetrated every conceivable barbarity on men, women, and children. The "Jeune Turc" has for the last two months served up a daily dish of horrors under the heading of "Dossier des Alliés," and it is frequently noticed that the same incident reappears again and again with a varied dressing.

It ignores the fact that the Bulgarian regular army was too occupied with the Ottoman forces to detach troops for the maintenance of order in Macedonia proper; that the excesses committed in those regions during the operations were not one-sided and practically ceased after the conclusion of the armistice; that they were the work of irregular bands under the leadership of such notorious outlaws as Sandansky, Panitsa, Tchernopnof, &c., who are anti-Bulgarian and in favour of an autonomous Macedonia, and who, as allies of the Committee of Union and Progress, were the authors of many

* Not printed.

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political assassinations during the last four years; that the peasantry, who appear to have abetted them, have been paying off such scores as the wholesale massacres and village burnings by the Turks in 1903; the cruelties perpetrated by the Committee of Union and Progress in execution of the unconstitutional Bands Law of 1909; the disarmament of that and the following year; the project, partly put into force, of the Committee of Union and Progress to settle the Macedonian question by swamping the native Christian elements by introducing 1,000,000 Bosnian Moslems and 200,000 Jews from Roumania—in fact, the sad past history of Macedonia, which resulted in 300,000 Macedonian Bulgarians having to seek refuge in Bulgaria, not to mention the 70,000 that fled across the border at the outset of the campaign to avoid the fate which seemed to be in store for them in October last, when Turks were heard to state that "if they had to lose Macedonia, they would hand it over without any Macedonians."

It was evident from the past that a war in those regions, begun in such a spirit, would be fought by methods incompatible with the rules of civilised warfare, but a campaign like that of the "Jeune Ture," conducted on the basis of apparently deliberate gross exaggeration and distortion of fact, can only do harm, as, translated into the vernacular Turkish press, the accounts, frequently imaginary, poison the minds of the Moslems against their Christian fellow-countrymen, and, percolating down into Anatolia, arouse fanaticism to a dangerous degree, while tendering to create a state of mind which with the slightest accidental provocation may translate itself into wholesale massacres like those of Adana in 1909. Already serious fears are entertained that such untoward events may with difficulty be avoided, and, should massacres of the kind occur, there is no doubt that the responsibility will lie mainly at the door of those who inspire this campaign in the committee organ, the "Jeune Ture," and cognate local papers.

In the same connection it should perhaps be remembered that neither the 600,000 Moslems in Bulgaria nor the Moslems in Crete have in any way been molested. In fact, despite King Ferdinand's proclamation at the beginning of hostilities, the Balkan war has been one rather of race than of creed, and the struggle has been fiercer between Turk and Bulgar perhaps owing to the blood affinity between the two races, the latter of which has such a large admixture of Tartar. One of the objects of the atrocity campaign has undoubtedly been to prejudice the case of the allies in European and particularly German and Austrian public opinion, and in both countries it, apparently, has not been without such effect.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[7957] No. 334.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Cettinje, February 14, 1913.*

AS reported to you at the time, Hassan Riza Bey, the commandant of Scutari, was informed early in December by means of a letter signed by the German Minister here that an armistice, to which Montenegro was a party, had been concluded by the Turkish Government. The letter was conveyed to him by a Montenegrin officer, but he refused to accept the communication, and fighting has continued during the following two months, and an attack was made by the Turks, with some success, on the Servian posts to the south of the town.

On the 5th February a letter purporting to come from the officer in command at Scutari was received at the Montenegrin head-quarters, stating that news of the conclusion of an armistice had reached the garrison, and proposing a meeting with a view to delimitating neutral zones between the combatants. Two Montenegrin officers were sent to parley, and explained to Essad Pasha, who told them that he was acting as commandant in the place of Hassan Riza, that the armistice was on the point of expiry. The incident gave rise to much speculation here, as Essad Pasha is an Albanian and known to be a personal enemy and rival of Hassan Riza, to whose energy and courage the successful defence of the town is attributed. It was even rumoured that the latter had been killed by the townspeople, who were desirous of coming to terms with the besiegers. But nothing has so far occurred to confirm these ideas.

Combined operations of the Montenegrin and Servian forces were commenced on the following day. The Servian troops captured an outlying post at Bushati, some miles to the south of Scutari, and proceeded to attack Bordica. The latter position would seem to be important, as it is situated on an isolated hill opposite to but considerably lower than the principal fort of Tarabosh, which cannot be attacked from the south as long as the Bordica is in the hands of the Turks. So far the Servian attempts to take it do not seem to have met with any success.

On the 6th February the Montenegrin quarters on the east side of the lake were moved further south from Gruda to Grujemir. A heavy fire was opened at daybreak from Murichani against Tarabosh by General Martinovitch, who is in command of the forces operating on the western side of the lake. At 10 o'clock the same day an attack was commenced on the eastern side of the town against the high ground, on which are the villages of Bardanjolt. After two days' fighting the position was taken by assault at 3 o'clock on the 9th February.

I am unable to express an opinion as to what may be the practical value of this success, or how far it may have a decisive effect on the result of the siege. Further operations from the east will, it would seem, be considerably facilitated, but as long as the Turks retain possession of Tarabosh on the west side, which commands the whole of the town, it would seem to be impossible for the Montenegrins to effect any lodgment in it.

The fighting must have been severe. The Montenegrins admit to a loss of 2,500 on the east side of the lake alone. Cettinje is filled with wounded; not only such public buildings as there are, but also private houses and cafés. It is reported that at Podgoritza and Rijeka all available accommodation has been taken for hospitals. The small British Red Cross detachment, which voluntarily remained after the withdrawal of the unit, is at Zogaj, on the west side of the lake, close to Tarabosh.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

[7938] No. 335.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 122.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at the Dardanelles, reporting on the fighting which took place on the Bulair lines on the 7th February.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 335.

Acting Vice-Consul Harris to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Dardanelles, February 11, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on Friday, the 7th February, some severe fighting took place between Bulair and Kuru Dagh. The Bulgarians crossed the bridge over Suyu Dere, and, after some sharp skirmishing with the Turkish outposts, retired in disorder. The Turks followed them and crossed the bridge on to the plain to the west of Kadikeuy and Kavak, at the foot of Kuru Dagh. There they were exposed to a violent shrapnel fire, with the result that they lost at least 3,000 wounded.

Every house and public building available at Gallipoli is full of wounded, and three transports have come here with about 950, nearly all shrapnel wounds.

According to the reports of villagers from the district, the Turks were driven back to Bulair in great confusion.

I have, &c.
M. G. HARRIS.

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[7939] No. 336.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 123.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at the Dardanelles reporting on recent military movements at Gallipoli and the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 336.

Acting Vice-Consul Harris to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Dardanelles, February 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that I went to Gallipoli yesterday morning and found that very great preparations are being made there.

Enver Bey's expedition did not land at Rodosto or anywhere else on the coast of the Marmara, as was reported, but went straight to Indji Burnu, a point between Charkouy and Gallipoli, and landed 4,000 men there on Sunday the 9th, under the protection of the "Medjidie's" [?] guns. The Bulgars nevertheless succeeded in driving them off again. They then left for Gallipoli.

The harbour of the town is full of men-of-war and transports. Of the former, I noticed the "Torghud Reiss," "Barbarosse," and several torpedo-boats, one of which is ashore; just before I left in the evening, another man-of-war was coming up in the offing; I believe it was the "Medjidie." The "Reshid Pasha" and "Midhat Pasha" were also in the port and are said to be full of wounded.

I noticed the following transports:—

"Ou Temouz," "Zahir" "Mahmoud Shevket Pasha," "Ak Deniz," "Kara Deniz," "Bahri-Djedid," "Bezmi Alem," "Plevna," "Ghul Djemal," "Beicos," "Bastangatch," "Scaramangas," and three other Greek steamers, now used as transports, and about twenty Sherket boats, which are used as tenders between the transports and the landing stages.

The greatest confusion reigns in the streets of Gallipoli, which are rendered impassable by crowds of soldiers, horses, baggage animals, sacks of flour and fodder, gun-carriages, &c. Everything points to a great battle for the possession of Kuru Dagh, which is considered the most important strategic point in the district. It is a long ridge at a distance of 20 miles from Bulair running almost parallel with the coast of the Marmara, and the ground slopes down on one side right away to Adrianople, on the other to the sea of Marmara. The idea is evidently to attack the Bulgarians now on their way to Adrianople, in the rear. But the Bulgarians are reported to be very strongly fortified at Kuru Dagh and ready for any force the Turks could send against them.

Fahri Pasha and Fethi Bey, chief of staff, are at Bulair, and Enver Bey was to have joined them there, but the soldiers made a hostile demonstration and he has had to take refuge on the "Barbarosse."

All the officers, whom I saw at Gallipoli, spoke very bitterly of the atrocities perpetrated by the komitajis on the Moslem population of Ipsalla, Malgara, and the hinterland to the north of Kuru Dagh. The soldiers are also incensed by the stories they have heard and all pretence at civilised warfare has now been abandoned. They openly express their intention of giving no quarter and told me rather theatrically, that either no Bulgar or no Turk shall remain in that district. The soldiers are assuming a very threatening attitude towards the local Christians, nearly all of whom have already crossed the Straits to Lampsaki. The mutessarif also sent his family away three days' ago, and this has been followed by a general exodus of Mahommedans.

Meanwhile, the usual difficulties are cropping up in the commissariat department; I am told by the local inhabitants, that groups of soldiers are going round from house to house with money in their hands, asking for bread. All the horses are in an emaciated condition, and no adequate supplies of fodder are forthcoming, though all the stores

have been broken open; the merchants at the Dardanelles too were invited to the Konak yesterday and told that they would have to give up all their stores if required by the military authorities.

I have heard from several sources that the Greeks will probably land troops under the protection of the guns of their fleet at Caba Tepe, directly across the peninsula from Maitos and attack Gallipoli and Bulair from the rear. It is also said that Greek transports are at Gaekli and mean to land troops there. If they do, they will meet with little resistance, as nearly all the troops from this district have left for Gallipoli; trenches are nevertheless being dug all along the Edremit road to the west of the town, and to the east I have seen trenches dug facing the Straits, as if they feared the Bulgars could cross.

The greatest activity reigns everywhere, and we are evidently on the eve of very serious fighting for the possession of the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
M. G. HARRIS.

[7940] No. 337.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 124.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Colonel Tyrrell, military attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, on the subject of the present military situation.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 337.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 14, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to state that news of the military operations now in progress is rather scanty and conflicting, and that there is not much material for a satisfactory report. A certain amount can be gleaned, in broad lines, from the official communiqués to the press, which, however, bear the stamp of being purposely somewhat confused, and which are contradicted as to details by similar, and possibly equally unreliable, communications from Sophia.

In any attempt to gauge the military situation from here we are confronted by the initial difficulty that practically nothing is known of the strength and distribution of the Bulgarian army. But it may be assumed that with the inclusion of the Servian troops its strength is considered adequate to contain the Turkish forces elsewhere while proceeding vigorously with the siege of Adrianople, the capture of which place is most important politically.

At the moment of the renewal of hostilities the Turkish forces (excluding those around Smyrna, which do not seem to be intended for the operations in Thrace, and so need not be considered for the moment) were distributed in two main groups, viz: about 180,000 men in the Chatalja lines and about 50,000 in the Gallipoli Peninsula (the figures are only rough estimates and may conceivably be very far wrong), while some 30,000 men were at Ismid and Panderma in readiness to be transported by sea to reinforce either army or to co-operate with either by a timely landing on the European coast.

The Turks are bound to attempt the relief of Adrianople, and must assume the offensive, which is the rôle least suited to them, with one or other of their armies.

Each of the Turkish armies has practically one road by which it can advance on Adrianople, that of the main army, though it has the advantage of a railway, being very much the longer one. The Bulgarians were probably influenced by this consideration, and by the idea that lack of transport, bad weather, and bad roads would render the Turkish advance from this side an extremely slow and difficult proceeding, when deciding to withdraw their own main army from its position before the Chatalja lines, which it had taken considerable pains to fortify. Also, with the

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resumption of hostilities their army lost the line of supply by rail through Adrianople which it had enjoyed during the armistice; and with both shores of the peninsula athwart which it stood under the control of the Turkish fleet, its rear and communications would always have been threatened by the disembarkation of the 30,000 men in readiness on the Asiatic coast of the Marmora.

That it has withdrawn, whether with or without fighting, there seems to be no doubt, and the Turks seem now to be on a line Ormanli–Kalfa Keui–Akalan–Chatalja–Boghados, while advanced troops seem to have reached Sinekli. Details as to the Turkish advance are wanting, but it seems to have been somewhat cautious, and the Bulgarians appear to have imposed on them, and even to have delayed their advance in places by the use of dummy figures, stove pipes to represent guns, &c., showing in the trenches. It is said that the Bulgarians have not damaged the railway in their retreat, which might be taken as a sign that they mean to return; and railway engineers and workmen to repair telegraph lines have been sent from Constantinople to the front, as well as a "works" train to reopen communication between Hademkeui and Chatalja village.

It will be interesting to see how far the Bulgarians have withdrawn, and how far they will allow the Turks to advance on this line. They may be drawing them on as far from their base and their fortified position as possible before giving them battle, or they may have foreseen that the Turks, if pressed in the direction of Bulair, would not be able to resist the temptation of detaching troops from the main theatre of war to reinforce Gallipoli instead of making their Chatalja army as strong as possible with the Bulgarian main army as their sole objective.

There has been fighting in the region of Hexamili (north-east of Bulair), of which little can yet be said except that it seems to have been quite severe and the Turks to have been driven back on the lines of Bulair, while the tale of their wounded sent back to Gallipoli is a heavy one.

I had previously reported that the troops at Ismid and Panderma were probably destined to effect a landing about Sharkeui to co-operate in the advance of the Gallipoli army by acting on the flank of the Bulgarian force opposed to it. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that the 31st division left Ismid on the 7th in five transports, and that the 32nd division left Panderma and Artaki on the same evening in four transports, while on the 8th two Italian warships which passed through the Dardanelles for Constantinople report having seen, at 6·30 that evening, nine transports lying off Sharkeui under convoy of the Turkish fleet, which was then bombarding the village. It has since transpired that an attempt to land about 4,000 men about Sharkeui was made on the 8th, but that it failed, and that here also the Turks incurred heavy losses. Now, a report which I have just seen from His Majesty's vice-consul at the Dardanelles states that the battle about Hexamili took place on the 7th. It also says that an abortive attempt at a disembarkation was made on the 9th at Inje Burun, about eight miles nearer to Bulair than is Sharkeui. Whether this refers to the same operation as the one previously mentioned, or whether it was a second attempt at a landing, it would seem that a part, at least, of the troops transported were intended to co-operate with the Gallipoli army as suggested above, but that, in addition to the fact that the Bulgars were prepared for this move, they arrived at least a day too late, and after the fight about Hexamili had been settled.

In the meantime there has been considerable embarkation of troops at Constantinople and San Stefano. From the 7th to the 11th some 15 ships left Constantinople with stores, carts, pontoons, &c., and perhaps 9,000 men, while 25,000 are reported to have been "embarked and entrained" at San Stefano on the 10th, a piece of information which is very vague, and therefore only to be taken as an indication that a fairly considerable embarkation took place.

In addition to the above-mentioned ships, the boats of the Shirket Company which ply for passengers up and down the Bosphorus have been used for troop transport, and on the 8th the whole service was dislocated by the fact that the Government requisitioned 17 of these steamers. They can hardly be said to be sea boats, but they have powerful engines and are capable of going anywhere in the Marmora in fine weather, while the larger ones are capable of taking from 1,000 to 1,500 men. They are now being used as tenders between the transports and landing stages at Gallipoli.

On the 8th and 9th the Turks commenced withdrawing troops from Chatalja. Though small numbers only have so far been reported to me, this fact probably accounts for the embarkations at San Stefano.

With all this movement going on it has been extremely difficult to say where the troops were actually being taken, in which connection I may note the excellent

result, from a Turkish point of view, of the prohibition of cypher telegrams, mentioned in my despatch No. 8. The papers report bombardments of, and landings at, various places, such as Rodosto, Eregli, Silivri, but these are all probably invented, for an Englishman just returned from the Dardanelles reports having seen the whole flotilla, of about 45 ships (including the Shirket steamers), with the troops still on board, lying off Gallipoli. This looks as though, whatever original intentions may have been, practically all the troops which have been embarked are now destined to reinforce the Gallipoli army. This may mean that the intention is to advance on Adrianople by the shorter line, or it may be that the Turks have been induced to send all available troops to guard against the Bulgarian threat on the peninsula.

Two days ago a Turkish officer told me, and I think he was speaking what he believed to be the truth, that the main debarkment was to be at Rodosto. "There is our great hope," he said, putting his finger on the map, "that is where Khurshid and Enver are now." This tends to show that the presence now of all the transports at Gallipoli is due to the pressure of the Bulgarians in front of Bulair, which is imposing upon the Turks action which was not originally intended.

For some days there were rumours in Constantinople that the Turks had effected a landing on the Black Sea coast. This appears to be supported by a wire from Sophia, dated the 9th: "Turkish attempt to land at Podina on Black Sea repulsed with loss of 50 killed." A ship full of troops did, in fact, leave Constantinople in the direction of the Black Sea on the evening of the 7th, and local information says that it carried from 200 to 400 Kurdish cavalry and 90 Caucasian volunteers. This force disembarked and advanced some way inland, when it met a Bulgarian force (survivors aver they were Russians), which dispersed the Caucasians, only about 40 of whom regained the ship. The Kurds meantime disappeared into the country. I had previously been told that the Kurdish cavalry now in the Selimiyeh barracks (see my despatch No. 94 of the 27th December) would probably be let loose on the Black Sea coast, where they might harry the flank and communications of the Bulgarian army without being too much exposed to the danger of meeting regular troops in combat, and also, perhaps, to burn villages and overrun the country as reprisals for the doings of the komitajis, a task which may be supposed to appeal to their instincts and to be suited to their military value. It may be noted in this connection that there is no news of the embarkation of the Kharput Redif division, which I suppose to be at Kartal, near Ismid, and I have been told that this division is being held in reserve for the Black Sea coast to prepare the way for the disembarkation, and then to support the raid, of the Kurdish cavalry division.

The navy appears to be too busy watching transport and disembarkment operations in the Marmora to have any thoughts of going out to try conclusions with the "Averoff" again, and the bulk of it was at Gallipoli on the 11th. The "Assari-Tevfik" was in the Black Sea supporting the right of the Turkish position at Chatalja. On the 10th she was reported to be aground near Podina (another account says off Kara Burun), and two tugs went from Constantinople to float her. It is reported that up till yesterday their efforts had been unsuccessful, that she was being fired on by Bulgarians, and that the cruiser "Mejidie" was going up from the Marmora to her assistance. Two old and disused ships, the "Ijlalie" and the "Zouave," have been fitted with guns, and their names are mentioned in the papers as participating in bombardments or assisting at disembarkations in the Marmora.

The "Hamidie," whose raid a month ago caused some excitement, is reported from Port Said as having returned from the Red Sea and come up the canal for the Mediterranean.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

P.S.—With reference to the troops mentioned above as being at Kartal, there have been rumours here, and they been repeated in the local press, of the prevalence of cholera in that place.

G. E. T.

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[7933] No. 338.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 90.)

Sir, *Paris, February* 18, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 43 of the 29th ultimo, copy of an *aide-mémoire* from the Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the protection of the interests of the foreign holders of Turkish bonds. M. Jonnart enquires whether His Majesty's Government accept the draft articles, dated the 10th January, which were transmitted to you in my despatch No. 17 of the 15th January, formulating the principles to be recommended to the belligerent States for the safeguarding of the creditors of the Ottoman Empire and of the holders of concessions and contracts in the provinces of European Turkey. In that event, M. Jonnart suggests that the councillors of the embassies concerned should resume, in conjunction with M. Gout, the examination of the methods of applying and carrying out the dispositions of the first two articles.

His Excellency further transmits to me copy of a fresh text of the draft articles, containing certain amendments to the second and third articles.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 338.

Aide-mémoire.

EN se référant à la note en date du 14 janvier dernier, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères serait désireux de savoir si son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique accepte les projets d'articles sous la date du 10 janvier, posant les principes qui doivent être recommandés aux Puissances belligérantes en orient pour la sauvegarde des créanciers de l'Empire ottoman et des détenteurs de concessions ou de contrats dans les provinces européennes de la Turquie. Si telle est l'opinion de son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie, M. Jonnart lui proposerait de vouloir bien, en conformité de l'article 3 du projet ci-dessus visé, continuer avec lui l'examen des modalités d'application et d'exécution des dispositions des deux premiers articles, afin d'arrêter les vues des Puissances en ces matières. Comme il a été procédé antérieurement, les Ambassadeurs pourraient inviter les conseillers de leurs ambassades à se réunir avec M. Gout, Ministre plénipotentiaire, sous-directeur au Département des Affaires Étrangères, pour procéder à un travail préparatoire.

M. Jonnart croit devoir communiquer ci-joint à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique un nouveau texte du projet d'articles contenant, d'une part, un amendement proposé à l'article 2 par le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, et, d'autre part, une modification de pure forme de l'article 3.

Paris, le 12 février, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 338.

Projet d'Articles.

CHACUN des États signataires du présent traité qui reçoit cession d'une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman supportera une part de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois derniers exercices financiers.

La quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera incessible, insaisissable et ne pourra faire l'objet de compensation; des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles dont le maintien sera reconnu impraticable seront données par les États cessionnaires pour la garantie des créanciers.

La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée sera convertible en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent.

2. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemins de fer et autres ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité; ils s'engagent également à remettre les compagnies intéressées en possession immédiate

des lignes exploitées par elles avant la guerre, nonobstant tout règlement qui pourrait être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord avec les intéressés; ils engagent, en outre, dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valablement consentis par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités ottomanes compétentes.

3. Les modes d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront élaborés par une commission internationale, où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances, et qui se réunira à , le . Les procès-verbaux et les protocoles de cette commission seront annexés au présent traité.

[7971] No. 339.

National Bank of Turkey to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)

Sir, 50, *Cornhill, London, February* 18, 1913.

WE beg leave to refer to our letter of the 20th December, 1912, by which we set forth certain obligations of the Imperial Ottoman Government in connection with an issue of 1,500,000*l.* Treasury bills maturing the 28th February (13th March), 1913, and forwarded copy of the contract with the Imperial Ottoman Government, dated the 1st (14th) February, 1912.

We now beg to draw the attention of Secretary Sir Edward Grey to clause 1, article 7, of that contract, by which, among others, the surplus customs revenues of the Salonica district are assigned as security for these Treasury bills. In respect of the payment of £ T. 300,000, due on the 31st January (13th February), in accordance with clause 2 of article 7, only £ T. 75,000 has been received, and the Turkish Government is now in default as regards the remaining £ T. 225,000. The customs and indirect contributions of the Salonica district having been for some time encashed by one or some of the allied Balkan States, it is necessary that such State or States be notified of the contract of the 1st (14th) February, 1912, and of the claim of the holders of the Treasury bills, which are largely held in this country, that the revenues collected in the district of Salonica be held on their behalf to the extent to which they have been assigned for the security of the holders of the bills.

We beg to enclose several prints of the contract above referred to, and shall be grateful if Secretary Sir Edward Grey will cause the necessary steps to be taken, in order to notify the Governments concerned of the position of the holders of the Treasury bills.

We have, &c.

(For National Bank of Turkey),

R. BECHT, *Manager.*

Enclosure in No. 339.

Contract dated February 14, 1912.

BONS DU TRÉSOR DU GOUVERNEMENT OTTOMAN 5½ POUR CENT, 1912.

ENTRE le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, représenté par son Excellence Naïl Bey, Ministre des Finances, agissant en vertu de l'article 8 de la Loi des Finances pour l'année 1327 (1911–12), d'une part; et la Banque nationale de Turquie, représentée par Sir Henry Babington Smith, président du conseil d'administration et directeur général, et son Excellence Ahmed Djémal Bey, administrateur, de ladite banque; et la Banque de Salonique, représentée par M. Alfred Misrachi, directeur général, et M. I. Franses, co-directeur, de ladite banque, d'autre part—qui seront ci-après dénommées les banques contractantes—il a été arrêté et convenu ce qui suit:—

Article 1er. Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman décide de contracter un emprunt à court terme, en créant des bons du Trésor pour un montant de 1,500,000*l.* à l'échéance du 28 février (13 mars), 1328 (1913), qu'il cède aux banques contractantes, qui acceptent, aux conditions ci-après déterminées.

Art. 2. Les bons faisant l'objet de la présente convention seront libellés en livres sterling au porteur. Leur remboursement aura lieu en livres sterling, à l'agence de la Banque nationale de Turquie à Londres.

Art. 3. Les bons seront divisés en 260 coupures de 5,000*l.* chacune, et 200 coupures de 1,000*l.* chacune.

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Art. 4. La remise des bons aura lieu le 1er (14) mars, 1328 (1912), à l'agence de la Banque nationale de Turquie à Londres, et les banques contractantes les escompteront dans les conditions ci-après, sur la base d'un escompte de 5½ pour cent l'an.

La contrevaleur des bons au taux de 98½ pour cent diminuée du montant de l'escompte sur la base ci-dessus, soit la somme de 1,395,000*l.*, sera portée à cette date au crédit d'un compte spécial que la Banque nationale de Turquie à Londres, ouvrira au Gouvernement ottoman, et qui sera productif d'un intérêt au taux de 1 pour cent l'an au-dessous du taux d'escompte de la Banque d'Angleterre, avec minimum de 2 pour cent et maximum de 4 pour cent l'an.

Sur ce compte spécial, la Banque nationale de Turquie prélèvera une somme équivalente à ¼ pour cent sur le montant nominal des bons. Les banques contractantes prendront à leur charge tout courtage ou commission qui devra être payé au cours de l'opération.

Art. 5. Il est expressément convenu que les bons faisant l'objet de la présente convention seront remboursés sur le produit du premier emprunt qui sera contracté par le Gouvernement Impérial, exception faite de l'Emprunt ottoman 4 pour Cent des Routes nationales, avec affectation spéciale sur les douanes de la circonscription de Trébizonde; de la seconde tranche de l'Emprunt Impérial ottoman 4 pour Cent, 1911, avec affectations spéciales sur les douanes du vilayet de Constantinople, et de tout emprunt dont le produit est affecté exclusivement aux travaux publics.

Aussitôt l'emprunt en question contracté, le Ministère prélèvera sur le produit de l'emprunt la contrevaleur desdits bons qu'il versera à l'agence de la Banque nationale de Turquie à Londres, pour être payée aux porteurs des bons à leur échéance.

Dans ce cas, la Banque nationale de Turquie bonifiera au Gouvernement un intérêt égal à l'intérêt réel de l'emprunt (intérêt correspondant au prix de la prise ferme des titres) sur la somme qui lui aura été versée, à partir de la date du versement susdit, jusqu'à l'échéance des bons du Trésor. Si la Banque nationale de Turquie ne trouve pas de sa convenance de payer le taux d'intérêt susdit, dans ce cas le Gouvernement remboursera les bons à leur échéance.

Les banques contractantes auront le droit de recevoir en titres dudit emprunt la contrevaleur desdits bons, en se chargeant du remboursement desdits bons en effectif, et en calculant la valeur desdits titres au prix fixé par le contrat de l'emprunt comme prix de la prise ferme des titres par l'établissement financier qui signera le contrat de l'emprunt.

Les banques contractantes jouiront, en ce qui concerne lesdits titres, des mêmes délais de payement et de jouissance que l'établissement financier qui aura contracté l'emprunt. Lesdits titres devront être remis, libres de tous frais, aux banques contractantes, confectionnés et dûment timbrés. La proportion desdits titres à timbrer dans chaque pays sera conforme à celle stipulée pour les titres de l'emprunt en général. Les banques contractantes devront supporter, pour les titres leur revenant, l'allocation forfaitaire allouée à l'établissement qui aura contracté l'emprunt pour les frais de confection, d'émission, de publicité, de timbre et autres, pourvu toutefois que cette allocation ne soit pas comprise dans le prix de la prise ferme des titres et que la quotité de l'allocation ne soit pas supérieure aux précédents.

S'il était alloué à l'établissement qui aura contracté l'emprunt une bonification pécuniaire quelconque, en dehors de l'allocation forfaitaire susmentionnée, les banques contractantes jouiront également de cette bonification.

La cote qui sera obtenue pour les titres de l'emprunt en question devra comprendre les titres qui devront être livrés aux banques contractantes.

Au cas où des titres d'emprunt seraient assumés par les banques contractantes comme ci-dessus pour le remboursement des bons à leur échéance, les intérêts courus sur ces titres, à partir de la date de leur jouissance jusqu'à la date du remboursement des bons, seront restournés au Gouvernement par lesdites banques.

Au cas où il ne serait pas de la convenance du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman d'accorder aux banques contractantes le droit d'option comme ci-dessus sur les titres de l'emprunt éventuel susdit, le Gouvernement aura le droit de proposer aux banques contractantes la création d'un emprunt à part, d'un montant suffisant au remboursement des bons, au même prix et dans les mêmes conditions de timbrage et de cote ainsi que dans les mêmes autres conditions purement financières que l'emprunt susdit, et avec garanties identiques ou équivalentes ou autres garanties agréées par les banques contractantes. Si les banques contractantes n'acceptent pas cette proposition, elles ne pourront plus exercer le droit d'option susdit, et les bons seront remboursés à leur échéance.

Les stipulations qui précèdent ne modifient en rien l'engagement du Gouvernement

Impérial de rembourser les bons à leur échéance par ses propres ressources, au cas où il n'aurait contracté aucun emprunt, pour quelque cause que ce soit, avant la date de cette échéance.

Art. 6. Les banques contractantes jouiront du droit d'option stipulé au quatrième paragraphe de l'article 5 du présent contrat sur les titres de l'emprunt éventuel visé au premier paragraphe du même article, avec tous les avantages y stipulés, jusqu'à concurrence du montant qui, aux prix de prise ferme des titres, équivaudra au montant primitif des bons faisant l'objet du présent contrat, et cela jusqu'à la date de l'échéance des bons.

Afin de permettre aux banques contractantes l'exercice du droit qui leur est conféré par l'article 5 du présent contrat, ainsi que par le présent article, le Gouvernement Impérial notifiera auxdites banques les conditions établies avec l'établissement financier qui contractera l'emprunt, et les dites banques devront, dans les cinq jours qui suivront cette notification, déclarer si elles font usage de leur droit. Ce délai passé sans acceptation de la part des banques contractantes, celles-ci ne jouiront plus du droit d'option susdit.

Art. 7. Pour assurer le payement du capital et des intérêts des bons, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman assigne et affecte aux banques contractantes, d'une manière exclusive, irrévocable et inaliénable de sa part, à partir du 1er (14) mars, 1328 (1912), jusqu'à parfait remboursement des bons en capital et intérêts, les revenus de l'Administration générale des Douanes et Contributions indirectes dans les directions de Salonique, de Smyrne, d'Andrinople, de Brousse et de Beyrouth, déduction faite des frais administratifs et de perception, et à l'exclusion des revenus provenant de l'augmentation de 3 pour cent apportée aux droits d'importation, ainsi que du produit de toute augmentation ultérieure éventuelle de ces droits, le tout après prélèvement de la somme de £ T. 390,000 affectée au service de l'Emprunt Douanes en vertu du contrat du 28 septembre (11 octobre), 1902, entre le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et la Banque Impériale ottomane, de la somme de £ T. 122,000 affectée au service de l'emprunt 1901-1905, et de la somme de £ T. 130,000 affectée au service de l'emprunt 1908.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman s'engage d'ores et déjà à verser à la Banque nationale de Turquie, à compter du 1er (14) mars, 1328 (1912), jusqu'à la date de l'échéance des bons, et si, par impossible, les bons n'étaient pas payés à l'échéance, jusqu'à leur parfait remboursement avec les intérêts éventuels de retard, la totalité des revenus desdites douanes faisant excédent sur un montant de ces revenus égal au total des affectations—annuelles antérieures spécifiées ci-dessus—soit £ T. 642,000, cela chaque année mensuellement dès la date où ce montant aura été atteint et encaissé, le tout en exécution de la garantie accordée par le présent article au payement en capital et intérêt des susdits bons. Toutefois, par exception, au cours de l'année 1328 (1912–13), lesdits excédents seront versés à ladite banque, pour une somme de £ T. 300,000 au minimum, le 31 janvier (13 février), 1328 (1913), et le solde de l'excédent à la fin de l'année, si toutefois la provision nécessaire au remboursement des bons n'a pas été déjà parfaite avant cette date.

Au cas où le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman désirerait reprendre la libre disposition des revenus affectés ci-dessus, il aura la faculté de les libérer, soit en y substituant une autre affectation ou garantie agréée par les banques contractantes, soit en déposant auprès de la Banque nationale de Turquie la somme nécessaire à parfaire la provision pour le remboursement desdits bons à l'échéance.

Dans le cas où une autre affectation ou garantie aurait été substituée aux revenus affectés ci-dessus, ainsi que dans le cas où des titres de l'emprunt éventuel visé à l'article 5, paragraphe premier, auraient été remis aux banques contractantes, la Banque nationale de Turquie tiendra à la disposition du Gouvernement tout somme qui aura été versée à cette banque sur les revenus susdits des douanes, ainsi que les intérêts courus au taux stipulé ci-dessous.

Les stipulations du présent article ne peuvent en aucune façon modifier la date de l'exigibilité des bons, qui reste toujours fixée comme ci-dessus au 28 février (13 mars), 1328 (1913).

Art. 8. Les versements à faire à la Banque nationale de Turquie sur les revenus de la douane, conformément aux dispositions de l'article 7 du présent contrat, seront faits à Constantinople, en effectif ou en couverture sur Londres.

Si les versements sont faits en effectif, la Banque nationale de Turquie remettra à Londres au mieux de l'intérêt du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, la contrevaleur en sterling des versements ainsi effectués dans les trois jours qui suivront leur réception, pour être portée au crédit du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman à partir du huitième jour de la réception des fonds à Constantinople. Au cas où un versement serait fait

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par chèque sur Londres, ledit compte sera crédité le cinquième jour après la remise du chèque à la Banque nationale du Turquie à Constantinople. Ledit intérêt sera calculé au taux de 1 pour cent l'an au-dessous du taux d'escompte de la Banque d'Angleterre, avec minimum de 2 pour cent et maximum de 4 pour cent l'an.

Art. 9. Les droits de timbre à payer en Angleterre seront à la charge du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman.

Tous les frais de timbre qui pourraient être exigibles en Turquie sur le présent contrat, les lettres, copies, quittances ou actes d'une nature quelconque, se rapportant à l'emprunt faisant l'objet du présent contrat, sont à la charge du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman.

Art. 10. Toute contestation pouvant naître entre le Gouvernement Impérial et les banques contractantes du chef de l'exécution et de l'interprétation du présent contrat résolue par deux arbitres, dont l'un sera désigné par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et l'autre par lesdites banques.

En cas de désaccord, ces arbitres nommeront un tiers arbitre pour les départager. Sa décision sera définitive et exécutoire pour les deux parties.

Fait en triple exemplaire et échangé à Constantinople le 1er (14) février 1328 (1912).

Le Ministre des Finances,
NAIL.

Pour la Banque nationale de Turquie :
Le Président du Conseil d'Administration
et Directeur général,
H. BABINGTON SMITH.

Un Administrateur,
A. DJÉMAL.

Pour la Banque de Salonique :
Le Directeur général,
ALFRED MISRACHI.

Le Co-Directeur,
I. FRANSES.

A son Excellence Naïl Bey, Ministre des Finances, &c.

M. le Ministre, *Constantinople, le* 1er (14) *février*, 1328 (1912).

Au troisième paragraphe de l'article 7 du contrat signé le 1er (14) Février, 1327 (1912), entre votre Excellence, la Banque nationale de Salonique, il est stipulé qu'au cas où le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman désirerait reprendre la libre disposition des revenus affectés à l'emprunt qui fait l'objet du susdit contrat, il aura le droit de libérer lesdits revenus, soit en y substituant une autre affectation ou en indiquant une autre garantie agréée par les banques contractantes, soit

Nous déclarons agréer dores et déjà, à cet effet, la garantie de l'une des banques contractantes ou de l'un des établissements ci-dessous énumérés, soit :—

La Banque Impériale ottomane.
La Deutsche Bank.
Le Crédit Lyonnais.
La Banque d'Angleterre.
The London County and Westminster Bank.
La Société générale pour favoriser le développement du Commerce et de l'Industrie en France.
La Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas.
La Maison Rothschild à Londres.
La Maison Rothschild à Paris.
La Maison Rothschild à Vienne.
La Dresdner Bank.

Veuillez, &c.
H. BABINGTON SMITH.
A. DJÉMAL.
A. MISRACHI.
I. FRANSES.

[8076] No. 340.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, February* 19, 1913.

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir Louis Mallet's letter of the 1st instant, in which Secretary Sir Edward Grey invites the observations of their Lordships on the financial aspects of the recommendations made by Sir H. Babington Smith as concerns the protection of British and foreign financial interests which may be affected by the cession of Turkish territory on the conclusion of the war.

They have also had before them subsequent communications enclosing telegraphic replies to various questions which they have suggested.

In the short period which has elapsed since their advice was asked, it has not been possible for their Lordships to make a thorough examination of this complicated question, but they understand that the Secretary of State is anxious for an immediate reply. They accordingly desire me to make the following observations :—

The general proposal, as my Lords understand it, is that the allies shall assume a portion of the charge for the Turkish Debt, in the sense not that they will take over directly any portion of the Turkish Debt (relieving Turkey so far of its obligation towards its creditors), but that they will undertake to pay certain sums (annual or capital) to the Ottoman Government as a contribution towards the Debt charges for which it is liable, leaving the relations of Turkey and its creditors undisturbed.

In order that the holders of the Turkish Debt may not be prejudiced, it is desirable to secure two conditions :—

(*a.*) That the total contribution made by the allies shall not be less than the actual or average contribution to the service of the Debt made by the ceded territories before the war.

(*b.*) That the contribution shall be applied to the service of the various loans in such a manner as to preserve the existing rights *inter se* of the various classes of bondholders. Of these the former is the more important and immediate; if this is secured the second condition does not concern the Balkan States, but is rather a matter for independent arrangement between Turkey and the Great Powers.

As the Debt of the Ottoman Empire is primarily secured on revenues specifically assigned to the service of the several loans the most satisfactory method of determining the contribution of the allies would be, in theory, to proceed from the basis of the actual contribution made by the various portions of the ceded territories to the service of the Debt. This method, if adopted, would avoid difficult questions (which in any case must be settled beforehand) as to the allocation of the contributions of the allies as between the various loans, but, as Sir H. Babington Smith points out, the calculation on this basis would involve numerous debatable questions and great practical difficulties, and my Lords note from Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 91 of the 16th February that even the Council of the Debt would not propose to apply it as regards any loans other than those regulated by the decree of Muharrem.

On giving their best consideration to the various arguments adduced, their Lordships have come to the conclusion that the situation is such as to make it inadvisable, and indeed unnecessary, to suggest at the present stage that this method of calculation should be proposed, except so far as may be involved by the proviso mentioned below.

It appears to them that under no régime which may be established in the ceded territories will it be possible that the bondholders shall have precisely the same security as they now enjoy. The fiscal system of the ceded territory will in all probability be assimilated to that of each annexing State: it will be undesirable, if not impossible (as Sir H. Babington Smith observes), that the Ottoman Debt Administration should continue to act on present lines, or at all, in the ceded territories; nor can it be predicted with any certainty that the cession of territory to the Balkan States and consequent diversions of trade will not affect (either for better or for worse), say, the customs of Salonica.

In these circumstances it appears to their Lordships that, as regards the ceded territories, the creditors of Turkey can only be offered in the future security equivalent to (not identical with) the security which they now possess, and, provided that the

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principle of equivalent security is insisted on, the plan advocated by the French Government offers a simple and satisfactory solution of the question, namely, that the contribution of the allies should be determined according to the ratio existing between the revenues of the ceded territories and the aggregate revenues of the Ottoman Empire.

For these reasons the French "Projet d'Articles" of the 27th January (see Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 43 of the 29th January) appears to my Lords to be satisfactory, subject to one reservation, viz., that the formula therein laid down does not necessarily secure the primary condition which they indicated above in paragraph (*a*). They would accordingly suggest to the Secretary of State that a proviso should be added in the sense suggested by the German banks, namely, that the total sum payable by the allies shall not be less than the aggregate yield of the assigned revenues in the ceded territories.

With the remainder of Sir H. Babington Smith's memorandum my Lords find themselves in substantial agreement, and they do not think they need advert in detail to his recommendations; but they would like to emphasise the suggestion made in the concluding paragraph of that memorandum, that numerous difficulties would be avoided if the contribution of the allies towards the Turkish Debt could take the form of a capital payment which would be applied through the Council of the Debt in discharge of a corresponding portion of the Ottoman Debt.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[8080] No. 341.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 19, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 65 of 16th February.

Grand Vizier has received a message from Shukri Pasha asking what reply he should give to Bulgarian messenger. The Grand Vizier is not disposed to allow foreigners to leave, owing to risk of their revealing valuable information, but he would consent to their being relegated to Karagatch.

The French Ambassador has been endeavouring to induce the Grand Vizier to agree to their departure, and the latter has now consented to refer the question to the Cabinet.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[8092] No. 342.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 19, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that the French Ambassador, M. Louis, has been recalled by his Government on grounds of ill-health, and the Emperor has approved the appointment of M. Delcassé as his successor.

His Excellency said that the news had taken him completely by surprise, and that it had much upset the German Ambassador, to whom he told it yesterday.

Though M. Louis was unwell in December, his health is now quite restored, but his wife's health has kept her absent from St. Petersburgh for more than a year, and this, coupled with the fact that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs does not like him, may have induced the new President of the Republic to replace him.

[8093] No. 343.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February 19, 1913.*

BALKANS.

Please refer to Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 25, marked Very Confidential, of the 17th [illegible].

There is no good foundation for French criticism of policy of the Russian Government.

The successive victories of the allied Balkan States induced the Russian Government to modify its attitude in regard to territorial changes in the same way as the other Powers, and it was not until it was clear that Bulgaria would not be satisfied with anything less than Adrianople that Russia advocated the cession of that town by Turkey.

The anxiety of M. Sazonof to avoid war between Roumania and Bulgaria, and the consequent inevitable intervention of Russia and probability of a general European war, inspired his action in recommending the cession of Silistria. The determination of the Emperor to preserve peace, almost at any price, is shown by the line thus taken by the Russian Government.

[8082] No. 344.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 67 A.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 19, 1913.*

ADRIANOPLE.

My telegram of 16th February.

My communication with His Majesty's consul at Adrianople has been limited to one official telegram asking him to let Bulgarian Government know the number of British subjects, if any, in the town. Similar telegram has been handed to the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs by my French, Austrian, and Russian colleagues at the request of Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. We have not yet heard whether the telegram has got through the Turkish lines.

[8091] No. 345.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 19, 1913.*

A Mr. WALLIS of the Society of Friends and an occasional contributor to "Daily News" has called on me. He is anxious to disprove stories of alleged outrages and proselytising converts by the Bulgarians, and he erroneously charges the legation with spreading reports regarding outrages. He has seen Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, and the latter has evidently shown him the text of memorandum presented to Bulgarian Government by your instructions. He asks me for details and sources of information on which memoranda are based. I have considered it advisable to withhold this information.

As Mr. Wallis intends to travel in the country for purposes of investigation, do you approve my instructing vice-consul at Philippopoli to inform him of authentic and indisputable instances, of which he has proof, and to advise the consul-general at Salonica in that sense? The matter is of some importance, as Wallis is fond of publicity, and one letter of his has already appeared, I gather, in the English press and has been reported here.

[8085] No. 346.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 19, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

My telegram No. 64 of 15th February.

Minister of Finance has just called. He states that Bulgarian Government have received information from Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest to the effect that Roumanian Government would not be unwilling to submit their differences to

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arbitration of Italian and Russian Governments, with a third Government as super-arbiter if necessary. Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs further informed Bulgarian representative that his Government proposed recalling Roumanian representative here for a few days only, in order to discuss with him the state of negotiations and to hear exactly his own personal impressions. His Excellency added that Roumanian Government would also be compelled to call out the reserves immediately as a precautionary measure; he sincerely trusted that neither of these actions would be misunderstood by the Bulgarian Government, and that they would be viewed in the right light. Minister of Finance stated that he had just come from the Cabinet Council, that his colleagues considered such action on the part of Roumanian Government would be most reprehensible, and that they were indignant at the proposed method of procedure.

His Excellency declared that, should the Roumanian Government act as proposed, such ill-feeling would be created that he feared they would have to depart from their present policy and would call on their Servian allies to aid them in resisting the Roumanian territorial pretensions.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[8081] No. 347.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 37. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 19, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 18th February.

From what I learn from my Russian and Italian colleagues of the Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversations with them at his Excellency's weekly reception yesterday, it seems clear that the Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes to obtain from the Powers eventually selected as mediators some kind of assurance that proposed mediation will not leave Silistria to Bulgaria.

My Italian colleague, to whom the Minister for Foreign Affairs has as yet made no formal request for Italy's mediation, tells me that Italy will in no case accept the rôle of mediator if her hands are thus tied, and unless final decision in the event of disagreement between the two mediators is to be left to an umpire.

[8080] No. 348.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 19, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 98 of 19th February: Foreign subjects at Adrianople.

You should support your French colleague if any further representation becomes necessary.

(Repeated to Sophia, No. 50.)

[7756] No. 349.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 19, 1913.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires called on the 15th February to communicate to Sir A. Nicolson an item of information which he thought might be of interest.

Fifteen or twenty Turkish officers of various grades were about to proceed, viâ Bucharest, to Vienna, where they would meet a certain Dervish Hima, who for a long time past the Servian Government had known as an Austrian agitator in Albania—he was, in fact, an Austrian secret agent. This Dervish Hima would supply the Turkish officers with means and fuller instructions, and dispatch them by sea to Vallona, whence the officers would proceed to organise bands and guerilla warfare against the Serbs and Greeks. Five of these officers had already arrived at Bucharest and were

awaiting their companions. M. Grouitch said that this information is quite trustworthy. Sir A. Nicolson asked him who was supplying the funds for this enterprise. M. Grouitch said he would leave it to Sir A. Nicolson to conjecture.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8222] No. 350.

Miss Durham to Mr. Nevinson.—(Received at Foreign Office, February 20.)

Dear Mr. Nevinson, *Podgoritza, February 10, 1913.*

MANY thanks for letter of the 2nd February, to which I will reply later. Last Friday at 5 P.M. began the attempts to take Scutari by storm.

I applied for leave to go to the camp and was refused by the prefect, one Markovitch, but at once scored off him by wiring Cettinjé and getting full permit. But just as I'd got it, came pouring in a flood of wounded. And I've stayed on to help. It is reckoned over 2,000 wounded have as yet arrived. And except the Italian, which has been reinforced, all the Red Crosses have left and the hospitals are bunged up with enteric. So it is a mess. The Montenegrins, in their usual way, have been talking for two months of attacking Scutari, and have not got ready a thing for wounded. The houses here are now crammed.

How many are dead no one knows. It is said three battalions are pretty nearly annihilated.

The Montenegrin Red Cross has a lot of stuff and money, but gives out most reluctantly. I'm trying to hold my stuff for the Albanians, as they will get short shrift and little help.

The Montenegrins make no concealment of their hope of killing off the people and re-settling the land. Their enmity and their pitilessness are blood-curdling. I had a long talk the other day with the man who is now secretary to the Provisional Government in Bijelopoljo. He boasted, and with pride, of the fact that in the campaign in "Old Servia" the Montenegrins have destroyed every man of the Rugova tribe. Having overpowered Rugova, "nous les avons fait filer par le sabre. Je vous assure qu'il n'y reste pas un—pas un! Mais des bêtes sauvages—des animaux!"

The Serbs did the same, according to their own account, in Ljuma. It is no wonder that correspondents have not been allowed, for this has been not merely a war but—whenever opportunity allowed—a massacre, a race extermination. The Montenegrins say quite openly that if they once get hold of a slice of Albania there will be no Albanian question in it. The extermination and forcible shavising of the race is intended. Kill off the males and force the children into Serb schools. It ought not to be allowed at this period of the world's development.

All the tribesmen of the Albanian mountains were summoned to assist in the assault on Scutari. But so far as I can learn only a small proportion has gone. The Gruda tribe has, after a week's hesitation, gone in force. Its chief, Sokol Betzi, is practically Montenegrin. Kastrati too has gone. Of the others, I believe, few.

The same secretary of Bijelopolje gave me a very interesting account of the Prohaska affair—the Austrian consul at Prisrend. The secretary was attached to Yanko Vukotich, the Montenegrin general, and was all through that campaign. I asked him about Prohaska, and said I supposed the Austrians had exaggerated the affair. He laughed much and said: "Exaggerated! On the contrary, they dare not tell the truth. All Europe would mock at them and they would be forced to declare war. Oh! the Serb officers played 'des jolis tours' to Prohaska. They insulted him in every possible way. They even spat in his face!" "But why?" "Why? To show what they think of Austria—to mock at Austria. He was very impertinent; he posed as representing Austria. He invited 'des sales Arnaouts' to his house!" "But he did represent Austria, and a consul has the right to ask people to his house." "Mais quel consulat! Austria is finished there, and now she knows it." "It is then true that they imprisoned him!" "Comment non! he was shut up for days. I swear to you that Austria does not dare tell the indignities ('choses ignobles') that were done to her consul!"

And the teller was overjoyed and so much in earnest that I cannot doubt he was telling the truth.

The Montenegrins now have but one idea truly, and that is the destruction of the Albanian people. They propose making presents of the best houses in Scutari and of

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lands to all their officers and officials, quite regardless of the owners. If I say there must be great misery in Scutari they say, "The more die the better for us."

Scarcely any Montenegrins have visited Scutari, and they say that they will rebuild it and make it nice like Podgoritza and Cettinjé, quite ignorant of the fact that it is already far superior and that in Scutari one can buy a hundred things that one does not find in Montenegro.

There is another thing that should be noticed, that is, the terrible misery of the Turkish prisoners here. There are 1,500 nizams, nearly all South Albanians, in most pitiable state. No foreigners are allowed in the camp, except under strict supervision.

Unexpectedly I rode in with two saddle-bags of shirts, and soon enough. A large number have only rags—neither shirt, drawers, nor stockings. They sleep on bare earth under leaky tents without any blanket. Most of their great-coats were looted. A large proportion are anæmic; over 200 are in hospital, and deaths, as many as five often, occur daily. In addition they all have to do forced labour, make shoes for army, drive carts, &c. They received enough food, but the exposure and hardship are too much. As for the wretched civilian prisoners of war, in heavy irons since beginning of war, arrested only on suspicion and untried, well, *væ victis!* That any justice will prevail in the conquered Albanian lands, if the Montenegrins are allowed any, is hard to believe. Please forward this if you think advisable.

Sincerely yours,
M. E. DURHAM.

[8124] No. 351.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 20.)

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Salonica, February* 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of the forcible conversion of Mussulman villages to Christianity by the Bulgarians in the district of Djumaa-i-Bala.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 351.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Salonica, February* 13, 1913.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of the 7th instant I have the honour to report to your Excellency that, according to information which has reached me from a thoroughly trustworthy source, the process of forcible conversion of Mussulman villages to Christianity therein alluded to has been proceeding also in the district of Djumaa-i-Bala. My informant states that towards the latter end of last month the inhabitants of Krupnik, Osenovo, Tzerovo, and Simitli (and probably other villages as to which he had no direct news) received invitations to return to the faith of their (remote) ancestors. These suggestions having remained without effect, three or four of the most prominent men were successively murdered to intimidate the rest. The inhabitants of each village were then rounded up in the open and harangued by priests and kumitajis in the presence of an armed band, after which all those who were persuaded of the superior advantages of Christianity were invited to step forward. No one daring to refuse, each received a new name from the priest, who made the mark of the Cross with oil upon his forehead, and the ceremony was concluded.

My informant believed that complaints in regard to these conversions, or at least to the somewhat drastic measures adopted by the modern apostles of Christianity to undermine the religious convictions of the Pomak villagers, must already have reached Sophia, since he had heard that about a week ago the Bishop of Dubnitza had visited Djumaa accompanied by a Greek doctor, and it was understood that part of their mission was to search for and exhume the corpses of the murdered men.

I have forwarded copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and also to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[8125] No. 352.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 20.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Salonica, February* 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of the objections raised by the Greek monasteries of Mount Athos to the Russian proposals for the autonomous government of the peninsula under the control of the Orthodox States.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 352.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Salonica, February* 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that this morning the local representative of the Holy Synod of Mount Athos called upon me to express, in the name of the Epitropies of the seventeen Greek monasteries, the apprehension with which they had heard of the Russian proposals for the establishment in the peninsula of an autonomous government under the control of the Orthodox States. This proposal was regarded, he said, as the final step in the intrigues which had been steadily carried on by Russia ever since 1847 with a view to gaining for herself the predominant control over the immense politico-ecclesiastical influence and very considerable material resources of the monastic establishments on the holy mountain. All the Orthodox States, excepting Greece, being under the direct influence or subject to the pressure of St. Petersburgh, whilst four out of the five are of Slavonic nationality, a "joint control" by these States is practically equivalent to control by Russia itself, and under such an arrangement the interests of the seventeen Greek monasteries, with their 5,000 permanent inmates, would be entirely subordinated to those of their three Slav neighbours, Pantaleimon, Zographo, and Khilandar, while the whole moral and material influence of Mount Athos would be utilised to advance the projects of a militant Panslavism. According to the views of the seventeen, Mount Athos was geographically and historically Greek, and should therefore be incorporated in the Hellenic Kingdom; but, if that were impracticable, and it were necessary to create an independent administration, the latter should be placed under the control of the Great Powers of Europe, as was the case with Samos, and more recently with Crete, or else of some neutral and impartial Power, such as England, but never allowed to fall under the influence of a country or combination of countries that would exploit it for ends tending to the ultimate destruction of Hellenism, if not eventually of Greece herself.

The delegate handed me a copy of a telegram which he stated had been dispatched to the foreign Ministers of all the Great Powers by the superiors of the seventeen Greek monasteries, and concluded by begging me, in reporting his visit, to submit to your Excellency that this was a matter which the Greek Church in general and the monasteries in particular regarded as being of the most vital importance, and that they relied on the clearsightedness and political acumen of British statesmen to find the means of preventing the power and resources of their organisation from being debased into the instrument of a narrow and intolerant nationalistic propaganda.

I have forwarded copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as well as to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

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[8111] No. 353.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, February 14, 1913.*

M. VENIZELOS returned to Athens on the 11th instant, having on his way from London visited Paris, Vienna, Belgrade, Sophia, and Salonica. I called upon him this morning, and had a short but discursive conversation with him.

He told me he had learnt in London how strongly I had represented the Greek point of view, and he thanked me for doing so. I said that for nine years I had been trying to obtain the realisation of Greek aspirations in Crete, but that now I was very glad I had not been listened to. M. Venizelos replied that the Cretan question had undoubtedly been the proximate cause of the war. If annexation had been permitted, war might have been postponed for four or five years.

He deeply regretted the Bulgarian mistake in agreeing to an armistice, and said that next time the Turks demanded a cessation of hostilities they would be required to sign preliminaries of peace, including the required cessions of territory and a war indemnity. I said I understood that difficulties would be made about the latter. M. Venizelos said he was aware of it, but that if the allies were to be saddled with a considerable portion of the Turkish debt, a war indemnity was indispensable. Turkey would have no difficulty in bearing it. As a matter of fact, she would be economically in a stronger position after the war than before it. None of the territories to be taken away from her, except Thrace and Mitylene, brought her in anything; the rest were a charge on her budget.

He had told the Bulgarians that if they wanted help at Chatalja or Gallipoli to bring the war to an end, the Greeks were ready even now to abandon offensive operations before Janina, and, leaving enough troops to contain the garrison, to transport the bulk of their troops wherever they might be most useful. As yet, however, the Bulgarians had made no request for assistance. In the meantime he thought the campaign before Janina was useful as opening the eyes of the world to the stuff the Greek troops were made of.

As to the question of the islands he was sanguine—as regards the northern islands, because the Greeks are in possession, and he does not see who is going to turn them out; as regards the islands in Italian occupation, on account of the very firm attitude you have taken up in opposition to the retention of them by the Italians.

As for Salonica, he was in great hopes that the question would be solved satisfactorily. He was prepared to give the greatest facilities to Bulgarian and Servian trade. To my remark that Austria would demand at least equal facilities, he replied that up to the present Austria had asked for nothing of that kind. I said that Austria would not yet admit by implication that Salonica was to remain in Greek hands, but that she would surely ask for facilities, and that in that case everyone else would do the same. M. Venizelos declared that he was prepared to act with the greatest liberality, and he saw that it was in the interest of the town of Salonica that he should do so.

I said that those who had hitherto traded with Turkey under the mild 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff were likely to demur to finding themselves under the régime of the high tariffs of the Balkan States. M. Venizelos said they should look to the profits they will make, whatever the duties may be, by the enormous expansion of trade which is sure to follow the gradual development of the new territories. It was obviously impossible to apply different tariffs in them and in the old countries. I said I thought there was a grand opportunity for a great reduction of tariffs all round, which I was sure would greatly benefit Greece. I was, however, a free trader, and perhaps he would not agree with me. M. Venizelos said he was a free trader too, and one of the things he was looking forward to doing was to bring about a great diminution of the customs duties. It could not, however, be done in a moment, but would require time and careful study, and Greece must not be overburdened by her share of the Turkish debt.

He had broached the subject of a Balkan Customs Union with M. Danef, and they had come to the conclusion that although difficult to arrange it was not impossible, as there were no competing industries to conciliate.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[8103] No. 354.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 93.)

Sir, *Paris, February 19, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replying to the ones which I addressed to him under the instructions conveyed to me by your despatch No. 92 of the 5th instant and your telegram No. 61 of the 8th instant, in regard to various acts by which the Governments of the allied Balkan States had interfered with the interests of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied territories. M. Jonnart acquaints me with the instructions which have been issued to the French diplomatic and consular agents concerned in the Balkan peninsula, and with the reception which has been accorded to their representations by the various authorities to whom they were addressed.

His Excellency further expresses the entire agreement of the French Government with His Majesty's Government in protesting against the action of the Servian authorities in regard to the revenues of the Ottoman Debt at Uskub, and suggests for the consideration of His Majesty's Government that a further representation should be made to the Servian Government by the representatives of the interested Powers.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 354.

M. Jonnart to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 19 février, 1913.*

PAR une lettre du 6 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu porter à ma connaissance qu'à la suite de l'intervention du Syndicat des Porteurs étrangers signalant les difficultés auxquelles se heurtait l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane dans les territoires occupés par les armées des États balkaniques, Sir E. Grey avait été amené à adresser, le 1er de ce mois, des instructions télégraphiques aux représentants de Sa Majesté britannique à Sophia, Athènes et Belgrade, leur enjoignant de protester contre toute intervention de leurs fonctionnaires qui porterait atteinte au libre fonctionnement de cette institution autonome chargée de la gestion des intérêts des porteurs étrangers.

Par une nouvelle note en date du 9 février, votre Excellence a bien voulu me signaler qu'aux représentations adressées à ce sujet par le Ministre d'Angleterre à Belgrade, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Gouvernement serbe avait répondu que, conformément aux principes du droit des gens, les autorités serbes avaient en effet assumé le contrôle de la dette ottomane, m'informant en outre que Sir E. Grey serait heureux de connaître le sentiment du Gouvernement de la république à ce sujet.

En réponse à ces diverses communications, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que, dès le 22 novembre dernier, mon département avait adressé des instructions télégraphiques aux consuls de France à Salonique, Uscub, Monastir, Scutari et Janina, leur enjoignant d'appeler l'attention des autorités militaires sur le fait que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane ne saurait être à aucun degré assimilée à une administration ottomane, et que, nonobstant toute occupation militaire par les armées des États alliés, elle demeurerait seule qualifiée pour opérer, au compte des porteurs étrangers, la perception des revenus concédés par le décret de mouharrem et affectés à la garantie de la dette extérieure de l'Empire ottoman.

Les Ministres de France à Belgrade, Sophia, Athènes et Cettigné recevaient à la même date pour instructions de faire, dans le même sens, toutes réserves auprès des Gouvernements des États balkaniques, en invoquant au besoin le précédent créé, au bénéfice de la Dette publique, au cours de la guerre italo-turque.

Ces démarches ont été effectivement faites tant par les consuls de France auprès des autorités militaires des pays occupés, que par les représentants français auprès des États balkaniques, et la note laissée dès la fin de novembre par le Ministre de France en Serbie n'a notamment soulevé aucune contestation de la part du Département serbe des Affaires Étrangères. La même démarche a été faite le 3 décembre à Athènes, le 9 décembre à Cettigné, et le 13 décembre à Sophia, sans qu'aucune réponse ait été

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adressée à nos représentants. Toutefois, dès l'origine, le Gouvernement hellénique a tenu à donner à nos agents les assurances les plus satisfaisantes à cet égard, et par une note du 24 décembre, le Ministre de Grèce à Paris les a confirmées d'ordre de son Gouvernement, déclarant que "malgré les précédents que pourrait fournir la pratique internationale, le Gouvernement hellénique n'entendait pas toucher pendant la guerre au fonctionnement des institutions établies pour la sauvegarde des droits des créanciers étrangers de la Turquie."

Les incidents d'Uscub, dont l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a entretenu le Département des Affaires Etrangères par une note du 7 janvier dernier, témoignaient d'un esprit différent chez les autorités militaires serbes, et il semble en effet que le Ministre serbe des Finances ait récemment encore enjoint aux autorités militaires serbes de maintenir le personnel et l'organisation de la Dette publique ottomane, mais d'attribuer au Trésor serbe les perceptions ainsi effectuées par cette administration.

Le Gouvernement de la république est entièrement d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique pour protester contre de telles prétentions, estimant que les droits des porteurs étrangers confiés à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane sont intangibles; aussi dès le 4 février, le Ministre de France à Belgrade a-t-il reçu pour instruction d'agir à nouveau auprès du Gouvernement serbe pour la sauvegarde des intérêts communs des créanciers de l'Empire ottoman. J'ai donc tout lieu de penser que M. Descos se sera associé aux démarches que le Ministre d'Angleterre a reçu pour mission de faire auprès du Gouvernement serbe. Je ne verrais d'ailleurs pas d'inconvénients à renouveler une démarche des représentants de toutes les Puissances intéressées auprès du Gouvernement serbe si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique est disposée à s'y associer.

Agréez, &c.
JONNART.

[8403] No. 355.

Memorandum communicated by Herr von Kühlmann, February 20, 1913.

(Translation.)

THE Great Powers will presumably not be able to prevent the Balkan States, after they have carried into effect their acquisitions of territory, from treating the Capitulations as abolished in the newly-incorporated Turkish districts and introducing the higher rates of duty in force in their old economic territory. The Imperial Government, however, share entirely the view of Sir E. Grey that the Powers should at least make an attempt to secure some equivalent for the surrender of the advantages connected with the régime existing hitherto. The only means of attaining this would seem to be for the Powers to make their recognition of the annexation dependent on certain conditions. The Imperial Government consider it expedient that the Powers should proceed in this matter so far as possible in concert, and they are willingly prepared to come to an understanding with the British Government beforehand as to the nature of the conditions to be stipulated.

In the view of the Imperial Government, the Powers will have to exercise care that the conquered districts are not placed under exceptional conditions which would involve disadvantages for foreign trade and industry as against the situation existing in the conquering States. It would also be desirable when the new régime is introduced that, in so far as it entails disadvantageous alterations, a reasonable period of transition should be granted in the interests of business transactions previously entered upon. With respect to the industrial undertakings operating in what has up till now been European Turkey, the result which it would be desirable to attain would be that the Balkan States should not only recognise the concessions granted by Turkey, but should also take over the contracts entered into by that Government and not yet completed, the object being to prevent losses resulting to those interested as a result of the transition to the new régime. For this purpose it would be desirable that the Balkan States should compensate the contractors on a basis of equity for any losses and overproduction resulting from the new régime. Lastly, it should be stipulated that the Great Powers and their nationals should be treated on an entirely equal footing with all other countries and their nationals, and that no special economic privileges should be reserved for any country.

German Embassy, London, February 20, 1913.

[8226] No. 356.

Messrs. Bourke, Schiff, and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received February 20.)

Sir, 28, *Throgmorton Street, London, February 20, 1913.*

THE representative of the Greek Government has approached us whether we can arrange for a loan of 400,000*l.* on one-year Treasury bills. The conditions and rate of interest are such that the business seems feasible, but before approaching any of our friends we would like to ask the opinion of His Majesty's Government whether they would favour such a loan at the present moment.

We hardly need to assure you that any opinion you may give us on the subject would be treated by us with the strictest confidence.

We should be greatly obliged if you could favour us with an early reply, and remain, &c.

BOURKE, SCHIFF, AND Co.

[8086] No. 357

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 28.) [By Post.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 19, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 27 of the 17th instant.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, replying to my communication made on receipt of your telegram No. 76 of the 15th instant respecting Suda Bay Island, states that, in his opinion, it is better for the present not to approach the Greek Government on the subject.

[8206] No. 358.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 20, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 69 of 19th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me this morning that, although the idea of recalling the Roumanian Minister at Sophia to Bucharest for a few days and of calling out reserves had been mooted, no decision in this sense has been taken, and for the moment at least there is no question of Roumania taking such action.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[8228] No. 359.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 20, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 37 of 19th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the conditions of the acceptance of mediation are to be discussed at a council of Ministers to-morrow. It is evident from to-day's newspapers that warlike section of the Cabinet will oppose mediation, except on express condition that it will result in cession of Silistria to Roumania.

Minister for Foreign Affairs seems to realise fully the futility of submission to mediation on such lines, and I gathered both he and M. Take Jonesco will vigorously combat any attempt to bind the mediators.

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[8231] No. 360.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 40. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 20, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Russian Minister made it clear to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day that Russia would not take part in mediation or arbitration if any conditions were made restricting the free judgment of mediators or arbitrators.

[8204] No. 361.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, February 20, 1913.*

GERMAN cruiser "Geier" has arrived to replace embassy stationnaire. Firman issued for Austrian "Kaiserin Elizabeth" instead of that for "Admiral Spaun" previously granted.

[8221] No. 362.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 20, 1913.*

VICE-CONSUL at Dardanelles reports that "Barbarossa," "Medjidieh," and three destroyers went out morning of 18th February and returned after making reconnaissance as far as Caba Tepe.

[8234] No. 363.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, February 20, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 60 of 15th February.

Italian Government considers it unnecessary to make reserves at Athens regarding Suda Bay Island.

[8229] No. 364.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 20, 1913.*

ASSISTANT Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this afternoon and asked me in the name of the Minister, who was engaged at a Cabinet Council, to inform you that Russian Ambassador had been instructed to state at to-morrow's meeting of the Ambassadors that, while yielding on questions of Tarnbosch, Luma, and Radomir, Russia, for ecclesiastical and other reasons which Ambassador will no doubt explain, could not consent to exclusion of Djakova and Dibra from Servian territory. His Excellency added that, after having protested against use of expression "last word" by Austria, Russian Government were loath to use it themselves, but Russian Ambassador would state that he saw no possibility of his Government making any further concessions.

Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes he may count upon support of French Ambassador and yourself. He would be very glad if you could see Russian Ambassador before the Ambassadors meet.

Servian Minister told me this morning that he had informed Russian Government that under no circumstances would his Government withdraw their troops from Dibra and Djakova.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs is much preoccupied at hearing that Roumania contemplates recalling her Minister from Sophia and calling out her reserves.

[8227] No. 365.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 70. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 20, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

The Prime Minister confirms the information communicated to you in my telegram No. 69 of 19th February.

He has informed the Bulgarian Minister at London of the intention of the Roumanian Government to call up reserves, and to request the Roumanian Minister here to leave temporarily for Bucharest.

His Excellency earnestly hopes that you will use all your influence at Bucharest to prevent calling out of the reserves, as such action would be liable to provoke radical change in the attitude of the Bulgarian Government.

The departure of the Roumanian Minister, although disagreeable to Bulgarian Government, as it would be liable to be generally construed as an exercise of pressure, he considers of less importance.

Bulgarian arguments are as follows: To meet wishes of Triple *Entente*, Bulgaria has made a fair offer (see my telegram No. 64 of 15th February) to cede portion of their own territory. Question is a vital one for Bulgarian Government and only one of *amour-propre* for Roumanian Government. Should latter endanger the peace of Europe by any imprudence, responsibility would fall on them.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[8217] No. 366.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 20, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 61 of 14th February.

Twenty-six new Servian Creuzot guns have now been put into position and are ready for use at Adrianople.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[8627] No. 367.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador informs me that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would agree to exclude the town of Dibra and the valley of the Reka from Albania, but could only propose this if it would result in a settlement by the rest of the last Austrian line being accepted. He urges also importance of not letting question of Albanian frontier drag on longer. He urged me to recommend this proposal.

I said that if Austria would give up both Djakova and Dibra I would press for a settlement, but that if she would give up only one I would do no more than transmit the proposal.

Austrian Ambassador was very emphatic that Austria could not give way on both towns. The Austrian Government could not give way on more than three of the five places in dispute, Prisrend, Ipek, and Dibra, as against Scutari and Djakova. This was a last attempt to come to an accord on the delimitation of Albania. He was instructed not to conceal from me the gravity of the situation or the dangers involved in a further postponement of the solution of delimitation of Albania, which was a danger to the peaceful solution of the Balkan crisis.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me therefore to take this communication as a proof of his honest endeavour to avoid at the last hour the breakdown of the Ambassadors' conference and all the consequences this would have.

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Subsequently I saw German Ambassador. He was positive that Austria could not be induced to give way about both Djakova and Dibra.

He informs me that German Government have used their utmost endeavours at Vienna in last few days, and Italian Ambassador tells me the same of his Government. I believe that both Governments have spoken strongly at Vienna, and that it has taken much pressure to secure concession of Dibra.

I am sure that German Ambassador here has done his utmost; and if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs doubts whether more might not be obtained through Berlin, he might speak to German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh or direct at Berlin.

I have used every argument, such as pointing out how much Austria had gained by solution of port question; but my impression is that no more than this last offer can be obtained, and that if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs holds out for both Djakova and Dibra he must be prepared to face break up of conference of Ambassadors here unless he subsequently gives way on one of the towns. I think Austria might be induced to give way on Djakova instead of Dibra, if that was preferred, but not upon both.

Djakova is, I am told, a town of only 6,000 inhabitants; Russia can fairly say that but for her influence Prisrend and Ipek, as well as Dibra, would have been included in Albania, and that Servia and Montenegro would never have been allowed to join hands across the sanjak. From this point of view settlement of Balkan crisis, even if Djakova goes to Albania, does not look favourable for Austria, especially if judged from standpoint of four years ago.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris. No. 99.)

[7430] No. 368.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 90 of 16th February.

Powers decided to withdraw vessels from Crete, and to avoid any possible insults to Turkish flag it was considered advisable not to have it hoisted on departure of ships, but to entrust it to care of consular body.

[8860] No. 369.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 57.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador told me to-day that the Montenegrin delegate had informed him that Scutari would fall within the next two or three days, and that nothing but compulsion would ever turn the Montenegrins out of it. The Ambassador went on to say that his Government had informed the Austrian Government that they could not think of going to war to turn the Montenegrins out of Scutari by force. The Austrian Government would probably propose that all the Powers should agree to make the frontier of Albania respected.

I said that I did not think that Russia could join in this unless an agreement had first been come to as to what the frontier should be, and I saw great difficulty in coming to an agreement unless the towns of Djakova and Dibra were conceded to Servia.

The Ambassador remarked that the Montenegrin delegate had said that Montenegro was in occupation of Djakova. There was an agreement between Servia and Montenegro that each country should keep what it had first occupied, and that was why Montenegro had made sure of Djakova.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8857] No. 370.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 61.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

THE Turkish Ambassador and Hakki Pasha came to see me to-day. They argued that, before Turkey agreed to accept the advice of the Powers, she ought to know what terms the Powers were going to propose. Would Imbros, for instance, be left to Greece? This would be a very serious matter.

I said that, if Turkey could settle the questions of the Ægean Islands and of Adrianople in her own way by continuing the war, she would of course not go to the Powers for advice, but if she could not do that she had something to gain and nothing to lose by putting her case in the hands of the Powers, and asking their mediation, which would be, in effect, what the Powers had suggested in their last communication to Turkey.

The Ambassador and Hakki Pasha urged that, if Turkey gave way about Adrianople, she might find that she had gained nothing, because the allies, who were spoilt by their unexpected success, might put forward further claims. How were the Powers to know that the allies would not do this?

I said that, though I could not speak definitely without consulting the Powers, my idea was that, if Turkey placed her case in their hands, they would propose to the allies that peace should be made on the basis of a line, say, from Enos to Midia, leaving Adrianople to Bulgaria, and leaving the question of the Ægean Islands to be settled by the Powers. It was possible that the allies might make further demands, in which case it was also possible that the Powers would tell the allies that they were asking for too much. I agreed that it would not be reasonable for the Powers to present Turkey with proposals for peace without having made sure that the allies were not going to make further demands, and I assumed that they would make sure of this if Turkey put her case in their hands.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8149] No. 371.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 70.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador announced on the 17th February to Sir A. Nicolson that his Government accepted the latest version of the reply to be made to the note of the Porte.

Prince Lichnowsky said that his Government has instructed their Ambassador in St. Petersburgh to propose to the Russian Government that in the event of a conflict between Roumania and Bulgaria, or of an advance of Roumanian troops into Bulgaria, the Russian and German Governments should respectively and mutually engage to remain neutral. The German Government would be glad if we were to support this proposal.

Sir A. Nicolson told Prince Lichnowsky that he would refer the matter to me, but that he rather doubted if M. Sazonof would bind himself in the manner suggested.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8854] No. 372.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day what the Austrian Ambassador had said to me this morning. I said that it was a great pity that Djakova and Dibra were not both offered, as in that case a settlement could have been reached.

The German Ambassador said that his Government had done all they could in Vienna. It was really impossible for Austria to give up both Djakova and Dibra, though personally he thought that if it was preferred that Djakova should be given up instead of Dibra this might be arranged.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8858] No. 373.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 74.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1913.

THE German Ambassador spoke to me to-day of the desire of Turkey to be assured that, if she gave up Adrianople, she would be free from further demands, and would get some advantages. He gave me the accompanying *aide-mémoire*.

I said that I thought it quite reasonable that, if Turkey put her case in the hands of the Powers, the Powers should not recommend her to give up Adrianople without assuring her that she would not subsequently have fresh demands put upon her by the Balkan States. I thought it would be quite reasonable that the Powers should propose to the Balkan States a line, say from Enos to Midia, passing near Adrianople, but leaving Adrianople to Bulgaria; and that the question of the Ægean islands should be left to the Powers. The Powers might tell the Balkan States that Turkey would make peace on these terms, but that the Balkan States must not demand an indemnity, and that the questions of the Turkish debt, concessions, and railways should be settled in a manner equitable for Turkey. The Balkan States might also be told that they could not expect to have Capitulations set up for them in Turkey which they had not possessed hitherto; this was no time for making new Capitulations or extending those that already existed. The first thing, however, was that Turkey should put her case in the hands of the Powers. The Powers would have to exercise pressure on the Balkan States to prevent them from asking for too much, and the Powers could not use this pressure unless they could go to the Balkan States and state the terms on which they would advise Turkey to make peace. I pointed out that what I proposed agreed with four out of five of the points included in the *aide-mémoire* which the Ambassador had given me. With regard to point four, the 4 per cent. increase of the Turkish customs dues, this did not concern the Balkan States, and there was no reason why we should say anything about it to them. The British Government could not promise it except on the conditions about the Persian Gulf and the extension of the railway beyond Bagdad for which we had stipulated long before the war broke out, and which Hakki Pasha had now come to London to discuss with us.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 373.

Aide-mémoire.

UNE prochaine conclusion de la paix semble être dans l'intérêt aussi bien de la Turquie que des Etats des Balkans et il paraît que les deux partis la désirent. La conclusion de la paix éclaircirait aussi sensiblement la situation générale et serait, par conséquent, accueillie avec satisfaction dans l'intérêt de l'Europe. A moins d'un changement décisif dans le cours des événements guerriers, la paix ne pourrait être conclue que sur la base de la note collective du 17 janvier. La Sublime Porte devrait donc renoncer à Andrinople. Le Gouvernement Impérial suppose que même le Gouvernement ottoman actuel ne se fait pas d'illusions sur ce point. Il paraît que le Gouvernement ottoman ne prend son attitude intransigeante que pour sauvegarder sa dignité. La décision de renoncer à Andrinople pourrait être facilitée si les Puissances se décidaient à préciser en détail les assurances en faveur de la Turquie faites dans leur note. Dans cet ordre d'idées on pourrait prendre en considération—outre les garanties déjà promises pour les intérêts islamiques et les lieux saints d'Andrinople—les points suivants:—

1. Les Puissances donnent la garantie à la Sublime Porte qu'elle n'aura à payer d'indemnité de guerre.

2. Elles se portent garantes de ce que les questions concernant la dette publique, les concessions et les chemins de fer soient réglées d'une manière satisfaisante pour la Turquie.

3. Elles prennent la garantie de ce que la nouvelle frontière entre la Turquie et la Bulgarie passera près d'Andrinople et entreprennent de fixer cette frontière en grandes lignes.

4. Les Puissances précisent la nature de l'appui promis à la Sublime Porte et déclarent qu'elles consentent à l'augmentation de 4 pour cent des droits de douane.

5. Elles prendront soin que les Etats balkaniques ne reclameront dans les territoires que la Turquie garde en se fondant sur les Capitulations d'autres droits que ceux qui leur appartiennent déjà.

Avant de communiquer une telle proposition à la Turquie, les Puissances devraient s'assurer du consentement en principe de la Confédération balkanique. Sinon, la Sublime Porte risquerait de faire d'abord les concessions recommandées par les Puissances et de se voir, plus tard, dans une position tactique moins avantageuse vis-à-vis de nouvelles demandes des alliés. Evidemment il serait impossible de forcer les Etats balkaniques à conclure la paix sur une base arrangée entre les Puissances et la Sublime Porte, mais pas approuvée d'avance par la Confédération.

[8859] No. 374.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1913.

THE German Ambassador gave me to-day the accompanying *aide-mémoire* about the Roumanian difficulty.

I observed that Russia had already sent a circular to the Great Powers, asking that they should collectively propose to the Bulgarian and Roumanian Governments that these Governments should submit their differences to the decision of the Powers. We had authorised our Ministers in Bucharest and Sophia to join in this. The first thing to do was to make this collective proposal, and secure an affirmative answer to it from both Bulgaria and Roumania. I asked what was meant by the words in the *aide-mémoire*, "une cour d'arbitrage," other than resort to the Powers.

The Ambassador replied that this was not defined, but possibly it meant that certain of the Powers should undertake the decision.

I said that I had no objection to this, but that the first thing to do was to obtain from Roumania and Bulgaria their assent to submit their differences to the Powers, and if they did so the Powers might arrange "une cour d'arbitrage" if this was desired.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 374.

Aide-mémoire.

CONFORMÉMENT à l'exemple donné par Sir E. Grey et à l'avis exprimé par la conférence des Ambassadeurs en date du 14 février dernier, le Gouvernement Impérial a réitéré à Bucarest et à Sophia ses conseils apaisants, et a recommandé aux deux Gouvernements de s'adresser à la médiation des Grandes Puissances en cas qu'un accord direct ne se fasse pas. M. Majoresco est disposé à accepter non seulement la médiation, mais même la décision des Puissances, pourvu que la Bulgarie y consente également. M. Guéchof n'a pas rejeté l'idée d'une médiation, mais s'est réservé sa décision définitive.

Les Puissances sont unanimes dans le désir de faire sortir le conflit aussi vite que possible de l'actuelle phase dangereuse et de prévenir une solution par les armes qui pourrait en résulter.

Différentes informations reçues à Berlin démontrent que tous les Cabinets deviennent de plus en plus convaincus que, pour atteindre ce but, il serait opportun de faire un autre pas dans la direction indiquée par Sir E. Grey, en donnant, par une

démarche collective, le conseil aux partis intéressés d'en appeler à l'arbitrage. Le Gouvernement Impérial partage cette conviction et proposerait de concevoir la déclaration collective qui devrait être faite à Bucarest et à Sophia à peu près dans les termes suivants :—

Les Grandes Puissances sont d'avis que les différends entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie ne sont pas assez importants pour justifier un recours aux armes. Elles sont convaincues qu'un arrangement des difficultés par la voie de négociations directes et conciliantes servirait le mieux les intérêts des deux pays.

En cas qu'une solution ne pourrait pas être obtenue par cette voie, les Puissances conseillent de remettre entre les mains d'une cour d'arbitrage les points contentieux dont la solution n'a pas pu être trouvée.

[8861] No. 375.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 76.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1913.

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day the substance of what the German Emperor had said to Lord Granville, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 68 of the 16th instant. I said that the Emperor had put his finger on the real point of difficulty when he said that Roumania should not ask for Silistria. If Roumania would give up this demand, I did not think that there was any chance of Russia intervening by force in the quarrel. If, however, Roumania would insist on trying to take Silistria, it might be very difficult for Russia not to act.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8856] No. 376.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1913.

M. VESNITCH, the Servian delegate, came to see me to-day. He repeated the arguments about Djakova and Dibra and the impossibility of Servia giving way about them.

I asked him who was in occupation of Djakova, and whether it was to go to Montenegro or to Servia.

He thought that the Servians were in occupation of Djakova, and that it would go to Servia, while Montenegro would get Ipek.

I said that, but for Russian support, Ipek and Prisrend would have been included in Albania, and, if it was found that Djakova and Dibra could not be obtained by diplomatic methods, it would be unreasonable of Servia, by fighting for those two places, to risk everything which she had already gained. If she did so, she would be like a man who, having come sooner than he expected into a fine property, committed suicide because there were one or two fields on the boundary which he could not obtain. If Ipek and Prisrend and all the rest of which Servia was assured could be obtained by diplomatic methods, the amount gained in this way would be so important that the question of Djakova and Dibra would be insignificant by comparison. I said that I was speaking as a friend, and I did not say that the question had yet been settled, but I could not promise that those two towns would be obtained by diplomatic means.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8853] No. 377.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 20, 1913.

THE Austrian Ambassador made to me this morning the communication described in my telegram No. 168 of to-day to Sir G. Buchanan.

I told him that, if Djakova as well as Dibra was conceded, I thought that Russia would accept the last Austrian line for the frontier of Albania. At any rate, I should be prepared to urge its acceptance. But I saw great difficulty in getting Russia to agree if only one of the points was conceded. I urged upon the Ambassador that the Austrian solution about the Adriatic port had been accepted; that Scutari was now to be given up as Austria wished; and that, unless both Djakova and Dibra could be conceded to Servia, there would be very great difficulty in reaching an agreement.

The Ambassador contended, on the other hand, that the settlement of the Adriatic port question was an essential part of the autonomy of Albania, and that, as regards the frontier of Albania, there had been five places in dispute: Scutari, Prisrend, Ipek, Djakova, and Dibra, and Austria could not give way on more than three of these. Except for Scutari, Albania would really have no towns if Djakova and Dibra were both excluded from her. Each town was the economic centre of a large district, and if Albania did not have the town in each case the Albanians who came for their supplies to the district would be obliged to pay an extra duty on every thing they bought.

The Ambassador left with me the following *aide-mémoire*, which he had prepared very roughly, and could only leave with me purely as an *aide-mémoire* of the situation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 377.

Aide-mémoire.

THE arguments laid down in my "note explicative" and those brought forward in repeated discussions have no doubt made it clear that further concessions on our side would be contrary to the indispensable necessities upon which, in our opinion, the creation of an "Albanie viable" would depend and render the creation of an "Albanie viable" impossible for ethnographic, economical, and international reasons.

I am desired to point out, that by the last Russian counter proposal it is just the towns which are left out, and of which Albania would have already so few, and that certain districts which undoubtedly are considered purely Albanian are deprived of their economical centres.

Under these circumstances the difference between the last two proposals of delimitation—although it certainly has become smaller—still appears to be so great, that a dead lock could hardly be overcome.

On the other side, every postponement in the solution of the question of Albanian delimitation is a danger to the peaceful solution of the Balkan crisis.

We are aware that Sir E. Grey is making every effort to bring about the maintenance of the peace, and we therefore should deeply regret if the conference should break down. In deference to Sir E. Grey we are prepared to make another attempt to get over the deadlock. We are quite ready that the last Russian proposal should be discussed point by point, and we hope to give herewith a new proof of our good-will.

Should, as it unfortunately seems to be very likely, this discussion prove to be without result, we could not look without concern at the idea suggested by Sir E. Grey of settling the question of delimitation by a commission. I have had opportunities to bring forward our arguments in the conference as well as in different conversations. Our principal arguments are that such an international commission would lead to protracted deliberations and long delay; the danger of massacres between the different nationalities is very real; we have had a precedent on a very similar occasion when statistical examinations were to be made in Macedonia.

Any loss of time could only aggravate the situation. We could sooner make up our minds to make another and very last sacrifice. We should be prepared to cede

the Reka valley and the town of Dibra, but of course on the explicit condition that the rest of the frontiers would be accepted integrally. (The remainder of the sanjak of Dibra would be left with Albania.)

This concession, which we are only prepared to make if Sir E. Grey could recommend it as a safe basis for acceptance by an unanimous decision of the Ambassadors' conference, would also make allowance for the—although, perhaps, not quite justified—principle put forward at different occasions by the Russians of establishing a balance in the number of the concessions to be made from both sides. We should give up Prisrend, Ipek, and Dibra, Russia only Scutari and Djakova.

Should Sir E. Grey find himself in a position to try this last attempt to come to an accord at the Ambassadors' conference on the question of the delimitation, it must of course be left to him to decide whether he would try to get the consent of Russia to a proposal made by him on the said base by direct enquiry in St. Petersburgh or through Count Benckendorff.

In any case, I have not to concede to Sir E. Grey the gravity of the situation or the dangers involved in a further postponement of the solution of the pending question.

Count Berchtold hopes Sir E. Grey will take this communication as a proof of his honest endeavour to avoid, at the last hour, the breakdown of the Ambassadors' conference and all the consequences it would have.

[7278] No. 378.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 132.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,† forwarding a report from the acting British vice-consul at Cavalla relative to the closing of the French and Austrian post-offices at that port.

I have to request your Excellency to enquire of the French Government what view they take of the action of the Bulgarian Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[8855] No. 379.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.‡

(No. 139.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

I SAW the French and Russian Ambassadors together to-day, and told them what the Austrian Ambassador had said to me this morning about the Albanian frontier.

M. Cambon considered that Austria was unreasonable in not giving way about both Djakova and Dibra: the two together had nothing like the importance of Scutari.

The Russian Ambassador agreed that, if Djakova and Dibra had been conceded, the rest might have been settled; but he saw great difficulties unless this was done.

I told them what had passed in my conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, and that I was going to telegraph to your Excellency, as I did in my telegram No. 168 of to-day.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 52), Athens, and Sofia.
† No. 250.
‡ Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 86).

[8147] No. 380.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 57.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

HAKKI PASHA was brought by Tewfik Pasha to see Sir A. Nicolson on the 17th February. He said that as negotiations were proceeding here in ambassadorial meetings he might perhaps be of use if desired. Sir A. Nicolson asked if he were ready to discuss questions which specially interested Turkey and this country, *e.g.*, the Bagdad Railway, the Persian Gulf, &c. He replied in the affirmative, and said that he hoped it would be possible to arrive speedily at a settlement.

He said that on passing through Paris M. Briand had said that the "note responsive" of the Porte afforded some basis for future discussions. It was, Hakki Pasha said, of no avail for Turkey to negotiate direct with the allies, and she would prefer that the Powers signatories of the Treaty of Berlin should take the peace conditions in hand.

Sir A. Nicolson told Hakki Pasha that we hoped very shortly to give a reply to the "note responsive" of the Porte, but that it would not be possible to take the "note responsive" as a basis for actual discussion. The Powers would be ready, Sir A. Nicolson thought, to enter into communication with the allies if the Porte accepted the advice of the Powers, but we were still awaiting the replies of one or two Powers before answering the "note responsive."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8224] No. 381.

*Sir Edward Grey to Count Mensdorff.**

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and has the honour to transmit herewith two copies of a memorandum explaining an addition which His Majesty's Government consider advisable to the draft of the first article which was submitted to the meeting of Ambassadors on the 20th January, 1913.

Foreign Office,
February 20, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 381.

PROJET D'ARTICLES.

[*Text as agreed to by the Ambassadors' Conference on January 29, 1913.*]

I. CHACUN des États signataires du présent traité qui reçoit cession d'une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman supportera une part de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre le revenu de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois derniers exercices financiers.

La quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera inscrite, inaliénable et de première classe, lors de la répartition des valeurs équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles dont le maintien sera à cette époque disponible, soit qu'elles soient données par le Gouvernement ottoman pour la garantie des créanciers.

La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée sera convertible en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent.

II. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne le cours forcé de la monnaie de papier ayant pour emploi dans les territoires cédés par le présent traité; ils s'engagent également à remettre les compagnies intéressées en possession intégrale de l'exploitation [illegible] pour l'établissement du régime qui pourrait être convenu pour l'avenir, et à observer les mêmes engagements à cet égard dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valablement consentis par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités ottomanes compétentes.

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* Also sent to the French, German, Italian, and Russian Ambassadors.

III. Les détails d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront consignés dans des protocoles, annexés au présent traité et élaborés par une commission internationale, qui devra représentées les six Grandes Puissances et qui se réunira à , le .

On 13th February, 1913, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador asked Sir E. Grey if he had any objection to a resolution being adopted by the Ambassadors' meeting to the effect that the above articles, with a slight modification in article 2, should be embodied in the terms of peace between Turkey and the Allies. The modification desired by his Excellency in article 2 is that the words "dont l'exploitation leur a été concédée" should be deleted, and the following words substituted: "exploitées par elles avant la guerre." The French Government have informed us that they agree to this modification, and we have no objection.

On 18th February the French Government informed Sir F. Bertie that they wanted the wording of article 3 modified in form, though not in substance.

A copy of the three articles, embodying the changes desired by the Austro-Hungarian and French Governments, is given below; and the addition which the Treasury desire in article 1 is here shown in italics:—

I. Chacun des États signataires du présent traité qui se verra céder une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman supportera une part de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois dernières années; *toutefois la contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ne sera pas inférieure au rendement annuel moyen de l'annuité des revenus donnés en gage aux porteurs étrangers dans les territoires cédés.*

La quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera incessible, ne pourra faire l'objet de compensation, de sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles dont le maintien sera reconnu inaptriciable, seront données par les États cessionnaires pour la garantie des créanciers.

La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée sera convertible en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent.

II. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemins de fer et autres ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité. Ils s'engagent également à remettre les compagnies intéressées en possession immédiate de lignes exploitées par elle avant la guerre, nonobstant tout règlement qui pourrait être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord avec les intéressés; ils s'engagent en outre dans ces territoires à regarder et à exécuter les contrats additionnels conclus par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités ottomanes compétentes.

III. Les modes d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront élaborés par une commission internationale, où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances et qui se réunira à le ; les pouvoirs, rôle et les prérogatives de cette commission seront annexés au présent traité.

The reason why His Majesty's Government desire to introduce the addition to article 1 is that, as the article was previously drafted, there is a danger that all or some of the bondholders may suffer in the value of their security; in other words, His Majesty's Government are advised that the wording of the article, in its original form, does not necessarily secure that the total sum payable by the Allies shall not be less than the aggregate yield of the assigned revenues in the ceded territories. The point will, if desired, be explained in greater detail in a separate memorandum.

Foreign Office,
February 20, 1913.

[8250] No. 382.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 7.)

Cettinjé, February 16, 1913.

Sir,

IN my preceding despatch I reported to you the news which has so far been published here with regard to the fighting on the east and south sides of Scutari from the 6th to the 9th February, terminating in the capture of Bardanjoli and the failure of the Servians to take Brdica.

No details have so far been made known with regard to the engagement on the west side of the lake, but the struggle seems to have been severe, and to have entailed considerable loss on the Montenegrins without, as far as I can gather, much corresponding advantage. I enclose herewith copy of a report forwarded to me by Dr. Goldsmith for transmission to the Red Cross Society, with regard to the number

of casualties treated by his party. The village of Zogaj in question is situated close to the lake to the north of Tarabosh.

I have sent the report direct to the society.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 382.

Dr. Goldsmith to British Red Cross Society.

Sir,

AS you will see from the enclosed tabulated report, the first six days of this month were occupied in the ordinary routine hospital work.

On the 7th instant an attack was commenced on the Turkish positions by the Montenegrin army. I went up with Orderly Ford at 9 A.M. to choose a position for a dressing station near the firing line. I remained there till noon, when we were relieved by dressers Todd and Starkie, who returned to the hospital at dusk, no casualties having been brought in. Five wounded men were brought into the hospital during the day, who were treated by the staff.

On the 8th the attack was continued with greater fury, and 104 cases were treated, of whom 83 were sent on by steamer to Cettinjé after their wounds had been dressed and 22 were retained in the hospital for the night.

Sergeant-Major Day, Dresser Todd, and Orderly Williams went out and formed first-aid stations at convenient spots and applied first field dressings to about 70 wounded men.

On the 9th instant the battle still raged, and 121 wounded men were brought in and 126 were sent away by steamer, and 17 remained for the night; one man died in the hospital of peritonitis following on abdominal wound. Dresser Lauder and Orderly Williams were at the outposts that day and treated about 60 wounded men on the spot.

On the 10th there was too much work at the hospital, so no field party was sent out. 150 cases were admitted and treated and 114 sent away by steamer, and we had to feed and accommodate 53 for the night. As the hospital was too small, we had to occupy a house in the vicinity for the overflow. One man died in the hospital of a penetrating wound in the liver. To-day, the 11th February, there was very little fighting, the attack being to some extent a failure. 66 cases were received at the hospital and we managed to send away 110 by steamer to the base hospitals, leaving 9 in the hospital at the present time. Some of the wounded had been for two or three days without being dressed and were in a very weak state. Altogether, from the 7th to the 11th inclusive, we have admitted 441, sent on to the base hospital 430, 2 have died and 9 remain in the hospital. Fortunately, the wounded came in a continuous stream and not in rushes, so were well able to keep up with our work, and I do not think any soldier was kept for more than a very few minutes without his wounds being attended to. For the past four days we have been on duty practically all the time, snatching a few mouthfuls of food when opportunity offered, and taking it in turns to sleep. It is impossible to single out any member of my party for special praise as all did their work cheerfully and well, and I venture to think that the work done by my party will compare very favourably with any work done by any unit or Red Cross Society during the war, and there is no doubt that our presence here relieved untold suffering and has been the means of saving many lives.

The fighting for the next few days will, I think, be confined to an area on the opposite side of Scutari, and I do not anticipate any further influx of wounded at present.

I have, &c.
F. GOLDSMITH.

P.S.—During the battle several shells passed quite close to the hospital and quarters, the nearest exploding about 50 yards away. I do not think they were aimed at the hospital but at a steamer conveying wounded soldiers passing at the time. Probably the Turks were not aware either that wounded men were on board, as she was not flying the Red Cross flag, only the Montenegrin colours.

F. G.

FO 424/243 | ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

[8349] No. 383.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received February 21.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, February 20, 1913.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence respecting the duties levied on goods destined for territory in Servian occupation, I am directed by the Board of Trade to transmit herewith, for Sir Edward Grey's information, copy of a further letter on the subject, with its enclosure, which has been received from the London Chamber of Commerce.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 383.

London Chamber of Commerce to Board of Trade.

Oxford Court, Cannon Street, London,
Sir, *February 8, 1913.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, and particularly to your letters of the 10th and 24th ultimo, I beg to enclose, for your information, a copy of a further telegram which this Chamber has received from the Chamber of Commerce of Salonica respecting the duties levied on goods imported at that port and destined for territory occupied by the Servian and Bulgarian troops.

I am, &c.
CHARLES E. MUSGRAVE, *Secretary.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 383.

Chamber of Commerce of Salonica to London Chamber of Commerce.

(Télégraphique.) *Salonique, le 7 février, 1913.*

AUTORITÉS serbes continuent percevoir douanes déjà acquittées ici plus droits octroi différentiels exorbitants. Ceci entraine immobilisation commerce Salonique et transactions impossible avec pays occupation serbe. Prions intervenir remédier situation et attendons résultat vos démarches.

[8348] No. 384.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received February 21.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Treasury, February 20, 1913.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 10th December last, forwarding a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Athens respecting the revenues assigned to the service of the Greek Debt.

Their Lordships have deferred their answer to this letter in the hope that the situation might get clearer, but they conceive that Sir E. Grey would wish to receive without further delay such observations as they are in a position to make, though these observations, owing to the continuing uncertainty of the position, can only be of a general character.

As regards the first question of Mr. Beaumont, viz., whether the bondholders can claim any share of the increase of the revenues in which they are interested (*i.e.*, stamps and monopolies) in territory which may be ceded to the kingdom of Greece, it would appear to be premature to come to any decision. The anticipation of Mr. Beaumont that the Greek Government will be saddled with some charges in connection with the Ottoman Debt is, according to other communications from your department, likely to be realised, and it is possible that specific revenues in the ceded territory may be assigned for the service of that debt. In these events it would probably be impracticable to charge the ceded territory for the Greek Debt also, and

my Lords are disposed to think with Mr. Beaumont (though perhaps the question is not within their competence) that the Greek bondholders cannot properly claim any share of the new revenues. However, pending developments, it may be well not to make any statement which would prevent His Majesty's Government from supporting such a claim if it was necessary, *e.g.*, to safeguard the interests of Greek bondholders.

2. The second question, as to the guarantees required to secure that the new conditions shall not adversely affect the revenues now encashed by the Financial Commission, does not admit of any definite answer at present.

It is not, however, clear to their Lordships that Mr. Beaumont's suggestion, viz., identity of prices and dues in the new territory and in the existing kingdom, will completely safeguard the position. Is there no danger that, even though the prices and dues are identical, measures might still be taken to increase the sales, &c., in the new territory at the expense of those in the old, and so divert revenues at present encashed by the commission?

It may well be that the commission may be required to undertake the service of the share of the Ottoman Debt to be assumed by Greece. In that event it might be advisable to recast the list of articles of monopoly, &c., to extend it to the new territory, and to apply the receipts to both the Greek Debt and the assumed debt. This arrangement would be a satisfactory one, provided it did not substantially affect the plus-values, which could be preserved on their present lines if a fixed sum was applied to the assumed debt.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[8235] No. 385.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 20.) [By Post.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 20, 1913.*

M. DELCASSÉ has been appointed French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. He will proceed thither early next month.

The appointment has not been well received on the Bourse.

[8246] No. 386.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 20, 1913.*

TURKISH Government have signed a contract for the sale of extensive Government lands at Pera with Taxim barracks for sum of £T. 500,000, with proviso that Turkish Government may cancel the contract on payment of £T. 50,000. I understand that £T. 200,000 will be paid at once, and other payments will be made as the title-deeds are forthcoming. This scheme was violently opposed in the Chamber in 1910, and consequently shelved.

[8283] No. 387.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 20, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from Sir A. Block:—

"Reference to figures in my telegram of 16th February. If it is proposed that Balkan States should [? group omitted] proportional part of debt charge, then, instead of £T. 1,162,000 from Roumelian provinces as to-day, bondholders of the decree will only receive £T. 414,216."

FO 424/243 ALL WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

[8308] No. 388.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 20, 1913.*

THE Grand Vizier has left for Gallipoli. It is stated that the journey is in connection with the disagreements between commanding officers, and it is rumoured that Fahri Pasha, General Officer Commanding, Gallipoli, will be succeeded by Torgoud Shevket.

The Grand Vizier expected to be back on Saturday.

(Sent to Sophia, Athens, and Bucharest.)

[8309] No. 389.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 20, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 103 of 19th February.

I have received a written notice from the Porte to the effect that the consuls and foreign subjects at Adrianople have accepted the quarter of Karagatch as a neutral zone, and have conveyed their thanks to the Grand Vizier for this kindness.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[8247] No. 390.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 20, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 70 of 20th February.

I do not agree that the question for Roumania is only one of *amour-propre*, and that *amour-propre* has been brought into play is largely due to the evasive and procrastinating tactics of Bulgaria.

Roumania was treated badly by the Treaty of Berlin, and as frontiers fixed by that treaty are now to be revised she feels that she also is entitled to a revision. Roumania has well-known claim to gratitude of Bulgaria on account of services in the past. Last autumn, relying on the Great Powers' formula of the maintenance fo territorial *status quo*, and on the allies' protestations of territorial disinterestedness, she remained passive. She was content with her present frontier while Bulgaria remained as she was, but now that Bulgaria is determined to acquire large accession of territory and increase of population, and as Bulgaria has given evidence of hostile intentions against the Dobrudja, it naturally seems to Roumania necessary that she should strengthen her frontier between the Danube and the Black Sea. If Silistria remains in the hands of Bulgaria it is difficult for her to do this. (See my despatch No. 21, penultimate paragraph of enclosure.)

(Sent to Sophia.)

[8376] No. 391.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 21, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 40 of 20th February.

Following is briefly substance of a communiqué published in the Liberal press this morning, showing the attitude of the Liberal party towards the proposed mediation of some of the Great Powers :—

"Liberal party is not opposed to mediation in the proper sense of the term, namely, the friendly intervention of various Cabinets with a view to reaching an understanding on the bases fixed by Roumanian Government as compatible with the interests and dignity of Roumania, but it would not be right for the Roumanian

Government, after reducing its claims to the minimum which it has formulated at Sophia, to refer this minimum unconditionally to the arbitration, as distinguished from mediation, of the Great Powers."

Communiqué represents the views also of three of the Conservative members of the Cabinet.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[8352] No. 392.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, February 21, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from vice-consul at Constantza:—

"Turkish steamer sailed, cargo of ammunition, under escort of three torpedo-boat destroyers."

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[8377] No. 393.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 135 of 15th February: Crete.

The Russian Government do not consider it necessary to make reserves at Athens.

[8395] No. 394.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day all that you said in your telegram No. 108 of 20th February, but I entirely failed to move him.

Russian Ambassador, he said, had received his instructions, and he had nothing to add to them. Russia could not consent to hand over to a Mussulman Albania towns like Dibra and Djakova, where there were Slav religious institutions. He had yielded in the case of the three districts referred to in your telegram, as this objection did not apply to them. Servia, moreover, would not withdraw her troops from either of the two towns in question. It would be very difficult for Russia to force her to do so, as their withdrawal would lead to the fall of the present Servian Government and probably to a revolution.

I enquired whether there was no other concession he could suggest to induce Austria to give up both towns.

His Excellency replied that he knew of none, and that he personally could do nothing more without the consent of the Council of Ministers and the Emperor.

I said that in that case conference would break down and the situation would become very grave. What, I asked, would then happen?

His Excellency replied that Germany and Austria must find some way out of the difficulty. Austria, he hoped, would not be mad enough to provoke a war for a single town of no importance to her. On my remarking that after the various concessions she had made Austria would say the same of Russia, Prisrend and Ipek, his Excellency answered, were not real concessions, as Austria had never meant to claim them seriously for Albania. Russia had made all the concessions she could, and there was nothing more to be done but to await developments. He could not believe that Austria would venture to expel Servians by force from either of the two towns, but, if she did, it would be more than Russia could stand, and it would mean war.

His Excellency's language throughout was calm, but determined; but whether he will adhere to his present attitude if war is the only other alternative will depend on the Emperor.

FO 424/243 ALL WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

[8327] No. 395.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, February 21, 1913.*

IN conversations with Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and my Russian colleague yesterday I gathered that, although Servians have felt obliged to comply with Montenegrin appeal for assistance against Scutari, they have not done so with any eagerness or great expeditiousness.

The artillery which has been sent will probably require about a fortnight to reach.

[8399] No. 396.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, February 21, 1913.*

I AM informed by a man who has been travelling about near the Austrian frontier in Volhynia and Podolia that there are great accumulations of stores and troops, and that officers expect hostilities. Many Austrian spies are being arrested.

More exact information without sending [? group omitted].

(Sent to embassy.)

[8628] No. 397.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 21, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador having informed me of concession that Austrian Government were prepared to make respecting Dibra on condition that this would secure a settlement, I have transmitted it to Russian Government, putting it in the most favourable light I can.

But Russian view is that she cannot consent to exclusion of Djakova and Dibra from Servian territory. It is practically certain that if Austria would give way on both these points a complete settlement of the Albanian frontier would be arrived at. Russia would then give way about Scutari, Tarabosch, and Luma, and no other real points of dispute would be left.

But, failing this, I am afraid that there may be deadlock, and the meetings of Ambassadors may have to be discontinued.

Meetings of Ambassadors would no doubt continue, if the Powers so desire, to provide useful machinery for dealing with terms of peace between Turkey and allies and other developments, but it would be misleading and undignified to continue them indefinitely for this purpose if they are unable to deal satisfactorily with the question of the Albanian frontier, which is the greatest anxiety between the Great Powers.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[8091] No. 398.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 52. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 68, Confidential, of 19th February: Mr. Wallis.

If Mr. Wallis calls at consulates at Salonica or Philippopoli, he should be informed that His Majesty's representatives are satisfied that outrages have been committed, but they should give him no details themselves. He can enquire for himself from the same people as have given information to the consuls, to whom they can refer him.

(Repeated to Salonica, No. 11.)

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 70) and Sir R. Rodd (No. 76).

[8377] No. 399.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 6 of 14th February: Turkish flag at Suda Bay.

French, Russian, and Italian Governments think it unnecessary to make reserves at Athens.

I agree.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 26.)

[8838] No. 400.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 21, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day the German Ambassador gave us the following *aide-mémoire*:—

"Une prochaine conclusion de la paix semble être dans l'intérêt aussi bien de la Turquie que des États des Balkans et il paraît que les deux partis la désirent. La conclusion de la paix éclaircirait aussi sensiblement la situation générale et serait, par conséquent, accueillie avec satisfaction dans l'intérêt de l'Europe. A moins d'un changement décisif dans le cours des événements guerriers, la paix ne pourrait être conclue que sur la base de la note collective du 17 janvier. La Sublime Porte devrait donc renoncer à Andrinople. Le Gouvernement Impérial suppose que même le Gouvernement ottoman actuel ne se fait pas d'illusions sur ce point. Il paraît que le Gouvernement ottoman ne prend son attitude intransigeante que pour sauvegarder sa dignité. La décision de renoncer à Andrinople pourrait être facilitée si les Puissances se décidaient à préciser en détail les assurances en faveur de la Turquie faites dans leur note. Dans cet ordre d'idées on pourrait prendre en considération—outre les garanties déjà promises pour les lieux saints d'Andrinople—les points suivants:—

"1. Les Puissances donnent la garantie à la Sublime Porte qu'elle n'aura à payer d'indemnité de guerre.

"2. Elles se portent garantes de ce que les questions concernant la dette publique, les concessions et les chemins de fer soient réglées d'une manière équitable.

"3. Elles prennent la garantie de ce que la nouvelle frontière entre la Turquie et la Bulgarie passera près d'Andrinople et entreprennent de fixer cette frontière en grandes lignes.

"4. Les Puissances précisent la nature de l'appui promis à la Sublime Porte et déclarent qu'elles consentent à l'augmentation de 1 pour cent des droits de douane.

"5. Elles prendront soin que les États balkaniques ne réclament dans les territoires que la Turquie garde en se fondant sur les Capitulations d'autres droits que ceux qui leur appartiennent déjà.

"Avant de communiquer une telle proposition à la Turquie, les Puissances devraient s'assurer du consentement en principe de la Confédération balkanique. Sinon, la Sublime Porte risquerait de faire d'abord les concessions recommandées par les Puissances et de se voir, plus tard, dans une position tactique moins avantageuse vis-à-vis de nouvelles demandes des alliés. Évidemment il serait impossible de forcer les États balkaniques à conclure la paix sur une base arrangée entre les Puissances et la Sublime Porte, mais pas approuvée d'avance par la Confédération."

Thereupon the following resolution was come to:—

"La réunion estime qu'il n'y a pas lieu de formuler dès à présent les conditions de la paix ou les garanties à donner à la Sublime Porte. Ce serait s'exposer à une discussion qui risquerait de rendre la médiation impossible. Elle est donc d'avis qu'il y a lieu d'attendre la réponse de la Sublime Porte à la dernière communication de Sir E. Grey, c'est-à-dire de savoir si le Gouvernement ottoman se remet aux Puissances du soin d'établir les conditions de la paix et s'engage à accepter leur décision.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 141), Sir E. Goschen (No. 77), Sir R. Rodd (No. 58), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 87).

FO 424/243 [illegible]

"Cette déclaration une fois obtenue, les Puissances pourront s'adresser aux alliés et leur demander s'ils acceptent leur médiation dans les mêmes conditions.

"La réunion considère dès à présent les propositions du Prince Lichnowsky comme devant être acceptées le moment venu, en supprimant l'article 4, qui vise l'augmentation de 4 pour cent des droits de douane, laquelle ne concerne pas les alliés et ne peut être mentionnée dans le futur traité de paix."

The German Ambassador gave the meeting the following *aide-mémoire* :—

"Conformément à l'exemple donné par Sir E. Grey et à l'avis exprimé par la conférence des Ambassadeurs en date du 14 février dernier, le Gouvernement Impérial a réitéré à Bucarest et à Sophia ses conseils apaisants et a recommandé aux deux Gouvernements de s'adresser à la médiation des Grandes Puissances en cas qu'un accord direct ne se fasse pas. M. Majoresco est disposé à accepter non seulement la médiation, mais même la décision des Puissances, pourvu que la Bulgarie y consente également. M. Guéchof n'a pas rejeté l'idée d'une médiation, mais s'est réservé sa décision définitive.

"Les Puissances sont unanimes dans le désir de faire sortir le conflit aussi vite que possible de l'actuelle phase dangereuse et de prévenir une solution par les armes, qui pourrait en résulter.

"Différentes informations reçues à Berlin démontrent que tous les Cabinets deviennent de plus en plus convaincus que, pour atteindre ce but, il serait opportun de faire un autre pas dans la direction indiquée par Sir E. Grey, en donnant, par une démarche collective, le conseil aux partis intéressés d'en appeler à l'arbitrage. Le Gouvernement Impérial partage cette conviction et proposerait de concevoir la déclaration collective qui devrait être faite à Bucarest et à Sophia à peu près dans les termes suivants :—

"Les Grandes Puissances sont d'avis que les différends entre la Roumanie et la Bulgarie ne sont pas assez importants pour justifier un recours aux armes. Elles sont convaincues qu'un arrangement des difficultés par la voie de négociations directes et conciliantes servirait le mieux les intérêts des deux pays.

"En cas qu'une solution ne pourrait pas être obtenue par cette voie, les Puissances conseillent de remettre entre les mains d'une cour d'arbitrage les points contentieux dont la solution n'a pas pu être trouvée."

Some discussion arose upon what was meant by the words "une cour d'arbitrage" in the last paragraph. It appeared that the German word in the original instructions of the German Ambassador might rather be translated as "umpire." There was a general impression that the phrase was therefore much the same in substance as "la décision des Puissances."

I communicated to the meeting the instructions which I had sent last Monday, the 17th, to Sir George Barclay, in telegram No. 16, and to Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, in telegram No. 44.

The following resolution was come to :—

"La réunion trouve la proposition allemande entièrement d'accord avec les instructions déjà adressées aux représentants des Puissances à Bucarest et à Sophia, lesquelles leur prescrivent d'obtenir que les Gouvernements roumain et bulgare remettent la solution de leurs différends à la décision des Puissances. La réunion pense que cette décision doit appartenir aux six Puissances, et elle considère comme très désirable que la déclaration collective soit faite d'urgence, si elle n'a pas déjà été faite."

I had given the Ambassadors copies of the words which we wished to be inserted in the resolutions about the Turkish debt.

The Austrian Ambassador raised the question of whether the resolutions should not be communicated to the allies, with an intimation that they should be inserted in the terms of peace.

The general feeling was that they should be inserted in the terms of peace, but that the proper time to communicate them to the allies would be when the terms of peace were formulated by the Powers as a whole, should both parties accept their mediation.

The Austrian Ambassador communicated the following suggestion about the customs difficulty in the territory occupied by the allies :—

"Dans les territoires turcs occupés actuellement par les alliés balkaniques le régime douanier turc tel qu'il était avant la guerre doit être rétabli et doit rester en vigueur jusqu'au règlement définitif des questions territoriales.

"Les Grandes Puissances ne peuvent pas admettre :

"La double perception des droits de douane pour les marchandises importées ;

"La perception de surtaxes sous le nom de contribution de guerre pratiquée par la Serbie ;

"La perception de surtaxes sous le nom de taxe de consommation ou d'équivalent de taxe de monopole ;

"La prohibition d'importer certains articles à raison qu'ils sont des articles de monopole dans les États balkaniques ;

"Le traitement préférentiel appliqué aux provenances des États alliés importées dans les territoires occupés au détriment des marchandises pareilles provenant des autres pays."

It was agreed that a collective *démarche* should be made, and the following resolution was come to upon it :—

"Sur l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassadeur de l'Autriche, la réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de prescrire aux représentants des Puissances à Sophia, Belgrade et Athènes de faire une démarche collective dans ce sens."

I stated to the meeting that I thought it would become misleading and undignified to continue our sittings unless we could deal with the question of the Albanian frontier, and make an agreement about it. It was almost ridiculous for us to be attempting to make peace between Turkey and the allies if the question of the Albanian frontier was to remain in suspense, causing increasing anxiety and difficulty between the Great Powers.

The Ambassadors, however, all regarded with consternation the panic which would be created if we allowed it to be supposed that we had adjourned *sine die*.

I agreed, therefore, that it might be announced that we had provisionally fixed a meeting for next Thursday, the 27th instant. I said that I was going away at the end of this week to get a week's rest, if I possibly could. But I should be able to come up to London at any time if my presence was urgently required, and, should it be necessary to have a meeting in a hurry, Sir Arthur Nicolson would summon one and be present at it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8485] No. 401.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, February 12, 1913.*

MR. WACE, formerly of the British School of Archæology here, and now a professor in the University of St Andrews, has with his colleague, Mr. Thompson (who furnished me with the information transmitted in my despatch No. 120 of the 11th October, 1911), spent a good deal of time among the Koutzo-Vlachs of Macedonia, studying their language and customs. Thinking that he might be in correspondence with some of them, I wrote to ask him whether he had heard anything of the stories of ill-treatment of the Vlachs in the territories occupied by the Greeks, which have aroused so much feeling in Roumania, and which have been contradicted with equal indignation in Greece. I regret to say that his answer, of which I have the honour to enclose an extract, offers but too much corroboration of them.

An interesting point is his statement that Koritsa is "purely Albanian with a small Vlach colony." Here it is claimed as purely Greek.

I have the honour to request that Mr. Wace's letter may be treated as confidential, as the publication of it might be the cause of inconvenience to other members of the British School.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

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Enclosure in No. 401.

Mr. Wace to Sir F. Elliot.

125, *North Street, St. Andrews,*
February 6, 1913.

Dear Sir Francis,

I AM sorry I have left your letter so long unanswered, but I was hoping to get letters from some of my Vlach friends which might contain news that would interest you. I have had two. The Vlach Nationalists are doing badly under Greek rule, as was only to be expected. All the Nationalist (Roumanian) schools have been closed except the Roumanian Commercial School at Salonica. Further, prominent adherents of the Roumanian (Nationalist) propaganda are being imprisoned and otherwise worried. At Doliani, near Verria, which was a village inhabited only by Nationalist Vlachs, the Greeks have burnt the service books in the church. At Verria, where the Nationalists were very strong, they have suffered badly. At Grevena and in the neighbourhood Greek bands have been about. One entered the village of Turia (called Krania by the Greeks) killed the leader of the Vlachs, Demetrios Chicma (Tsoukama in Greek), and arrested the schoolmasters, priests, and other notables and took them to Grevena, where they were subsequently released. At Grevena the Greeks say that the Nationalists of their own accord offered to the town their school and cemetery. Samarina has been harried by a Greek band, and it is mainly a pro-Greek village in its politics. Further, I am told that on entering Grevena the Greeks plundered right and left, friends and foes alike. Some of my Vlach friends, Greeks in politics, have lost almost all they had; they are families that winter at Tirnavo. A line from a Vlach of Turia who is in Bucharest tells me that most of the schoolmasters and other prominent Vlach Nationalists have fled to Roumania. Of course all this must be received with caution, but a good deal of it is true, I expect, and what one expected would happen. The Greeks themselves have admitted in an Athenian paper that they killed Demetrios Chicma, but the details are lacking. His life had frequently been attempted by the Greek bands between 1903 and 1908, and he had worried the Greeks a good deal. He was a capable man, and we stayed with him at Turia. Also the Greeks tell the tale themselves about the reported offer of the Vlach school and cemetery to the town of Grevena. Of course I do not suppose that any of this pressure which is being put on the Vlachs is being brought to bear officially. The Greeks are too clever to do that. There are other methods—through the church, the schools, by winking at the unauthorised proceedings of bands and police. It is very foolish of the Greeks, because if they left the Vlach Nationalists alone with their schools and churches and the same privileges that they had under the Turks the Nationalists' propaganda would gradually die a natural death. Persecution will only strengthen it, or drive a large number of people from their homes. But it is all on a par with the usual intolerance of the Greek political propaganda in Macedonia. I hope they will not be allowed to treat any Albanian territory like this, though I hear they are in Koritsa, which is purely Albanian with a small Vlach colony.

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Yours, &c.
A. J. B. WACE.

[8492] No. 402.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)

Sir,

Rome, February 12, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Roumanian Minister paid me a visit this morning and informed me that he learned that his Government intended to insist on the cession of Silistria by Bulgaria, and that the terms they had proposed for a settlement of the frontier were their last word. Under these circumstances he regarded the situation as very serious, since he did not anticipate that the Bulgarian Government would yield on the crucial point. M. Diamandy said that he felt the general opinion in Europe would be against Roumania, and when I agreed with this estimate, which I said, in my opinion, was inevitable, he not unnaturally endeavoured to defend the position as best he could.

M. Diamandy argued that the question was not a new one arising out of the present situation. Ever since the Treaty of Berlin it has been a pressing necessity for Roumania to rectify what she regarded as the injustice done to her. The question

had now been a burning one for the last two months, but though Roumania had receded from the original standpoint she had for years upheld, which aimed at securing a line from Rustchuk to Varna, and had now only put forward a much more modest demand for the line from Silistria to Balchik, she was now held up to the indignation of Europe for having taken advantage of the difficulties of Bulgaria to press her claim. I observed that the rest of the world could not help also appreciating the Bulgarian point of view and realising the difficulty which the cession of Silistria presented, that town and district being, as I understood, entirely populated by Bulgarians. M. Diamandy said it was the military authorities who insisted upon Silistria, and I pointed out that after the war of 1870 it was the demands of the military authorities, so far exceeding what Prince Bismarck had contemplated, which made the relations between France and Germany irreconcilable ever afterwards. Was it wise for Roumania to insist on a solution which would perpetuate Bulgarian hostility? It did not seem to me that Roumania would have the approval or support of any of the Great Powers, as I did not think that during the present crisis even Austria-Hungary was likely to look favourably on action which would tend to prolong the struggle in the Balkans. It was here, and specially immediately after the mention of Austria-Hungary, that M. Diamandy said that he now realised that this was so, and that it was all the harder on Roumania because she had always been led to believe that the justice of her claims would be recognised if there was to be any disturbance of the *status quo*. That disturbance had now occurred, and it seemed that, after all, Roumania was not going to receive the support she had had reason to anticipate. On my asking what Powers had given Roumania reason to expect their support, he did not specify them precisely, but said the claims of Roumania were well known to, and countenanced by, some at any rate of the Great Powers, but on the understanding that they were not to be raised as long as the *status quo* in the Balkans remained unchanged. I said I was not aware that His Majesty's Government had ever had the question submitted for their consideration, and was, in fact, not conscious that any of the Great Powers had led Roumania to expect their support.

M. Diamandy said that he foresaw that Roumania would have to stand alone in maintaining what she regarded as vital for her future safety. As a big change in the *status quo* was impending, the national interest demanded that she should not let go an opportunity to make good, which might never occur again, simply because Bulgaria was embarrassed. He regretted that a suggestion which had been put forward, that Roumania should join the Balkan allies with two army corps at Chatalja in return for the cession of Silistria, had not been entertained. He did not know which of the two Governments had finally declined the proposal. Now he feared it was too late, and that a crisis was approaching. All round the situation seemed to be much more serious than it was a few weeks ago. The ambitions of Servia to absorb Montenegro were, he understood, preoccupying the Austrian Empire, which might eventually find an excuse to protect the latter by an occupation. There were also indications of a tendency in Bulgaria, which would probably finally sever the ties of sympathy which had bound her to Russia over the question of the future of Constantinople, to draw closer to Austria-Hungary. He had heard that the present aspect of things, and especially the problem of the eventual destiny of Montenegro, was giving great anxiety here to the President of the Council.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[8558] No. 403.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 2. Commercial.)

Sir,

Monastir, February 13, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1, Commercial, of the 8th instant, I now have the honour to report that goods imported direct to Monastir are being required to pay at Salonica transit dues amounting to 1 per cent. instead of the former import duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*.

At Monastir the customs tariff and octroi continue to be as reported.

Exports from Monastir pay 1 per cent. *ad valorem* at the custom-house in this town.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

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[8506] No. 404.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 126.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 16, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 100 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that I now learn from the Austrian Embassy that the Bulgarian Government has informed the Austrian Legation at Sophia that, for military reasons, no foreign postal service can be permitted at Dedeagatch during the continuation of the war.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

8508] No. 405.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 128.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 17, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting on the forcible conversion of Mussulmans to Christianity.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 405.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Salonica, February 5, 1913.*

ACCORDING to information received from the British acting vice-consul at Cavalla, great pressure is being exercised by the Bulgarian inhabitants and petty local officials in the Ruptchos and Nevrocop districts to compel the surviving Pomak (Slavophone Mussulman) population to embrace Christianity. Mr. Morgan specially cites the villages of Oreshe and Dolno Drjanovo, lying somewhat east of Nevrocop, and of Plesbta.

This information confirms what I had myself heard some weeks ago from the neighbouring district of Osmanich (Petchovo), formerly belonging to the vilayet of Kossovo. I happen to know that Mussulman friends of mine here were approached by delegates from Pehtchevo with a request for advice as to their conduct under such pressure, and were answered that temporary compliance, and even attendance at the Bulgarian church if necessary for the protection of their lives and property, were permissible and more to their advantage and to that of the country than a wholesale emigration of the Mussulman element. I have, however, no means of judging to what extent this advice has been followed.

Numerous cases of forced conversion have likewise been reported to me from the districts round Serres, and it may therefore be concluded that this forms part of the general policy of the Bulgarian conquerors throughout the region which they have occupied. Where the male members of the community have survived the matter may eventually arrange itself; but the case of Mussulman women who have been forcibly married to Bulgarian bandits, frequently without knowing whether their original husbands are alive or dead, is a delicate one, though still less critical than that of the more numerous class of solitary women and girls who have failed to secure the protection of an individual.

I ventured to communicate the gist of Mr. Morgan's information to His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in a brief telegram this afternoon, though I am afraid that the matter is one in which little practical result can be hoped to follow from foreign intervention.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[8510] No. 406.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 130.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 507 of the 5th November last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, reporting on local opinion with regard to the renewal of war.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 406.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 4.)

Sir, *Damascus, February 1, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the ihtint class of reservists between the ages of 29 and 45 years have just been notified to be ready for immediate service. The continuation of war is very unpopular, and there would seem to be a strong disposition not to respond to this call among the lower classes, judging from murmurs which are widespread. It would seem also that the more educated classes of Syrians begin to recognise the futility of a continuation of hostilities and the great danger it involves for the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

[8514] No. 407.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 134.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 17, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report the election of Mgr. Germanos, Metropolitan of Chalcedon, on the Asiatic shore over against Stamboul, as Œcumenical Patriarch of the Orthodox Church in succession to the late Joachim III.

The new Patriarch, styled Germanos V, lately completed his 77th year, having been born at Balata, Constantinople, in December 1835. He studied at Constantinople, Jerusalem, and Athens, and in 1866 became Bishop of the Island of Cos. In 1871 he was made a member of the Holy Synod, in 1876 Metropolitan of Rhodes, and in 1886 was again made member of the Holy Synod, where he played a prominent part in the affairs of the Patriarchate, notably in 1890 when the Patriarch Dionysos V resigned over the dispute between the Ottoman Government concerning the privileges of the Patriarchate. Mgr. Germanos, who became *locum tenens*, closed all the Greek churches, and interdicted all the spiritual life of the Orthodox Church in protest against the attitude of the Government. This struggle lasted some three months, whereupon the late Sultan examined the matter himself and decided to order his Ministers to "go to Canossa." He thus showed himself as uncompromising in dealing with Abdul Hamid's Government as his predecessor Joachim III in combating the anti-clericalism of the Young Turks.

The present election of a Patriarch to the Greek Orthodox Church has been of special interest in view of the recent events in Macedonia. The Patriarchate being from the point of view of the Ottoman Government an official Ottoman institution, the Patriarch is elected by Ottoman Metropolitans. Had peace ensued before the election, the forty-three Metropolitans of Turkey in Europe would probably have been precluded from taking part in the election.

Indeed, with the shrinking of the Ottoman dominions, the Patriarchal election, confined to Ottoman-Greek Metropolitans, will be correspondingly restricted in area. Many Greeks are beginning to forecast the eventuality of Constantinople exchanging its Ottoman masters for other non-Greek rulers, in which case the Patriarchate would be a solely Greek institution in the matters of language, tradition, and spirit, and the other Slav-speaking and Roumanian autocephalous churches, *e.g.*, Russian, Servian, Bulgarian, Roumanian, &c, would probably refuse to allow the Patriarchate to remain a purely Greek-speaking institution, and insist on having Slav-speaking prelates on

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the Holy Synod and in participating in the election. The final outcome of such a change might be that the Œcumenical Patriarchal Chair, heretofore filled by Greeks, might be occupied by a Slav prelate, thus radically changing its Hellenic or Byzantine character. Many were, consequently, in favour of the election of a young man who might be likely to considerably outlive the undoing of 1453, at present being speculated on in Greek circles. The recent *locum tenens*, Mgr. Germanos of Amassia, who is about 42 years of age, received, in fact, in the first stage forty-two votes against the forty-seven recorded for the present Patriarch.

The needful Imperial iradé of the Sultan-Caliph sanctioning the election of Germanos V has now been issued. His Holiness will be received in solemn audience by His Majesty, and after the customary official visit to the Grand Vizier at the Porte, the religious ceremony of the enthronement as Patriarch will take place at the Church of the Patriarchate at Fener, on the Golden Horn.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[8480] No. 408.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 22, 1913.*

DURING the last two days local organs which reflect the opinions in committee circles have displayed pacific tendency and comment at length on interdependent questions of Silistria and Adrianople. Some of them calculate that if former town is not ceded to Roumania opportunity may be taken of accepting arrangement as regards Adrianople, proposed by the Porte in its reply, and thus form a precedent for some similar hybrid arrangement in the case of Salonica as opposed to sole possession by the Greeks.

As regards Adrianople it may be of interest to recall that His Majesty's consul, in his despatch No. 62 of 15th October last, reported the amount of wheat and flour in the town was believed to be sufficient to feed the garrison and town at the then rate of consumption (presumably full rations) for seventeen weeks, viz., until 11th February.

(Sent to Bucharest and Athens.)

[8665] No. 409.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 22, 1913.*

TURKISH Government request that commanders of British ships be warned not to land their men at any point on the coast between Gulf of Xeros and Aivalik, for fear of their being taken for enemy forces.

[8629] No. 410.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, February 22, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 39 of 20th February.

Following is full summary of communiqué to the press this morning :—

"The Cabinet yesterday decided to accept mediation offer by the Powers, and to ask all six Powers, and not two Powers, to mediate. Roumanian Government reserves the liberty to accept or reject recommendation made by the Powers as the result of the mediation. If mediating Powers recommend Bulgarian Government to cede Silistria, Bulgarian Government will have to say whether or no they accept recommendation. In like manner if the Powers think it suitable that cession of territory should not include Silistria, Roumanian Government will then have to reply whether they accept this or whether they decide to insist on Silistria at any cost and to resort to arbitrament of arms."

I understand that legation will receive note informing them of this decision to-day.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[8644] No. 411.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, February 22, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 21st February.

I learn from a good source that Servians are sending one division to Scutari. As it proceeds viâ Salonica, it will take at least three weeks to arrive.

[8655] No. 412.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February 22, 1913.*

ALBANIAN delimitation.

Minister of Foreign Affairs is laid up in bed and could not see me, but I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your telegram No. 70 of 21st February. I used every argument I could to persuade him of advisability of Austria to yield on the question of Djakova. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that importance of keeping Djakova in Albania was that it was bazaar for an entirely Albanian rural population, and that if all the towns in that part were given to Servia she might make it difficult for the Albanian mountaineers to carry on their commercial business.

I pointed out that this difficulty might perhaps be overcome if the six Powers guaranteeing the integrity of Albania obtained from Servia guarantees for the security of the Albanian population in the frontier districts. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that he would report to Minister for Foreign Affairs the arguments I had used.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs observed to me that, if Albanian question were settled by Austria yielding in the question of Djakova, it seemed to him that it would be essential that the six Powers should undertake to force acceptance of Albanian delimitation on the allies.

[8657] No. 413.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, February 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 76 of 21st February.

I have communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs contents, who took note of them, and said that ethnographically and geographically he believed that Austrian contention with regard to both Djakova and Dibra was sound, but such considerations were secondary as compared with urgency of finding conciliatory solution, and he would continue to work in that sense. Germany was also now urging conciliation at Vienna, but only since new Minister for Foreign Affairs had assumed office. At present he found no disposition to yield at Vienna regarding former place, and all really depended on whether Scutari fell or held out. The King of Montenegro had lost his head, and announced that once in Scutari he would never withdraw. In that case he believed that Russia would also not give way.

[8653] No. 414.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, February 22, 1913.*

I COMMUNICATED your telegram No. 90 of 21st February to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day and left with him an *aide-mémoire* of its contents. He said that he warmly appreciated your efforts to secure a compromise, but that he had gone as far with Austria as he possibly could. With the object of avoiding complications he had

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already urged Austria further in the direction of concession than was perhaps wise in view of future status of Albania, and Austria had given way on many important points such as Prisrend, Ipek, line of Boyana, and now Dibra. Surely it was now for Russia to show herself conciliatory and give up Djakova for the sake of a settlement. I reminded his Excellency that Russia had given way on the Adriatic port question, and seemed now willing to give up Scutari, Tarabosch, and Luma. These were all points to which she had attached much importance. His Excellency maintained that balance of concession still remained with Austria, and that in any case question of Albanian frontier was of more direct interest to her than to Russia. We discussed the question for some time, but he said finally that, anxious as he was for a settlement, he could not undertake to advise Austria to give way any further. All he could do was to communicate your views to the Austrian Government.

[8648] No. 415.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, February 22, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called to deliver Roumanian reply to mediation proposal. Reply is verbal, but his Excellency left with me *aide-mémoire* which runs as follows:—

"Roumanian Government accept offer of mediation made by British Minister on 14th February on behalf of His Majesty's Government, who advise resort to mediation of all or of one of the Powers. German Minister associated himself with the British proposal on 16th February by reading to Minister for Foreign Affairs instructions supporting British representations. Subsequently representatives of the other four Powers took similar steps.

"Mediation thus offered by the Great Powers is accepted by Roumania all the more readily, as she was glad to be able to associate herself at The Hague Conference with all the proposals of the Powers in favour of peace, and as in particular she signed with them in 1907 Convention No. 1, 'For the peaceful settlement of international conflicts,' which in articles 3–7 contemplates and defines mediation.

"Of the two alternative mediations indicated in the British proposal, Roumania has decided to accept the mediation of all Six Great Powers. She accepts without further condition, merely expressing one wish—a wish justified by circumstances and warranted by article 8 of the said convention, which, though it relates to another hypothesis, implies necessity of fixing a term for mediations. Roumania desires that Great Powers should be so good as to limit duration of their action, and should communicate to Roumania term within which they think their good offices will have reached the agreed result."

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[8649] No. 416.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No 46. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 22, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs made it clear to me to-day that, while leaving place of mediation to the pleasure of the Powers, Roumania would prefer that it should not be London. I believe that he regards the atmosphere there as unfavourable to Roumania, although he gave as his reasons for preferring some other capital that the Ambassadors in London had many other questions to deal with and that their discussions may have tended to produce friction among them.

Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned St. Petersburgh.

[8650] No. 417.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 23, 1913.*

TO prevent misunderstanding I should state that no collective action has yet been taken in the sense of your telegram No. 16 of 17th February, instructions in which seem to contemplate arbitration rather than mediation.

French and Italian Ministers received similar instructions on 18th February, my Russian colleague 19th February, my German colleague yesterday. Austrian Minister had until last night no such instructions.

Meanwhile mediation proposal has been considered and answered by the Roumanian Government, and I rather doubt whether collective pressure for arbitration would achieve any better result than that reported in my telegram No. 44 of 22nd February, for it would be difficult to persuade Roumania to accept arbitration except on the express basis of acquisition of Silistria.

[8656] No. 418.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February 23, 1913.*

ALBANIA.

I sounded the German Ambassador last night to ascertain whether he could not use his influence with the Austro-Hungarian Government to persuade them to give way with regard to Djakova. He was very guarded in his reply, and said that in his opinion Austria-Hungary had already given way so much to Russia that it was difficult to press them to yield further to Russian demands. I gather from his language that at present he would neither persuade nor dissuade Austro-Hungarian Government in the matter of Djakova.

[8652] No. 419.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 23, 191.*

ROUMANIA.

Your telegram No. 44 of 17th February.

I joined to-day with my colleagues of the Great Powers in a joint *démarche* requesting Bulgarian Government to submit their differences to the Powers.

Prime Minister informed us that matter was receiving careful attention of the Cabinet, and that he hoped to send us written answer in the course of a day or two.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[8654] No. 420.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, February 23, 1913.*

ALBANIA.

Your telegram No. 91 of to-day acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs much depressed by your communication. He says that all he can do is to repeat it to Vienna, but he does not think that it will have much effect. He had already gone as far as he could in extracting concessions from the Austrian Government, and even that respecting Dibra had been made in deference to Germany's wishes. He greatly feared that deadlock of which you spoke was imminent unless Russia gave way. He again maintained that balance of concession was in favour of Austria, and spoke strongly as to the peace of Europe being endangered by Balkan

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States acting through Russia. He realised your position as regards Russia, and hoped that you would understand his as regards Austria. He was as anxious as you to obtain a settlement, but was at the end of his tether as regards advice and suggestions.

Scutari would probably fall soon, and the situation would then become even graver. He also had been given to understand that Austria was against international commission to report on local conditions, which had surprised him, as he thought they would be gainers by it.

As he had no suggestions to make, I begged him to consider your communication carefully, and to let me know to-morrow if he could do anything, but he said that he was sure he could do no more than repeat what you said to Vienna.

(Repeated to Vienna, No. 77.)

[8905] No. 421.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1913.

IN transmitting last Austrian proposal about Dibra to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs I not only put it in the most favourable aspect that I could, but took care to embody in my communication the grave statements on which the Austrian Ambassador laid stress in his communication to me.

I have now received a reply from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he says that Russia cannot consent to hand over to a Mussulman Albania the towns of Dibra and Djakova, where there are Slav religious institutions. Servia would not withdraw her troops from these towns, and Russia could not be indifferent to an attempt to expel Servia by force from either of them.

Djakova is, I understand, a town of only 6,000 inhabitants; it is the town, not a large territory, that is in dispute, and this is the one outstanding point on which the whole diplomatic settlement will be made or wrecked.

It seems unreasonable and intolerable that this should be allowed to cause serious trouble between Great Powers, but a question of prestige has become involved in it.

Austria has secured her settlement as regards an Adriatic port; Scutari will also be conceded, a town of vastly more size and importance than Djakova and Dibra, or both put together. I cannot believe that to allow Djakova and Dibra to Servia would be regarded as any loss of prestige to Austria when the Albanian settlement came to be reviewed as a whole.

On the other hand, Russia is already criticised for having abandoned Servian claim to a territorial port: the Russian Government and even the Emperor will be attacked for refusing to support Montenegro about Scutari or agreeing that she should be prevented from obtaining or retaining it. If, in addition to this, Russia yields about Djakova and becomes a consenting party to the eviction of Servia from it by force the position of the Russian Government may become impossible.

For these reasons I cannot, after the Adriatic port and Scutari have been conceded, press Russian Government further about Djakova. The only suggestion I could make would be the reference of outstanding points of dispute to an international commission to report on the local conditions; but this I understand is not agreeable to Austria.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, while being very firm in his communications about Djakova, has made them so friendly in tone as regards myself that I am very reluctant to make any appeal to him on this point, which he might resent.

But my own efforts to secure a settlement are very nearly exhausted, and it is necessary to put the position before German Minister for Foreign Affairs as it is. We have so nearly reached a settlement; and yet without Djakova being conceded to Servia a settlement becomes impossible.

There is no risk that I can see of the question becoming acute until an attempt is made to expel Servia by force, but I cannot well avoid a statement in debate on King's speech when new session of Parliament opens on 10th March, and if we have to confess then that there is a diplomatic deadlock it will make a very bad impression; if, on the other hand, in next fortnight we register an agreement about Albanian frontier at meetings of Ambassadors there will be enormous relief. But to bring the question before meeting of Ambassadors while Austria and Russia are irreconcilable about Djakova would precipitate deadlock, emphasise disagreement, and make it appear that

* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 71) and Sir R. Rodd (No. 77), *mutatis mutandis*.

Powers were divided into two opposite camps according to diplomatic support given to Austria and Russia respectively at Ambassadors' meeting. The meetings of Ambassadors have hitherto been most favourably free from such a division.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of the whole substance of this telegram.

[8938] No. 422.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.**

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1913.

FOLLOWING resolution was agreed to at ambassadorial meeting on 21st February, which I send for your own information :—

"La réunion trouve la proposition allemande entièrement d'accord avec les instructions déjà adressées aux représentants des Puissances à Bucarest et à Sophia, lesquelles leur prescrivent d'obtenir que les Gouvernements roumain et bulgare remettent la solution de leurs différends à la décision des Puissances. La réunion pense que cette décision doit appartenir aux six Puissances, et elle considère comme très désirable que la déclaration collective soit faite d'urgence si elle n'a pas déjà été faite."

[8938] No. 423.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 23, 1913.

FOLLOWING resolution was agreed to at Ambassadorial meeting on 21st February, which I send for your own information :—

"La réunion estime qu'il n'y a pas lieu de formuler dès à présent les conditions de la paix ou les garanties à donner à la Sublime Porte. Ce serait s'exposer à une discussion qui risquerait de rendre la médiation impossible. Elle est donc d'avis qu'il y a lieu d'attendre la réponse de la Sublime Porte à la dernière communication de Sir E. Grey, c'est-à-dire de savoir si le Gouvernement ottoman se remet aux Puissances du soin d'établir les conditions de la paix et s'engage à accepter leur décision.

"Cette déclaration une fois obtenue, les Puissances pourront s'adresser aux alliés et leur demander s'ils acceptent leur médiation dans les mêmes conditions."

[8833] No. 424.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Canea, February* 15, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 6 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that Captain Alderson, R.N., commanding His Majesty's ship "Yarmouth," received instructions on the evening of the 13th instant to sail for Milo next day. In conformity with a previous understanding between us, he ordered the flags on Suda Island, which were in the usual course hauled down at sunset on the 13th, not to be rehoisted on the 14th, withdrew the guard from the island, and next morning handed the flags of Turkey and the protecting Powers to me as doyen of the consular body. My three colleagues received their respective flags from me, and we agreed that for the present the Turkish flag should remain in my custody.

No sooner had His Majesty's ship "Yarmouth" sailed than the captain of the port of Canea was sent by M. Dragoumis to take possession of Suda Island and hoist the Greek flag there. I understand that some of the Greek bluejackets, whose arrival was reported in my despatch No. 2 of the 25th January, are left on the island as a guard.

These happenings naturally provoked joyful demonstrations amongst the Cretans,

* Also to Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 54).

who consider that the protecting Powers are deliberately abandoning their position in this island.

In the absence of instructions on the subject, my colleagues and I decided to maintain the flags which have hitherto been flown on the flagstaffs by the British, French, Russian, and Italian landing-stages in front of the officers' clubs in the old Turkish arsenal at Suda, hoisting them on the days when the consulate flags at Canea are hoisted. There is a certain amount of property belonging to the respective navies remaining in the club-houses and in the godowns in the arsenal, and we considered it advisable to give M. Dragoumis no opening for annexing these premises until the Powers have definitely withdrawn from Suda.

On behalf of my colleagues and myself, I have requested the commandant of the gendarmerie to instruct his men at Suda to see that no unauthorised person meddles with these premises, and this he has promised to do.

A petty officer and two men are in charge of the French buildings in the arsenal, the Russians and Italians have caretakers there, but we have nobody. The British club was partly burned down on New Year's Eve, and the furniture is stowed in the canteen. Captain Alderson, on leaving, handed me the keys of these two buildings.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[8831] No. 425.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Salonica, February 16, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, two copies of a despatch which I have this day addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting further cases of forcible conversion of Mussulman villages by the Bulgarians.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 425.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Salonica, February 16, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 9, 10, and 11 of the 5th, 7th, and 13th instant respectively concerning the forcible conversion of Mussulman villages to Christianity by the Bulgars in occupation of the country, I have the honour to report that I have just received a letter from Mr. Vice-Consul Wilkie Young, dated Xanthi, 28th January, in which he informs me that a similar operation was being carried out in the Pomak villages of that neighbourhood, amongst which he quotes:—

	Houses.
Yassoren	400
Shahin	350
Emali	200
Siukova	250
Soujak	60
Urlou	250
Mustaphtchova	300

The conversions are said to have been effected by armed bands who rounded up the inhabitants and, even if they did not actually resort to murder, made free use of threats of massacre and torture in order to attain their ends. A number of village "elders" are reported to have had their beards shaved off and been subjected to various other indignities.

I had the honour of telegraphing this morning the main facts reported by Mr. Young to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom I am transmitting a copy of this despatch direct, as also to His Majesty's representative at Sophia.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[8686] No. 426.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 62.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February 19, 1913.*

PRINCE HOHENLOHE'S mission, which it was hoped would serve to relax the tension so long existing between Austria and Russia, has failed to bear permanent fruit. The sincerity of the pacific assurances exchanged by the two Emperors is not doubted, but it is felt that something more than friendly words is required to compose deep-rooted differences and conflicting interests. While Austria, as Prince Hohenlohe stated, cannot be indifferent to what passes on the other side of her southern frontier, and is therefore obliged to maintain her army on a war footing till a final and satisfactory settlement has been arrived at, Russia has to see that justice is done to the Balkan Slavs. She is, nevertheless, ready to disband her reservists if only Austria will demobilise; and had Prince Hohenlohe been in a position to promise a speedy reduction of Austrian armaments, such an announcement would have done more to inspire confidence in Austria's good intentions than all the platonic assurances with which he was charged. Prince Hohenlohe, however, could hold out no such hope; and the only answer, therefore, that he carried back to Vienna was the pious wish expressed by the Emperor Nicholas that by common efforts on the part of the two Governments, and by mutual concessions, an arrangement satisfactory to both countries might be reached.

Austria's desire to create a great Albania has so far prevented her making concessions of a sufficiently far-reaching character to satisfy Russia. The Austrian councillor of embassy, indeed, even went so far as to give M. Sazonof to understand that the line of delimitation proposed by Prince Lichnowsky—the Austrian line under the German flag, as M. Sazonof styled it—was Austria's last word. For this he was taken to task by M. Sazonof, who remarked that such a statement, if seriously meant, might have dangerous consequences, as Russia would also have to say her last word on the subject. His Excellency had, however, no desire to close the door on a reasonable compromise; and, in informing me of the counter-project which he was telegraphing to London, said that, provided that Austria did not prove intransigeant, there was still room for mutal concessions. The state of public feeling towards Austria was, nevertheless, clearly manifested by the manner in which almost the entire press, with the single exception of the semi-official "Rossia," rejected the olive-branch held out by the "Fremdenblatt" in the article that took for its text "The Balkans for the Balkan races."

During the past week that feeling has been intensified by the acute phase on which the Roumanian question has entered. The announcement that Roumania was claiming an extension of her frontier to a line drawn from Silistria to Baltchik, inclusive of the former town, was received with general indignation, more especially when it became known that Roumania was even contemplating an occupation of that territory by force. For the first time since the outbreak of the crisis the president of the council spoke to me in most despondent terms of the situation. An optimist by nature, M. Kokovtsof had hitherto succeeded in inspiring the financiers who from time to time consult him on the political outlook with his own optimism; and the bourse has consequently for some time past maintained a firm tone. At the beginning of this week, however, it experienced a sharp fall; and I am told that M. Kokovtsof had previously warned his friends to be prudent, as it was impossible to say what might happen. M. Sazonof, on his part, was equally pessimistic, and confessed that Saturday, the 15th instant, was the most anxious day that he had passed since the Balkan war broke out. While bringing all his influence to bear to keep the Roumanians quiet, he told the Bulgarians, who had requested his intervention, that he could do nothing unless they were prepared to make some substantial concession. The concession which he had in his mind was that of the town of Silistria. That he should have pressed its cession at Sophia is symptomatic of the Emperor's determination to maintain peace almost at any price; and it is the more significant, seeing that His Majesty, as I have reason to know, is incensed with what he regards as an unjustifiable attempt to deprive Bulgaria of what Russia had given her after the war of liberation. What made M. Sazonof anxious to obtain Bulgaria's consent to the cession of Silistria was the fear that otherwise a forcible occupation of that town by Roumania would sooner or later entail Russia's armed intervention; while, as Austria would in that case have to come

to Roumania's assistance, a general war was almost certain to ensue. In the hope of averting such a calamity he proposed, should the Roumanian army cross the frontier, to confine his action at first to a strong protest, and to a declaration to the effect that Russia would recognise no change in the territorial *status quo* that was effected without Bulgaria's consent. He did not, he said, wish to be more Bulgarian than the Bulgarians, and he would therefore consent to any cession of territory that they could be induced to make. They could not, however, be expected to cede a strategic point like Baltchik, that dominated Varna, nor even Kalakria. The only hope of a peaceful solution, he seemed to think, lay in the mediation of the Powers, for which, as he told me, a proposal had been put forward by the Italian Ambassador in London. He accordingly addressed a circular telegram to the Russian Ambassadors at the various capitals, urging some collective action at Bucharest and Sophia, with a view to inducing the two Governments to place the whole question in the hands of the Powers, and suggesting that should this step prove unsuccessful, the Powers should declare that they would not recognise any territorial changes that were made without their consent.

On the 17th instant M. Sazonof was informed by the Bulgarian Minister that, though his Government would never consent to the cession of Silistria, they would not offer armed resistance should it be occupied by force. This announcement was welcomed by his Excellency, as he hoped that if no fighting took place Russia could not be called upon to intervene, and could content herself for the moment with entering a strong protest against such a violation of Bulgarian territory. It would only, however, afford a respite and not avert the danger altogether, as Bulgaria would, he was convinced, but wait till she felt herself strong enough to retake what she had lost.

As foreshadowed in Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 38, Confidential, of the 15th instant, the German Ambassador represented to M. Sazonof on the 16th instant the serious consequences that might ensue from an active intervention on the part of Russia, and at the same time drew his Excellency's attention to the difficulties with which King Charles was being confronted at home. M. Sazonof did not tell me whether he gave Count Pourtalès any assurances on these points, but he took the opportunity of urging how advisable it was that Roumania and Bulgaria should place the whole question in dispute in the hands of the Powers. His Excellency also, either in this or in some other recent conversation, drew Count Pourtalès's attention to the fact that by assuring Austria of her support in the event of war, Germany had placed a very dangerous weapon in Austria's hands. He could not, he said, understand why Germany could not make it clear at Vienna that there were certain bounds which Austria must not pass, and that if the latter would not listen to her counsels of moderation, Germany's proffered support would be no longer at her disposal. To this Count Pourtalès had replied that Germany could not afford to lose her one and only ally in Europe, as otherwise the policy initiated (as he alleged) by His late Majesty King Edward would be realised, and Germany would find herself hemmed in on all sides. M. Sazonof rebutted this contention, arguing that Austria would never dare to cut herself adrift from Germany, as without the latter's support she would be at Russia's mercy.

I have more than once called attention to the fact that, in spite of the active part that Germany played during the annexation crisis of 1909, she has never been regarded here, at least during recent years, with the same feelings of intense hostility as Austria. Of late, however, there have not been wanting signs that people are beginning to fix on her the responsibility for much that is happening in the field of international politics. The German Ambassador recently told me that he had noticed a certain coldness on the part of Russians, with whom he had formerly been on a most friendly footing. The reason for this change is, I think, not difficult to find. Roumania, it is argued would never have adopted her present provocative attitude could she not count on Austria's support; while, if Germany did not stand behind Austria, the latter would never brave Russia single-handed. Germany is therefore regarded as holding the key of the situation in her hands.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[8666] No. 427.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 135.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 19, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the Amnesty Law which was published here in the local press on the 14th instant. The issue of this measure at the present moment at first occasioned some surprise, and the committee press was not slow to laud the magnanimous conduct of the present Government and to contrast it with the persecuting methods of its predecessors, while pointing out at the same time that the law was only retrospective and warning the opponents of the present Government that it left the Government a free hand to deal with any future misbehaviour.

The conviction is now general that the law, under the guise of a generous measure of pardon, is in reality only intended to shield the perpetrators of the murder of Nazim and of the other victims of the *coup d'État* at the Sublime Porte on the 23rd January.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 427.

Newspaper Extract.

L'AMNISTIE GÉNÉRALE.

VOICI le texte de la loi d'amnistie générale pour les délits et crimes politiques, insérée dans le "Takvim-Vékai" :—

"Article 1er. Une amnistie générale est accordée pour tous les crimes politiques commis jusqu'à la date de la publication de la présente loi.

"Exception est faite pour tous les individus sur qui retombe une responsabilité des revers militaires et pour ceux qui, pendant la guerre, ont prêté une aide matérielle ou morale à l'ennemi.

"Art. 2. Le Ministre de l'Intérieur et le Ministre de la Justice sont chargés de l'exécution de la présente loi.

"Je promulgue cette loi provisoire, qui sera soumise au Parlement lorsqu'il sera convoqué. Elle entrera en vigueur du jour où elle sera publiée par les journaux, et elle sera inscrite dans le Recueil des Lois de l'Empire.

"MEHMED RÉCHAD.

"Le Grand Vizir,
"MAHMOUD CHEVKET.
"Le Ministre de l'Intérieur,
"AADIL.
"Le Ministre de la Justice,
"IBRAHIM.

"*Le 4 Rébi-ul-Evel*, 1331, 26 *Kianouni-Sani*, 1328 (11 *février*, 1913)."

[8667] No. 428.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 136.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 20, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, reporting the dispatch of troops to Akaba.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Cairo.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 428.

Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3 E.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, January* 26, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the steam-ship "Koweit" of the Arab Steamers (Limited) of Bombay, that was chartered by the Ottoman Government for the transport of troops, embarked here on the 11th instant 1,500 officers and men (regulars) of various battalions belonging to the Yemen Army Corps.

The vessel proceeded to Loheia on the following day, and, after taking 700 more regulars on board, sailed for Akaba, where the above troops will be landed.

Although the latter were described as "sick and invalids" by the local authorities, it was observed that the majority of the men, especially the officers, were in good health. It is supposed that they are destined for service at the front.

Referring to my *locum tenens'* despatch No. 780 to Mr. Consul Shipley, I would like to mention that the reserves (strength, 1,651 men) transported from Mokha to Akaba in the "Islami" belonged to the Buzgir, Eregli, and Karaman battalions of the Karaman regiment of redifs (Konia Division), and those embarked at Loheia (700 men) consisted of the Yarpuz battalion of the Adana regiment and the Kozan reserve battalion respectively. They were the last of the reserve troops remaining in the Yemen that had been landed at the beginning of 1911 for service during the insurrection under the Imam Yahya.

As has already been reported, the other redif battalions were sent away in the ships "Budrie" and "Koweit" in November last, and disembarked at Akaba.

The two pieces of artillery mentioned in Mr. Taylor's despatch as having been conveyed from Sheikh Saïd to Hodeidah were two of the four Austrian howitzers dispatched from Constantinople in 1911. They had been mounted at the Sheikh Saïd fortress during the late Italo-Turkish war.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

[8670] No. 429.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 139.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 20, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy reporting on German officers serving with Turkish army.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 429.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 18, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that four German officers, or ex-officers, accompanied Enver Bey when he left Constantinople on the 7th instant, in connection with the embarkation of the Xth Army Corps, of which he is the chief staff officer. The names of these Germans are Gumpenberg, Zehe, Kastner, and Bentheim, and they were all, I believe, serving with the Turks in Benghazi under Enver Bey during the Turco-Italian war. A few days before their departure I met Gumpenberg, who was wearing the uniform of a Turkish lieutenant, and who told me he had spent ten months fighting in Tripoli and had followed Enver Bey here; also that he was still an officer in the German army, and that when the war was over he would go back to his own army.

The German military attaché here denies that these men are officers on the active list of the German army. Two are officers "zur Disposition," which means, he says, that they have left the army of their own accord and can go back to it if they like, and two have

been obliged to leave the army for misconduct or some other reason. These two might be allowed to enter the army again if they did something to merit reinstatement (such as the acquirement of war experience, presumably) and if the nature of the offences for which they were removed did not preclude it.

There is another German officer here called Baring, who appears to be in the same category as the above, and who was in Tripoli with Fethi Bey during the Turco-Italian war. He is now attached to the Kurdish tribal cavalry division in the Selimiyeh barracks.

A German doctor called Feist, a civilian, also accompanied Enver Bey on this trip. He came out here originally with a German Red Cresent hospital, but left it and has since been working on his own account among the refugees, &c.

I learned some time ago that there were actually two German officers in Adrianople, and I have now got the following details concerning them: One is a Lieutenant Wagner, a Saxon officer who was compelled to leave the army on account of an "accident" in Dresden, and has been about two years in Turkey; the other is a man called Thoma, who was a non-commissioned officer in Germany, and was engaged as such by the Turkish Embassy in Berlin, but who has since been given the rank of second lieutenant in the Turkish army.

Of the German officers officially lent to the Turkish army, only three appear to be now at the front. These are Lieutenant-Colonel Lossow (see my No. 80 of the 20th October, 1912), who is now commanding the 8th Division at Chatalja; Major Lehmann, who was actively employed in supervising the artillery during the fighting at Chatalja, and of the exact nature of whose work with the army on the present occasion I am unaware; and Colonel Back, who is said to be commanding the 2nd Division, and who appears to be actually in command of the advanced guard on the left of the Turkish army, now operating between Kallikratia and Silivri.

Lieutenant-Colonel Veit (my No. 80 above) was here a few days ago, and I do not know whether he intends to go to the front or not.

The idea that the German officers who took an active part in the war might have difficulty in getting back to their own army eventually seems to be quite exploded, and I gather from all the German officers I talk to that no difficulty will be made, and that Lossow and Veit, in spite of renouncing their German nationality, will go back to their own army as if they had never left it; I believe the Turks refused to accept Veit as a "subject."

Lieutenant-Colonels Tupschowski and Weiz and Majors Rabe and von Frese are in Constantinople, and are not likely to take any active part in the war, while all the rest seem to be in Germany, either on leave or for good.

Of the German officers who are here unofficially, Major von Hochwaechter, in spite of the fact that he was on Mahmud Mukhtar's staff in the earlier battles and has since published a book on the war, is not to go to the front, and has been ordered to return to his post at Damascus, before doing which he was, when I last saw him, trying to get three months' arrears of pay out of the Turkish Government.

When the war broke out a number of German officers came out here on the chance of seeing something and in the hope of getting employment in the Turkish army, and it is interesting, and perhaps instructive, to note that their Government does not at all seem to discourage them from trying to get a little war experience at first hand. A certain Count Preising (an officer of Reserve) was with Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha during the fighting at Chatalja. He was an enterprising youth in search of adventure, and having got an introduction to Mahmud Mukhtar through the good offices of the German Embassy, he borrowed a Turkish uniform, provided himself with a horse, and did a reconnaissance in the Bulgarian lines which very nearly ended in his capture. His horse and all that it carried fell into the hands of the enemy, and he had to swim out to a boat in Lake Derkos, by means of which he finally effected his escape. He formed a very poor opinion of the enterprise and resource both of the Bulgarian outposts and of the Turkish soldiers by whom he was accompanied. I also met two young officers at Chatalja who were students at the German Staff College. They were Lieutenants Count Stiegenkron (15th Hussars) and Knörze. They began by telling me that they were no longer in the German army, and that they had offered their services to the Turkish Government. These had been refused, so they were there as simple spectators. When the fighting was over they would return to their duties in Germany. When they spoke of being no longer in the German army they did so in perfect good faith. I find that the criterion applied by the Germans as to whether an officer is in his own army or not is the question of whether or not he is receiving his army pay. An officer goes to reorganise a foreign army, or gets leave to go and see the war, and so long as he

ceases to draw his pay is considered not to belong to the army. Directly he returns he resumes his own place without losing a day's seniority. In other words, his position is analogous to that of a British officer who is "seconded," the difference being that in the case of the German officer his Government does not seem to consider itself responsible for his actions. This rather broad interpretation of the status of a German officer is naturally very much to their advantage in Turkey, as they can assist the Turks as much as they like, or as the Turks allow them to, in time of war without contravening the orders of their own Government, and I have often heard comparisons drawn by Turks between the respective attitudes of the German and British officers in their service towards the war, comparisons which are unfavourable to the latter. The different attitudes of the German and British Governments on the question of neutrality as regards the conduct of their officers in time of war is also interpreted as showing the more friendly intentions of the German Government towards Turkey. Astonishment too has been expressed that no British officers have volunteered to help them as Germans, like Preising, have done.

There are two German press correspondents out here called Sprenger and Von Reitzenstein, who I was told were really army officers with special missions, one of them being an artillery expert.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[9749] No. 430.

Pro-memoriâ communicated by Tewfik Pasha, February 24, 1913.

(Très Confidentiel.)

REÇU télégramme.

La défense de la capitale ne peut être assurée qu'à la condition que la nouvelle frontière parte du cap de San-Stefano (sur la mer Noire) et aille à la rivière Maritza, pour nous assurer ainsi la possession d'Indada, Lulé-Bourgas et Baba-Eski. Il est par conséquent nécessaire de savoir d'avance si les Puissances peuvent nous assurer leur concours et consentement sur ce point comme aussi pour l'obtention de l'exterritorialité de tous les mosquées, tombeaux, monuments religieux et historiques dans la ville d'Andrinople et les alentours.

C'est aux Puissances qu'est laissée la solution de la question des îles, à la condition expresse toutefois que cette solution soit conforme aux vues et aux considérations développées dans la note responsive de la Sublime Porte.

Pour ce qui est d'une demande quelconque d'indemnité de guerre, nous déclarons d'ores et déjà que nous ne pourrons en aucun cas prendre en considération une pareille demande, et que nous exigeons en toute justice que les États balkaniques assument une part proportionnelle de la dette publique ottomane.

Il est, en outre, nécessaire pour la sécurité même de la capitale que les Puissances veuillent bien nous assurer que les fortifications d'Andrinople et de Kirk-Kilissé seront démantelées et que la Bulgarie n'en fera pas des places fortes dans l'avenir.

Dans le cas où une entente pourrait s'établir sur ces points, les assiégeants devront consentir soit à ce que la ville d'Andrinople soit ravitaillée, soit à ce que la garnison puisse quitter la ville en recevant tous les honneurs militaires et en emportant avec elle tout son matériel de guerre, tels que canons, fusils, munitions et autres. Les canons et matériaux qui ne pourront être transportés immédiatement continueront à appartenir au Gouvernement Impérial, qui se chargera de les retirer aussitôt qu'il disposera des moyens de transport nécessaires. Il est également entendu que les habitants d'Andrinople et les réfugiés bénéficieront du droit de pouvoir quitter la ville dans le cas où tel serait leur désir.

Vu le caractère délicat des pourparlers, il est indispensable, pour mener à bonne fin les négociations ultérieures, que le secret le plus absolu soit gardé à ce sujet.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 24 février, 1913.

[8742] No. 431.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 23, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Sophia and Bucharest appear to be at cross-purposes.

I gather from Sophia telegram No. 72 of 23rd February that the Bulgarian Government is considering a collective proposal for a settlement by the Great Powers, Roumania and Bulgaria presumably being bound to abide by the Great Powers' decision; whereas Roumania has already considered and accepted the suggestion made by you and supported by the other Powers for mediation, and under Hague Convention, article 6, neither State is bound to accept results of mediation. It is this point in mediation that has made Roumania so ready to adopt your suggestion.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[8793] No. 432.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 19 of 23rd February and my telegrams Nos. 45, 47, and 48 of 22nd and 23rd February.

The Austrian Minister has now received instructions, but as resolution recorded in your telegram was previous to Roumanian Government's acceptance of mediation proposal, I do not propose to join in any collective action in the sense of your telegram without further instructions.

[8930] No. 433.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 73. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 24, 1913.*

BALKAN war.

All Bulgarian troops, including youngest recruits, have now left for the seat of war. Only force remaining in the country is the small territorial army in the various districts which is left to oppose a Turkish invasion from the Black Sea.

Orders have been sent from head-quarters to prepare a hospital for fresh sick and wounded, and all minor cases have been sent home.

I hear from private reliable sources that but few wounded arrive, as they perish on the way from cold and exposure. Winter has come late in South-East Europe, but it is exceptionally severe.

The Bulgarian Government have now no fresh forces to fall back on, and should more be required they will have to appeal to their Greek and Servian allies.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[8939] No. 434.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey. —(Received February 24.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 24, 1913.*

ONE of the principal Committee organs strongly denounces Hakki Pasha's statement, reported through Reuter, as to "leaving the question of peace to the Powers" and his reference to "two keys for Adrianople" and "lost territory as irrecoverable." The paper characterises Hakki Pasha's alleged utterances as "inept" and "unpardonable." It appears that Djavid Bey, ex-Minister of Finance, may proceed to London to supplement or replace Hakki Pasha. Cabinet and Committee seem divided, Grand Vizier and others being in favour of a moderate course, while Talaat and Djavid, &c., are in favour of war *à outrance*, as in case of Tripoli.

(Sent to Sophia, Bucharest, Athens, and Vienna.)

[8941] No. 435.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 24, 1913.*

THE Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me last night that the Austrian Ambassador had informed him yesterday that the report given by Prince Hohenlohe to the Emperor of Austria of his cordial reception at St. Petersburgh had caused His Majesty much pleasure. The Ambassador said that he had been instructed to express the hope that the Russian Government would dismiss their reservists if Austria reduced her forces on the Galician frontier below normal peace effective of Russian army.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs had, in thanking the Ambassador for this friendly communication, enquired whether Austrian forces on the Servian frontier would not also be reduced, and, on being told that this was impossible on account of the uncertainty of political situation, said that he would submit what the Ambassador had told him to the Emperor.

I suggested that were the Russian Government to meet Austria's wishes in this matter it might dispose her to yield on the question of Djakova. His Excellency replied that were that question only settled there would be an end of the crisis. Unfortunately Russian public opinion suspected Austria of wishing to compel Servia to keep her military forces within certain prescribed limits. Before therefore consenting to dismissal of reservists, Russia might have to ask for a guarantee that Austria would neither attack Servia nor impose humiliating conditions on her. He would discuss the whole question with the Emperor to-morrow.

[8951] No. 436.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 67. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, February 24, 1913.*

IN a conversation I had last night with M. Sazonof, I mentioned question of increase of German armaments. I was told by his Excellency that he had drawn the the attention of the Emperor at his last audience to the consequences such increase might entail for Russia herself. In reply His Majesty had said that he had foreseen the attitude M. Sazonof would adopt and had given orders that two new army corps should be formed, the one to be stationed near the western frontier and the other in the Caucasus. Until this step is made public his Excellency begged that the information he had given me might be treated as strictly secret.

Accordingly to M. Sazonof the decision of Germany to increase the size of her army on a peace footing was prompted by the discovery that the Austrian army was not all that it should be.

[8943] No. 437.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, February 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 77 of 23rd February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I have communicated substance, fully appreciates difficulty therein set forth. He feels that it is essential to arrive at some settlement of Albanian question before fall of Scutari becomes an accomplished fact, because, though Russia may now be disposed to consent on certain terms to exclusion of Montenegro from that town, he does not think that she would agree to use force to turn Montenegrins out if once there. Austrian action with this object would also be unfavourably viewed in Italy.

Believing that compromise regarding Djakova need not be despaired of if some guarantee regarding future of Scutari could be offered to Austria, he had suggested at St. Petersburgh that Powers should inform Balkan allies that they would be expected to conform to decisions of Great Powers regarding delimitation of frontiers.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was disposed to agree to this in principle, but said that Russia would not employ force to impose their conditions. Russian Minister was, however, ready to go even a step further than Italian proposal, and suggested that Balkan allies should be informed that Powers would refuse recognition of any arrangements not in conformity with unanimous decisions of the Great Powers at Ambassadors' meetings. Even if such a declaration could not be accompanied by menace of force to impose it, the allies need not be allowed to know such a sanction was lacking, and there was great probability that they might bow to its terms. In any case it would be a step in advance, and he felt that recording of such a declaration might make it easier for Austria to consent to a compromise regarding town of Djakova.

Failing this, he was not altogether indisposed to return to idea of a commission to examine geographical conditions in order to gain time before having to admit failure of negotiations; but this would inevitably prolong uncertainty, and in the meantime Scutari might fall, so that he preferred to try turning the question by a declaration which would give Austria satisfaction by implying that unanimity had been secured among the Powers on Scutari issue, thus leaving Djakova as the only point to be solved, which he felt influence of England, Germany, and Italy should be able to accomplish.

Latest information he had received from Budapest was to the effect that, owing to the suspension of business and extent of unemployment, Hungarians were growing to regard war as inevitable issue from an impossible situation. Ministers and Emperor were still pacific, but there was a danger that their hands might be forced.

[8944] No. 438.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, February 24, 1913.*

ALBANIA.

Your telegram No. 71 of 23rd February.

I have communicated this afternoon substance of above telegram to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is ill in bed, and I left with him an *aide-mémoire* of the chief points of your telegram, so that he may reconsider whole question. He told me that he would shortly reply through Count Mensdorff.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me that he did not see how he could be expected to give way with regard to Djakova. He had made concession after concession to Russian demands, which were founded on no racial principle, and he could go no further. He had given way in regard to Dibra, and, on Russia pointing out that a small Orthodox convent existed near Djakova, he had agreed to its being given extra-territorial rights. He argued that Djakova was a purely Albanian town, and essential as a market for the Albanian population in those parts. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh that chief reason why Russia desired that Djakova should go to Servia was that by this means the position of Servian Prime Minister would be strengthened. His Excellency observed to me that this argument could carry no weight, as Servian Prime Minister's position was a matter of indifference to Austria, whose arch-enemy he had always been.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that all Russia had conceded to Austria was that Scutari, which had not yet been taken, should remain Albanian, and that she had used her influence to make Servia declare that she would some day withdraw from the Adriatic ports. With regard to this his Excellency told me that Servian authorities had ordered a large cargo of cement to be sent from Trieste to Durazzo for harbour improvements. This he thought was a disquieting sign.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would be prepared to cede Djakova if special protection could be assured to the Albanian population there under the guarantee of the Powers. He replied that no guarantee would be of any avail against the systematic extirpation of Albanians by Servian authorities. On this point he will probably make a communication to the Powers shortly, as he has in his possession a mass of information in regard to massacres of Albanians.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[8942] No. 439.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, February 24, 1913.*

A PRESS telegram which appeared in Belgrade yesterday reported that M. Vesnitch, on instructions from his Government, had notified you that Scutari must be secured to Montenegro.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the Servian Government knew nothing of such instructions, and if such communication had been made it was altogether unauthorised. Servia must first look after her own interests, Djakova and Dibra, before she troubled about Montenegro.

His personal point of view was that Scutari would not fall. The Montenegrins had lost large numbers of men and had no ammunition. It would be a long time before the Servian artillery and reinforcements arrived at Scutari—at least three weeks, if not more—since these had not yet been embarked at Salonica. To some extent want of transports, but also the precariousness of venturing forth whilst the whereabouts of the Turkish cruiser "Hamidieh" were still unknown, were responsible for the delay. I gather that the Servian Government are not at all keen for the fall of Scutari. Although they recognise that if it were in Montenegrin hands another route to the Adriatic might possibly be open to them, they think that the difficulty with Austria about Djakova and Dibra would be greatly increased. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that the King of Montenegro has greatly exaggerated the danger to his dynasty if Scutari is not secured, and apparently the manner in which he asked for Servian assistance, laying the responsibility of doing so on his own Government, has given umbrage here.

[8790] No. 440.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 48 and 49 of 23rd and 24th February.

If all your colleagues have received instructions to take the collective step mentioned in my telegrams Nos. 16 and 19 of 17th and 23rd February you should associate yourself with them, notwithstanding what has passed previously.

[9021] No. 441.

Sir Edward Grey to Vice-Consul Peckham.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 24, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador states reports have been received by his Government from Austrian consul at Uskub to the effect that massacres are being perpetrated by Servian komitajis in the district of Ghilan.

Have you any information as to any alleged recent Servian excesses?

[8537] No. 442.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 24, 1913.*

M. POPOVITCH, one of the Montenegrin delegates to the Peace Conference, called at this Office on the 20th instant.

He announced to Sir A. Nicolson that Scutari would very shortly be taken, and showed him on a map that on the east side the Montenegrins were practically in possession of the suburbs of the town, while on the other sides a general assault would be made within a few days to capture Tarabosh, &c. Once in possession of the town the Montenegrins would never surrender it, and would fight anyone to retain possession of it. They had already lost some 6,000 men before Scutari, and would probably lose some 2,000 more, an enormous sacrifice for so small a country.

It was, therefore, the wish of his Government that the Powers should know of the unalterable resolve of Montenegro to retain Scutari once she had obtained possession of it, and in this she would be supported by all her allies. He had so informed the Russian and Italian Ambassadors, and was anxious that Sir A. Nicolson should acquaint me also with the fact.

Sir A. Nicolson made no comment, but said that he would transmit his communication to me.

M. Popovitch asked whether this resolve would have any effect on the decisions of the Powers, and Sir A. Nicolson told him that he could not possibly say what view other Powers would take. The question of Albanian limits was, as he knew, being examined by the Powers, and Scutari had not yet fallen.

M. Popovitch said that there were eighteen Austrian officers inside Scutari fighting for the Turks, and they would be produced dead or alive when the town had fallen to show Europe that Austria was giving active assistance to the Turks.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8535] No. 443.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 60.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 24, 1913.*

ALL the Powers having agreed to the reply to be made to the last Turkish communication, Sir A. Nicolson handed to the Turkish Ambassador on the 18th instant the memorandum which was drawn up at the preceding ambassadorial meeting.

Tewfik Pasha wished to discuss what, as Sir A. Nicolson told him, were secondary matters, *e.g.*, customs, financial assistance to Turkey, &c., and Sir A. Nicolson said that these were questions to be examined later. The main point was for the Turkish Government to place the Powers in a position to communicate with the allies.

His Highness said that he would telegraph to his Government the contents of the paper which Sir A. Nicolson had handed to him.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8284] No. 444.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 24, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 17th February that the Austro-Hungarian Government agreed to the latest draft reply to the Turkish note if all the other Powers agreed.

His Excellency told Sir A. Nicolson confidentially that Count Berchtold fully recognised and appreciated all that His Majesty's Government had done and were doing in the cause of peace—and he trusted that I would find it possible to arrange "something" as to Scutari—and also to expedite the work of the Ambassadorial meetings.

Sir A. Nicolson told Count Mensdorff that he knew very well that I had been most anxious to discover a *terrain* of compromise between Austrian and Russian views, and had abstained from no effort to attain that end, but both parties must make some concessions, and, if Scutari fell to the future Albania, some compensation must be found elsewhere to satisfy Montenegrin wishes. Everyone should bring their quota of good-will and conciliation to the common fund.

Count Mensdorff also spoke as to the Bulgaro-Roumanian difficulty, and said that Count Berchtold quite agreed to counsels of moderation and prudence, and, failing them, to proposing the mediation of the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8148] No. 445.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 24, 1913*

M. DE ETTER called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 17th February, and read a circular telegram which M. Sazonof had sent to all the Great Powers, asking that they should collectively propose to the Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments that the latter should submit the solution of their differences to the decision of the Powers.

M. Sazonof was much disquieted at the outlook, and considered that it was a matter of urgency that efforts should be made to avoid the two countries coming into open conflict, which would probably lead to grave complications.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8226] No. 446.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Bourke, Schiff and Co.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, February 24, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant respecting the question of a loan to the Greek Government.

In reply I am to inform you that His Majesty's Government cannot express any opinion on the subject, and that if a loan is made it must be made on the sole responsibility of those concerned in it.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[8982] No. 447.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Cettinje, February 18, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the instructions which the French chargé d'affaires has received from his Government relative to the steps which they desire should be taken in concert with the other Powers in order to protect the interests of the foreign creditors of the Turkish Empire in the territory to be ceded to the Balkan States.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 447.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Chargé d'Affaires at Cettinje.

Paris, le 28 janvier, 1913.

POUR faire suite à ma communication du 15 de ce mois, vous transmettant, pour votre information particulière, copie d'un projet d'articles élaboré par la commission technique instituée auprès de mon département pour la sauvegarde des intérêts des créanciers étrangers de l'Empire ottoman, j'ai l'honneur de porter aujourd'hui à votre connaissance que, par une note du 22 de ce mois, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris m'a informé que le Gouvernement Impérial donnait son entière adhésion aux propositions françaises et qu'il enjoignait à ses représentants auprès des États belligérants de s'associer à leurs collègues étrangers pour insister auprès de ces Gouvernements en vue de l'adoption des mesures de sauvegarde ainsi stipulées.

De son côté, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, par l'entremise de son Ambassadeur à Londres, a fait connaître son adhésion au point de vue français et a exprimé en même temps son désir de voir préciser à l'article 2 du projet l'obligation des États cessionnaires de remettre immédiatement en possession les compagnies concessionnaires de chemins

de fer, au cas où les opérations militaires auraient modifié temporairement les conditions normales de l'exploitation.

Vous trouverez sous ce pli la copie rectifiée de ce projet d'articles. L'Ambassadeur de la république à Londres a reçu pour instructions d'en recommander l'adoption à la réunion des Ambassadeurs. Vous voudrez bien de votre côté agir d'accord avec vos collègues auprès du Gouvernement Royal pour qu'il donne son adhésion entière à ces dispositions, qui devront être insérées dans le traité de paix mettant fin à la guerre actuelle.

(Pour le Ministre),
PALÉOLOGUE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 447.

Draft Articles.

(*Projet du 10 janvier, modifié le 27 janvier, après adoption d'un amendement austro-hongrois*)

CHACUN des États signataires du présent traité, qui reçoit cession d'une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman, supportera une part de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois derniers exercices financiers.

La quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera incessible, insaisissable et ne pourra faire l'objet de compensation; des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles dont le maintien sera reconnu impraticable, seront données par les États cessionnaires pour la garantie des créanciers.

La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée, sera convertible en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent.

2. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemin de fer et autres ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité; ils s'engagent également à remettre les compagnies intéressées en possession immédiate des lignes dont l'exploitation leur a été concédée, nonobstant tout règlement qui pourrait être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord avec les intéressés; ils s'engagent en outre dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valablement conclus par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités ottomanes compétentes.

3. Les détails d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront consignés dans des protocoles, annexés au présent traité et élaborés par une commission internationale, où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances, et qui se réunira à

[8966] No. 448.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Athens, February 20, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen, military attaché, reporting an interview with His Royal Highness the Crown Prince at his head-quarters at Philippiada, and forwarding some notes on the mechanical transport on the Prevesa line of communication.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure 1 in No. 448.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Prevesa, February* 14, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday, by request of the other military attachés, I proceeded to Philippiada and was accorded an interview by the commander-in-chief, whose head-quarters still remain at that place.

His Royal Highness appeared to betray no anxiety about the position in front of Yanina; on the contrary, he was particularly calm and full of equanimity. He said that it was possible an attack would be delivered in the course of four or five days, but having regard to the severe losses which must in all probability ensue, he was not going to commit himself until he had matured his plans to the utmost extent.

2. I gathered that some very considerable rearrangement and marshalling of the troops had been necessary on taking over the command from General Sapountsakis, and moreover that it was only now that the supply of the army and the replenishment of ammunition had been established on a sound, working basis. For the artillery, it would be possible from this week onwards to keep in hand an allowance of 400 rounds per gun.

It was evident, I think, that the Prince would prefer not to move until an attack could be delivered from several sides of the fortress. But, while in addition to the main army (four divisions) on the Bezani side and the detachments west of Metzovo, the 3rd division is now actually some 50 kilom. north of Yanina, and, therefore, probably soon disposable, the Prince's request for the 1st division to land at Santi Quaranta has not yet been complied with by the Government. The reason of this I do not know, since I understand that no Greek troops are going to Gallipoli, but should the decision not to send the 1st division to Santi Quaranta be changed, this will probably cause a further delay in the attack, as the advent of this division, as well as that of the 3rd division, will then no doubt be awaited.

His Royal Highness said that Essad Pasha had been communicated with in regard to surrender, but he had replied that he would hold out so long as he had ammunition left; on the other hand, the morale of the Turkish troops is stated to be at a low ebb, several thousands having lately left Yanina and made their way north as refugees.

3. In the course of further conversation, I was told that the Bulgarians had again refused Greek co-operation at Gallipoli and that two Greek staff officers, who had gone there, had been recalled.

His Royal Highness gave me a personal assurance to communicate to the other attachés, that if and when an attack developed, we should be permitted to witness the operations.

4. I should add that the casualty list among the Greek troops continues fairly high; in addition to the casualities in action which occur in the daily combats at the outpost line, there are a large number of sick with illnesses such as frost-bite, pneumonia, &c., incidental to exposure, with typhoid here and at Philippiada. Some cases of small-pox have also recently broken out at Prevesa.

I append a few notes, for the information of the War Office, on the subject of mechanical transport on the Prevesa line of communication.

I have, &c.
F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 448.

Notes on the Mechanical Transport on the Prevesa Line of Communications.

AUTOMOBILES were very little used in Greece before the war broke out, there being only a few private cars with private chauffeurs. Consequently the mechanical transport now employed has had to be obtained from abroad and the personnel is inexperienced. The majority of the drivers are well-to-do Greeks who have returned from abroad as volunteers.

In the first stages of the war in Macedonia the roads were only fit for light automobile cars, but the present road from Prevesa north is in all respects fit for heavy traffic; one bridge has had to be replaced, the others merely strengthened.

Forty lorries are now running on the road, of the "Renaud," "Bleriet," and "Fiat" type, purchased in France and Italy. The "Renauds" carry between 7,000

and 8,000 lbs., the two latter are smaller and only carry about 3,000 to 4,000 lbs., but the "Fiat," of the three, give the best value.

Each vehicle makes one journey to Canetta and back (total 170 kilom.) every third day; on each of the other two days it goes to Philippiada and back (total 84 kilom.). Generally, owing to the inexperience of the drivers in the mechanism of the vehicles, about 20 per cent. of the cars are in process of repair, but many of the "Fiats" have gone on uninterruptedly for a period of three months without a breakdown.

There are no steep gradients on the road and the surface, though in need of repair, is good.

Besides the motor lorries, the Red Cross cars (of which there are many, Greek, Italian, Russian, Swiss, and Netherlands) are on occasion used for purely military purposes). When used for medical transport they carry four patients lying down or eight to ten sitting.

As regards the remainder of the transport, the pack mules and donkeys have now to a great extent been superseded by the ordinary two-horse country cart, with military personnel throughout.

To facilitate movement on the main road, an auxiliary line of river transport has now been opened up from Prevesa to Luros (24 kilom. forward).

Since writing the above I have got more exact details in regard to the capacity of the motor vehicles named:

	H.P.	Weight carried. Okes.	lbs.
"Renaud"	30	2,250	= 6,300
"Bleriet"	14	1,200	3,360
"Fiat"	30 to 40	800	= 2,240

The Red Cross cars are "De Dion," 30 H.P.

F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN.

[8954] No. 449.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 103.)
Sir, *Paris, February* 24, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the "Temps" publishes the text of a telegram respecting Scutari, stated to have been dictated by the King of Montenegro to his marshal of the palace at Cettinjé, and dispatched by the latter to the special correspondent of that paper at St. Petersburgh.

After an expression of gratitude to the "Temps" for its interest in Montenegro at a time of crisis, the telegram states that Scutari is a question of vital importance for that country. Its separation from Montenegro has for centuries arrested that country's political and economic development. Public opinion in Europe should understand that the tenacity of the Montenegrin claims, their enormous losses round the besieged town—losses which greatly exceed the price paid by any great Power for the conquest of territories infinitely more extensive than Scutari, but of far less importance for its national future—are an absolute proof that the Montenegrin people are firmly decided not to surrender their conquest. Montenegro hopes that Europe will not force it to push its legitimate claims to the necessity of taking "supreme resolutions."

The telegram ends with an appeal to the public opinion of France through the "Temps," "qui a été de tout temps le champion des revendications nationales et l'interprète autorisé des éléments moraux qui forment pour chaque nation la vie digne d'être vécue."

It is the policy of the "Temps" to favour the consolidation of a Slavonic Power in the Balkans which might at some future time be brought into line against the Triple Alliance.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[9085] No. 450.

M. Madjarof to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

THE Bulgarian Minister presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, acting on orders from his Government, has the honour to transmit the enclosed statement of the considerations on which the Governments of the allied States base their demand for a war indemnity as one of the conditions of the future treaty of peace.

Bulgarian Legation, London,
February 24, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 450.

Exposé sur la Question d'Indemnité de Guerre qui doit être imposée à la Turquie.

AVANT l'interruption des pourparlers de paix, entamés à Londres entre les représentants des États balkaniques alliés et ceux de la Turquie, le "Temps" et quelques autres journaux étrangers ont déclaré que les alliés ne devaient pas insister pour qu'une indemnité de guerre leur fût payée par la Turquie, vu que cette dernière se trouvait dans une situation financière très précaire et que les alliés balkaniques seraient suffisamment compensés par la cession de certains territoires turcs.

Les pourparlers sur la question des territoires que la Turquie doit céder aux vainqueurs ayant inutilement traîné en longueur—ce qui amena la rupture des pourparlers de paix et la reprise des opérations de guerre—les représentants des États balkaniques alliés ne sont pas arrivés à poser la question de l'indemnité de guerre à l'ordre du jour de la conférence, cette question ne devant être examinée, d'après les instructions données auxdits représentants, qu'après le règlement de la question territoriale. Le fait que l'indemnité de guerre n'a pas été mise à l'ordre du jour pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus ne doit pas être interprété dans le sens que les États balkaniques alliés, et en premier lieu la Bulgarie, ne sont pas fondés d'exiger cette indemnité à la Turquie ou qu'ils n'en ont pas eu l'intention. Les prétentions des alliés sont, à ce rapport-ci, au contraire, aussi fondées que justes. Après les déclarations des Gouvernements respectifs des États balkaniques alliés, portant qu'ils sont prêts à supporter une partie de la Dette publique ottomane dans le but de ne pas léser les créanciers de la Turquie par l'annexion des régions libérées, il serait bien difficile de taxer de déplacée la demande d'indemnité de guerre des alliés, surtout après la reprise, par la seule faute de la Turquie, des opérations de guerre, qui entraînèrent de nouveaux sacrifices et qui augmenteront encore les dépenses effectuées durant la première période de la guerre et pendant les pourparlers de paix, qui n'ont pu aboutir.

En premier lieu, il est devenu presque de règle générale, au cours des quarante à cinquante dernières années, que l'État vaincu payât au vainqueur une indemnité destinée à compenser les pertes nombreuses résultant de la guerre et subies par le vainqueur sur le terrain financier et économique—pertes qui, de par les besoins même de la guerre moderne, deviennent de jour en jour plus grandes et plus difficiles à compenser. La guerre actuelle, entreprise pour libérer les chrétiens de Macédoine et du vilayet d'Andrinople ainsi que pour créer dans ces régions des conditions favorables au développement cultural, dans la paix, a été imposée à la Bulgarie et à la Serbie par la Turquie elle-même; en effet, cette dernière a rejeté avec mépris les propositions des Grandes Puissances et des États alliés concernant l'introduction des réformes promises depuis trente-trois ans; de plus, quelques jours avant que les alliés aient ouvert les opérations militaires, la Turquie avait, de fait, entamé le combat avec les troupes de frontière de la Serbie et s'était déjà livrée à des actes d'inimité à l'égard de tous les alliés, soit en confisquant l'artillerie et les navires des uns, soit en exterminant la population dans les provinces des autres. Enfin, c'est encore la Turquie qui, la première, a déclaré la guerre à la Bulgarie, à la Serbie et à la Grèce.

Les considérations en vertu desquelles la Bulgarie insiste pour que la Turquie soit obligée à payer une certaine somme sous forme d'indemnité de guerre sont non seulement fondées, justifiables, elles sont aussi imposées par les besoins économiques et financiers du pays. Une fois que la Bulgarie aura assumé une partie de la dette

publique ottomane et qu'elle se sera engagée à payer une certaine annuité, cette dernière, du moins pour les premiers temps, ne pourra en aucune manière être compensée par les revenus des régions libérées, vu que la plus grande partie de ces régions est dépeuplée à la suite de l'émigration de l'élément turc, qui prenait la fuite après le passage des armées turques en retraite, à la suite également du massacre des chrétiens par ces mêmes armées. En dehors des dépenses énormes que l'État bulgare aura à supporter pour assurer le développement cultural des régions qui vont être annexées, cet État devra, de plus, pourvoir à l'entretien des familles des tués et des invalides de la guerre—soit plus de 25,000 tués et 25,000 autres invalides—et ce pour une période de vingt-cinq à trente ans, en acquittant plus de 10,000,000 de francs de pensions par an. Aussitôt après la fin de la guerre, et pour se maintenir au niveau d'avant, la Bulgarie doit procéder au réarmement de ses troupes (ce qui comporte également des dépenses considérables), les armes qui ont servi à la guerre étant pour la plupart hors d'usage. A part ces trois chapitres de fortes dépenses qui dans un avenir très proche s'imposeront à la Bulgarie, l'économie nationale subira pendant un couple d'années les mauvaises conséquences de la guerre, car il y a plus de quatre mois que sévit une période de pénible stagnation dans le commerce et l'industrie, dont la conséquence inévitable sera la faillite en masse de nombre de commerçants, industriels et artisans. Les pertes des agriculteurs ne sont pas à négliger non plus aussi, tant à cause des ensemencements d'automne, qui n'ont pas été faits à temps, qu'à cause du risque que courent ces agriculteurs d'être encore retenus sous les drapeaux et voir compromettre par là les semailles du printemps, auquel cas le pays tout entier est menacé de famine pour l'année en cours. Non moindres sont les pertes de l'élevage, vu que plus de 200,000 chevaux, bœufs, buffles, &c., sont perdus ou inutilisables pour avoir trop servi dans les chariots de l'armée. Une grande part de ces animaux sont donc perdus pour l'économie nationale. Pour toutes ces pertes énormes, qu'il est si difficile d'évaluer et impossible de compenser intégralement—pertes causées par la Turquie, l'unique provocatrice de la guerre, la seule coupable d'avoir fait traîner pendant plus de dix semaines les pourparlers d'armistice et de paix (en effet, les opérations de guerre ont été interrompues, le 5 (18) novembre, 1912, à la suite d'un télégramme du Grand Vizir en date du 30 octobre demandant la conclusion d'un armistice) sans que, toutefois, l'on soit parvenu à la paix, pour la raison que la Turquie n'a pas pu, ou mieux n'a pas voulu, se rendre compte de la situation de vaincue—pour toutes ces pertes, il est fort naturel que la Turquie seule soit tenue responsable: elle doit compenser les dommages subis en payant une indemnité de guerre. De cette manière, après avoir ainsi sanctionné les résultats du succès des alliés par la cession des territoires conquis, elle sentira la responsabilité que l'équité et le droit font peser sur elle. Il est hors de doute, en l'espèce, que le droit est du côté des États balkaniques alliés et vainqueurs, la Turquie vaincue étant seule coupable.

L'indemnité de guerre qui doit être imposée à la Turquie devra être en proportion du minimum des dommages effectifs subis—dommages imposés aux alliés par la guerre—et son payement régulier, soit en une fois, soit au cours de quelques années, devra être garanti par la Turquie afin que la clause de l'indemnité qui figurera au prochain traité de paix entre la Turquie et les alliés balkaniques ait une sanction efficace. Les alliés n'insisteraient pas pour le payement en une fois de l'indemnité de guerre si les moyens du Trésor ottoman ne le permettaient pas; il n'est pas, en outre, indispensable que la Turquie contracte à cet effet un emprunt spécial à l'étranger, ce qui permettrait à ses créanciers d'affirmer que l'obligation imposée à la Turquie de payer une indemnité de guerre retomberait à leur charge, vu que le Trésor aurait recours à eux pour se procurer les moyens nécessaires, d'autant que la Turquie jouit de fort peu de crédit.

Il y a lieu de rappeler, avant tout, que les États créanciers de la Turquie sont en même temps ceux des États balkaniques alliés et que, par suite, si la peur qu'ils ont de voir empirer la situation financière de la Turquie, par le fait de l'obligation d'acquitter une indemnité de guerre, est fondée, ces créanciers ont exactement le même intérêt à ne pas faire empirer la situation financière des États alliés, qui disposent, par comparaison, de ressources plus faibles que celles de la Turquie et qui ont en perspective d'aussi considérables dépenses à venir pour le relèvement cultural des régions à annexer, indépendamment de tous les dommages qu'ils ont subis au cours de la guerre. Voilà pourquoi le crédit de ces États balkaniques doit être ménagé avant celui de la Turquie, dont on croit bien à tort que les ressources financières sont faibles au point qu'elles ne permettraient pas le payement d'une indemnité de guerre. Il est de notoriété publique que l'amortissement de la dette publique ottomane est réellement garanti dans sa plus grande partie: l'Administration de la Dette publique

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ottomane a versé, pour l'année 1911, de ses revenus nets, au Trésor ottoman les sommes de £T. 1,476,947·41,* sans parler de l'excédent des revenus des garanties kilométriques, que ladite administration est également chargée d'encaisser et qu'elle verse de même au Trésor ottoman—soit £T. 1,145,702·45 pour 1911†). Il est évident que ces sommes suffisent à garantir le payement régulier de la plus grande partie de l'indemnité de guerre dans quelques années jusqu'à actuellement définitif. Par conséquent, on commet une erreur en affirmant que la Turquie ne dispose pas de moyens de payer une indemnité de guerre—quelle qu'elle soit—aux États balkaniques alliés, alors qu'elle a, au contraire, à sa disposition des moyens considérables, sans qu'il y ait pour elle lieu de recourir à un emprunt. En outre, alors que sa situation financière et économique des États balkaniques alliés deviendra peut-être difficile pour une certaine période, après l'annexion des régions conquises, et cela pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus, la situation de la Turquie s'améliorera au contraire de suite, parce que ce pays cessera de faire pour les territoires cédés les dépenses infructueuses, qui grevaient jusqu'ici ses budgets de plus de 30 et parfois même de 40 pour cent des revenus de l'Empire. Du reste, cinq sixièmes des revenus de la Turquie proviennent des provinces d'Asie, avec une tendance constante et systématique vers l'augmentation; ces provinces demeurent en entier en pleine possession de la Turquie. Il faut observer, d'autre part, qu'après la conclusion de la paix, la Turquie se déchargerait de l'obligation de dépenser les revenus de la surtaxe 3 pour cent douanière, lesquels n'ont été admis qu'à condition d'être dépensés exclusivement pour les besoins des vilayets européens. Il est donc inutile d'invoquer des données nouvelles pour prouver qu'il est fondé et juste que la Turquie paie une indemnité de guerre aux États balkaniques, aussi bien qu'il est inutile d'insister sur le fait que la Turquie dispose des moyens voulus. On peut, on doit lui imposer de payer une indemnité équivalent aux dommages qu'elle a causés aux alliés.

Bien que le payement de la part de la dette consolidée ottomane, part que les alliés prendront à leur compte, et le payement de l'indemnité de guerre se rapportent à deux questions différentes, qui, toutefois, sont en dépendance l'une de l'autre, ayant à être réglées ensemble lors de la conclusion de la paix entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques alliés, ces derniers insisteront pour que ce payement s'effectue de manière à ce que les intérêts des porteurs de titres de la Dette publique ottomane, qui sont les créanciers de la Turquie en même temps que ceux des États balkaniques alliés, et qui le seront également dans l'avenir, soient respectés. Dans ce but, les États alliés insisteront pour que le payement régulier de l'indemnité de guerre soit garantie, en premier lieu, par l'excédent des revenus cédés ou confiés, pour en être encaissés, à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, gardienne des intérêts des porteurs de titres de la Dette publique, institution à laquelle les États balkaniques alliés s'obligeraient à verser annuellement l'amortissement de la partie de la dette ottomane qu'ils supporteraient. Dans ces conditions, au lieu de verser au Trésor ottoman 75 pour cent de l'excédent des revenus qu'elle administre, l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane importera sur ce même excédent la somme nécessaire à l'extinction de l'indemnité de guerre, tout en tenant, par ailleurs, compte de l'obligation acceptée par les États balkaniques alliés au sujet de la partie de la dette publique ottomane qu'ils auront prise à leur compte et qui sera également amortie par annuités. De cette manière l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane sera l'intermédiaire pour le règlement en temps opportun des obligations entre la Turquie et les alliés—obligations résultant de la clause du traité de paix aux termes de laquelle la Turquie s'obligera à payer une indemnité de guerre et les alliés à supporter une partie de sa dette publique; en même temps, cette administration conservera intégralement la proportion des revenus provenant des garanties réelles accordées à priorité aux divers emprunts turcs. Les alliés balkaniques insisteront aussi pour la concession à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane de quelques autres garanties réelles, telles que le revenu de l'impôt militaire; l'administration pourra ainsi disposer de ressources nouvelles supplémentaires, tout en renforçant ses garanties et le contrôle qu'elle a sur les finances de l'Etat turc.

La question du payement d'une indemnité de guerre par la Turquie est une des conditions pour la conclusion de la paix. Bien que cette demande n'ait pas été traitée

* Versé au Trésor Impérial turc par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane 75 pour cent de l'excédent des recettes nettes pour: 1908, £T. 1,050,814·35; 1909, £T. 1,311,602·55; 1910, £T. 1,431,702·47; 1911, £T. 1,476,947·41.

† L'excédent des revenus tels pour les garanties kilométriques perçus par la même administration et revenant au Trésor Impérial turc pour: 1908, £T. 671,617·96; 1909, £T. 670,642·94; 1910, £T. 976,923·17; 1911, £T. 1,145,702·45.

devant les délégués turcs à la conférence de la paix, pour les raisons déjà mentionnées, les États balkaniques alliés n'ont jamais pensé à renoncer à l'indemnité, parce que le bien-fondé de leur demande ne peut être contesté par personne et, principalement, parce que, si la Turquie ne peut être forcée à payer une indemnité de guerre, cela voudrait dire que l'État vaincu est favorisé au point de vue financier et économique au détriment des vainqueurs. Ce ne sont pas les exemples de payement d'indemnités de guerre qui manquent, en commençant par la guerre franco-allemande de 1870, la guerre russo-turque de 1877, et en terminant par la guerre gréco-turque de 1897. Seule la dernière guerre entre la Turquie et l'Italie fait exception. La Turquie n'a pas payé d'indemnité de guerre à l'Italie, mais ce fait s'explique par les circonstances particulières dans lesquelles le Gouvernement de Rome a déclaré la guerre à la Turquie. Dès le commencement de la guerre, l'Italie se déclara prête à indemniser la Turquie des territoires occupés, tout en renonçant pour sa part à quelque dédommagement que ce soit. Il est donc justifiant que la Turquie n'ait rien payé à l'Italie. Or, cette norme ne peut pas être appliquée à notre cas, car c'est la Turquie qui a provoqué la guerre et qui a réussi au moyen de ruses et de coups d'État à retarder la conclusion de la paix; il n'y a pas non plus d'analogie entre le cas de l'Italie et celui des alliés balkaniques, parce que ces derniers prennent à leur charge une part de la dette ottomane consolidée.

Sophia, février 1913.

[9035] No. 451.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received February 25.)

Sir, 17, *Moorgate Street, London, February* 24, 1913.

WITH reference to the Turkish Debt, the Council of Foreign Bondholders have received information from Sir Adam Block that two methods have been proposed for calculating the contribution to be paid by the Balkan allied States in respect of the territories taken by them from Turkey, viz.:—

1. That the contribution should be the equivalent of the sum derived in the ceded territories from the revenues assigned to the service of the Debt.

2. That the contribution should be based on the proportion existing between the revenues collected in the ceded territories and the general revenues of the Turkish Empire.

The council, as representing the British holders of Turkish bonds secured by the Decree of Moharrem of 1881 and the Décret annexe of 1903, are of opinion that the first method is the proper and equitable one to adopt, and that the second method would not be acceptable to the bondholders concerned.

The council trust that His Majesty's Government will support this view.

I have, &c.

JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

[8948] No. 452.

Sir H. Rose-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, February* 24, 1913.

FOLLOWING is text of Prime Minister's reply to collective *démarche* reported in my telegram No. 72 of 23rd February:—

"Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Bulgarie a l'honneur d'informer le Ministre de l'Angleterre que le Gouvernement Royal, confiant dans l'esprit des Grandes Puissances, accepte la proposition de leur remettre pour la solution du différend bulgaro-roumain à la décision des six Puissances, si la Roumanie l'accepte aussi."

(Sent to Bucharest.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[9081] No. 453.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 25, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 24th February.

The German Minister has received instructions to the effect that, as the Roumanian Government have now accepted the mediation of the Powers, collective step proposing that Roumania and Bulgaria should submit the solution of their differences to the decision of the Powers must be abandoned.

I cannot but think that abandonment of the collective step in question is wise, at any rate until we know whether or not Bulgaria will be content with the mediation of the Powers.

Not only would it be exceedingly difficult to induce Roumania to consent to a proposal which would involve her binding herself to abide by the decision of the Powers, but also it might well exasperate public feeling here were we, after having suggested mediation, now to propose something which comes very near to arbitration.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[9096] No. 454.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 25, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 50 of to-day.

Italian Minister has also received instructions not to proceed with the collective step now that Roumania has accepted mediation.

I find that views of all my colleagues of the Powers coincide with mine as expressed in my immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking to me to-day regarding discrepancy between formula accepted at Sophia and that accepted here, said that Roumania could not in the face of public opinion accept the former, now that she had accepted latter, though he thought that moral force of advice given by the Six Great Powers, resulting from deliberations of the mediators, would prove as effective as a technically binding decision.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is submitting for the King's sanction a proposal that the mediation should be conducted by the three representatives of the Triple *Entente* at Bucharest and the three representatives of the Triple Alliance at Sophia. When he has obtained sanction he will instruct Roumanian representatives to propose this arrangement to the Great Powers. Mediation would not, I understand, be at Bucharest or Sophia.

[9083] No. 455.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, February 25, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 91 of 17th February.

The French Government are ready to support the views set forth in your circular telegram No. 83 of 17th February to Berlin in regard to customs duties in occupied territories, and have instructed the French representatives at Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade to concert with their British colleagues in order to urge the respective Governments to take steps for removal of the abuses which hamper international commerce at Salonica.

[9252] No. 456.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 25, 1913.*

THE Ambassadors, at meeting to-day, decided to propose to their Governments that, as Bulgarian Government had accepted the proposal of the Powers, made collectively, it was indispensable to take an identical step at Bucharest, and are recommending to their Governments that instructions should be consequently sent in that sense to their representatives. When your colleagues are authorised, you should associate yourselves with them.

[8541] No. 457.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.[*]

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 25, 1913.*

FOLLOWING suggestion was made by Austro-Hungarian Ambassdor at Ambassadors' meeting on 21st February:

"In Turkish territories actually occupied by the Balkan allies, the Turkish customs régime, such as it was before the war, must be re-established, and must remain in force till the definite settlement of the territorial questions.

"The Great Powers cannot admit—

"The double levy of customs duties for goods imported;

"The levy of surtaxes under the name of war contribution, practised by Servia;

"The levy of surtaxes under the name of tax of consummation or of equivalent of monopoly tax;

"The prohibition to import certain articles by reason of their being articles of monopoly in the Balkan States;

"Preferential treatment applied to goods coming from the allied States imported into occupied territories to the detriment of similar goods coming from other countries."

It was agreed that a collective step should be taken, and the following resolution was adopted by the meeting:—

"On the *aide-mémoire* of the Austrian Ambassador, the meeting thinks that there is ground for instructing the representatives of the Powers at Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens to make a collective *démarche* in this sense."

You should act accordingly when your colleagues of the other Great Powers are similarly instructed.

This supersedes the proposals described in my telegram of 14th February to His Majesty's consul general at Salonica.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 102; Berlin, No. 93; Rome, No. 80; Constantinople No. 109; Vienna, No. 73; St. Petersburgh, No. 172; and Salonica, No. 12.)

[9751] No. 458.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.[†]

(No. 157.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 25, 1913.*

AT the meeting of the Ambassadors held to-day, the following communication was made by Count Benckendorff:

"D'après nos renseignements, en partie consulaires directs, les habitants de Scutari, et très probablement d'Andrinople et de Janina, en sont réduits à la famine et

[*] Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 27) and Sir R. Paget (No. 47).
[†] Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 89), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 42), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 100), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 68).

aux dernières extrémités ; les magasins destinés aux besoins des habitants se sont épuisés plus rapidement que ceux destinés aux garnisons.

"Dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Impérial, le souci de la sécurité des consuls et des étrangers justifie pleinement, en ces conditions, les Puissances à exiger des belligérants que les habitants civils reçoivent l'autorisation de sortir des places assiégées. Les États balkaniques, qui ont déclaré la guerre pour secourir réciproquement leurs sujets opprimés, ne sauraient se soustraire à adhérer à pareille résolution. La Turquie, à part qu'il y aurait là pour elle un avantage au point de vue militaire, ne peut rester indifférente au sort des populations musulmanes non militaires renfermés dans les places assiégées en question.

"Je suis chargé par M. Sazonof de proposer à la réunion des Ambassadeurs une résolution qui formulerait une proposition à faire aux deux belligérants à l'effet que toute la population civile puisse évacuer les places assiégées."

And the following resolution was agreed to by the meeting in regard to it :—

"La réunion des Ambassadeurs, s'inspirant des vues humanitaires russes, recommande cette proposition à la bienveillante attention des Gouvernements."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9390] No. 459.

Minutes.

MR. HUGO BARING called and communicated a confidential letter from M. Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, to Sir Ernest Cassel, in which M. Gwinner stated that M. Salen, of the Salonica Bank, had come back from Paris, where he had learnt that Government pressure was being used to prevent the bank from joining in small advances to Turkey, and that this action appeared to be inexplicable, except on the supposition that France wanted Turkey to make a raid on the foreign creditors in order that the French Government might have a pretext for moving in Syria. Mr. Baring agreed that the Syrian explanation was far-fetched, but said that, as three milliards of French money were at stake, it was most difficult to know what motive was actuating the French Government.

Sir E. Cassel thought that we should like to know this; he was not anxious himself to lend money, and was going to reply that he was averse from lending unless the French banks joined.

I said that I personally had not heard whether the French Government had said anything more to us on the subject since his interview with Sir A. Nicolson, but would let him know if we should hear anything.

Perhaps M. Cambon should be asked?

L. M.

Foreign Office, February 25, 1913.

M. Cambon will communicate with Paris as to making small advances.

A. N.

[9101] No. 460.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)

Sir, *Bucharest, February 16, 1913.*

I HAD the honour of an audience of King Charles last evening in order that I might deliver to His Majesty the King's reply to King Charles' letter announcing the recall of M. Maio.

His Majesty said that it had been necessary at this time to have a Minister in London who was more conversant than was M. Maio with the Eastern question, but he observed that M. Misu had not once been invited to attend the Ambassadors' meetings in London.

I told His Majesty that I had just learned from you that you had informed M. Misu that you would apprise him if the Ambassadors proceeded to deal with anything which affected Roumania, and that they had so far been occupied with questions which affected the interests of the Great Powers or might cause difficulties between any of them.

His Majesty then remarked that he had seen in the press that the Ambassadors' meetings had lately been occupied with the question of the limits of Albania, a question which closely interested Roumania on account of the Koutzo-Vlachs in Albania.

His Majesty then proceeded to speak of the negotiations between Roumania and Bulgaria. He characterised the tactics of M. Danef as those of a trickster ("fourbe"). M. Danef, during his stay in Bucharest last December, had given the impression that he would treat the Roumanian demands in a conciliatory spirit. He had, however, acted far otherwise, and no sooner had he left Bucharest than his attitude had changed. When he passed through Vienna on his way to London, he had complained to Count Berchtold that he had not been able to ascertain what Roumania wanted, whereas King Charles had himself explained the positon clearly to him. Throughout the negotiations he had been tricky and obdurate. There had been a meeting between Prince Ghica, the Roumanian Minister at Sophia, and M. Sarafof on the 12th instant, and everything seemed to have passed off smoothly. M. Danef had been absent from Sophia on that occasion, but he had now returned, and His Majesty expected that there would now again be difficulties.

I ventured to repeat to His Majesty the language you had used to M. Misu, as recorded in your telegram to me No. 11 of the 13th instant, and His Majesty then expatiated on the warlike feeling prevailing in political circles in Roumania.

He said a King was never in favour of war, and he himself was certainly against it, but he found the Conservative section of his Cabinet, with the solitary exception of M. Majoresco, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, even more warlike than the Liberals. It was true that M. Bratiano, the leader of the Liberal party, had recommended, when war between Turkey and the Balkan allies was seen to be imminent, that Roumania should concentrate troops on the Dobroudja frontier, and he wished now, King Charles said, that he had followed M. Bratiano's advice, but at the present time it was a section of the Conservative party who were the really warlike element.

His Majesty said that great harm had been done by the disclosure of the Bulgarian demands. On the Roumanian side the utmost possible secrecy had been observed, and the disclosures had been made from the Bulgarian side. Had complete secrecy been maintained, it might have been possible to confront the country with some modest arrangement which, now that there had been so much open discussion about Roumania's claims, would be regarded as inadequate by Roumania.

I ventured to remark that the Bulgarian Government might find great difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Sobranjé to extensive territorial concessions, and His Majesty replied by reminding me of the extreme difficulty he had had when Russia obtained by the Treaty of Berlin that portion of Bessarabia which had been given to the principalities by the Treaty of Paris.

His Majesty spoke of the ingratitude now shown to Roumania by Bulgaria. In the days before the Russo-Turkish war, Roumania had been used by persecuted Bulgars as an asylum; Bulgars had received their education in Roumania, and many had been employed in Roumanian Government offices. In the war of 1877–8, which created Bulgaria, Roumania had played an important part, and later she had remained neutral when Servia attacked Bulgaria in 1885, and now, when Bulgaria was about to acquire such a large accession of territory, she refused the slight cession of territory which Roumania required.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[9102] No. 461.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Bucharest, February 19, 1913.*

AS already reported in my telegram No. 30 of the 14th instant, I read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on that day a translation of your telegram No. 11, in which you informed me that you had urged upon the Roumanian Minister that, while a settlement by direct negotiation between Roumania and Bulgaria was the best solution, yet, if that failed, resort to the mediation of all or of one of the Great Powers would be preferable to resort to war. The German Minister received instructions on the 16th to support this advice, and did so on the same day. The Austrian Minister, under instructions, tendered similar advice on the 17th instant, and yesterday at the weekly reception of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Italian and French Ministers followed suit. The Russian Minister, although he had received no instructions for this specific step, has repeatedly given advice in the same sense, and he repeated it at the weekly reception yesterday, on which occasion M. Maioresco informed me and my colleagues that he accepted in principle the mediation of the Powers, and he intimated that Italy and Russia would be acceptable to Roumania as mediators.

No collective action has been taken in the sense of your telegram No. 16 of the 17th instant, which, as I understand it, points to arbitration rather than mediation. Only the French and Italian Ministers have received similar instructions, and I am not certain that at this moment, while mediation is on the tapis, it would be wise to take collective action in the sense indicated. So formal a step might be interpreted as a menace, and, in the present sensitive state of public opinion, it would seem better to avoid it except in the last resort.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[9144] No. 462.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 14. Treaty.)

Sir, *Salonica, February 19, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 8 of the 14th and my reply to the same, No. 10 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Fox-Strangways, on the basis of articles in the local press, indicating the views held by the majority of the commercial community in this place in regard to the imposition of fresh customs duties on imported goods reforwarded from here into the territory occupied by Servian or Bulgarian troops and the proposals made by Mr. Collinas, representing the Greek Ministry of Finance, with a view to relieving the trade of Salonica from the stagnation, of which this is a contributory cause.

Mr. Collinas has taken a great deal of trouble and shown much good-will in regard to this and other cognate matters, but all his proposals, however reasonable in principle, are open to the same objection, viz., that in practice they would impose on merchants interested in trade with the interior an infinity of troublesome and time-wasting formalities, which would be almost as restrictive of business as the double import duty itself.

The simplest solution certainly would be for the Greek Government to make no distinction between goods imported before and after their occupation of the town, but to refund 11 per cent. *ad valorem* on all merchandise of foreign origin forwarded from here into the interior. Even this would necessitate the fulfilment of sundry formalities, and would entail a certain expenditure for which the Government would stand to receive only a very indirect return, and it is therefore perhaps too liberal a measure to expect them to adopt.

Moreover, when all is said and done, the question of the double duty, however vexatious that may be, is a much less serious hindrance to the trade of Salonica than the Servian octroi duties or "contribution de guerre," alluded to in my despatch No. 13, Treaty, which in the case of some articles is practically prohibitive.

I am told that ten truck-loads of goods dispatched from here to Monastir before it

was known that the octroi was being levied there, have been ordered to be returned to the senders, who have preferred to stand a loss of 30*l.* per truck rather than pay the dues.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 462.

Memorandum on the Transit Trade of Salonica and Mr. Coffinas's proposals for its facilitation.

IT is estimated that about 60 per cent. of the annual imports of Salonica are ultimately reforwarded to the interior, but only about 10 per cent. of them can strictly speaking be classed as "goods in transit"; the remaining 50 per cent. only reach their ultimate destination after a more or less lengthy stay in Salonica, being sent up country at various times and in consignments of varying importance, according to the varying demand.

Those goods which are originally manifested as being "in transit" are allowed to remain in the custom-house for a period not exceeding one month without paying "ardich," or warehousing charges, whereas all other goods become liable to this charge after the expiration of the first week. The former, therefore, have an advantage over the latter to the extent of three weeks' "ardich." To this is now added the further advantage of paying the import duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* only once, whereas the "indirect transit" goods are now compelled to pay it twice over, *i.e.*, once on landing at Salonica and once again on passing into the territories in the temporary occupation of the Servian or Bulgarian forces, the limits of which on the north and east are reached within a very short distance of the sea. This manifestly constitutes a serious disadvantage, with a view to alleviating which and facilitating this "indirect transit" trade Mr. Coffinas, the delegate of the Greek Ministry of Finance, has put forward the following proposals: The existing customs warehouses being admittedly insufficient, importers should be allowed to establish in the town of Salonica a species of private bonded warehouses with duplicate keys, one of which would be deposited with the customs authorities. In these warehouses imported goods might be stored on payment of a fixed warehousing charge; goods so deposited could be withdrawn, either for local consumption or for re-transmission to the interior according to the exigencies of the demand. They would pay the 11 per cent. duties in the first case on being withdrawn; in the second case on entrance into the Servian or Bulgarian zone. Importers whose business was insufficient to justify them in establishing warehouses of their own might utilise those belonging to the banks, or hereafter to be established by private enterprise. It having been objected that the margin of profit on certain classes of goods such as flour, rice, and colonials, is too narrow to admit of their supporting additional warehousing charges, Mr. Collinas suggested that these classes of goods might pay duty on landing, and be withdrawn by the importer, after each package had been sealed ("plombé") with the custom-house seal. In the event of any such sealed packages being reforwarded to a place in the Servian or Bulgarian zones, the Greek authorities would refund the 11 per cent. originally levied by them.

Mr. Coffinas was of opinion that this scheme secured to the mercantile community of Salonica all the advantages ordinarily afforded by "bonded warehouses" or by the establishment within the custom-house of a "zone franche," for which the space at the disposal of the authorities is altogether inadequate.

Local opinion regards Mr. Coffinas's proposals as ingenious and deserving of recognition as a genuine effort to meet the requirements of the trade of this port, but not as an adequate solution of the difficulties existing. They appear to secure to the "indirect transit" trade equal advantages with the transit trade properly so called. A comparatively small proportion of the goods reforwarded to the interior go forward in their original packages. The unpacking, reassortment, and repacking necessitated by the requirements of this trade (operations for which there is no sufficient accommodation in the existing custom-house) might take place in the private warehouses as advantageously as in the dealer's own stores.

The system proposed, however, according to the critics, is not altogether free from objections. It is represented for instance:—

(1.) That the system of duplicate keys is not practical. Many importers would prefer to have a special customs official maintained at their own expense, rather than

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have to apply to the custom-house (and probably have to wait their turn) every time they desired to enter their warehouse. On the other hand, a custom-house employé, who was in the direct pay of the merchant, might fail to command the entire confidence of the administration;

(2.) That the formalities involved are likely to be complicated and annoying;

(3.) That the sealing of packages is a lengthy and cumbersome process; and

(4.) That Government administrations, though ever ready to collect money, are notoriously slow payers, and that merchants would meet with innumerable and vexatious delays every time that they had to apply for the contemplated refunds.

All plans hitherto suggested for avoiding the double payment of import duty, which involve a refund based upon a certificate of previous payment, encounter the same difficulty, consisting in the fact that the goods sent from here to the interior are, in a vast majority of instances, not original packages, which could be identified as having been cleared through the custom-house at any given date, but are selections of miscellaneous articles, varying in character, in quality, and in place of origin. The delivery of a certificate of previous payment of duty in regard to such a consignment of goods would necessarily be a long and difficult process. The only way of avoiding this difficulty is held to be that the Greek authorities at Salonica should consent to pay an 11 per cent. drawback on all imported goods, whensoever and whencesoever imported, which should be forwarded from here to any place in the Servian or Bulgarian zones. This would probably be satisfactory to the commercial community, but it is obviously a very considerable concession to demand, and might be submitting to too severe a test the sincerity of the Greek desire to foster trade.

It has been somewhat ingeniously argued that the loss to the custom-house, if called upon to pay an 11 per cent. drawback upon goods which were imported before the surrender of Salonica, and the 11 per cent. import duty on which had consequently been encashed by the Turks, would be more apparent than real, seeing that such goods on being reforwarded to the interior would almost immediately be replaced here by fresh supplies of the same nature, on which the Greeks would levy duty in turn. This argument may carry weight with the Salonica merchant, who is accustomed, like a London tailor, to receive payment for goods supplied only upon the delivery of fresh orders for a similar amount, so that his accounts show always the same amount of open credits; but it is hardly likely to appeal to the Greek Customs administration.

As regards the drawback or refund to be made by the Greek authorities, it has been suggested that it might be paid by means of coupons, similar to the Turkish "serghis," which might in turn be accepted in lieu of cash in the payment of customs duties.

[9114] No. 463.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 141.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 21, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 106 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the notice which I received from the Sublime Porte stating that the consuls and foreigners in Adrianople have accepted the Kara-Agatch quarter as a neutral zone.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 463.

Note communicated to Sir G. Lowther by Sublime Porte.

LE Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur d'informer l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique, pour sa gouverne, que les consuls et sujets étrangers résidant à Andrinople ont définitivement accepté le quartier de Kara-Agatch comme zone neutre, et ont fait parvenir au Grand Vizirat leurs remerciements pour la bienveillance dont ils viennent d'être l'objet de la part du Gouvernement Impérial.

Sublime Porte, le 20 février, 1913.

[9115] No. 464.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 142.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 21, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reporting that in January the houses of the local leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress were searched and certain documents seized by order of the central authorities at Constantinople. This incident apparently occurred almost immediately before the *coup d'État* of the 23rd January, and that event has of course robbed it of its effect, but the state of affairs revealed by the search is worth noting.

It would appear that the local branch of the committee was found to be supplied not only with a private cypher, but with a copy of the Ottoman Government cypher. This goes far to confirm the impression that, when the committee is not actually in office, there exist two Governments in Turkey, and it is an indication of the way in which apparently spontaneous agitations have during recent years been suddenly engineered in the provinces, *e.g.*, at Bagdad during the "affaire Lynch," and in various phases of the Cretan imbroglio.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 464.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Bussorah, January 25, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, acting on a decision of the Council of State, the Minister of the Interior has telegraphed to the acting vali to search the houses of certain persons at Bussorah and sequester all papers and correspondence found relating to the affairs and members of the Committee of Union and Progress. In consequence of these orders, certain persons, appointed by the acting vali and accompanied by police and gendarmes, visited the premises of Yusuf Effendi Diab, representative of the committee at Bussorah, the house of Abdul Nebi, mumeyiz of the mektoubji's office, the offices of the club of the Committee of Union and Progress, the house of Mohammed-el-Asayimi, and that of Mustafa Bey. A search was made in these houses and a quantity of papers were confiscated, including correspondence with members of the committee, papers relating to the vilayet, a copy of the Government cypher, and a special private cypher used by Abdul Nebi for communicating with officials at Amarah. A commission has been appointed to examine these papers, and the enquiry is still proceeding.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[9117] No. 465.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 144.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 22, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 75 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir reporting on current events in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 465.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 4. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, February* 12, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on current events in this district:—

1. *Military Information.*

Until the 7th instant there was no important change in the position of the Turks and Greeks in the Kolonia district. On the 8th instant the Greeks claim to have occupied Ersek after a battle with the troops under Javid Pasha. The report lacks confirmation, but 200 or 300 Turkish prisoners are said to have arrived at Florina. Much is being heard of an impending Greek effort to crush the Turkish resistance between Gorcha and Janina with a view to the more effective isolation of the southern Albanian fortress, on which, according to all the reports which reach Monastir, the besieging army is making scanty impression.

Some 6,000 Malissores from Dibra district, under Mersim Dema and Ali Pushtina, are reported to have passed west of Elbassan to Berat, and thence to have made their way to the Kolonia district to join Javid Pasha's force.

Meanwhile Albanian unrest, attributed to Turkish and Austrian instigation, is undoubtedly increasing. Since the incident at Dovolyani (north of Dibra) reported in my last despatch, a threatening attitude has been assumed by the Malissores of Mat, Bulchiza (west by south of Dibra), and Kalissi (immediately south of Liyouma), whilst acts of aggression by the usually peaceful Tosks against Servian pickets and outposts are reported from the districts immediately south of the line Elbassan–Ochrida. In the Spat region (south of Elbassan) the villages of Gostima (twenty houses) and Stipan (seventy houses) are reported to have been bombarded and completely destroyed for the murder of ten Servian soldiers, and the same fate is believed to have befallen certain villages at the southern extremity of Lake Ochrida for some similar, but still unknown, incident.

An Albanian band, described as consisting of sixty or seventy men, was seen on the 8th instant near Malovishta (only 12 miles west of Monastir), and several others are reported to have appeared in the Presha and Ochrida districts.

Ochrida has been reinforced by three battalions of the 1st Morava Division from Monastir, and most of the 2nd Morava Division, whose head-quarters are at Kalkandelen, is scattered in the Dibra–Elbassan region. The following information has been received as to the whereabouts of ten of its battalions: one at Dibra; four in the districts south of Dibra, including one at Elbassan; five in the Dibra Malissia, including one at Voinik (11 miles north-north-west of Dibra).

It is rumoured that a considerable number of further Servian troops are likely soon to arrive here from Uskub, but the military authorities are at present observing the greatest secrecy, and it is difficult to obtain information of such movements.

On the 1st instant ten guns were dispatched by train from Monastir to Salonica, to be there shipped to San Giovanni di Medua to reinforce the Montenegrins before Scutari.

It was at first believed that they were Servian field-guns, but it has since been ascertained that they were howitzers captured from the Turks at Monastir.

This has been reported telegraphically to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade.

Fehim Bey Zavalani, after spending a few days at Elbassan, has arrived at Valona. Abdul Bey Uppi, president of the Albanian club at Constantinople, has reached the same destination by way of Gorcha. They are always so closely in touch with Albanian events that great importance is attached locally to their movements at the present moment.

2. *Relations between the Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgars.*

Since my despatch No. 1 of the 23rd January the boundary dispute between the Serbs and Greeks has been less acute. A rough temporary settlement was arrived at between the Crown Prince Alexander, who visited Monastir on the 24th January, and

Lieutenant-Colonel Hadji Ali [illegible] the two Greek [illegible] Turkish officers, to have [illegible].

The *status quo* is maintained in the Florina district, that is to say, the Serbs continue to hold Bel, Papadisse, and Vodrina, [illegible] in ousting the Greeks.

In Florina district the Greeks have withdrawn [illegible] the Cherna Kamenar.

Nashdol [illegible] Serb.

Since then some fighting has been reported [illegible] village about 10 miles south of Monastir, from which [illegible].

The general tendency is, however, towards [illegible] Greeks and Serbs, who are both [illegible].

The Greeks have apparently given up [illegible] since the visit to Saloniea of M. Venizelos, who [illegible] Monastir that there is very little chance of the town falling to the Greeks.

The Serbs continue to apprehend Bulgarian claims to the disputed.

In a recent conversation with me the Servian [illegible] Monastir remarked: "We do not mean to recognise that any of the Slavs in [illegible] Bulgarians. They are all of Serb origin, and they will soon assimilate our ways and become like the once so-called Bulgars of Pirot and Vranja."

The Bulgars of Perlepe complain that they are [illegible] in an exceptional way if they attend the Bulgarian church, and at Dibra a Servian priest appears on one occasion to have officiated in the Bulgarian church, with the result that it has been abandoned by the congregation, who complain that they have been deprived of their place of worship.

The Bulgarian voivodas and komitajis are not inclined to submit easily to a change of allegiance. Tchaoulef has angrily resigned his post under the Serbs as gendarmerie commandant at Ochrida in order to go to Chatalja with 100 komitajis.

The Servian authorities have authorised his departure, but refuse to permit the departure of his band—a short-sighted step which is causing much discontent.

Mihan Matof, Chakalarof, and Liondas are expected to follow suit and join the Bulgarian armies.

A somewhat high-handed attempt made by an official of the Bulgarian National Bank to open a branch in Monastir has failed. Without consulting the Servian authorities, he hired a house and was having it fitted up as a bank when he received notice to leave the district.

An ex-Minister (Bulgar) of Finance, M. Liapchef, has recently been in Monastir. His visit was probably connected with the proposed bank. He incurred the odium of the Serbs at Ochrida by telling the local Bulgars that the Serb occupation is merely temporary. On leaving Monastir he went to Florina, but was promptly requested by the Greek authorities to leave the district.

The disappearance of a Bulgarian schoolmaster at Perlepé, named Latvief, was reported in my despatch No. 1 of the 23rd January. Further information received convinces me that he was deliberately disposed of by the Servian authorities, and that his fate was intended as a warning to other persons of too openly Bulgarian sympathies.

All schools except the French and Jewish establishments are still closed. The different communities have applied for permission to open them, but they invariably receive the answer that no instructions on the subject [illegible] head-quarters. I am informed that the Bulgarian and Greek schools will almost certainly be closed in the event of a Servian annexation of Monastir, but that an exception may be made in the case of the Vlachs.

The closing of the schools, the flooding of the market with paper money, the imposition of an ill-considered customs and octroi tariff, and the impossibility of carrying on legal business of any kind—apart from other shortcomings—are providing the enemies of the Servian occupation with legitimate grievances.

I have, &c.

C. A. GREIG.

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[9118] No. 466.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting on a systematic campaign of forcible conversion of Moslems to Christianity, as carried out in the last weeks in the districts of Nevrocop and Rupchuz.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 466.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Cavalla, February 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a systematic campaign of forcible conversion of Moslems to Christianity seems to have been carried on in the districts of Nevrokop and Rupchuz, especially during the month of December 1912, and to be still proceeding.

I enclose translations of three petitions received from an envoy from the villages of Orashch, Pletena, and Drenova Zir, in the kaza of Nevrocop.

Villagers representing the village of Baratun and other villages administered from Devlen, in the district of Rupchuz, came to Cavalla to see me and tell me similar tales to those recounted in the above petitions with regard to forcible conversions and maltreatment of women. The spokesman of the party said that the Government official at Devlen was a komitaji, and that he directs and encourages the local Christian population in their actions against their Moslem neighbours, and pays no attention to Moslem complaints. He mentions that a Bulgarian officer stationed at Devlen had remonstrated with the governor, but could obtain no satisfaction.

The Moslems of Nevrocop and Rupchuz are for the most part Pomaks, *i.e.*, Moslems of Bulgarian stock, who in the past adopted the Moslem religion. In many cases these Pomaks speak only Bulgarian, and have many customs in common with their Bulgarian neighbours. However, they deeply resent their enforced conversion to Christianity, and would, no doubt, at once repudiate it and practise and profess Islam openly, if assured of protection from the local authorities and population.

The massacres perpetrated on Moslems in those districts, and the looting of their possessions, are regarded by them as normal happenings in war time, and excite no great indignation among them, but their compulsory change of religion is very keenly felt.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 466.

Petition of the People of Orashch, in the Kaza of Nevrocop.

To the British vice-consul in Cavalla,

WHEN the Bulgarian troops invaded our country in November 1912, and came to our village, we received them with due politeness, and surrendered what arms we had, and we suffered no loss or damage, hurt, or ill-usage from them. A month went by, and five Bulgar priests and more than 150 brigands, who were going round the villages in the district, came to our village, surrounded it, seized our valuables, threw down our minarets and mosques, killed the imam and mukhtar (headman), and several God-fearing and honourable men amongst us who opposed them, and wounded others. They turned all out of the houses—men, women, and children—subjected them to all sorts of indignities, collected them in the public square, changed our names to Bulgarian names, made us Christians, and said, "From this day on you are Bulgarians." Now we can never accept this. We cannot give up our religion, and, as we have no one to appeal to to help us and to have pity on us, we appeal to you. Give us back our religion. We beg of you to help us.

(Here follow fourteen names.)

January 21, 1913.

Enclosure 3 in No. 466.

Petition of the People of Pletena, in the Kaza of Nevrocop.

To the British vice-consul in Cavalla,

WE are people of the village of Pletena, in the kaza of Nevrocop. When the war broke out Bulgarian troops came, but did no act of tyranny against us, but we had to obey their orders. But when they went away the native Bulgarian population left no act of cruelty undone against us. We had perforce to look on in silence while they took away our goods, property, and money. We would, however, have been content to give up everything, but one thing has touched our innermost feelings, viz., their forcing us to adopt their religion at the point of the sword. Five priests and more than 300 native Bulgarian "chetejis" (members of bands) went about from village to village, and came also to our village, threw down our minarets and the mosques, and killed the imam, the mukhtar (headman), and others. Again, five or ten persons entered into each house, tore off the veils of our women, took us all outside, changed our names to their names, and said, "Henceforth you are Bulgars." We beg your assistance in giving us back our religion.

(Here follow the names of twenty Moslem villagers.)

January 18, 1913.

Enclosure 4 in No. 466.

Petition of the People of Drenova Zir, in the Kaza of Nevrocop.

To the British vice-consul in Cavalla,

RECENTLY priests and "comitajis" (members of bands) came to our village, entered into every house, turned out by force the inhabitants, our wives and children, collected us together inside a ring of bayonets, and, in order to make us change our religion and give up our faith, said, "You must either adopt our religion or we will kill you." Half of our population, bearing in mind the people killed in the neighbouring villages, and other acts of cruelty, changed their religion to save their lives; and others, leaving their homes and all their possessions, are sorrowing in other places. Now none of us can accept this state of things, and our strength has left us through weeping bitter tears by day and by night. No man of conscience can approve of what has been done to us. Let us remain in our religion. Out of your pity find a way of helping us.

(Here follow the names of thirty Moslem villagers.)

December 21, 1912.

[9119] No. 467.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 146.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Cavalla reporting that the octroi dues at that port are being levied by the Bulgarian authorities.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 467.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 6/12.)
Sir, *Cavalla, February 13, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that octroi dues are being levied at Cavalla by the Bulgarian municipal authorities.

Some two years ago, when it was proposed by the Turkish authorities that octroi dues should be levied in Cavalla, the proposition was agreed to by the local foreign merchants on condition that the dues so collected should be handed over directly to a

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commission representing the foreign merchant body. On their side, the foreign merchants undertook to apply the money received to town improvements, such as paving of streets, construction of sewers, &c.

Under the Turkish rule the money collected in octroi dues was duly handed over to the commission and deposited in certain local banks.

After the Bulgarian occupation the octroi dues were for a short time not collected, but were soon revived, the money so collected being retained by them and not handed over to the commission. In December last the Bulgarian municipal authorities asked for a loan of 400*l.* from the octroi commission (the president of which is the Austrian vice-consul), on the ground that the municipality had no money in hand for urgent municipal works. Their request was granted.

It should be noted that the merchants of Cavalla have no objection to the levying of octroi provided the money collected is duly handed over to the commission.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[9120] No. 468.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February 26.*)

(No. 117.) *Cairo, Cox's Hotel, February 22, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir, on the subject of the distress and relief work in that district.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Cairo.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 468.

Vice-Consul Gayley to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3. Confidential.) *Monastir, February 4, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a note, the original of which was addressed by me to Lord Onslow, on the subject of the distress in this district.

The following is a brief statement (1) of funds actually available, and (2) of funds anticipated or promised for British relief work in this district:

1. *Funds actually available.*

	£
(*a.*) For the work of the Macedonian Relief Fund, represented by Miss MacQueen and Mr. Maynard: Granted by the Macedonian Relief Fund	250
(*b.*) For the work of His Majesty's vice-consulate— Sent by the British Red Crescent	550
Given by the Macedonian Relief Fund	100
	1,000

2. *Funds anticipated or promised.*

	£
(*a.*) For the work of the Macedonian Relief Fund— Promised by the Macedonian Relief Fund	50
(*b.*) For the work of His Majesty's vice-consulate— Promised by the editor of the Indian paper "Comrade" ..	400
	450

A considerable part of the funds under the first heading have been spent.

Apart from these resources, a supply of much-needed clothing has been kindly promised by Lady Paget for the relief work of this vice-consulate, and Miss MacQueen has promise of a similar supply from other sources.

It is hoped that the hospital, of which Miss MacQueen has taken charge, may develop after the war into a permanent British establishment—a proposal to which the Servian authorities would appear to have no objection.

As stated in the accompanying note, the funds available and promised are utterly insufficient to deal with more than a fraction of the distress in the town of Monastir, leaving no margin for work outside.

The villages were intended to be the special province of Mr. Maynard, but, until and unless much larger sums are forthcoming, he will be limited to reporting on the situation, whereas relief in the form of food, clothing, and fuel is needed at once. The position is appalling.

Supplies of flour, rice, and butter for distressed Moslems have been promised by Kamel Bey Teymour, who recently visited Monastir, and describes himself as "Head of the Fourth Egyptian Red Crescent Mission and of the High Relief Commission."

Kamel Bey is evidently quite under Austrian influence, to which, as will later be shown, he was probably won over before leaving Egypt.

He came to Monastir with the intention, above all, of promoting and supporting the comparatively insignificant relief work of the Austrian consulate, which has from the first deliberately subordinated charity to political propaganda, and endeavoured by the carefully organised campaign of its numerous agents to create amongst the Moslems an impression that all the relief work in this district, our own included, is inspired by and due to Austrian pro-Moslem initiative.

He arrived here on the evening of the 30th January, and at once entered into relations with the Austrian consulate, where he seems to have been treated to such a flattering account of Austrian pro-Moslem endeavour and intentions that he thought it superfluous even to take stock of the parallel British, French, and American organisations, to which my colleague had obviously made a calculatedly passing allusion.

He intended to leave on the following morning without calling on anyone else. An accident prevented this. His application for a railway "pass" to Salonica had been sent in through the Austrian consulate, and consequently the Servian authorities were slow in making it out, and he missed his train.

Meanwhile his arrival had become the main topic of conversation in Monastir, and his intimacy with the Austrian consulate had provoked considerable comment. Consequently, with a whole day to spare, he felt obliged to call on me, which he did, accompanied by my Austrian colleague, who did not leave him a moment the whole day.

It transpired from his conversation that he had very readily committed himself to promoting the Austrian relief work in a way admirably calculated to favour Austrian propaganda, and very detrimental to British prestige, by the following means:—

1. By arranging to send to the Austrian consul a supply of flour, rice, and butter, to be shared by him, apparently at his discretion, with any other deserving relief work.

2. By arranging to send to the Austrian consul a considerable sum of money, to be administered by an international committee, of which the Austrian consul, the mufti, and certain Moslem notables, would be the central figures, round which would be grouped the representatives of the other local relief organisations—British, French, and American.

As an outcome of our conversation it was arranged, as regards the first point, that a supply of provisions equal to that promised to the Austrian consulate should be sent to me directly—not through the medium of my Austrian colleague. As regards the second point, I observed that, in the event of money being sent, it would in the circumstances be possible for me to become a member of the suggested committee only on the understanding that it should include, besides the mufti and Moslem notables, a representative of each of the other relief organisations in Monastir on exactly equal terms. I also suggested that the Moslem notables should be elected by lot from a list drawn up by the proposed *ex officio* members of the committee, hoping so to prevent in some degree the obvious evil of a panel selected solely by the Austrian consul.

Kamel consented vaguely to these proposals.

He did not visit the hospital being organised by Miss MacQueen.

In a previous paragraph it was stated that, to the best of my belief, Kamel was tampered with in Austrian interests before leaving Egypt. In this connection it is known with tolerable certainty that an endeavour was made through a M. Naus, a Belgian subject who lives in Cairo, and is the brother-in-law of my Austrian colleague, to induce the Egyptian Red Crescent to place at the disposal of the Austrian relief work in Monastir a sum of 50,000 fr., described as being ten days' interest on certain sums held by that organisation. The scheme, approved by a majority of the Egyptian Red Crescent Committee, or kindred body, appears to have nearly succeeded, but was at the last moment frustrated by the veto of an Egyptian prince (name unknown to me). This vice-consulate at the time received vague information that this plan was on

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foot, and on the 19th December I had sufficient information to justify my telegraphing to the Foreign Office that an Austrian attempt was being made to obtain funds from Egypt for Austrian relief work in Monastir.

All honest charitable efforts, British or foreign, being equally deserving of support, it will be a matter for regret if Austrian relief work, which is an instrument of propaganda, and of propaganda bitterly hostile to British interests, should be promoted to our detriment by funds which are the fruits of British administration in Egypt.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

P.S.—I would mention that the Austrian consul is doyen of the Monastir consular corps, and that Austrian consulates, where no German consulates exist, undertake the official protection of Ottoman subjects at the present moment. But I venture to think that these are no reasons at all for the preferential treatment shown by the representative of the Egyptian Red Crescent.

C. A. G.

Enclosure 2 in No. 468.

Note on Distress in District of Monastir.

THE war has caused widespread distress in the Monastir district. It is believed that about 80 per cent. of the villages inhabited exclusively by Moslems, and of the Moslem quarters of villages with a mixed population, have been sacked and partially or wholly destroyed, or both, throughout the kazas of Monastir, Kirchevo, Florina, Serfidjé, Kaïlar, Kozhani, Elassona, Grevena, Naselitch, and Kastoria. Considerable distress is also reported amongst both Christians and Moslems in the Gorcha and Dibra districts.

Subsequent enquiry will probably show that the irregular troops attached to the contending armies and parties of marauders from the neighbouring Christian villages were mainly responsible for the work of destruction.

The destruction has not been limited to Moslem villages. In the kaza of Florina the Christian population suffered severely, especially round Sorovitch, Banitsa, and Eksisou. But, so far as is known, enough villages have everywhere survived to harbour all the refugees. No place has been heard of where the Christian villagers are in any danger of starvation. In many cases they have actually been enriched by plunder from their Moslem neighbours.

In the early days of the campaign thousands of Moslems fled from the villages and took refuge at Salonica and Monastir. About 8,000 of the refugees in this town have been distributed amongst the few surviving Moslem villages, whose resources must be taxed to the utmost. The relatively accurate statistics now available show that some 12,000 remain—a larger number than was at first supposed. Of these some 4,500 are receiving relief from the following sources:—

1. The Red Crescent, which, through His Majesty's vice-consulate, is providing food for upwards of 800.*
2. The Macedonian Relief Fund, which, represented by Miss MacQueen, is providing food for a number to be brought up to about 1,000. Miss MacQueen has undertaken other work described in a subsequent paragraph.
3. The American Mission, which, with funds partly provided by Great Britain, is feeding about 800.
4. The French Sisters, who, with funds partly furnished by the French Government, are feeding about 1,000.
5. The Austrian consulate, which, with funds partly provided by the Austrian Government, is feeding about 800.

The remainder, in receipt of no permanent relief,† are in a pitiable condition. Many of them have sold the few effects they were able to carry away from their homes, including blankets and bedding, and are within sight of starvation. Numbers of the permanent inhabitants of the town are in nearly as bad a plight as the refugees. The

* To this work the Macedonian Relief Fund has kindly contributed 100*l*.

† The municipal authorities are feeding upwards of 2,000 persons, but their funds are only sufficient for a short period.

crowded Moslem quarters, where even mosques are used as dwellings, are in a very unsanitary state, with which the municipal authorities are unable to deal for lack of funds and transport. The absence hitherto of any serious epidemic is probably due to the healthy climate. There have been cases of smallpox, but as vaccination is being carried out by the authorities on a large scale its rapid spread is not anticipated.

The funds generously provided are therefore, unhappily, very inadequate to meet the existing distress even in the town of Monastir, much less in the outlying districts, where the surviving Moslem villages must be crowded with refugees in much the same state.

The whole of the relief work in progress here as already described is organised on the assumption that its continuance will be necessary for only three or four months. It may be necessary much longer. If so, it is hoped that the necessary funds will be forthcoming. It would be painful to leave to their fate those now being helped.

It is not anticipated that many of the refugees still here will or safely could return to their ruined villages until a stable administration exists. Those who ultimately return will need temporary shelters, a free grant of personal and household effects, oxen and donkeys, agricultural implements, and seed, and, above all, the means of tiding over an initial period of penury. Emigration may partly solve the difficulty.

This year's crops are expected to give less than half the normal yield.

The work undertaken by Miss MacQueen has already been referred to. Apart from her other occupations, which include the distribution of food, visits to sick persons, and a vigilant look-out for disease, she is taking charge of thirty beds at the municipal hospital, which have courteously been placed at her disposal by the Servian authorities.

The present need in the Monastir district is probably far greater than in 1903 and 1904, when vastly larger sums were devoted to its relief.

C. A. GREIG.

Monastir, January 21, 1913.

[9121] No. 469.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 148.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 24, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith four brief articles, all taken from to-day's issue of the "Turquie,"* which may be of some interest as illustrating the manner in which the entire local press endeavours to deceive the public as to the true situation of the country. Since the *coup d'État* only one Turkish paper, the "Ifkham," has ventured to raise a word of warning and advise its readers to accept plain facts and make the best of them, and the "Ifkham" was promptly suppressed and fined 100*l*.

The rest of the Constantinople press, both Turkish and foreign, publishes daily articles on the lines of those now enclosed. Two of these articles are contributed by the Italian telegraph agency, an enterprise which has resumed publication on strong Committee lines since the conclusion of the Italian war. This agency and the Agence ottomane are the staple purveyors of foreign news, and the heavily-biassed reports which they date from various capitals are widely reproduced and commented on, not only in the Turkish press but in the allied press of other countries.

The truth as to the recent military operations at Bulair and Sharkeui has not been allowed to transpire in the local press, and the withdrawal of the Bulgars from their positions at Tchatalja is generally represented as the result of a series of brilliant Turkish victories. The financial situation is usually pictured as being quite satisfactory, and imaginary loans, such as those that figure in one of the enclosures, have become increasingly popular of late, though the general effect is somewhat marred by the fact that the editor, while enthusiastically greeting the patriotic response of the country to the internal loan in one column, has to threaten and cajole them into being more generous in the next.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* Not printed.

[9126] No. 470.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Rome, February 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a memorandum which I have received from the Italian Government in reply to my request for an expression of its views on the Servian contention that the attitude adopted by the Servian authorities towards the Ottoman Debt administration in occupied Turkish territory was based on the principles of international law. I have already reported that the Italian Government has not found it easy to formulate views on the matter, being on the one hand anxious to protect the interests of the Turkish bondholders, and at the same time unwilling to advocate diplomatic action which would be indirectly a reflection on the attitude adopted by the Italian authorities established in the Ægean Islands. The result is that a compromise is suggested, namely, that the action of the Balkan allies should not be called into question, but that a representation should be made with a view to eliciting a categorical statement that on the conclusion of peace due regard will be had for the interests of the bondholders.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 470.

Pro-memoria communicated to Sir R. Rodd.

(Translation.)

THE Rome Chamber of Commerce, as the representative of the interests of the Italian holders of Turkish stock, has had occasion to draw attention to the desirability of adequately safeguarding the interests of the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the matter of the levying of the revenues due to it in the regions in the Balkans actually occupied by the four allied Powers.

With regard to the action of the Greek authorities, it appears that while declaring their intention to respect the rights of the foreign creditors of Turkey, they have restrained the Ottoman Bank at Salonica from disposing of the sums of money deposited with that institution, "in order to prevent Turkey making use of the surplus of the revenues destined for the service of the Debt"; at the same time they expressed their readiness on the conclusion of peace to make up the accounts, with a view to determining what portion is due to the Public Debt and what will accrue to the Greek Government by right of capture in war.

As the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt administration maintains that the sums in question do not represent surpluses which could in any conceivable circumstances devolve to the Ottoman Government, and therefore considers that the measures taken by the Hellenic authorities are solely due to a misunderstanding, the Royal Legation at Athens was authorised on the 13th January last to take action with a view to elucidating this point and to obtaining, should circumstances warrant it, the reversal of the action taken at Salonica. The Royal Legation has, however, not yet reported the action which it has taken on these instructions.

With regard to the question of principle involved, the views of the Royal Government are as follows:—

In view of the obligations which the temporary administration of the occupied territories imposes on the Powers which have to undertake it, and in consideration of the fact that existing conventions recognise special rights as devolving on such Powers to enable them to meet these obligations, there is in reality no reason to contest their practical realisation of these rights, provided that, in enforcing them, the Power occupying the territory in question should demonstrate its readiness, as Greece has already taken the opportunity of doing, to take the interests of the foreign creditors of Turkey into account.

In order to elicit categorical and binding declarations on the subject from the Governments concerned, the Royal Government is ready to associate itself in such representations as may be made to them, either with a view to calling their attention to

the responsibilities towards the holders of the Ottoman funded Debt, and towards the Powers which have the right to protect the interests of the latter, or to making reserves as regards such decisions as, after the conclusion of peace, may be found necessary in order to ensure that this protection may be efficaciously and permanently exercised.

[9103] No. 471.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 25.)
Sir, *Bucharest, February 23, 1913.*

AS reported in my telegram No. 45 of yesterday, the Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me last evening to deliver the reply of the Roumanian Government to the advise offered by His Majesty's Government, and later by the other Great Powers, that the Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments should resort to the mediation of the Great Powers for the settlement of their dispute.

When I delivered the message conveyed in your telegram No. 11 of the 13th instant, I left with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his Excellency's request, the pencilled translation of your telegram, which I had brought with me to read to him, and his Excellency was therefore kind enough when he called on me yesterday to leave with me an *aide-mémoire* recording the reply of the Roumanian Government, and I enclose a copy herewith. As I have already reported, Roumania accepts unconditionally the mediation of the six Great Powers, and it now rests with Bulgaria to follow suit.

His Excellency told me that the Cabinet Council on the 21st instant, at which the mediation proposal had been discussed, had lasted over three hours, the discussion turning mainly on two points: (1) whether recourse should be had to one Power, to two Powers, or to all six Powers, and (2) whether any conditions should be attached to the mediation. M. Maiorescu said that it was for the Powers to decide where the mediation was to take place. He himself thought that it would be better not to choose London, where the Ambassadors were already occupied with so many questions, and where the discussions which they have had might well have tended to produce friction among them. He thought St. Petersburgh was perhaps the capital the best suited for the purpose.

Before leaving the legation, M. Maiorescu said that in taking the initiative in advising recourse to mediation you had taken an important step in the direction of peace, and he expressed with evident sincerity his appreciation of the delicate manner in which you had handled the matter, by which I understood his Excellency to refer to the avoidance of anything in the nature of a collective *démarche*, the advice of each Power having been given separately and individually.

I regret that I cannot at this moment lay my hands on The Hague Convention of 1907, but I understand that article 6 records the right of the States resorting to mediation to reject the ruling of the mediating Powers, thus defining clearly one of the distinctions between mediation and arbitration; but it may, I suppose, be confidently hoped that when two smaller European States refer their differences to the mediation of all the Great Powers, the former will abide by the ruling of the latter.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 471.

Aide-mémoire.

LE Gouvernement roumain accepte la médiation offerte par la démarche du Ministre anglais à Bucarest, Sir George Barclay, au nom du Gouvernement anglais, communiquée à M. Maiorescu, vendredi, 1er (14) février, et dans laquelle l'Angleterre conseille "d'avoir recours à la médiation des Puissances ou à la médiation d'une des Puissances." A cette démarche anglaise s'est associé M. de Waldbaesen, Ministre allemand, le 3 (16) février, en lisant à M. Maiorescu une communication du Gouvernement allemand "d'appuyer la proposition anglaise." Du lundi, 4 (17) au mercredi, 6 (19) février, MM. les Ministres plénipotentiaires des autres quatre Grandes Puissances ont fait la même démarche.

La Roumanie accepte d'autant plus la médiation offerte ainsi par les six Grandes Puissances de l'Europe qu'elle a été heureuse de pouvoir s'associer lors de la conférence tenue à La Haye au mois d'octobre 1907, à toutes les généreuses propositions des Puissances en faveur de la paix et que, notamment, elle a signé avec elles, le 18 octobre, 1907, la première convention "pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux," qui dans les articles 3–7 prévoit et précise une pareille médiation.

Dans le choix qui lui est laissé par la proposition anglaise, la Roumanie s'est décidée à accepter la médiation de toutes les six Grandes Puissances, et l'accepte sans autre condition, en ajoutant seulement un désir, justifié par les circonstances et, du reste, pouvant s'appuyer sur l'article 8 de ladite convention, qui—bien que prévoyant une autre hypothèse—contient l'idée d'un terme nécessaire à prévoir pour les médiations; ce désir est que les Grandes Puissances médiatrices veuillent bien limiter la durée de leur action et communiquer à la Roumanie le terme jusqu'auquel elles croient que leurs bons offices seront arrivés à un résultat.

Bucarest, le 9 (22) *février*, 1913.

[9104] No. 172.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 26.)

Bucharest, February 23, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of conversation yesterday afternoon, gave me certain details regarding the recent Roumano-Bulgarian negotiations which seem to exonerate Roumania from the charge which has been brought against her of having increased her demands at the moment when Enver Bey's *coup d'État* had opened up the prospect of a renewal of hostilities.

His Excellency said it was true that in the course of the negotiations Roumania had increased her demands, *i.e.*, whereas she had at the beginning of the negotiations shown her readiness to accept a frontier from Silistria to Cavarna, she had through M. Misu on the 14th January, or more than a week before Enver Bey's *coup d'État*, put forward a demand for a frontier from Turtukai to Baltchik. She had done so because in the last days of last year M. Kalinkof, the Bulgarian Minister here, had conveyed to M. Maioresco a message from M. Gueschof that the latter was desirous of concluding a very comprehensive convention with Roumania. The Roumanian Government in response to this advance had proposed to make to Bulgaria various economic concessions to build a bridge across the Danube, to make a loan and to exercise pressure on the Porte (M. Maioresco did not mention any offer of military assistance). Such offers naturally involved a corresponding increase in Roumania's demands.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[9179] No. 173.

Messrs. Bourke, Schiff and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received February 26.)

28, *Throgmorton Street, London, February* 25, 1913.

Sir,

WE are in receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, and beg to thank you for your courteous reply.

For the moment we are not proceeding any further with the proposed loan to the Greek Government, and will wait till conditions are more settled.

We remain, &c.

BOURKE, SCHIFF AND Co.

[9542] No. 174.

Memorandum communicated by Count Mensdorff, February 26, 1913.

LE Comte Berchtold m'a chargé de m'exprimer dans le sens suivant à l'égard de la communication que Sir E. Cartwright lui a faite relativement à la délimitation albanaise.

Nous avons déjà consenti à la séparation du nord-ouest de l'Albanie de tous les endroits où une minorité serbe se trouve en face d'une majorité albanaise. Mais il serait vraiment trop demander que nous consentions aussi à l'érection d'autres districts purement albanaises à la Serbie. Ainsi tous les districts de Djakova, qui constituent politiquement et économiquement une unité indépendante appartiennent, sans aucun doute géographiquement et ethnographiquement à l'Albanie. C'est seulement par égard pour la Russie que nous avons fait spontanément la concession d'exclure de l'Albanie le monastère orthodoxe Visoki Decsani, qui se trouve isolé au milieu d'une contrée purement albanaise. Mais il est inadmissible qu'on veuille maintenant de cette concession si importante pour réclamer aussi la ville de Djakova pour la Serbie. Aux intérêts peu importants du couvent orthodoxe dans cette ville on peut opposer un grand nombre de mosquées et de monastères de derviches. De plus, il se trouve à Djakova une paroisse catholique, un petit couvent des pères franciscains avec une ancienne chapelle de Saint Antoine, qui fait l'objet d'une vénération de tous les catholiques des environs, qui se trouvent sous notre protectorat et ne méritent pas moins d'égards que lesdits intérêts orthodoxes. En ce qui concerne l'objection de laisser Djakova à "l'Albanie musulmane" on peut faire observer que les intérêts de culte des chrétiens jouiront dans une Albanie placée sous la garantie des Grandes Puissances au moins de la même sécurité que ne pourrait l'attendre l'Islam et le catholicisme en Serbie d'après des expériences si défavorables faites jusqu'à présent. Si on insiste à observer que la Russie a fait plus de concessions que nous, nous constatons que nous sommes prêts à céder Ipek, Prizrend avec la plaine fertile de Metoja et Dibra, tandis que la Russie n'a cédé que Scutari et le Tarabosch en faisant des difficultés en ce qui concerne les environs de cette ville.

Sir Fairfax a mentionné deux alternatives pour régler la question de Djakova, c'est-à-dire d'y envoyer une commission internationale d'après la proposition de Sir Edward Grey ou de constituer Djakova et les environs en enclave autonome sous la protection des Puissances. A la première alternative on pourrait opposer la considération qu'on devra s'attendre qu'avant l'arrivée de la commission internationale on essayera de transformer de force Djakova en ville serbe. La seconde alternative constituerait une mesure d'exception tellement complète qu'elle ne paraîtrait ni motivée ni réalisable en pratique.

Quant à la crainte exprimée par Sir F. Cartwright que de la part de Djakova à l'Albanie pourrait mener à la chute du Cabinet Pachitch, il ne faudrait certainement pas la valeur de Pachitch comme homme d'État, mais il faudrait considérer si, à l'égard de la délimitation d'un nouvel État, qui doit représenter quelque chose de durable pour l'unique raison que dans un pays voisin l'un ou l'autre homme d'État se trouve actuellement au pouvoir, ce qui—vu l'état de choses en Serbie—ne peut avoir qu'un caractère éphémère.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres, le 26 *février*, 1913.

[9309] No. 175.

Memorandum communicated by Tewfik Pasha, February 26, 1913.

(Très Confidentiel.)

LA défense de la capitale ne pouvant être assurée qu'à la condition que la nouvelle frontière parte du cap de San-Stéfano (sur la mer Noire) et aille à la rivière Maritza de façon à assurer à la Turquie la possession d'Inéada, Lulé-Bourgas et Baba-Eski, le Gouvernement Impérial aime à espérer qu'il peut compter sur le plein appui et le consentement des Grandes Puissances.

Les mausolées, mosquées et tombeaux, ainsi que les autres monuments et souvenirs tant religieux qu'historiques, situés dans la ville d'Andrinople et ses alentours, bénéficieront du principe de l'exterritorialité.

La solution de la question des îles est laissée aux Grandes Puissances, à la condition, toutefois, que cette solution soit conforme aux vues et légitimes considérations exposées dans la note responsive de la Sublime Porte.

Le Gouvernement Impérial, devant les immenses sacrifices territoriaux consentis, ne peut envisager même la question d'une indemnité de guerre, et se croit en droit d'exiger en toute justice que les États balkaniques assument une part proportionnelle de la dette publique ottomane.

Toujours en vue d'assurer la sécurité de la capitale, il est nécessaire que les Grandes Puissances obtiennent le démantèlement des fortifications d'Andrinople et de Kirk-Kilissé avec l'assurance que la Bulgarie ne les fortifiera pas dans l'avenir.

Si une entente s'établit, il importe que la ville d'Andrinople soit ou ravitaillée, ou bien à ce qu'il soit permis à la garnison de quitter la ville en emportant tous les canons, fusils, munitions de guerre et autres, et que les canons et matériaux de guerre qui ne pourront être transportés immédiatement continueront toutefois à demeurer dans la possession de l'armée Impériale, qui les retirera aussitôt qu'elle pourra disposer des moyens de transport nécessaires.

La garnison ottomane devra recevoir tous les honneurs militaires, et les habitants d'Andrinople ainsi que les réfugiés jouiront de la liberté absolue dans le cas où ils voudraient quitter la ville.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 26 février, 1913.

[9253] No. 476.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 111. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February 26, 1913.*

SINCE the return of the Grand Vizier four days ago from the Dardanelles, Cabinet seem more inclined to peace and prepared to cede Adrianople against a frontier from San Stephano to the north of Iniada to Chakmak, and thence by the Maritza to Enos, providing that allies do not make other demands.

"Tanin," in an article to-day, appears to be preparing the public for the fall of Adrianople. Arrests of non-committee officers and the reported decking of four Maxims at the Porte would point to the internal situation being precarious.

(Sent to Sophia and Athens.)

[9251] No. 477.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, February 26, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 24 and Belgrade telegram No. 29 of 8th February: Ottoman Public Debt.

I am informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Austrian Ministers at Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade have been instructed to join their German and British colleagues in making a protest against the action of Greek, Bulgarian, and Servian authorities, and to urge that the officials and bureaux of the Ottoman Public Debt should be left undisturbed in their work of administration in the occupied territories.

The Austro-Hungarian Government will give their views on the reply of the Servian Government to the protest of His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade when they have heard the result of the similar *démarche* made by their representatives at Belgrade.

[9255] No. 478.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 26, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

Bucharest telegram No. 50 of 25th February.

Bulgarian Government have now shown their entire good-will in agreeing to submit their dispute with Roumania to the decision of the Great Powers, although there has never been a precedent of a country consenting to submit a cession of their own territory to the decision or arbitration of a third Power. Thus of the two nations the one who could with the greater reason have refused decision, whilst perhaps accepting the mediation, of the Powers would have been Bulgaria. Difficulty which has now arisen in Bucharest by their accepting only mediation, and not decision of the Powers, has complicated the situation.

As Roumania is not satisfied with frontier fixed by the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin, they ought most certainly to agree to submit any change in this frontier to the same Powers.

An impression has been created here that there has been a divergence in the *démarche* between the representatives of the Great Powers in Sophia and Bucharest, which, when generally known, can only aggravate situation.

Public opinion of Europe, including jurists, leading statesmen, and all friends of international peace, will condemn Roumania if she refuses to submit to the decision of the Powers in a question which involves cession of Bulgarian territory.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[9254] No. 479.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, February 26, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 66 of 24th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will, by Emperor's orders, discuss question of dismissal of reservists with President of the Council and Minister of War. He thinks that Russian Government will comply with Austrian proposal if the latter gives an assurance that mobilisation on Servian frontier is a measure of internal police and not the first step towards some aggressive action. His Excellency takes much more hopeful view of the general situation, though somewhat annoyed that Roumania has not accepted mediation unreservedly.

[9100] No. 480.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, February 26, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 21 of 25th February and my telegrams Nos. 50 and 51 of 25th February.

I do not know all the considerations which have motived the Ambassadors' proposal, but as at present informed I adhere to the view expressed in my telegram No. 50. I think that the course proposed is a perilous one, and might precipitate a crisis. In my opinion it should only be taken, at any rate, when it is clear that Bulgaria will not be content with mediation.

I believe that it would be less difficult for the Cabinet to justify to the country eventual acquiescence in the result of mediation than the acceptance of proposal made at Sophia, by which Roumania would bind herself beforehand to accept the decision of the Powers.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[10000] No. 481.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF handed to Sir A. Nicolson to-day the enclosed paper, which he requested might be considered as a "verbal communication."*

Sir A. Nicolson did not go over old arguments with his Excellency, as it was of little use to do so, but pointed out one or two slight errors.

Firstly, the idea of constituting "Djakova et ses environs en enclave sous la protection des Puissances" probably referred to a personal suggestion of your Excellency's, as indicated in your telegram No. 27 of the 24th February.

Secondly, in the last paragraph of the memorandum it was stated that your Excellency "had expressed the fear that if Djakova was left to Albania the Pasitch Cabinet might fall." Sir A. Nicolson said that we did not understand that you had expressed such a fear. In fact, in your above-mentioned telegram, which Sir A. Nicolson read to Count Mensdorff, it was said that Count Berchtold had told you that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had made a statement to this effect to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. Your Excellency had not yourself mentioned this point.

Sir A. Nicolson told Count Mensdorff that he would send me this communication, and personally he regretted that it did not advance matters.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10001] No. 482.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 162.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.*

M. CAMBON read to Sir A. Nicolson to-day a long telegram from M. Bompard reporting a conversation with the Grand Vizier, who disclaimed all knowledge of any communication from the Powers respecting mediation, and said that before authorising the Powers to enter into negotiations the Porte would like assurances that they would receive the 4 per cent. surtax, loans, &c. The Grand Vizier said that the Austrian Ambassador had made this suggestion, and M. Bompard reported that the Triple Alliance was encouraging Turkey to make demands which would practically amount to the Powers paying Turkey for the cession of Adrianople. M. Bompard explained to the Grand Vizier very clearly that the Powers had communicated to Tewfik Pasha a memorandum saying that the *note responsive* could not be taken as a basis and that the Powers would be ready to communicate with the allies as to arriving at peace conditions if Turkey stated her willingness to abide by their advice.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9252] No. 483.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.†

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.*

THE following resolution was taken at a meeting of the Ambassadors held yesterday, in respect to the mode of settling the question at present in dispute between Roumania and Bulgaria:—

"Il semble qu'il s'est produit un malentendu dans l'esprit des représentants des Puissances à Bucarest.

"Ils avaient, comme ceux accrédités à Sophia, l'instruction de faire une démarche collective pour que les Gouvernements roumain et bulgare remissent la solution de leur différend à la décision des Puissances.

* No 474.
† Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 145), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 38), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 95), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 60).

"Cette démarche a été faite à Sophia, et le Gouvernement bulgare a adhéré à la proposition des Puissances.

"A Bucarest, nos représentants, ayant déjà parlé individuellement de médiation, et ayant reçu la réponse que le Gouvernement roumain l'accepterait, mais sans engagement de se soumettre à la décision des Puissances, hésitent à faire la démarche collective qui leur a été prescrite.

"Il est cependant indispensable de faire à Bucarest une démarche identique à celle qui a été faite à Sophia, et d'insister collectivement sur la nécessité d'une adhésion préalable à la décision des Puissances.

"La réunion est d'avis que des instructions dans ce sens devraient être adressées d'urgence aux représentants des Puissances à Bucarest."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8222] No. 484.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a letter addressed by Miss Durham to Mr. Nevinson, respecting the treatment of Albanians by Montenegrins.* You will observe that the conduct of the latter appears to be not only deplorable but highly reprehensible.

The reports that have reached His Majesty's Government as to the treatment of the Moslem inhabitants of territory in Servian and Bulgarian occupation have already been the subject of unofficial representations at Sophia and Belgrade.

In this instance, I leave it to your discretion to decide what, if any, use should be made of the information furnished by Miss Durham. It would of course be understood that, in any communications which you might think fit to hold with the Montenegrin Government no mention would be made of the source whence this information is derived.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7465] No. 485.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 63.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 110 of the 11th instant, enclosing copy of a letter from the chairman of the Keshan Collieries Company and Enos Forest Syndicate, respecting the shipment of charcoal from Enos and compensation for damage done to the property of the two companies, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia,† instructing him to apply to the Bulgarian Government for the desired permission to ship the charcoal and at the same time to reserve the right of His Majesty's Government to claim compensation, on behalf of the two companies, for damage done to their property.

I have to request your Excellency to inform Colonel English that no further action can be taken for the present in regard to the claim for compensation, which will be considered with a view to the possibility of eventual submission to the Bulgarian Government at the end of the war, along with any others of a similar nature that may be presented, if he will furnish more precise and detailed information respecting the damage sustained.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 350. † To Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 31), February 26, 1913.

[10001] No. 486.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 71.) *Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.*

Sir,

TEWFIK PASHA called to-day. Sir A. Nicolson asked his Highness if he had brought a reply to the communication of the Powers expressing their readiness to approach the allies as to peace conditions if the Porte would accept their advice. Tewfik Pasha said that "it was understood" that the Porte was willing that the Powers should mediate. Sir A. Nicolson again explained to Tewfik Pasha that we must have something in writing to that effect. Tewfik Pasha said that our communication was not a formal note. Sir A. Nicolson agreed, but said that it was a written communication, and he, Sir A. Nicolson, did not care in what form his Highness made his reply so long as it was in a shape which could be communicated to the Ambassadors. Tewfik Pasha said that he would send Sir A. Nicolson a letter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8862] No. 487.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 91.) *Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.*

Sir,

COUNT BENCKENDORFF asked M. de Etter to call at the Foreign Office on the 21st February to say that he had no objection, if I thought it would be useful, to my mentioning to Count Mensdorff that Russia was ready to admit that Tarabosh and Luma, with Radomir, should be included in Albania. Sir A. Nicolson told M. de Etter that the Austrians only conceded Dibra on the distinct understanding that the whole of the rest of the last Austrian line were accepted, and that he believed, though not having a map he could not be sure, that the above line included in Albania the places mentioned. M. de Etter said that Count Benckendorff thought that Austria might give up Djakova for the three places mentioned.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7971] No. 488.

Foreign Office to National Bank of Turkey.

Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant in which you solicit the assistance of His Majesty's Government in connection with the action of one or more of the Balkan Allied States in encashing certain revenues which have been assigned as security for certain Turkish Treasury bonds issued under a contract, dated the 1st (14th) February, 1912, to which the National Bank of Turkey was one of the parties.

The question is one requiring careful consideration, and before going any further the Secretary of State desires to be furnished with information on certain points enumerated below.

The question of the action which His Majesty's Government would be justified in taking must largely depend on the identity of the parties with whom the loan was contracted and to whom the revenues hypothecated to its service were assigned. The contract was made between the Imperial Ottoman Government on the one hand and the National Bank of Turkey and the Bank of Salonica on the other, and under article 7 the revenues in question were assigned to the "banques contractantes." Unless therefore it can be shown that a proportionate share of the rights of the two banks over the revenues in question was transferred, when the Treasury bills were issued, to the individual holders of those bills, Sir E. Grey is advised that the parties with whom the loan was contracted and to whom the revenues were pledged must be considered technically to be the two banks. I am accordingly to enquire whether,

[7465] No. 487*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 31.) *Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 110 of the 11th instant, copy of which was forwarded to you, enclosing copy of a letter from the chairman of the Keshan Collieries Company and Enos Forest Syndicate, respecting the shipment of charcoal from Enos and compensation for damage done to the property of these two companies, I have to request you to apply to the Bulgarian Government for permission for the company to ship the charcoal from Enos, as desired.

You should at the same time inform the Bulgarian Government that His Majesty's Government reserve the right to claim compensation for the damage already done to the property of the two companies.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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under the terms of the arrangement made between the banks and the holders of the bills, any such transfer has ever been effected, and, if so, in what way.

In the absence of any such arrangement the question passes to the nationality of the two banks. Sir E. Grey must assume from information in his possession that the Bank of Salonica must be considered to be a Turkish entity, and he would be glad to learn whether there are any grounds on which it may be held that this description does not also apply to the National Bank of Turkey.

Finally, I am to request that Sir E. Grey may be informed, if possible, in what particulars the conditions as to security differ in this case from that of the Bagdad Railway loan, which is understood to have a prior charge on the same revenue, also whether the bonds of the Bagdad Railway loan are issued to the bank concerned or to the actual lenders.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9281] No. 489.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 20.)
Sir,

Sophia, February 21, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 3rd February, I have the honour to report that, judging from a despatch received from the British vice-consul at Dedeagatch, the unsatisfactory attitude of the Bulgarian military authorities towards the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt would appear still to be maintained. The complaints of the inspector of the Debt communicated in the above despatch are in themselves of minor importance, but indicate an attitude on the part of the military authorities altogether at variance with the verbal assurances given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram No. 23 of the 25th January. I am continuing to press for an official reply to my notes on the subject, dated respectively the 13th December, 1912 and the 3rd February last.

The two complaints alluded to in the British vice-consul's despatch refer to the infringement of the fishing rights of the Debt on the lakes of Gala and Pamoukli, and to the action of the sergeant placed in charge of the salt works at Musselim, who insists on a rate of 100 piastres to the 20 fr. being accepted, instead of the recognised rate, which is fixed at 89 fr.; also to the failure of the Bulgarian commissariat at Kechan to deliver receipts for salt requisitioned.

The British vice-consul, in submitting these complaints to the military commandant at Dedeagatch, concludes his despatch with the following remark, which would appear to show that his representations are receiving but scant attention.

"Je ne doute pas, commandant, que, malgré votre silence pour ce qui concerne la remise des protestations précédentes, les intérêts de l'administration, se trouvant sous la protection des Grandes Puissances, ont dû avoir votre appui."

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[9361] No. 490.

The Ellerman Lines to Foreign Office.—(Received February 27.)

Sir,

Tower Building, Liverpool, February 26, 1913.

DETENTION to the "City of Khios" at Constantinople.

Referring to the writer's call yesterday afternoon upon Sir Chauncy Cartwright, K.C.M.G., we, as requested by him, beg to hand you herewith a semi *pro formâ* account of the "City of Khios" on the voyage in question, showing her average earnings as 74*l.* 3*s.* per day, which sum we claim for each day of detention, *i.e.*, 32 days 2,372*l.* 16*s.* In addition thereto there is also due to us the disbursements which were incurred during, and in consequence of, the detention, and which amount to 927*l.* 12*s.* 3*d.* We therefore enclose our claim for these items amounting together to 3,300*l.* 8*s.* 3*d.*

With regard to your letter of the 4th instant, No. 2429/12, paragraph 4; the "City of Khios" was, as you state, recalled from Rodosto on the 4th November, but we would point out to you that she had left Constantinople in our interests on the 2nd November, and she was prevented from taking the business that she was intended for, and was ordered by the British Ambassador to return to Constantinople. Therefore the time we lost was from the 2nd November, when she left Constantinople. Further, although it is admitted that you released the steamer on the 30th November, we had had no previous notice of your intention to release the steamer, and it was on the evening of the 30th (which was a Saturday night) that the cable reached us intimating the ship was released. We then had to find some employment for her and had to pass cables, and we think you will admit that as we managed to get the steamer away three days later, say the 3rd December, no time was lost, especially when you take into account that Sunday intervened. We therefore claim that we are entitled to compensation as from the 2nd November to the 3rd December inclusive, as that is the actual time we were deprived of the use of the steamer.

We would further remark that it was a very serious disappointment to us to have our steamer taken from us at a period when we had fixed engagements for her, and when freights were at a higher point than we have ever known them to be in our business career. The earlier part of November saw freights from the Constantinople and Black Sea districts at figures unknown before. As we showed you by charter parties, the freights obtainable in November were about double what they were two or three months before; this was of course by reason of the war. Very few ships were being sent up to the Constantinople and Black Sea districts, because of the risks attending such business, consequently there was a great demand for tonnage, and very high freights were being paid. Our business was much disconnected by the stoppage of the "City of Khios," as it was right in the height of our very busy season. Our trades in the Mediterranean are at their best from October to the end of January, and if the discretion had rested with us as to whether the steamer was kept at Constantinople or not, we should certainly, in view of our regular business engagements, have decided to send her away. It was not to us a question of what remuneration we should get for the detention to the steamer. It was of more importance to us to have our steamer for our regular trade at such a busy time when we badly needed her.

We are, &c.

(For the Ellerman Lines (Limited)),

H. E. WRIGHT, *Manager*.

Enclosure 1 in No. 490.

Semi pro formâ Account of Voyage of "City of Khios."

FOR loss of profit, and extra disbursements incurred through detention, by order of the British Ambassador, at Constantinople, of the steam-ship "City of Khios," from the 2nd November to the 3rd December inclusive, 32 days:—

	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
32 days demurrage at 74*l.* 3*s.* per day		2,372 16 0
Extra disbursements at Constantinople as agreed ..	213 18 11	
Crew wages	277 12 0	
Maintenance of officers and crew:—		
Captain and 7 officers at 2*s.* 6*d.* per man per day }	116 16 0	
Crew, 37 men at 1*s.* 6*d.* per man per day }		
Insurance on steamer	15 0 0	
Coal at Alexandria	68 0 0	
" Malta	206 5 4	
		927 12 3
Total		3,300 8 3

Enclosure 2 in No. 490.

SEMI *pro formâ* Statement respecting Forty-fourth Voyage of steam-ship "City of Khios."

1912.		£ s. d.	£ s. d.	1912.		£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Butler, Massey and Co.: 7691 ton coal at 12*s.* 4*d.* ..		468 19 6		October 3	Liverpool to Constantinople, &c. ..		3,681 15 8
Shipping ditto		29 6 6			Premium		100 0 0
			498 6 0		Freight and expenses outwards through rate goods ..	304 19 4	
					Returns	40 2 10	
October 2 Provisions .. 148 14 3		383 11 11			Transhipped at—		
Tradesmen's accounts (repairs, &c.) ..		62 6 8			Patras	25 0 0	
Cordage .. 25 11 7	Hood-Baughan & Co.	59 9 0			Patras	14 4 11	
Paint, &c. .. 2 18 0	Nereid, &c. ..	18 13 3			Syra	10 11 6	
Oil lamps, &c. ..		2 6 6			Syra	10 11 6	
Engineers' stores .. 257 16	Quayle-Noble ..	295 12 2			Smyrna	108 0 0	
Wages on boat .. 38 11	Lindsay & Co. ..	105 8 9			Constantinople		
Repairs to ditto .. 55 9 6	Calquhoun ..	43 16 2				532 18 7	
Painters .. 1 11 10	Schmidt's ..	3 1 3					3,148 17 1
Steamship hire, boat hire, flags & wages, &c. ..		51 9 3					Premium .. 30 12 0
			853 11 8				26 11 0
9 Agencies ..	Disbursements ..	38 18 6		10 Algiers ..	(Intermediate) ..	113 6 7	
" Malta ..	" ..	38 17 6		" Malta ..	" ..		
" Patras ..	" ..	12 12 11		" Patras ..	" ..		
" Syra ..	" ..	12 12 11		" Syra ..	" ..		
" Smyrna ..	" ..	94 4 1		" Smyrna ..	" ..		
" Constantinople ..	" ..			November 4 Rodosto ..	" ..		
22 Algiers ..	" ..	473 16 3		" Smyrna ..	" ..	106 18 8	
November 3 Rodosto ..	" ..			10 Smyrna ..	" ..		
" Smyrna ..	" ..	696 6 6		" Malta ..	" ..		
" Malta ..	" ..	46 12 1					229 3 3
			1,443 7 9				Premium .. 48 8 0
24 Pilotage ..	Dockage, &c..	153 5 6			Liverpool from Smyrna ..	6,566 6 6	
Lighthouse .. 15 10	Canal dues ..	142 18 6			*Deduct*—		
Canal dues .. 221 16	Pilotage, &c.	21 3 10			Freight and expenses on through rate goods ..	1,588 9 6	
Insurance, &c. 224 12 1	Quay expenses	18 12 2			Returns	311 11 6	
Demurrage:							4,666 5 0
Demurrage .. 370 16	Expenses ..	10 14 10					1,473 5 6
Crew: Coal .. 15 0	Provisions ..	671 11 4			Master portorage		415 6 1
Crew: Port dues ..	Consul ..	10 0 0					
Insurance on steamer ..	Consular charges ..	250 0 0					
Steamship hire, boat hire, flags & wages, &c. ..	Clearances ..	33 16 2					
	Agencies ..	22 12 4	1,881 16 1				
			4,677 1 6				43,533 8 11
Balance carried down (profit)			3,856 7 5		By balance brought down (profit)		3,856 7 5
			8,533 8 11				8,533 8 11

[9354] No. 491.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received February 27.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, February 26, 1913.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th February transmitting translation of a note from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador with a draft of certain provisions relative to navigation in the waters of the Balkan States which his Government proposs to submit to the conference of Ambassadors.

The Board see no objection to these provisions, which are for the most part on the lines of the usual clauses relative to navigation in commercial treaties. They are disposed, however, to suggest that the scope of article 3 might with advantage be enlarged so as to secure to foreign vessels the same privileges as national vessels in respect of the carriage of passengers as well as goods. Sir Edward Grey will recollect that article 11 of the "Model Draft" Treaty, which corresponds to the article at present under consideration, has recently been revised in this sense, and that this article is reproduced as article 16 of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1911.

Article 1 of the present provisions, in referring to the treatment accorded to "marchandises," is apparently not intended to extend beyond the treatment in respect of the loading, unloading, &c., of the cargoes of vessels as such. The Board, however, presume that in any general treaty to be negotiated, of which these provisions are intended to form a part, satisfactory provisions will also be inserted with regard to most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of goods (and especially as regards the customs duties leviable thereon) as well as national treatment for subjects or citizens.

Sir Edward Grey will doubtless consider how far such provisions as are now under discussion can properly be imposed on the Balkan States so far as concerns their existing territories, as apart from their rights in any new territory, hitherto under Ottoman Dominion, which they may acquire as a result of the present war.

The Board understand the provisions of the first paragraph of article 1 of the Austro-Hungarian draft as requiring the opening of the coasting trade of the Balkan States to the shipping of all nations. If, however, this is not the correct interpretation of the proposed provisions, or if they should be so modified in the course of negotiations as to permit the existing coasting trade to be restricted to domestic shipping, it will be necessary to guard carefully against the possibility of any attempt being made to declare trade between ports of the allied States, or between their existing ports and ports in the newly acquired territories, to be "coasting trade," and to exclude British shipping therefrom.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

[9752] No. 492.

M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, February 27, 1913.)

VEUILLEZ, avant de proposer à la réunion l'amendement à la formule française concernant la répartition de la dette ottomane que nous considérons nécessaire, vous en expliquer avec Sir Edward Grey et M. Cambon. Veuillez leur dire que nous sommes très loin de vouloir apporter des obstacles à la solution de cette question en conditions conformes aux intérêts des détenteurs des fonds turcs.

Mais, dans notre opinion, il ne serait pas d'équité d'imposer aux alliés une résolution ferme en tant que la portée de pareille résolution dépasserait les obligations évidentes et indiscutables des alliés que nous formulons dans notre amendement. Veuillez aussi signaler à Sir Edward Grey et à l'Ambassadeur de France que cet amendement s'appuie sur le précédent créé par le Traité de Lausanne et développe les arguments que vous trouverez dans communication spéciale que vous recevrez. Texte amendé de la proposition française :—

"1. Les États signataires du présent traité qui reçoivent cession des territoires ayant appartenus jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman, supporteront une part de la dette de la Turquie. Cette participation sera réglée dans un esprit d'équité et notamment de manière à ce que la somme représentant les contributions desdits

territoires au service de la dette ottoman, dans la mesure où cette somme garantit aux porteurs le payement du coupon et de l'amortissement ordinaire, reste en tout cas à la charge des États annexants. La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires sera convertible en capital.

"3. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et toutes les charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemin de fer et autres ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité; ils s'engagent, en outre, dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valables consentis par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman ou les autorités ottomanes compétentes.

"4. Les modes d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront élaborés par une commission internationale où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances et les États balkaniques et qui se réunira à , le . Les procès-verbaux et les protocoles de cette commission seront annexés au présent traité."

[9294] No. 493.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 26, 1913.*

I AM informed that the Committee has dispatched to India two agents to raise funds by placing Treasury bonds among Indian Moslems. One is named Fazil, and belongs to Salonica Cripto-Jews sect; the second, wearing green turban and dervish dress, is named Ali Khulki Effendi. They are reported to have gone viâ Egypt by Khedivial steamer "Osmalleh," which left Constantinople on 16th February.

(Sent to India and Cairo.)

[9310] No. 494.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 26, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

My telegram No. 69 of 19th February and Bucharest telegram No. 38 of 20th February.

Roumanian representative here has been ordered to Bucharest by his Government, and leaves to-morrow morning. He states that he expects to be absent for ten days or so, and that his Government are anxious to hear his own personal views on situation.

This action of Roumanian Government has created a bad impression, and if it be followed by calling out of the reserves, the possibility of which was reported by the Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest to his Government (see my telegram above mentioned), situation will be considerably aggravated.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[9433] No. 495.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 77. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, February 27, 1913.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 111 of 26th February.

Prime Minister informs me that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Bulgarian Minister at St. Petersburgh yesterday that Turks would cede Adrianople against frontier mentioned in above telegram, provided that no other demand was made by allies. He added that Grand Vizier had spoken himself in this sense to Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, and that the Russian Government had informed

Ottoman Government that they had better discuss question of peace with the allies direct.

Prime Minister told me that Bulgarian Government could not accept proposed frontier, but would prefer to continue war.

M. Danef, who has just called, alluded to the desire of the Ottoman Government to conclude peace, and stated that a war indemnity would be a *sine quâ non* of the preliminary signature of peace, which must be signed on the field of battle. Prime Minister, however, made no allusion to necessity for an indemnity.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[9434] No. 496.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, February 27, 1913.*

ADRIANOPLE.

My telegram No. 65 of 16th February.

British colony in Adrianople is reported to number ten persons. Total number of foreigners, exclusive of Bulgarians, Greeks, and Servians, is 898; subjects of allies number 500. Prime Minister says that Bulgarian Government, whilst willing to allow all foreigners to leave, cannot see their way to permit of a neutral enclave, as it would be a hindrance to military operations [group undecypherable].

[9436] No. 497.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Uskub, February 27, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 1 of 24th February.

At Lyubishta, in the Ghilan district, sixty Moslem Albanians have been recently massacred. There seems to be no doubt that Servian troops took part in this. There have also been massacres at Julekar and Terpess, in the same district, and, I hear, in other villages. Object is supposed here to be to assure Servian majority in the district.

[9499] No. 498.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 27, 1913.*

THE Ambassadors are informing their Governments that they consider that the Bulgarian reply (see Sir H. Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 74 of 24th February) should be brought to the knowledge of the Roumanian Government, and that the latter should be requested to state if they are disposed to submit their difference with Bulgaria to the Powers under the same conditions as those accepted by Bulgaria.

When your colleagues have received similar instructions you should act in the above sense.

(Repeated to Sophia, No. 56.)

[9499] No. 499.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 27, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram is for your information only.

[9553] No. 500.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 27, 1913.*

THE Turkish Ambassador here has not yet received authority to agree to the proposal made by the Powers that the Ottoman Government should express their readiness to accept the advice of the Powers. Until the consent of the Ottoman Government is obtained the Powers are unable to address themselves to the allies, and propose to the latter that they should adopt the same course as the Turks.

Please take the steps which you may think most advisable for expediting the necessary instructions to Tewfik Pasha.

[8103] No. 501.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 61, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and of my reply thereto on the subject of the interference of the allied Balkan States with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied territories.†

I request that you will communicate copies to the Government to which you are accredited, enquiring their views on the terms of the Servian reply to the recent representations of His Majesty's Government, and drawing attention to the fact that I have enquired if the French Government will draw up the terms of an identic protest, with which it is hoped that the German Government will in due course associate themselves.

[Following to Rome only.]

I am aware, from the terms of your Excellency's telegram No. 32 of the 21st February, that the Italian Government do not entirely share the views of the French Government; yet I earnestly hope that, in view of the great importance of concerted action in order to protect the interests of the bondholders, they will agree to participate in the suggested representation at Belgrade, and your Excellency should press this view to the utmost of your power on the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7933] No. 502.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 146.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 27, 1913.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 90 of the 18th instant, in which you enclose a copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the interests of the Turkish bondholders.

As your Excellency is aware from the confidential print (see No. 381, *ante*), I have informed the French, German, Italian, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors of an amendment, which the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury consider essential to safeguard the interests of those concerned, in the draft articles proposed by the French Government.

The reasons for this modification are fully explained in the Treasury letter dated the 19th February, of which a copy is in your Excellency's possession.

* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 39), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 61), *mutatis mutandis*.
† Nos. 354 and 503.

A further despatch will be addressed to your Excellency in due course, respecting British representation on the expert commission which it is proposed should meet at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consider and elaborate the financial details in pursuance of draft article 3.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8103] No. 503.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 147.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1913.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 93 of the 19th instant, communicating the reply of the French Government to the note which you addressed to them in accordance with the instructions contained in my despatch No. 92 and telegram No. 61 of the 5th and 8th instant, in regard to the interference of the Balkan allied States with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied territories.

I now transmit to you the full text of the Servian reply to the recent representations of His Majesty's Government on this subject,* with the request that you will communicate a copy to the French Government at the same time, enquiring their views as to how far the principles quoted therein can be held to apply in the case of interference in Turkish territory with an institution in the special position occupied by the Ottoman Public Debt administration.

I am in agreement with the last paragraph of M. Jonnart's note, and I should be glad if the French Government, in pursuance of their proposal, would draw up the terms of an identic protest to be made at Belgrade.

I also enclose a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to his Majesty's representatives at Berlin, Vienna, and Rome on this subject.†

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9570] No. 504.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Canea, February* 19, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that yesterday I received a visit from M. Collas, who, as reported in my despatch No. 92 of the 27th December, has nominally taken the place of M. Rangabe in Crete, but who appears in practice to act as secretary to the Governor-General.

He requested that the British Naval Club at Suda might be handed over to the Cretan administration to be transformed into a post and telegraph office.

Without mentioning the name of M. Dragoumis, with whom he knows, of course, that I have no official relations, M. Collas let me understand that he had been sent by that gentleman.

I replied that the club formed part of the British naval station at Suda; that I was not authorised by the naval commander-in-chief to abandon it, and that consequently I must decline to hand it over.

There is no pressing need to transfer the Suda post office to this particular building, and I see no reason to pander to the indecent haste of the Greeks to seize the estate of the moribund *status quo* before letters of administration have been granted by the protecting Powers.

I beg leave to correct an error made in my immediately preceding despatch. The Italian premises at Suda are in charge of a naval petty officer, not a mere caretaker.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

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* Enclosure No. 2 in Belgrade No. 24, February 8, 1913. † See No. 501.

[9446] No. 505.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Belgrade, February* 20, 1913.

A DESPATCH has reached me under flying seal addressed by His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica to His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub forwarding a protest by the Mair de Botton Cigarette Paper Company against the serious injury done to their interests by the irregular and inconsequent action of the Servian authorities in regard to the duties levied on goods exported from Salonica to the territory occupied by their troops.

The complaint states that one consignment of goods was delayed and subsequently released, whilst another has been held up altogether pending payment of unjustifiable duties. It concludes with a request that the Servian authorities may be moved to release the goods, and puts forward a claim of 100,000 fr. for losses incurred.

As it does not appear to me that it would serve any useful purpose until His Majesty's Government have come to a decision on the question of the legality of the Servian "war contribution" (see my telegrams Nos. 28 and 35 of the 7th and 17th instant respectively) to bring forward individual grievances and claims, I have suggested in my despatch to Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham, forwarding Mr. Lamb's despatch, that should importers be anxious to pass in their goods into the territory occupied by the Servian forces they should pay the impositions demanded, though under protest.

I have also informed Mr. Peckham of the communication I made to the Servian Government reserving all our rights to claim compensation or otherwise in the event of British subjects incurring any loss whatsoever through the action of the Servian authorities (see my despatch No. 19 of the 30th January last), and have added that it would be well, in order to emphasise any protest that may be made, that he should repeat this to the local authorities.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[9447] No. 506.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Belgrade, February* 21, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch with enclosure which I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham. Only the enclosure which sets forth the Servian view regarding the "war contribution," and with which you are already acquainted through the enclosure in Mr. Barclay's despatch No. 27 of the 11th instant, appears of any interest.

With regard to the question of the "war contribution," on the day of my return to Belgrade I saw M. Stefanovitch and pointed out to him that, notwithstanding all references to The Hague convention, it was my personal view that the levying by the Servian authorities of a war contribution was inadmissible.

The contention I put forward was stated in my telegram No. 35 of the 17th instant, but I am inclined to think it may be presented in a more simple form.

The ground upon which the Servian Government rely as furnishing them with a right to levy a war contribution is that given in the opening words of article 43 of The Hague convention, viz.: "The authority of the power of the State having passed *de facto* into the hands of the occupant," &c. But the authority of the power of the State here referred to was, in the case of Turkey, an authority limited by the Capitulations in so far as foreign subjects were concerned, hence it is only a similar authority that passes into the hands of the Servian Government upon the occupation of the territory by the Servian army. Over Turkish subjects, of course, the authority of the State was unlimited, and consequently, also, the authority passing into Servian hands as regards these is unlimited.

The possible right to levy taxes referred to in articles 48 and 49 would surely be limited by the extent of the authority passing from the conquered State to the occupant of the territory.

The Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs admitted to me that this contention appeared good, and that there seemed to be a flaw in the Servian argument.

I said that, although I had merely as yet stated this view unofficially, it might be well he should bring it to the attention of the Ministry of Finance.

I enclose copy of a despatch I yesterday received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, the third paragraph of which states that there is reason to believe the "kontributzin" has killed import trade from Salonica.

My French colleague has presented a memorandum to the Servian Government, copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 506.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Uskub, February* 14, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 20 of the 7th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the Servian delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs containing the official explanation of the "kontributzia." In effect, the position, as I understand it, is that the Servian Government, while admitting that under the Capitulations foreigners cannot be taxed without the consent of their Governments, maintains that the adherence, without reserve for Capitulation countries, of the Powers to The Hague convention constitutes permission for a belligerent State occupying Ottoman territory to levy war contribution on all and sundry.

Not being an expert in international law, it is with some diffidence that I hazard the opinion that, as the Servian Government has in the course of its occupation violated The Hague convention several times, it is estopped from invoking it when it considers that its prescriptions are in its favour.

I would quote the following cases of violation :—

The religious convictions of the natives and the exercise of public worship (article 46) have not always been respected (see my telegram No. 8 of the 17th January and my despatch No. 3, Confidential, of the 28th January (Exarchist Church), and my despatch No. 6 of the 3rd February (Moslem graveyards, &c.). Since writing the latter I have taken the opportunity of visiting the latrine trench mentioned therein, and found that the half had not been told me, for the tombstones themselves were bespattered with excrement).

It is a matter of common notoriety that looting (article 47) has been going on here (see my despatch No. 14, Confidential, of the 12th December). Some soldiers whom I admitted to my consulate as a guard at the time of the Servian occupation looted about 6l. worth of property belonging to one of my cavasses, and I believe that I could, if need be, produce sworn statements to the effect that officers have been looting.

If the technical difference between requisition and looting consists in the giving or not giving of requisition receipt forms, I would also quote Mr. Hadkinson's claim (His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica to myself, No. 1 of the 8th January) as an instance in which British interests are directly involved.

Even article 48, one of the articles invoked by the Servian Government, has been violated. In Turkey the burden of taxation falls either on the natives only (direct taxation) or on all persons alike or on all foreign goods (customs). But "kontributzia" is not levied on goods of Servian origin entering the occupied territory. With regard to the items of the "kontributzia" tariff, which are substantially the same as the Servian "trosharina" tariff, this violation is only technical: "trosharina" would be refunded at Ristovatz to be re-collected as "kontributzia" at Zibefche or Uskub. But in the case of the objects which are State monopoly in Servia, substantial injustice is done, for the Servian monopoly, which does not pay "kontributzia," can sell petroleum and cigarette-paper in Uskub at a price lower than that of any private business man who has paid 11 per cent. duty and "kontributzia," even if he renounces all profit on the transaction.

I would also note that this violates article 49, also invoked by the Servian Government, according to which the contribution should be for revenue purposes only, whereas it is evident from the foregoing that the object of the "kontributzia" levied on petroleum, cigarette-paper, &c., is really protective, not to say prohibitive, and amounts to a disguised re-establishment of the Servian State monopolies in Ottoman territory.

It appears to me also that the spirit, if not the letter, of the convention requires that the occupying Government should not remit any existing taxes while levying war contribution. I am not certain whether this has been done or not, but would note in this context that I hear that the Servian Government is trying to collect arrears of taxation due before the occupation, while refusing all responsibility for the debts of the Ottoman Government.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 506.

Delegate of Servian Foreign Ministry to Vice-Consul Peckham.

M. le Vice-Consul, *Skoplje, le 24 janvier* (6 *février*), 1913.

EN réponse à votre lettre du 19 janvier (1er février), 1913, relative à la question des prélèvements—en outre des droits de douane—d'un droit de consommation sur les marchandises (sucre) importées par la maison britannique Fils de G. Herrera Company (Limited), j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que les autorités douanières ne prélèvent pas une taxe de consommation, mais une contribution de guerre sur différents articles de consommation désignés dans l'ordonnance du quartier général du 18 janvier courant (v.s.), No. 136.

Le droit international—d'après l'article 43 de l'annexe à la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907—impose aux conquérants le devoir de veiller à la sécurité des intérêts et des biens des habitants des territoires occupés, et les articles 48 et 49 de la même convention autorise le conquérant non seulement à prélever tous les revenus des États existant sur les territoires occupés, mais de leur imposer aussi une contribution de guerre pour l'entretien des administrations chargées d'assurer la sécurité et le bien-être des mêmes habitants ainsi que de leurs propriétés.

Jusqu'à présent, le quartier général n'avait pas perçu ces contributions, tout spécialement parce que la perception dans les territoires occupés de tous les impôts donnait lieu à de nombreuses difficultés, par suite de la complication des impôts, et spécialement des impôts direct-, complications que vous connaissez très bien. D'après les mêmes considérations, l'impossibilité de percevoir des contributions directes étant évidente, il est aussi impossible, pour les mêmes motifs, de percevoir la contribution de guerre sous forme d'impôt direct.

Ces considérations ont amené le quartier général à percevoir la contribution de guerre sous la forme d'impôt, indirect et cela de celles qui sont relativement plus supportables parce qu'elles se concilient avec la situation économique des habitants. Ce sont des impots prelevés sur les articles de consommation courante, qui seront payés par le destinataire à la douane lors de leur importation de l'étranger, de manière que le destinataire en augmentera le prix de vente et le rejettera à la charge des consommateurs, en calculant sur le prix de vente la contribution de guerre qu'il aura payée.

Le quartier général s'est décidé à percevoir cette contribution parce que le droit international laisse toute latitude au conquérant de choisir le moyen de la perception et de l'encaissement des contributions de guerre, moyen qui se conforme le plus facilement aux exigences locales, prenant égard en même temps aux facilités d'en faire supporter les charges par les contribuables ainsi qu'aux facilités relatives à la perception.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Vice-Consul,
J. VOUTCHKOVITCH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 506.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Uskub, February* 19, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to report that my French colleague informs me that the Customs recently demanded "kontributzia" at the rate of 2½ dinars per pack on playing-cards imported here by a French house. Playing-cards figure on none of the "kontributzia" tariffs I have seen.

M. Vutchkovitch, when the French consul made representations to him, simply asserted the right of the occupying country to vary its "contribution de guerre" at its own sweet will.

I have some reason to believe that the "kontributzia" has simply killed the import trade from Salonica; so far from increasing their revenue here by it, the Servians have probably decreased their local revenue from customs duties.

I would draw your attention to the fact that the local population knows quite well that the present high prices here are not due to the war, but to the arbitrary action of the Servian Government. This does not tend to reconcile the conquered and conquerors.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 4 in No. 506.

Memorandum communicated to the Servian Government by the French Minister, February 18, 1913.

LA question de l'application d'un droit variable, à titre de contribution de guerre, sur quatorze articles de consommation dans les provinces occupées par les troupes serbes, ayant été soumise aux jurisconsultes du Département français des Affaires Étrangères, il ne leur a point paru que ladite perception pût être légitement fondée sur les articles 48 et 49 de l'annexe à la Convention IV de la deuxième Conférence de La Haye par l'application du principe que l'envahisseur ou l'occupant d'un territoire, soumis au régime des Capitulations, doit le subir aussi longtemps que l'abrogation n'en a pas été acceptée par les bénéficiaires.

Ce point de vue aurait été soutenu à propos de la Tripolitaine, et reconnu juste par le Gouvernement italien, notamment en ce qui concerne certaines surtaxes établies par les autorités militaires au cours de la campagne. Il s'appuie sur le principe que l'occupation militaire d'un territoire ne suffit pas à opérer le transfert de la souveraineté au profit du pays conquérant et que, par suite, la situation des étrangers, vis-à-vis des acts de l'autorité, ne peut être modifié que par le traité de paix, qui attribue définitivement le territoire et la souveraineté au belligérant victorieux.

[9448] No. 507.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 33.)
Sir, *Belgrade, February* 22, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham, giving his further views on the future of Albania.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 507.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Uskub, February* 18, 1913.

SINCE the three occasions last year (No. 8 of the 16th November, No. 9 of the 25th November, and No. 15 of the 14th December) on which I had the honour to express to you my opinions on the future of Albania, two new factors have caused me to modify to a certain extent my views as expressed therein, and I would now express my considered judgment on the matter.

First, we in Kossovo understand that the Powers are agreed in principle that there is to be an Albanian State. I would point out that this modifies the application of such statements of mine as "an Albanian is probably infinitely easier to denationalise than a Greek or a Slav." If Albania has no past, it at least now has some sort of future to look forward to. Just as the Macedonian Greek or Bulgar has had a Greece and a Bulgaria to look to as a foyer of national ideas, so in future the Albanian left out

from the new principality will have his foyer of irredentist ideas. I would quote but two points :—

(1.) There has always been a certain doubt as to how Albanian should be written, admitting that the alphabet is to be a Latin one, there are four or five variations of the Latin character in use. When the new State has fixed its official alphabet it is to be expected that this will become the alphabet of all Albanians, redeemed and unredeemed. Past experience in Macedonia shows what a rallying-point an alphabet can be. (See my despatch No. 9 of the 25th November, 1912.)

(2.) The national flag of Albania will no more be a thing of mildly historic interest, it will be admitted into the company of the flags of the nations. If Skodra passes into Montenegrin hands it will not be forgotten that the Albanian flag floated over it during the siege.

Second, we have seen enough of Servian methods of administration to gain a more accurate idea of how the non-Serb in Servia will be treated. Chauvinism and racial and religious intolerance are bad foundations for the reconciliation of a conquered people. I have already (No. 6 of the 3rd February) quoted some instances of how Islam has been treated in Uskub, though I have no information on the subject I have little doubt that the same sort of thing has been going on in Prisrend and Prishtina. Towards the catholic the Servian attitude is at least as severe. Local Albanian Catholics have told me that the Servians insist on regarding them as "Shvabs" (Austrians). I had already predicted (No. 8 of the 16th November, 1912) that crypto-Christian villages would declare themselves, and noted the beginning of the process (No. 9 of the 25th November). This has, I believe, stopped, owing to Servian intolerance—"If you want to become Christian, you must become Orthodox." This has actually happened to a group of five or six villages in Istukla karié, kaza of Gilan, which about twenty years ago, in Hafiz Pasha's time, became nominally Moslem, and now rashly assumed that under a Christian Government they might safely declare themselves Catholic again. It also appears that the sign of the Cross, made Latin fashion, excites the fury of the Orthodox Serb. A Catholic of my acquaintance expressed the opinion that it was better to be a Moslem than a Catholic under the Servians.

I heard of one case where a Catholic Albanian of Gilan wished to join the Orthodox Church. The priest, from ignorance or bigotry, insisted on re-baptising him, as though he was not a Christian already.

I have already said (No. 8 of the 16th November, 1912) that "Albanian nationalism is at present but a spark, but the wind of persecution may fan it into a flame." That wind has already begun to blow.

The creation of a State from the seemingly unpromising materials to hand is an experiment; to give it a chance of success the experiment should be made on a reasonably large scale. I assume that the Powers having decided on the creation of an Albania, are prepared to provide for the occupation and administration of the country, and to secure a settled and orderly Government till such time as the Albanian is capable of managing his own affairs. If they are not, it would be much better to partition Albania among the victorious States.

On ethnic grounds, the claim of the Albanian Provisional Government to Uskub and Kyöprülü seems to me as weak as the claim of Servia to Prisrend, the Albanian south of the Shar being in a very distinct minority. The other Albanian ground for claim is that "the Albanians came here last summer" (in my despatch No. 68 of the 15th August, 1912, I suggested that the object of the Albanian occupation was to peg out a claim). The south Kossovo Albanians are the advance guard of the Albanian movement, and are either recent immigrants or "made" Albanians, *i.e.*, Albanised Turks or Albanised Islamised Slavs, as under the Ottoman Government it paid a Moslem in this part of the world better to call himself an Albanian rather than a Turk.

The political importance of these people in the future, if Servia annexes Uskub, will be due rather to the possibility of the local Albanian and the local Bulgar combining against the Servian Government, a combination which I have some reason to believe is being negotiated (see my despatch No. 3, Confidential, of the 28th January). On the one hand, Hassan Bey, in April of last year, assured me (my despatch No. 31 of the 28th April to Salonica) that the Albanians had come to an understanding with the Bulgar revolutionary committees; on the other, I know that feeling ran very high between Albanian and Slav (including Bulgar) in the Kalkandelen valley last September (see my despatch No. 76 of the 24th September to Salonica). My own opinion is that hatred of the Serb will dominate all other motives and that the events of September

last will be forgotten, if not forgiven. In this context I would note the existence of a group of Orthodox Albanian villages near the head waters of the Vardar, immigrants from Dibra way. Up to the war these villages insisted that they were Albanian, in spite of energetic Serb propaganda. It remains to be seen whether they will make common cause with the Exarchist and the Albanian Moslem against the Serb, or whether the advantages of making their peace with the dominant element will be too much for their attachment to their national traditions.

The Albanian of mid-Kossovo, as I have already noted (my despatch No. 49 of the 9th July, 1912, to Salonica) falls into two divisions, the east and the west. Of these, the east is either naturally more tranquil or is more easily overawed owing to greater facilities for transport of troops. Also ethnically it has been Albanised later than the west. I used to infer from the absence of clan names on the map east of the Adriatic watershed that the people were Albanised Serbs, but have been assured that the bulk of them are colonies from farther west, and still preserve the name of the parent clan.

Mixed among them are doubtless many "made" Albanians. There are beyond doubt villages of Catholic Serbs or even Croats which have described themselves as Albanian for precisely the same reason as the Turk in south Kossovo, because it paid them to do so.

The West Albanian, on the other hand, has been at home on the Adriatic slope for very much longer, and if he has in the course of time absorbed Slav elements the process of digestion has been much more complete. The clan organisation exists on that side, and the tribesmen are in closer contact with the unmixed Albanian vilayet of Skodra. The foyer of last year's revolt was Dyakova, the Ipek Albanians have proved themselves turbulent under the Turk, and are likely to prove even more turbulent under the Serb or the Montenegrin.

(Recently an Albanian of my acquaintance remarked to me, "If only it was summer there would be 100 bands out in Kossovo." "And when the snow melts?" I asked. "Then a rifle will be worth £T. 50." The Servians disarmed Albania pretty thoroughly, but I hear that rifles are already beginning to come in from Austria.)

My object in quoting ethnology is not the same as that of the Serb apologist; the argument of the latter is "These people were Serbs and ought to be Serbs, therefore they shall be Serbs," ignoring the important fact that, however much their facial angle or their Slavas prove them Serb by race, so long as their national feeling unites them to Albania, they are for practical purposes Albanians and their strength goes to support the Albanian cause. I quote the cases of "made" Albanians rather because I consider that they will perhaps be easier to denationalise than the Albanian *per sang*, whereas the Serb appears to consider that they have never really been Albanised.

I would also note another case of what strike me as lack of clear thinking on the part of the Serb. There are, I take it, two theories of nationality current. The old, a survival from the days of absolutist government, looks on a given territory as the State, and the inhabitants as a sort of accessory. The newer looks on the people as the principal and the territory they inhabit as the accessory. This theory, besides producing Home Rule questions in various countries, is responsible for causes of political friction like Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine. It is the theory which called Italy into being, and it is the theory which the Servians themselves invoked in the Bosnian crisis four years ago. But the two theories are somewhat incompatible, "Bosnia should be ours because the Bosnians are Yugo-Slavs" does not quite square with "We do not care if these misguided people do call themselves Albanians, we have conquered Prisrend, we will annex Prisrend, and these people have got to be Serbs."

Ideally, I have no doubt that the frontiers of Albania should include Prishtina and Vuchitrn. The frontier I would suggest is a compromise which, while giving Albanians a reasonably large part of the country inhabited by Albanians, does not altogether leave out of the reckoning the dead of Kumanovo and Mardaré.

I would assign to Albania that part of the province of Kossovo which drains into the Adriatic, including the towns of Ipek, Dyakova, and Prisrend.

I need hardly insist on the advantages of such a frontier from the geographical, economic, and military points of view. It is easy to delimit, easy to police, is the least likely to produce incidents between frontier guards, and puts the heaviest handicap on smuggling.

It leaves to Servia the historic battlefield of Kossovo Polys, the monastery of Gradnitza, the more civilised part of the Kossovo Albanians, and the railway.

It leaves to Albania the four kazas of Ipek, Dyakova, Prisrend, and Lyuma, with an Albanian population in an overwhelming majority. I have, at times, expressed to Servians my opinion that it is not in the interests of Servia to annex large masses of

population which is not only non-Serb but bitterly anti-Serb. The general answer I have had to this is that Stevan Dushan had Prisrend, which seems to me of about the same political importance as the fact that William the Conqueror was born at Falaise.

It is also, in my opinion, in the commercial interest of the Powers to make Albania as large as reasonably may be. I assume that the Capitulations will, for the present at least, be maintained in Albania. I am certain that if they are not formally abolished in the provinces annexed to Servia they will meet with such systematic obstruction as will render them nugatory. Now, when the Capitulations go, the foreign business man is inevitably edged out of the market, by fair means or foul, witness Thessaly. It seems to me, therefore, in the interest of the Powers to keep under the Capitulations as large an area as possible out of the wreck of European Turkey.

One objection to this frontier remains, the existence of a certain number of Serb villages on the Adriatic slope. The remedy I propose for this may seem bizarre, suggesting the days of the great and notable Asnapper rather than the twentieth century. Half the difficulty of the Balkan question consists in the fact that the ethnographical map does not consist of broad masses of colour, but is a patchwork, or rather a mosaic (see "Turkey in Europe," pp. 15 and 16). I would provide that the Servian and Albanian Governments shall conclude a convention for the exchange, under European supervision, of non-homogene population at the expense of the two Governments, all the Serb population being removed from Albania, and an equal quantity of Albanians from new Servia. The population of Albania has suffered much from war and reprisals, and there might well be room in the new Albania for the great bulk of the east Albanians (no hindrance being put in the way of any non-homogene emigration from Servia). This would leave Prishtina sanjak comparatively empty, but the natural fertility of the Slav peoples would soon remedy that, and in the long run Servia would have a thoroughly Serb province instead of an irredentist one, not to mention the gain to Europe in general from measures tending to secure the peace of the Balkans.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[9449] No. 508.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Belgrade, February 22, 1913.*

IN a conversation which I had with M. Pasitch on the 18th instant, the day following my return to Belgrade, I referred to the subject of Djakova and Dibra. I recapitulated the points contained in your telegram No. 37 of the 12th instant, which had already been conveyed to the Prime Minister by Mr. Barclay, and said that I hoped the Servian Government would be reasonable, and not cause difficulties regarding the delimitation of Albania.

I found M. Pasitch almost unwilling to discuss the subject at all. He shrugged his shoulders, shook his head, and merely said he was very sorry to cause annoyance to the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, but in the matter of Djakova and Dibra Servia could not and would not give way. Even if he himself were inclined to cede, it would not be permitted by the public and the army. Should Austria eventually resort to force, Servia would resist; and if no assistance came from Russia, and the Servians were consequently worsted, they would make the best of a bad bargain, and go over entirely to Austria for the future.

On the previous day I had seen M. Stefanovitch, the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and, although I found him no less immovable about Djakova and Dibra than M. Pasitch, he was rather more communicative. When I questioned him about the population in Djakova and Dibra, he admitted that Albanians were perhaps more numerous, but maintained that these places had in former days been important Serb centres, and that the Serb population had either been driven out or Ottomanised. He contended, moreover, that geographically speaking it would be an absurdity to include Djakova in Albania. A natural boundary—a high range of mountains—existed a few miles south-west of Djakova, and if the Albanian frontier were pushed beyond these there would be no natural separation between Servian and Albanian territory. This would lead to constant unrest and troubles, as Austria would encourage Albanian aggression. Servia would hence have to incur

heavy expenses by keeping considerable forces on her frontier ready to cope with this state of affairs.

I then alluded to the military assistance that is being sent by Servia to Montenegro, and asked M. Stefanovitch whether the Servian Government were in reality so anxious that Scutari should fall. He replied that as military assistance had been sent to the Bulgarians it would have been very difficult to reject the appeal of Montenegro, and I gathered from his manner that the assistance was not being very eagerly given, and that it would also be some time before it could reach the Montenegrin forces. M. Stefanovitch's feelings concerning the future of Scutari appeared to be divided. He recognised that its fall would add a further serious difficulty to the already existing complications, but, on the other hand, he said that Scutari in Albanian hands would become the principal centre from which intrigue and agitation would be fomented against Servia by Austria, and that this accounted for the persistence of Austria to secure it to Albania.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[9450] No. 509.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit précis of an article which appeared in the Servian newspaper "Tribuna" of the 19th instant taking Bulgaria to task for her present selfish conduct to Servia, and warning her that if she continues in this attitude she is likely to endanger the continuance of the Balkan Alliance and the interests of the Balkan States.

The "Tribuna" is said to be the Crown Prince's organ, and I am informed on good authority that this article is written by a former Servian Minister and at the inspiration of M. Pashitch.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 509.

Précis of an Article in the "Tribuna" of February 19, 1913.

THE article criticises the attitude taken up by the Bulgarian press as inimical to the work of liberation in the Balkan peninsula, since its effect is to create ill feeling between Servians and Bulgarians. In order to avoid disastrous consequences, the "Tribuna" considers that the time has come for frank dealing on both sides, and takes upon itself the task of explaining the Servian point of view, which is briefly as follows:—

"The Balkan Alliance is a political combination of civilised States, whose object is to secure freedom, progress, and contentment for the Balkan people. The first step, viz., liberation from Turkish rule has already been in part accomplished, but although perhaps the most difficult it is still only the first step, and must be followed by others before the economic and educational development of the conquered territory can be proceeded with. Freedom and independence so hardly won can only be secured against the ambitious designs of powerful neighbours, by a continuance of that close union between the Balkan States which has produced such successful results during the recent campaign. To ensure the continuance of the union, a sound and natural basis for future relations must be found."

The "Tribuna" asserts that the language and arguments employed by the chauvinistic Bulgarian press, and notably the "Votcherna Poshta," so far from indicating any desire to strengthen the alliance, seem rather to be aimed at its destruction, by falsely insinuating that while Bulgaria has carried out her national task, Servia has failed to do so, and consequently that in the future Bulgaria will be more necessary to Servia than Servia to Bulgaria.

"If, as we admit," proceeds the "Tribuna," "Bulgaria has carried out her national task, she has only done so with the help of the Balkan Alliance, and further, she has occupied territory to which she has no ethnographical rights. Although in this we find no cause for complaint, because in the territorial aggrandizement of Bulgaria we see a general gain for the Balkan Alliance, still we Servians claim our share of the conquered territory in return for services already rendered, and which we will continue to render, in order to safeguard what we have won. Servia has time on her side for the accomplishment of her national task, and in this she will be helped by a process of natural evolution; she will not have to cope on one side with the hatred of a still formidable Turkey, nor be exposed on the other to the uncertainties of Roumanian policy. From this it would appear that so far from Bulgaria being more necessary to Servia than Servia to Bulgaria the contrary is the case, and should Bulgaria desert the Balkan Alliance she would probably find herself in a most unenviable position; and in the event of a Greco-Servian alliance, how could Bulgaria settle accounts and punish these two countries as is boastfully suggested by the 'Vetcherna Poshta!' Among other things this war has shown the true strength and value of Bulgaria. The Bulgarians are to be pitied if they think that they can still frighten Servia by brandishing their somewhat battered sword; Bulgarian statesmen should in the general interest put an end to these grotesque publications in the press."

Dealing with the ethnological question the "Tribuna" denies that the population of Macedonia is mainly Bulgarian, claiming that the inhabitants of most of the towns in Macedonia have been Bulgarised by force, and that in the country districts the peasants are entirely Servian. Continuing, it says, "Monastir is certainly not Bulgarian; in the town itself Greeks and Turks compose the majority of the population, while the surrounding villages are inhabited by Serbs. Monastir was captured for the Balkan Alliance by the Servian army, which lost 4,000 soldiers in the process, and yet Bulgaria wishes to take it away from its conquerors."

Referring to attacks on M. Gueshof's Government, "for making too many concessions to Servia," which have been made in various Bulgarian newspapers, the "Tribuna" reproaches the authorities at Sophia for not taking more energetic measures to control the local press, saying that it moves no finger now to restrain irresponsible journalists though during party elections it finds no difficulty in doing so. This inertia on the part of the Bulgarian Government is viewed by the "Tribuna" as a most serious factor in the situation, as it cannot fail to arouse mistrust in the minds of all Servians, and is most ill-timed, coming as it does at a stage in the operations when Servia is making and is preparing to make great sacrifices for the interests of Bulgaria.

Again referring to the ethnography of Macedonia, the "Tribuna" article continues as follows: "It is impossible to divide Macedonia on an ethnographical basis, as the different races in that country are hopelessly intermingled. No writing or shouting can ever change this state of affairs. Any logical or just procedure on ethnical lines would deprive Bulgaria of all claim in Thrace where there are over 1,000,000 Turks and about 100,000 Bulgars. Bulgaria should not dream of taking Adrianople, yet she has exposed not only her own soldiers but those of her allies in order to capture that fortress. Ethnically speaking, Salonica should belong to the Jews, and failing them to the Greeks, Bulgaria has no claim whatever on a town where hardly 10 per cent. of the population is Bulgarian."

After an ironical reference to the sincerity of the more chauvinistic Bulgarians as allies, the writer says: "It is high time that the Bulgarians ceased playing with fire which may burn them. By continuing their present method they will not only irretrievably ruin their own interests but also those of the other Balkan States. A nation which has succeeded with the assistance of allies should not assume a disloyal attitude at a moment when these allies are shedding their blood for its interests, such criminal greed cannot escape punishment."

The article concludes with an exhortation to the Servian Government demanding that it should settle the questions now outstanding with Bulgaria, and undertake all necessary measures for safeguarding Servian conquests, "Now, at once, before our army leaves for Chataldja to fight for a big Bulgaria." The Servian nation cannot trust an ally who threatens Servia at a moment when she is sending her sons to fight on that ally's behalf. Servia wishes to be a loyal friend and ally of Bulgaria, but it disgusts her to play the part of acolyte. Those responsible should know this and act accordingly.

[9451] No. 510.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit translation of a statement received by my Austrian colleague from the Austrian consulate at Uskub, and which he recently handed to me.

M. d'Ugron said that, even though it might be impossible to verify details, he himself had no doubt that horrors had been committed.

I am instructing His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub to endeavour, if possible, to investigate the truth of the information.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 510.

Memorandum communicated by the Austrian Legation.

REFUGEES from the Karadag report the following atrocities committed some ten days ago by Servian soldiers (another version says komitajis):—

In the villages of Ljubiste, Gjulekar, Cabashi, and Topetza the whole of the Albanian population were massacred—even all the women and children were killed. In Gjulekar alone 100 families were slaughtered, and in Cabashi 60. In Gjulekar a woman is said to have been ripped open and the fruit of her womb torn out of her. In Ljubiste, moreover, women and children were outraged. Also in Binka and Vitina murders took place.

Uskub, February 20, 1913.

[9452] No. 511.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February 24, 1913.*

WITH reference to paragraph 3 of Mr. Barclay's despatch No. 27 of the 11th instant, in which he stated he had presented a memorandum demanding the delivery of Messrs. Errera's sugar, which the Uskub customs authorities had refused to clear, together with other goods, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a statement which I have now received from the Servian Government, and which, after maintaining the right of the Servian authorities to levy war contributions on the said sugar, nevertheless puts forward a proposal to buy the consignments in question.

I have communicated this statement to His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, adding that it is for the importers to decide whether they are prepared to accept this suggestion, though it is of course understood that this in no way vitiates any decision which His Majesty's Government may arrive at concerning the admissibility of the application of the war contribution.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 511.

Memorandum by Servian Government.

A LA démarche faite par la Légation Royale de l'Angleterre, le 26 janvier (8 février), au sujet de la contribution de guerre dans les territoires occupés, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de répondre ce qui suit:—

La contribution de guerre est établie uniquement dans le but de faire payer à la population des territoires occupés une partie des frais occasionnés par l'administration que nous avons introduite dans ces régions, et dont elle bénéficie depuis les premiers jours de notre occupation militaire. Par conséquent, l'obligation de payer cette

contribution court du jour où nous avons occupé les territoires en question. C'est ce qui prescrit, du reste, le règlement sur la contribution de guerre élaborée par notre état-major suprême, en ordonnant que cette contribution frappera toute marchandise entrée dans les territoires occupés après notre occupation militaire, sans tenir compte de la date de la publication dudit règlement.

Le fait que la marchandise mentionnée dans la note verbale est entrée à Uscub avant la publication de notre règlement ne change donc en rien sa situation au point de vue du payement de la contribution de guerre.

Ce n'est qu'à l'avenir que cette marchandise sera vendue aux particuliers, donc postérieurement à la date de notre occupation militaire. La perception de la contribution sera naturellement effectuée à la même époque. Tout cela est en pleine conformité avec le règlement, donc fondé en droit.

Du reste, si l'on exemptait cette marchandise du payement de la contribution, on permettrait aux importateurs de vendre la marchandise exemptée au même prix auquel se vend la marchandise frappée de la contribution, et alors il arriverait que la population des territoires occupés payera cet impôt, seulement cette fois-ci non pas au profit de notre Trésor public, mais seulement au profit des importateurs.

Pourtant l'Etat serbe propose aux commerçants une solution de cette question s'ils jugent opportun de l'accepter: il leur rachtera la marchandise en question et la revendra ensuite pour son compte avec le supplément représentant la contribution à payer.

Belgrade, le 11 février, 1913.

[9453] No. 512.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Belgrade, February 24, 1913.*

A TELEGRAM from London having appeared in the Press Bureau telegrams yesterday to the effect that "M. Vesnitch, under instructions from his Government, had informed the Foreign Office that Scutari must be secured to Montenegro and Dibra to Servia," I enquired of the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning whether the Servian Government in reality attached so much importance to the question of Scutari.

M. Stefanovitch replied that the telegram had come as a surprise, since no instructions to this effect had been sent to M. Vesnitch, and if such a communication had been made it was unauthorised. Servia must first see to securing her own demands concerning Djakova and Dibra before she undertook to look after Montenegrin interests. Of course, the question of Scutari might to some extent affect Servia, since in Montenegrin hands it might offer another route to the Adriatic, whilst in Albanian hands it would be the centre from which Austrian intrigue would be fomented, but for the moment the Servian Government had more pressing considerations to attend to.

I remarked that it seemed to me personally that if Scutari were to fall the chances of serious complications would be greatly increased.

M. Stefanovitch said his own opinion was that Scutari would not fall. The Montenegrins were completely exhausted. They had no heavy artillery, and no ammunition for the artillery they possessed. Scutari was not to be taken with rifles and yatagans. It was true Servia was sending artillery and one division, but it would take a considerable time before these arrived, as they were still at Salonica. The delay in shipping them was partly due to the insufficiency of transports, but also to the fact that the whereabouts of the Turkish cruiser "Hamidieh" were unknown. This was causing some anxiety to the Servian military authorities for their troops, and to the Greeks for their transports. It would therefore, what with embarkation at Salonica, the voyage, and disembarkation at San Giovanni di Medua, be three weeks, if not more, before any Servian troops put in an appearance at Scutari.

Although military assistance is being sent to Montenegro, I understand that the manner in which King Nicholas asked for this assistance has caused some resentment here. As you are aware, Servian reinforcements were offered to Montenegro some time ago (see my despatch No. 4 of the 7th January) and were then refused. Apparently now, instead of candidly acknowledging that he is in difficulties and would have done better to accept the Servian assistance when offered, King Nicholas still makes

pretence that he does not consider Servian help necessary, and would not have asked for it, but has been forced to do so by his Government.

M. Stefanovitch made a few uncomplimentary comments on the subject, and remarked, moreover, that King Nicholas has, in his opinion, greatly exaggerated the danger to his dynasty in the event of his being deprived of Scutari.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[9459] No. 513.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Vienna, February 26, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 24 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith translation of a note which I have received from the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to my communication regarding the interference of the Bulgarian and Servian authorities with the Ottoman Public Debt administration in the territories now occupied by the allies.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure in No. 513.

Note communicated to Sir F. Cartwright.

(Translation.)

WITH reference to his Excellency's note of the 7th instant, the undersigned has the honour to inform Sir Fairfax Cartwright that the complaint of the Administrative Council of the Ottoman State Debt regarding the prevention of their officials from carrying out their duties by the Greek, Bulgarian, and Servian authorities in the occupied Turkish districts has also been brought to the notice of the Imperial and Royal Government by the Austro-Hungarian syndicate of Turkish bondholders.

The Austro-Hungarian Ministers in Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade have received instructions, in concert with the German representatives (who have had analogous instructions) and with the British representatives in those capitals, to make a protest to the Governments in question against the above-mentioned proceedings of their officials, which are calculated to do serious injury to the interests of the foreign bondholders; and at the same time to urge that the bureaux and the functionaries of the Public Debt should be enabled to continue to exercise their right of controlling certain public revenues in the territories in question.

With regard to the enquiry put to the Ministry as to the views of the Imperial and Royal Government on the reply given by the Servian Government to the protest of His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Belgrade, the undersigned begs to reserve a communication on this subject until the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade has made a report on the result of his similar *démarche*.

The undersigned, &c.
(Signed for the Minister),
MACCHIO.

Vienna, February 24, 1913.

[9490] No. 514.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 28.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, February 27, 1913.*

IN reply to your letter of the 14th instant, transmitting a note from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador with a draft of certain provisions relating to the rights of international shipping in the waters of the Balkan peninsula, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request that you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that they have no general comment to make on the substance of the draft, which has doubtless been also brought to the notice of the

Board of Trade. There are, however, two points to which they would wish to direct Sir E. Grey's attention:—

(*a.*) The first sentence of the draft ("Il y aura pleine et entière liberté de navigation le long des côtes et dans les ports de tous les Etats de la presqu'île balkanique") is so worded that it might conceivably be held to permit the free passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by ships of war of all nations. If (as my Lords presume) there is no intention of raising that question in this connection, the wording should perhaps be modified to make the meaning clear.

(*b.*) The provision at the end of section 2 of the draft ("Les bâtiments étrangers . . . . pourront dans ce but faire stationner dans les ports des allèges et des remorqueurs sous leur pavillon national") does not appear to correspond to any present treaty obligations of Turkey, and is, my Lords believe, in contravention of the rules laid down for themselves by almost all the Great Powers. Foreign shipowners have at present this legal right in the United Kingdom, but the Admiralty has recently taken exception to it on grounds of public safety. The provision might therefore well be considered by the countries concerned as a serious derogation from their rights as sovereign States.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[9564] No. 515.

Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha, February 28, 1913.

LE Gouvernement Impérial ottoman accepte la médiation des Grandes Puissances dans le but d'arriver à la paix.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 28 février, 1913.

[9599] No. 516.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 28, 1913.*

TURKISH Government inform me that they received a telegram from Adrianopl yesterday stating that all foreigners were in good health.

[9606] No. 517.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 28, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 112 of 26th February.

I hear that at the request of the Turkish Government, Deutsche Orient Bank, after unsuccessfully trying a bank at Hyderabad, are communicating telegraphically with National Bank of India with a view to Treasury bonds of 5,000,000*l.* internal loan.

Similar effort has been made as regards Lahore.

(Sent to India.)

[9542] No. 518.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 28, 1913.*

I RECENTLY addressed Count Berchtold, through Sir F. Cartwright, with the view of endeavouring to persuade him to give way about Djakova, and I advanced all

the arguments which it seemed to me would be most likely to influence him favourably.

I have received a reply, through Count Mensdorff, which I am afraid does not hold out any hope of his yielding over Djakova. He maintains that Austria has already consented to all the localities in North-East Albania where a Servian minority exists side by side with an Albanian majority being detached from Albania, but that it would really be asking too much if Austria were to agree to the incorporation into Servia of districts purely Albanian. His Excellency advances various arguments against the cession of the town of Djakova, and points out that Austria is ready to cede Ipek, Prisrend, with the fertile plain of Metoja, and Dibra, and Russia has ceded only Scutari and Tarabosh, while "making difficulties in regard to the environs of that town."

In regard to the alternative of an international commission to be sent to Djakova, Count Berchtold says that to this proposal "it might be objected that before the arrival of the commission efforts might be made to transform by force Djakova into a Servian town."

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of above, and say that I would be prepared to urge the international commission proposal once more on Count Berchtold if Minister for Foreign Affairs would consent to this alternative.

[9564] No. 519.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax Ironside.**

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 28, 1913.*

THE Turkish Government have announced that they accept the mediation of the Great Powers with the object of obtaining peace.

When your colleagues are similarly authorised, you should inform the Government to which you are accredited and ask if they would be disposed to accept the mediation of the Powers in the same terms.

[8654] No. 520.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 28, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 41 of 23rd February.

I certainly understand Herr von Jagow's position as regards Austria, and the corresponding difficulty of our own position with regard to Russia makes me not only understand but sympathise. It must be borne in mind that if Austria gives way about Djakova as well as Dibra, and Russia thereupon accepts the rest of the last Austrian line, Russia becomes a party to agreeing that Montenegro is to be prevented from obtaining or retaining Scutari, and that Scutari ceases to become a danger to European peace. Russia must also become a party to seeing that Servia withdraws from all places inside the agreed Albanian frontier. I think Herr von Jagow hardly realises how difficult it would be for Russia to become a party to an agreement that would entail compelling both Servia to withdraw from Djakova and Montenegro from Scutari. Russia might agree to one or the other, but not to both, and, as Scutari is far more important than Djakova to Albania, it is presumably Djakova that should be conceded to Servia rather than Scutari to Montenegro. There is some hope that commercial arrangements might be devised as regards Djakova that would make the possession of the town a matter of less intrinsic importance to Albania.

You should speak in this sense to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Vienna, No. 78, for his own information.)

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* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 51), Sir F. Elliot (No. 29), and Count de Salis (No. 16).

[9751] No. 521.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.**

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 28, 1913.*

THE following communication was made by the Russian Ambassador at a meeting of Ambassadors on 25th February :—

"D'après nos renseignements, en partie consulaires directs, les habitants de Scutari, et très probablement d'Andrinople et de Janina, en sont réduits à la famine et aux dernieres extrémités ; les magasins destinés aux besoins des habitants se sont épuisés plus rapidement que ceux destinés aux garnisons.

"Dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Impérial, le souci de la sécurité des consuls et des étrangers justifie pleinement, en ces conditions, les Puissances à exiger des belligérants que les habitants civils reçoivent l'autorisation de sortir des places assiégées. Les États balkaniques, qui ont déclaré la guerre pour secourir réciproquement leurs sujets opprimés, ne sauraient se soustraire à adhérer à pareille résolution. La Turquie, à part qu'il y aurait là pour elle un avantage au point de vue militaire, ne peut rester indifférente au sort des populations musulmanes non militaires renfermés dans les places assiégées en question.

"Je suis chargé par M. Sazonof de proposer à la réunion des Ambassadeurs une résolution qui formulerait une proposition à faire aux deux belligérants à l'effet que toute la population civile puisse évacuer les places assiégées."

At a meeting of Ambassadors on 27th February it was announced that all the Governments agreed to this proposal, Austro-Hungarian Government wishing to add the following : "That the allies should be asked not to place hindrances in the way of measures of succour organised in favour of those who leave the besieged places."

When all your colleagues are similarly instructed, you may approach the Government to which you are accredited.

[9564] No. 522.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 28, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 111 of 27th February.

Turkish Ambassador has just announced acceptance by Porte of mediation of Powers. You need therefore take no action on my above-mentioned telegram.

[10166] No. 523.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 28, 1913.*

THE Roumanian Minister called at the Foreign Office to-day. He was quite well acquainted with the slight hitch which had occurred over the mediation proposals, and Sir A. Nicolson told him that it was possible that we should ask the Roumanian Government if they would be disposed to follow the same course as the Bulgarian Government. The Roumanian Minister personally thought that this was quite the right course to take, as both parties should be placed on an exactly equal footing.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 28), Sir R. Paget (No. 48), Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 58), and Count de Salis (No. 15).

[8508] No. 524.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 33.) *Foreign Office, February* 28, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to telegraphic correspondence ending with my telegram No. 52 of the 21st instant, in the course of which you were instructed to bring unofficially to the notice of the Bulgarian Government the reports which had reached His Majesty's Government of the forced conversion to Christianity of Moslems in the territory occupied by the Bulgarian troops, under the auspices of the Bulgarian authorities, I transmit to you herewith copies of despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica on the subject.*

I have to request you to select from this correspondence such passages as you may think most suitable for communication to the Bulgarian Government, and to use your discretion as to the best way of bringing home to them the deplorable impression which will be produced both in this country and elsewhere if it becomes known that such conversions are taking place, and of pointing out to them that they should, in their own interests, take immediate steps to stop the commission of these acts.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9499] No. 525.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.†

(No. 154.) *Foreign Office, February* 28, 1913.

Sir,

AT a meeting of the Ambassadors yesterday the question as to whether a communication similar to that made to the Bulgarian Government should also be made to the Roumanian Government was again brought into discussion. The instructions which the Ambassadors had received from their respective Governments were not generally of a decisive character, and, after some conversation, the following resolution was adopted :—

"La réunion est d'avis qu'il convient de faire connaître au Gouvernement roumain la réponse du Gouvernement bulgare à l'offre des Puissances. Elles ont prescrit à leurs représentants à Sophia et à Bucarest d'obtenir que la Bulgarie et la Roumanie remissent la solution de leur différend à la décision des Puissances. En réponse à une démarche collective des représentants des Puissances, le Gouvernement bulgare a déclaré s'en remettre à leur décision si la Roumanie l'acceptait aussi.

"La réunion maintient son avis du 25 février relatif à la nécessité d'une démarche identique à Bucarest. Cette démarche serait d'autant plus justifiée que lors des conversations individuelles des Ministres accrédités à Bucarest avec le Ministre roumain des Affaires Etrangères on ignorait la réponse du Gouvernement bulgare. Cette réponse peut être portée à la connaissance du Gouvernement roumain, avec prière de faire savoir s'il accepte de s'en remettre aux Puissances dans les mêmes conditions que la Bulgarie.

"La réunion pense d'ailleurs que dans le cas où le Gouvernement roumain maintient sa première réponse, le Gouvernement bulgare devrait en être avisé afin d'être mis à même de modifier la sienne s'il le juge à propos."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Sir G. Lowther (No. 128), February 17; Consul-General Lamb (No. 1), February 7; ditto (No. 2), February 13; ditto (No. 4), February 16; Sir G. Lowther (No. 145), February 22, 1913.

† Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 86), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 97), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 41), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 63).

[10003] No. 526.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.©

(No. 158.) *Foreign Office, February* 28, 1913.

Sir,

THE following resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Ambassadors which was held here this afternoon :—

"L'Ambassadeur de Turquie a fait aujourd'hui par écrit à Sir Arthur Nicolson la communication suivante :

"'Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman accepte la médiation des Grandes Puissances dans le but d'arriver à la paix.'

"La réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de faire connaître aux Gouvernements alliés en leur demandant s'ils acceptent la médiation des Puissances dans les mêmes termes."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10163] No. 527.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.†

(No. 163.) *Foreign Office, February* 28, 1913.

Sir,

AT the Ambassador's meeting on the 27th February it was announced that all the Governments agreed to steps being taken to propose to the various belligerents to permit the civil populations to leave the besieged places. Austria-Hungary desired that the following rider should be added :—

"That the allies should be asked not to place hindrances in the way of measures of succour organised in favour of those who leave the besieged places."

This was agreed to, and the following resolution was adopted :—

"La réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de faire des démarches dans ce sens auprès des Gouvernements des belligérants."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8076] No. 528.

Foreign Office to Sir H. Babington Smith.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 28, 1913.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to express to you his cordial thanks for your valuable memorandum on the subject of the Ottoman Debt as likely to be affected by the results of the present war. This document has proved of very great utility to His Majesty's Government in coming to a clear idea of the various interests at stake, and of the considerations to be borne in mind in endeavouring to arrange a suitable settlement.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

©

* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 90), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 43), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 101), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 69).

† Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 95), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 46), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 105), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 72).